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Abstract  
 
This thesis consists of four independent chapters. Although the chapters are distinct 
works, they are related by their focus on urban policy and aim to contribute to the 
understanding of how planning policies and urban development affect specific 
outcomes in space. The chapters can be divided into two distinct parts. The first part 
comprises two studies on conservation planning. The first chapter investigates the 
complexities at play between conservation planning systems, their applications and 
how these vary between contexts. Based on a survey of conservation planning systems 
in 5 countries, focusing on 5 city case-studies, it considers how conservation compares 
between planning systems of the Global North and Global South and what this suggest 
about heritage value. The second chapter exploits the Italian context to examine to 
what extent non-compliance undermines conservation effects given that despite 
stringent planning regulation, the conditions of the urban environment vary widely 
throughout Italy, including within protected areas. This study is closely linked to the 
urban economics literature through an explicit consideration of housing markets and 
spatial issues.  
The second part of this thesis comprises two further chapters that focus on the effects 
of two distinctly urban occurrences: economic and morphological density. The third 
chapter investigates the costs and benefits of a widely supported policy paradigm: 
‘compact urban form’. It asks to what extent even higher densities within cities are 
desirable by assessing the effects of density on a broad range of outcomes ranging from 
wages, innovation, rents, various amenities, the cost of providing public services, 
transport- and environment-related outcomes to health and wellbeing.  
The final chapter focuses on deregulated planning using Beirut, Lebanon as a case-study 
given the city’s conspicuous transformations which have dramatically altered the city’s 
landscape, housing stock, and people-space relations. This chapter specifically 
investigates how morphological densification affects values residents attach to both 
their physical urban environments and intangible urban amenities such as 
neighbourhood belonging. The unifying theme of the thesis is to bring fresh evidence 
to policy-relevant issues in planning and urban economics by the generation of new 
datasets for all contexts and the application of multi-disciplinary techniques.  
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1 Introduction 
If we agree, like many scholars do (Boyko & Cooper 2011; Smith 1978; Storper & Manville 
2006; OECD 2010), that living in urban areas provides something valuable to an 
increasing number of people across the globe, then understanding issues that impact 
cities becomes paramount.1 The question then is one of perspective. Many different 
disciplines tackle urban questions, each using its own viewpoint. This thesis approaches 
the topic from the theoretical underpinnings of both urban planning and urban 
economics, to support the contention that interlacing both disciplines provides a fuller 
picture of urban processes and can improve the implementation and adaptation of 
urban policies.  
Urban planning has been advocated as ‘critical thinking about space and place as the 
basis for action or intervention’ (RTPI 2004). Urban planning is argued to ground 
knowledge in sociospatial processes, and cement critical thinking about these 
processes (Friedmann 1998). Making contributions about spatial interrelationships is, 
however, common to many geographic disciplines. What is often, if not exclusively, 
characteristic of planners is specifically seeking to connect sociospatial knowledge to 
forms of action in order to bring about change in the public domain (Davoudi & 
Pendlebury 2010; Friedmann 1987). It is this interventionist nature of planning which 
underlines its normative dimension and brings the issues of values to the foreground.  
Urban economics also tackles urban questions, using economic theory and applied 
economic methods to study cities and their development. In an urban economic model, 
individuals and firms are assumed to behave rationally, choosing locations based on 
costs and benefits. Urban economic models assume that markets – in which agents 
interact – are in spatial equilibrium, where prices adjust to ensure that supply equals 
demand for each location. Such models are then used to predict how urban areas 
function, and in many cases reveal what individuals consider valuable within their cities. 
Data on factors such as house prices, wages and firm performance2 are analysed to 
understand differences in urban economic performance and the potential effects of 
urban policy. Housing and land markets are key as they reveal differences across 
                                                             
1 Today, more than 50% of the world’s population live in urban areas (United Nations 2014). This 
share is expected to reach 70% globally by 2050, with 86% in OECD countries (OECD 2010) and 
more than 90% of new urbanities located in low-income countries (United Nations Population 
Fund 2007).  
2 These are the prices of the factors of land production and labour 
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locations. Real wages inversely mirror amenities, while house prices capture amenity 
differences at local level after controlling for housing quality and wages. Locations with 
high levels of amenities, such as transport access, good schools or access to green 
spaces, will thus have high prices.  
Urban planning and urban economics frequently seem to be at odds. Planners often 
think economists are too narrowly focused on productive cities and prices, while 
economists often consider planners attach too little importance to real world markets 
and focus too narrowly on their contexts of study.3 The role of planners is tied to adding 
value to the particulars of place, and although place matters to urban economists, it is 
seldom their area of focus. Divisions are also increasingly marked by the adoption of 
qualitative analytical methods by urban planners and quantitative statistical approaches 
by urban economists, often argued as antagonistic by one discipline or the other.4 These 
divisions are more widely present in wider geography, and have stimulated debate on 
the epistemological values geography should achieve (Overman 2004; Brooks et al. 
2012; Rodríguez‐Pose 2001). Such methodological and epistemological debate is not 
unique to geography. Disciplines such as political science have experienced long-
running debates about the trade-offs between statistical ‘large-N’ analyses and in-depth 
‘small-N’ approaches (Lieberman 2005).  
Brooks et al.’s (2012) Handbook of urban economics and planning attempted to 
underscore the fruitfulness and importance of opening pathways of communication 
between economists and planners. This thesis contributes to this call. Although these 
disciplines differ in their approach in terms of methods and sometimes in terms of 
philosophy, this thesis supports the consideration of their mutual interests as their 
objectives are in many ways complementary. While economists often talk about cause 
and effect (what is – positive economics), many applied urban economists also express 
normative judgements following their evaluations in an effort to advance policy (what 
ought to be – normative economics). The latter ties into planning’s normative 
dimension, supporting spatial policies or urban interventions to better urban living. 
Both urban economists and planners thus work towards an improved implementation 
of urban policy and both are often interested in socio-economic and environmental 
                                                             
3 Although it must be noted that planning education has made considerable efforts to 
incorporate understanding of economic trends in city growth and sharper appraisal of 
competitive urban land uses, starting with Harvard in the 1930s (Davoudi & Pendlebury 2010). 
4 One of the greatest challenges within my PhD ‘process’ has been understanding both 
disciplines and arguing for their compatibility, firstly to myself, and then to colleagues. 
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goals. While urban economists assess general patterns (large-N) and the essential 
economic logic of a situation, planners are usually concerned  with place-making issues 
in one or a few case-studies (small-N). Planning can therefore offer an important 
substantive contribution to urban economics analysis, while urban economics is 
necessary to provide a reality check on the claims planners make about the overall 
effects of urban policies and development.  
In an effort to help overcome methodological and epistemological deadlocks, this 
thesis also calls for the mixed use of both quantitative and qualitative research 
methods. While the chapters within it are distinct works, they use quantitative, 
qualitative and mixed methods to contribute to the understanding of how planning 
policies and urban development affect specific outcomes in space. This thesis rejects 
the view that qualitative and quantitative research techniques are incompatible and 
instead follows methodological pluralism – that is, the use of different techniques to 
uncover different facets of the same social phenomenon (Johnson et al. 2007; Greene 
2007; Elwood 2010).5 The interdisciplinary approach of this work presents an 
opportunity to help achieve a more complete picture, since it incorporates elements 
that might not be taken into account if one were to adopt a conceptual lens which relied 
entirely on one discipline. It predominantly traverses the disciplines of urban planning 
and urban economics but is also tied to other fields of study, including planning law, 
development studies, conservation studies and environmental psychology.  
The remainder of the introduction is organized as follows. Section 1.1 presents an 
overview of the thesis. Section 1.2 discusses the methods and data used in the thesis 
papers. Section 1.3 presents the common themes running through the different papers 
while sections 1.4 and 1.5 give an overview of limitations and policy implications. 
  
                                                             
5 Despite the significant divisions described, Elwood (2010) argues how social scientists have 
been conducting mixed-methods research for decades. 
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1.1 Overview of Thesis 
1.1.1 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of four independent papers. 
Paper I:  The politics of conservation planning: a comparative study of urban 
heritage making 
Paper II: Conservation planning and informal institutions: heterogenous patterns 
in Italian cities 
Paper III:  The economic effects of density: a synthesis 
Paper IV:  A permanent (re)construction site? Changing urban form and resident 
value of urban amenities 
Although the chapters are distinct works, they are related through their focus on urban 
policy and their aim of contributing to the understanding of how planning policies and 
urban development affect specific outcomes in space. The papers investigate urban 
policy from a legislative standpoint, through meta-analytic research, and test 
theoretical predictions in empirical settings by examining data on individuals and spatial 
market prices. The chapters can be divided into two distinct parts. The first part 
comprises two studies on conservation planning, while the second part encompasses 
two further chapters focusing on the effects of two distinctly urban occurrences: 
economic and morphological densification. In the following I provide brief summaries 
of each paper’s context, contribution, method and results. 
 
Part I 
Paper I: The politics of conservation planning: a comparative study of urban heritage 
making 
 
My first paper, co-authored with Nancy Holman and currently under review in Progress 
in Planning, investigates the complexities at play between conservation planning 
structures, their applications and how these vary between contexts. Urban heritage is 
the category of heritage that most directly concerns the environment of every 
individual. Conservation, or the integration of the built historic environment, is typically 
viewed as a desirable undertaking in city planning, and policies to this effect are 
established as an integral element of planning in many countries. This paper asks: how 
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does conservation compare between planning systems of the Global North and Global 
South and what does this suggest about heritage value?  
Although some studies have compared conservation planning in neighbouring 
countries, as far as we are aware a comparative survey of the progress of conservation 
planning systems has not to date been undertaken. Based on a survey of conservation 
planning systems in five countries (England, France, Italy, Brazil and Lebanon) and 
focusing on five city case studies (London, Paris, Milan, Rio-de-Janeiro and Beirut), this 
paper contributes to the literature by examining the position of conservation within 
planning in current urban policy in different contexts. The paper analyses how different 
planning systems have adopted and integrated definitions of urban heritage and, 
accordingly, how zoning techniques, governance levels and planning constraints have 
resulted in quite varied conservation planning outcomes, not only between the North 
and South but between European examples alone. In examining contexts where the 
desirability of conserving and enhancing the historic environment is overlooked, 
overturned or simply ignored, despite the existence of conservation policies, this paper 
also explores the limitations of regulation in pinning down heritage values (Ashworth & 
Tunbridge 1996; Lowenthal 1985).  
This paper takes an interpretive approach, addressing the question through textual 
analysis of official documents, semi-structured in-depth interviews and mapping of both 
North and South cities (Hamin 2003; Bevir & Rhodes 2006; Holman 2014). This method, 
following Bevir and Rhodes (2006, p. 89), was chosen in order to come to terms with 
complexity, as it rests on a philosophical analysis of meaning – value – in formalized 
actions – legislation. The paper limits itself to these formalized processes to facilitate an 
effective comparative exercise, bearing in mind that legislation is often known to follow 
some way behind public or societal attitudes (Larkham 1992, p. 96). 
The paper shows that there is no simple conservation planning model that is particularly 
Northern or Southern. All of the cases considered began their journeys from similar 
points of departure, but each then proceeded in slightly different directions based on 
local contexts. This is perhaps not unexpected, but it lends further weight to studies 
challenging the concept of patrimonialization as a European ideal merely applied in 
colonial contexts (Choay 1992). This paper argues that the embedded histories of 
urbanism, planning regulation and the invention of a conceptualization of heritage 
develop both separately and in parallel in each nation state. Whether the practice of 
urban planning links itself to the destruction of urban heritage ensembles or attempts 
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to preserve them, the concept of heritage emerges as a factor in opposition to 
prevailing urban development models. 
 
Paper II: The politics of conservation planning: a comparative study of urban heritage 
making 
Following from Paper I, the second paper investigates urban heritage value taking a 
different methodological approach, although continuing thematically by analysing how 
conservation planning plays out in practice. Conservation planning solves an economic 
coordination problem by internalizing positive externalities i.e. preserving urban 
heritage. Non-compliance compromises conservation effects, but little is known about 
how much harm it actually does. 
This paper exploits a novel data set of property prices for 55 Italian cities. Despite the 
stringent planning regulations in this context, the conditions of the urban environment 
vary widely throughout the country, including within protected areas. I concentrate on 
property prices as an outcome measure of economic value, following a long tradition of 
research using hedonic methods to estimate capitalization effects of a wide range of 
local public goods or policies (Cellini et al. 2010; Eriksen & Rosenthal 2010; Gibbons & 
Machin 2008; Gibbons et al. 2013). Abusivism (AB) – illegal or informal building – is used 
as a measure of non-compliance. AB is widespread in Italy to such an extent that it has 
assumed social and political importance (Biffi, Ciafani, Dodaro & Muroni 2014; Trentini 
2016), and can be described as a type of informal institution, given that it goes beyond 
simply ad hoc informal building behaviour, and refers to practices which are widely 
followed and embedded within Italian societies.  
To estimate the effects of non-compliance on the hypothesized capitalization effects of 
conservation, this paper uses a two-step econometric strategy. The first step explores 
the variation in price premiums across 933 Landscape Areas (LAs) and 236 Historic 
Centres (HCs) using a boundary discontinuity design. The second step uses an 
instrumental strategy to substantiate estimates and confirm that, at least partially, AB 
rates reduce heritage price premiums. In line with model predictions, heterogeneous 
patterns in premiums are found across Italian cities, with trends according to region and 
geographical location. By examining discontinuities at the boundary, I find a 
capitalization effect of about 6.5% (€160 extra per square metre) for LAs, and an 
estimated average premium of 3.5% (€86 extra per square metre) for HCs. The second 
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step of the analysis reveals that a 1% increase in AB is associated with an expected 
depreciation effect of 0.64 percentage points in HC price premiums, while a 1% increase 
in AB is associated with an expected depreciation effect of 0.14 percentage points in LA 
price premiums. 
The results thus suggest that, at least partially, places with higher AB are less compliant 
with conservation planning and consequently experience lower external benefits. The 
important implication from these findings is that planning policies capable of solving 
the free-market coordination problem related to architectural externalities are 
undermined in the Italian context by illegal practices. This underlines the necessity to 
either re-address policies limiting AB or, and perhaps jointly, to remove some of the 
administrative burdens (‘red tape’) within conservation areas. 
 
Part II 
The following two papers in the thesis address urban densification. While the third 
paper takes a large-scale approach in examining the effects of population and economic 
density on 16 distinct outcome variables across multiple countries, the fourth paper 
focuses on a single case study to assess how living in areas with different rates of 
morphological densification affects the value residents place on their urban 
environment. Although these two papers have different foci and thematic approaches, 
they both aim towards a better understanding of possible outcomes of densification. 
Density is closely tied to the ‘compact city’ paradigm, which originates from the critique 
of modernist planning approaches (Jacobs 1961), supporting both density and mixed 
use in line with a European discourse of inner-city spaces for a more efficient use of 
urban resources (Dantzig & Saatay 1973). The concept supports the idea of a city that is 
distinctively urban in general terms of density, but also in more specific terms such as a 
contiguous building structure, interconnected streets, mixed land uses, and the way 
people travel within the city. As discussed in Ahlfeldt & Pietrostefani (2017),6 it is 
characterized by economic density, morphological density and mixed use. While the 
third paper of this thesis focuses on economic density, the fourth and last paper 
discusses outcomes of morphological density when it is not integrated in wider 
sustainable city objectives (World Bank 2010; OECD 2010). 
                                                             
6 Ahlfeldt & Pietrostefani (2017) is a companion paper to Paper III of this thesis. 
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Paper III: The economic effects of density: a synthesis 
The third paper, co-authored with Gabriel Ahlfeldt and recently published in the Journal 
of Urban Economics, synthesizes the state of knowledge on the economic effects of 
density. The first contribution of this paper is to provide a unique summary of the 
quantitative literature on the economic effects of density. We consider 347 estimates 
from 180 studies of density elasticities of a broad range of outcomes ranging from 
wages, innovation, rents, various amenities, the cost of providing public services, 
transport- and environment-related outcomes to health and well-being. More than 100 
of these estimates have not been previously published and have been provided by 
authors on request or inferred from published results in auxiliary analyses. We also 
attempt to identify differences in density elasticities between non-high-income and 
high-income countries. 
The paper then contributes original estimates of density elasticities of 16 distinct 
outcome variables that belong to categories where the evidence base is thin, 
inconsistent or non-existent. This analysis uses data from the OECD functional urban 
area and regional statistics database. Along with a critical discussion of the quality and 
quantity of the evidence base, we then present a set of recommended elasticities. Our 
aim is to provide a compact and accessible comparison of density effects across 
categories and, where possible, we acknowledge cross-country differences. However, 
the quality and quantity of the evidence base are highly heterogeneous, and the 
baseline results are best understood as referring to high-income countries. 
Applying the recommended elasticity estimates to a scenario that roughly corresponds 
to an average high-income city, we find that in per-capita present value terms (at a 5% 
discount rate) a 1% increase in density implies an increase in wage and rent of $280 and 
$347 respectively. The decrease in real wage net of taxes of $156 is partially 
compensated for by an aggregate amenity effect of $100 and there is a positive external 
welfare effect of $60. We therefore conclude that density seems to be a net amenity; 
however, although densification policies may be welfare enhancing, the distributional 
effects may be regressive, especially if residents are immobile and housing supply is 
inelastic.  
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Paper IV: A permanent (re)construction site? Changing urban form and resident value of 
urban amenities 
Through the urban renewal process driven by a well-resourced Lebanese diaspora and 
foreign investment, Beirut has undergone conspicuous morphological densification, 
characterized by parcel aggregation and increasing building height. The state and 
planning agencies have contributed to these transformations, involving deliberate 
temporary suspensions of the law and contributing to deregulated and unplanned 
urban development. As argued by Fawaz (2017), although ‘exceptions’ cannot amount 
to a lack of planning, they are one of Beirut’s principal planning strategies, originating 
in continuities between the realms of the legal and the illegal, given the entanglement 
of the political elite and the real-estate industry. These dynamics have dramatically 
altered the city’s landscape, housing stock, and people-space relations (Gebara et al. 
2016).  
The fourth paper of this thesis asks whether morphological densification affects the 
values residents attach to their urban environments using Beirut as a case study. 
Although recent work has considerably furthered our understanding of deregulated 
planning in Beirut (Krijnen & Fawaz 2010; Fawaz 2017; Bou Akar 2018; Krijnen 2010), little 
is known of the preferences of local residents in regard to the urban development 
process. The paper focuses on both physical and immaterial amenities, as 
morphological change may influence both objective (visual, aesthetic) and subjective 
(social or symbolic) dimensions of neighbourhood satisfaction (Young et al. 2004). 
Specifically, this paper investigates how changing urban form affects how residents 
value architectural amenities, open space (specifically sidewalks) and neighbourhood 
belonging. 
This study uses a novel data set and a mixed-methods strategy of qualitative and 
quantitative research techniques. Mixed methods were chosen as a triangulation 
methodology (Greene et al. 1989; Greene 2007; Johnson et al. 2007) to obtain a 
comprehensive appreciation of the complex relationship between changing urban form 
and how residents value their urban environments in Beirut. In line with predictions, we 
find contradictions between resident satisfaction with the city’s morphological 
evolution and their preferences in preserving more traditional, vernacular forms of 
architecture, or in stopping excessive building. I observe higher willingness to pay to 
stop changes in urban form in areas that have undergone less building change, but 
much higher willingness to pay to improve open spaces, which suggests that spaces 
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with both infrastructural and social uses present a higher local value. I also find no 
evidence that morphological change affects neighbourhood belonging, which instead 
is positively correlated with years lived in a given area, and with locations showcasing 
better building conditions, confirming a role for the built environment.  
1.2 Methods and Data 
1.2.1 Methodology 
Empirical research has the potential to inform policymakers, public officials, private 
sector producers, community-based organizations and other actors involved in urban 
transformations. This can be done in various ways: describing problems, comparing 
policy definitions and outcomes, evaluating costs and benefits or revealing unintended 
effects of urban changes. Different research methodologies have been shown to be 
more adept at tackling different approaches.  
Both qualitative and quantitative researchers have to overcome a number of different 
barriers to achieve their objectives. Qualitative methodologies often face difficulties in 
gaining access to relevant stakeholders or actors, developing rapport, maintaining 
boundaries, following ethical practices, and then leaving the field (Clifford et al. 2010; 
Dickson-Swift et al. 2007). Quantitative methodologies face challenges such as 
overcoming identification concerns and sourcing data at a small enough geographical 
level as well as generating findings which are relevant beyond a specific study (Gibbons 
et al. 2014). An interdisciplinary approach, using the contributions of both planners and 
urban economists to shed light on different aspects of urban policy, presents an 
opportunity to help create a more complete picture by incorporating elements usually 
ignored by purely quantitative or qualitative methodologies. The papers presented in 
this thesis not only use different methods to understand how planning policies and 
urban development affect specific outcomes in space, but attempt to bridge the 
qualitative-quantitative ‘divide’ by adopting this multiple-methods approach to urban 
research (Philip 1998). 
An eclectic approach certainly entails challenges. Theoretical and terminological 
variation between planning and urban economics often hampers the discussion of 
research results. As argued by Brooks (2012), planners and urban economists often do 
not realize broad overlaps in their disciplines ‘for a lack of common foundation in 
microeconomics’ but more generally because of differences in language and 
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vocabulary.7 The different underlying theories of these disciplines result in diverging 
views of the relationships between theory and empirical evidence, leading to different 
approaches in research design. Differences in methodological approaches can make it 
difficult to interpret empirical results in a way that is understood and accepted across 
disciplines. Moreover, specific concepts are often associated with diverse meanings 
according to discipline – potentially undermining the clarity of an eclectic framework. 
While acknowledging these challenges, the decision to adopt a multidisciplinary 
approach for this thesis is grounded in the conviction that the benefits associated with 
the added insights gained from several disciplines outweigh the potential ‘costs’.  
Following McKendrick (1996), this thesis follows methodological pluralism by adopting 
both mixed and multiple methods. Mixed methods refer to a study where two or more 
methods are used to address a research question ‘at the same stage in the research 
process, in the same place, and with the same research subjects’ (McKendrick 1996). 
Mixed methods are adopted in Papers I, III and IV in different ways. Multiple methods 
are understood as a number of complementary methods employed to address different 
facets of a research question, or to address the same question from different 
perspectives. In this thesis, Papers I and II address different facets of related research 
questions addressing conservation planning, while Paper IV touches on some of the 
problematics brought forth in the second part of Paper I. Papers III and IV, moreover, 
address different facets of related research problems. 
The first and second papers are rooted in the understanding of the outcomes of 
conservation planning. The first paper uses the analysis of legal texts, elite semi-
structured interviews and visual analysis of geolocalized data to survey conservation 
planning systems in five countries. The analysis of case studies, where in some cases 
conserving the historic environment was undermined by urban actors, motivated the 
research question of the second paper: to what extent does non-compliance undermine 
conservation effects? In order to accurately identify the overall patterns of such a 
question, the second paper takes advantage of an econometric strategy carried out on 
a data set covering 55 Italian cities between 2011 and 2018. A complete understanding 
of the Italian context, leading to an acceptable identification strategy of the second 
paper would not have been possible, however, without the contextual nuance gained 
from the interviews of the first paper (Brooks et al. 2012). The third paper relies on 
                                                             
7 Brooks (2012) advocates the understanding of microeconomic foundations as a key step for 
planners to gain insights that can lead to effective policies. 
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multiple research methods including meta-analytic analysis, regression analysis and 
monetary evaluation. Although the paper’s strategies may appeal more to urban 
economists than to planners, the outcomes of density analysed in this paper include 
both traditional economic areas of interest, such as productivity and innovation, and 
areas closer to planners’ interests, such as green spaces and well-being. This paper also 
presents the overall effects not just in terms of the magnitude of their net benefit, but 
also in terms of the distribution of the losses, in many ways following Brooks et al.’s 
(2012) call for such approaches. Finally, the fourth paper features a mixed methodology. 
It draws on the regression analysis of a household survey and, in the absence of panel 
or other cross-section comparisons with the variables of interest to control for 
endogeneity, the triangulation of quantitative and qualitative data is used to 
complement, validate and develop the results obtained from that analysis (Lieberman 
2005; Greene 2007). In fact, given the limitation of data availability in Beirut, the fourth 
paper partly involved making use of a single method of data collection to generate both 
quantitative and qualitative data (Philip 1998). 
1.2.2 Data and context 
Another contribution made by this thesis has been to collect, construct and bring 
forward new data. The resulting data sets represent a considerable research effort that 
not only brings forward the findings of these papers but provides valuable new sources 
of information for future research. The papers in this thesis, while taking different data-
collection approaches, attempt to bring fresh evidence to policy-relevant issues in 
planning by generating new data sets for different contexts. Indeed, rather than 
focusing on one specific place, this PhD thesis combines empirical analyses drawing on 
data from both Global North and South case studies.  
Within the scope of the first paper, interviews were conducted and geolocalized data 
(shapefiles) was collected or created according to availability for five cities (London, 
Paris, Milan, Rio-de-Janeiro and Beirut) for visual analysis. Paper II collected over 60,000 
geolocalized property prices with a wide range of attributes through online scraping 
techniques from Immobiliare.it, the largest online portal for real-estate services in Italy. 
Geolocalized policy boundaries and a long list of locational controls were also obtained 
from Italian ministries, national geoportals and open street map and, in cases where 
they were unavailable, drawn on ArcGIS. Paper III collates an evidence base of density 
elasticity estimates from 180 studies, resulting in 347 estimates. To further the analysis, 
numbers of citations, adjusted for the years since publication, were also collected for 
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each study in order to generate a citation index. For the final paper, a household survey 
was conducted in Beirut (Lebanon), targeting 4,900 households and resulting in over 
1,000 household observations. Interviews and open-ended questions were also 
conducted for this last paper. 
By using data sets from a variety of contexts, this thesis seeks to uncover 
complementary insights into the potential effects of urban policy in a world 
characterized by interdependencies. By covering different parts of the world, this thesis 
aims to broaden understanding of its core themes (discussed in more detail below). 
Although Papers I and III present comparative elements, the design of the thesis as a 
whole does not follow the structure of a comparative study. Accordingly, the approach 
chosen here does not aim to provide a basis for an in-depth comparison of the role of a 
specific factor in different contexts. Instead, this thesis examines two main topics, 
conservation planning and densification, using different data sets and methodologies. 
By doing so, it hopes to provide a more comprehensive view of the challenges and 
dynamics to be considered by scholars and policymakers when addressing these topics.  
A related question concerns the weight attributed to contextual factors in this thesis. 
In geography and related disciplines, there is a debate about the extent to which an 
emphasis on universalizing logics, or in-depth understanding of context-specific 
distinctions, should dominate the conduct of research. The papers in this thesis are 
characterized by scepticism towards both extremes. Although this thesis underlines the 
importance of context-specific factors, rather than assuming ‘it is all different 
everywhere’, it assumes that findings based on data from a city or a set of cities can be 
carefully used to improve our understanding of situations in places with similar 
characteristics, e.g. regarding recent economic history, urban policy evolution, real-
estate markets. The degree of transferability of paper findings depends on the precise 
research question and the type of empirical finding under consideration. The papers in 
this thesis discuss context in order to understand policy differences, further 
identification strategies and understand urban residents’ reactions to urban 
transformations. This is most easily witnessed in Papers II and IV as they present applied 
presentations of local context, both papers concentrating on precise locations. Papers 
I and III acknowledge contextual importance in different ways. The first paper utilizes a 
comparative policy approach, following a line of research that critiques planning that 
seeks out policy models to apply interchangeably in different contexts. Instead, the first 
paper pursues a comparative urbanism of all urban national contexts as distinct units, 
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explaining similarities and differences between them. The third paper, although 
recommending density elasticity estimates across multiple outcome categories, 
cautions against using estimates beyond high-income countries and presents some 
geographical heterogeneity in estimates when possible. The nuanced discussion of the 
results in the third paper is meant to help the reader assess the extent to which the 
findings may have implications for specific places. 
1.3 Themes and Overall Contributions 
While the papers in this thesis are independent and should be read as such, to varying 
degrees, cross-cutting themes run through them. The themes correspond to the areas 
to which this thesis seeks to make a contribution. 
1.3.1 Shaping cities: outcomes of urban planning 
Planning can take different forms and appear in many different ways (Rydin 2011). Urban 
planning, as both a technical and a political process (URBAN@IT 2018), helps shape the 
cities we live in both in conjunction and in opposition to free urban markets. Planning 
policy consequently affects a long list of economic, physical and subjective outcomes in 
urban life.  
The papers address this broad theme in different ways. Paper III presents the effects of 
density on a large range of outcomes: productivity, innovation, value of space, job 
accessibility, service access, efficiency of public services, social equity, safety, open 
space, pollution reduction, energy efficiency, traffic flow, modal choice, health and well-
being. The paper appeals to different disciplines in the understanding of how cities are 
shaped, from urban economics in its consideration of how urban development 
increases productivity (Henderson 2003; Rosenthal & Strange 2001)8 to environmental 
psychology through its examination of the subjective effects of density on outcomes 
such as well-being (Young et al. 2004). Paper I looks at the physical outcomes of 
conservation planning, analysing how similar policies can have very different outcomes 
in space, relating back to planning’s parent profession of architecture and design, while 
Paper II examines the capitalization effects of conservation planning through house 
prices, closely tied to urban economic studies investigating policy effects on the value 
of usable space (Alonso-Mills-Muth model; Rosen-Roback). Paper IV, on the other hand, 
looks at both physical and subjective outcomes of deregulated planning by focusing on 
                                                             
8 Going back to the theory of knowledge spill-overs (Marshall 1920). 
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residents’ stated preferences, tying into emphases on the involvement of communities 
and stakeholders for a better understanding of planning outcomes (Rydin 2011). 
1.3.2 Undermining planning policy? 
Regulation and the market are frequently described as mutually exclusive realities 
where, as described by Ahlfeldt and Holman (2015), ‘an increase in performance of one 
necessarily implies an underperformance of the other’. However, in many contexts, the 
interplay of regulation, markets and other forces are far more complex. Informal or 
illegal building practices occur in conjunction with more generalized urban trends. Three 
papers in this thesis directly or indirectly address ways in which planning policy is 
undermined by different forms of urban illegality.  
The second paper looks at abusivism – illegal building and construction – and the extent 
to which it undermines positive heritage externalities preserved by conservation 
planning. This study thus adresses on how non-state actors, residents or local tactical 
groups – from landlords to mafiosi – can affect planning policy outcomes. The first and 
last papers of this thesis, on the other hand, address contexts where state policies and 
market forces converge to make profit-driven real estate a pillar of the neoliberal 
economy. In these cases, state authorities and planning agencies are often deliberately 
involved in the production of illegality (Fawaz 2017; Roy 2005), contributing to 
deregulated urban development and often leading to negative externalities, such as the 
exclusion of local stakeholders and communities. In investigating whether rates of 
morphological change affect the value residents place on urban environments, the last 
paper accounts for confidence in local government given the recognized overlap 
between real-estate and political practices in the Lebanese context. This thesis thereby 
contributes to different understandings of urban illegalities, both when they attempt 
to evade stringent planning policies and when they are embedded in the planning 
process.  
1.3.3 Resident value 
In tackling issues of space and place, planners and urban geographers often bring issues 
of local value to the fore (Davoudi & Pendlebury 2010; Friedmann 1998). Planning is 
never far from a discussion of how to balance the many different impacts of new 
development, ensuring that new development meets the needs and expectations of 
local communities (Rydin 2013; Rydin 2011). This thesis explores different aspects of local 
value, both by studying the limitations of regulation and planning policy in pinning down 
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local values (Paper I) and by assessing how urban environments are valued locally 
(Papers II, III and IV).  
The first paper compares planning systems of the North and South to discuss what they 
suggest about heritage value. It navigates the complex relationships between 
regulations and values, starting from the argument that regulation is a way of pinning 
down local values (Holman et al. 2018; Bevir et al. 2003). The second paper adopts a 
revealed preferences methodology grounded in urban economic theory which shows 
that, at the local level, price differences reveal amenity differences, in this case 
preferences for heritage areas. In evaluating a wide range of outcomes, and revealing 
which density outcomes are positive, the third paper also indirectly addresses value. In 
light of the absence of price micro-data for Lebanon, the final paper uses stated 
preferences to investigate how the value attached by residents to their urban 
environments changes according to rates of morphological change. 
1.4 Limitations and Extensions to the Research 
As with all research, there is a series of limitations to this thesis, which offer a number 
of areas for future explorations. The limits of the first paper are closely tied to the 
limitations of its scope. Indeed the paper does not address civil society as a part of the 
governance system directly, in order to make the cases more easily comparable. This 
presents a limitation especially in contexts where state governance is lacking and is 
therefore often taken over by alternative entities such as community-based or non-
governmental organizations. A possible extension to this research would be to consider 
the link between heritage value and non-formalized planning systems in future 
investigations. The third paper presents different challenges, including the difficulty of 
separating the effects of density from unobserved factors that determine density. 
Moreover, compared to wages and modal choice, the evidence base for the other 
density outcomes is generally underdeveloped. While high-quality contributions are 
available for some outcome categories, the nature of the evidence is at best preliminary 
for others, warranting a cautious interpretation of certain elasticity estimates but also 
presenting opportunities for further research into the effects of density on urban green, 
income inequality, health and well-being.  
A word of caution is also due regarding the difficulty of delineating urban economies 
and other trends in empirical analyses. Various literatures have underlined the 
conceptual and empirical challenges of the discretization of continuous space 
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(Overman 2010; Murphy 1991). In an ideal world, empirical researchers would have 
access to data that allows them to track variables across time and space indefinitely, 
thus being able to observe key variables (e.g. house prices) at multiple spatial scales and 
different points in time. This would allow for far more accurate identification of spatial 
boundaries, proving especially useful in quantitative strategies. In practice, however, 
the availability of key variables is limited in many countries. 
Although this thesis has made considerable research efforts to develop new data sets 
as illustrated in section 1.2.2, it was conditioned by time and resources constraints, as is 
most research. For example, although the spatial precision of the constructed hedonic 
Italian data set allowed for the boundary discontinuity design used in Paper II, the time-
period constraint limited the scope of the study which was not able to disentangle 
policy and heritage effects as done in Ahlfeldt & Holman (2017). However, the 
constructed data set presents opportunities for the evaluation of other recent urban 
policies in the Italian context. Moreover, although the household survey data collected 
in two Beirut neighbourhoods only allowed for cross-section descriptive analysis in 
Paper IV in regard to questions of urban value of urban amenities, the survey also 
replicated questions that had been run in the same areas regarding confidence in 
government and sociopolitical activism. The data collected will thus be used beyond the 
work within this thesis towards other studies.  
1.5 Policy Implications 
This thesis has shed light on different aspects of urban policy by exploring four research 
questions related to conservation planning and urban densification in both Global North 
and Global South countries. Each of the findings of this thesis has implications for 
policymakers. While sensitivity to place-specific factors is important, the policy 
relevance of the empirical results presented in the second and fourth papers go beyond 
the specific context discussed in the individual papers. Without attempting to identify 
universally applicable regularities, one can carefully consider potential implications with 
respect to places which share similar contextual characteristics. For example, the 
empirical analysis of the Italian data (Paper II) would be relevant to policymakers in 
emerging economies that are experiencing similar non-compliance trends with spatial 
policies, whether related to conservation policy or other stringent urban policies. 
Similarly, the empirical analysis of the Lebanese data (Paper IV) would be relevant to 
both policymakers and non-state actors in other deregulated planning contexts where 
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unrestrained morphological densification may be resulting in negative externalities for 
its residents of origin. 
Although using very different methodologies, the first and third papers’ multi-
contextual approaches aim to make it easy for policymakers to interpret the relevant 
findings. This is an area this thesis seeks to improve on, to better inform policy making. 
When the ultimate scope of the first paper was explained to interviewees, many 
indicated that the final comparative output would be useful to inform the limits and 
advantages of their own conservation planning practices. Although the third paper 
finds that density seems to be a net amenity associated with positive external welfare 
effects in average high-income cities, it also cautions that densification policies may not 
benefit everyone. Renters may be net losers because of rent effects that exceed 
amenity benefits. Failure to account for these unintended effects could overstate 
welfare estimates. An insight from these analyses is that policies often have unintended 
consequences, benefitting certain groups at the expense of others or achieving policy 
objectives by incurring some costs. Moreover, by revealing assumptions and limits of 
planning systems, Papers I and III support the formulation of new lines of inquiry and 
more situated accounts, ultimately encouraging systems to learn from one another.  
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 Paper I 
 
2 The politics of conservation planning: a 
comparative study of urban heritage making 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
‘Parmi le fonds immense et hétérogène du patrimoine historique, j’ai choisi comme 
catégorie exemplaire celle qui concerne le plus directement le cadre de vie de tous 
et de chacun, le patrimoine bâti. On eût dit hier les monuments historiques, mais les 
deux expressions ne sont plus synonymes’. Choay (1988, 10)9 
 
Why do we value urban heritage – the more everyday historic environment that makes 
up parts of our cities?  As this quote from Choay (1988) reflects it is precisely this type of 
space, which most directly impacts the lives of urban dwellers. Historic monuments and 
single buildings have their importance, but it is these more quotidian areas of cities, 
which permeate and help to create unique senses of place and identity. A city’s physical 
character, therefore, is at the genesis of place-based identity, making conservation a 
rationale often integrated into housing and local economic development strategies 
(Bandarin, 2015; Licciardi & Amirtahmasebi, 2012; Listokin, Listokin, & Lahr, 1998). 
Conservation or the integration of the built historic environment in city planning is then, 
typically viewed as a desirable undertaking, and policies to this effect are established as 
an integral element of planning in most countries in the Global North (Larkham, 1992; 
Pendlebury, 2009). The act of conservation thus establishes value, however ‘value’ is 
defined, for, in theory, societies only attempt to conserve things to which they attach 
meaning and importance (Pendlebury, 2009; Smith, 2006).  
The catch in our story, is that although the aesthetic and physical setting of cities has 
been identified as an amenity that contributes to quality of life, it is understandably 
secondary to other primary urban needs (Tweed & Sutherland, 2007; Watson, 2015). 
Conservation planning is often considered a luxury rather than a necessity. And although 
regulation has found its footing in many Southern contexts, urban heritage often 
                                                             
9  “Within the immense and heterogeneous stock of historical heritage, I have chosen as the 
exemplary category that which is most directly concerned with the environment of each and 
every one, built heritage. Formerly, this category would have been defined as historical 
monuments, but the two expressions are no longer synonyms”. Choay (1988, 10) (Translated by 
the authors) 
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remains an under-employed asset and the desirability of conserving and enhancing the 
historic environment is often overlooked, overturned or simply ignored (Ashworth & 
Tunbridge, 1996; Lowenthal, 1985). One of the gaps in our understanding of urban 
heritage value is thus tied to the complexities at play between land use policy structures, 
its applications and how these vary between contexts (Watt et al. 2014; Vernières 2011; 
Holman & Ahlfeldt 2015).  
The objective of our paper is to untangle how conservation planning systems and the 
local value of urban heritage, whether civic or residential, are linked across several 
different planning contexts in the Global North and the Global South. We use this 
juxtaposition to challenge the idea that the broad categorisation of planning systems 
into models or types is particularly helpful in our understanding of policy as it is 
practiced. As regulation has been argued to be a way of enforcing collectively rational 
behaviour and pinning down local values (Ahlfeldt & Holman, 2015; Bevir, Rhodes, & 
Weller, 2003; Holman, Mossa, & Pani, 2018) we see this as a good way of examining how 
heritage is valued in these diverse contexts.  Through 30 in-depth interviews and a 
comparative analysis of the ways in which heritage is regulated through the planning 
system in five case-study cities our paper will address our objective through an 
examination of three key questions. I) How has heritage been regulated in each city? II) 
How has this regulation evolved over time? III) How do planners interpret and enact this 
regulation?  In so doing, we illustrate how various regulations and definitions of heritage 
reveal the way societies value the historic environment; how challenges to these values 
are addressed and in turn how localised and variegated these values are in practice. 
2.1.1 Heritage, methods, meanings and approach 
The term ‘urban heritage’ refers here to an ‘immoveable’ subset of cultural heritage 
assets which includes not only a part of a city’s building stock but also comprises some 
of its landscapes and public spaces. This includes buildings of historical and architectural 
significance, harmonious urban fabric, areas such as parks, squares and other public or 
semi-public spaces that are considered historically or architecturally consequential 
(Cornu, Negri, Bady, & Leniaud, 2013; Licciardi & Amirtahmasebi, 2012; Tweed & 
Sutherland, 2007). This paper is not concerned either with ‘moveable’ heritage or 
archaeological complexes and sites that are not part of a city’s urban fabric, as they are 
not as directly associated with everyday urban environments, and as a result are not as 
interlinked with question of placed based identity (Anderson & Gale, 1992; Ashworth & 
Tunbridge, 1996). 
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This paper will take an interpretive approach, addressing the question through textual 
analysis of official documents, semi-structured in-depth interviews and mapping of both 
North and South cities (Bevir & Rhodes, 2006; Hamin, 2003; Holman, 2014). This method, 
following Bevir and Rhodes (2006, 89), was chosen as it allows us to analyse the 
influence of regulation on value, given that ‘people adopt beliefs and perform actions 
against the backdrop of an inherited tradition that influences them’. Traditions in this 
case are those formalised by conservation planning. The underlying challenge is that, in 
order to grasp how urban heritage is valued differently between countries, we must 
start by considering the legislative framework in order to gain a better understanding of 
how value emerges (Ahlfeldt & Holman, 2015; Holman et al., 2018; Pani, 2017). 
Our approach was chosen in order to come to terms with complexity. It rests on a 
philosophical analysis of meaning – in our case value – in formalised actions: the actions 
being legislation or the written plan and its applications through government (Bevir & 
Rhodes, 2006; Thomas, 2005). An interpretative approach distinguishes itself through 
theoretical views, that allow us to make sense of the governance of conservation 
planning in various contexts (Bevir et al., 2003). The approach undercuts the idea that 
there is one set of tools to be used to understand governance: ‘if governance is 
constructed differently, contingently, and continuously’ a single tool for managing it 
would be ineffective (Bevir et al., 2003, 199). It will allow us to make some initial 
deductions on how conservation planning plays out in various cities, and to interpret 
what these actions suggest about value. This of course takes into account that our 
analysis of meanings can grasp meaning only as part of a wider web of beliefs – the other 
elements of urban planning – knowing that heritage is only a small portion of them (Bevir 
& Rhodes, 2006, 15). 
The finer points of the analysis are rooted in a series of elite semi-structured in-depth 
interviews carried out between June 2016 and January 2017 in London, Paris, Milan, 
Beirut and Rio de Janeiro. The interviewees were selected by integrating purposive and 
chain sampling techniques. First, officers occupying positions at different levels of 
government in handling the designation and management of conservation areas were 
contacted. They were asked to provide further contacts, which enabled access to 
representatives at all levels of government (state, regional, local). The interview 
strategy thus included combined elements of maximal variation and snowball sampling 
of interviewees nested into the initial purposive sampling (Creswell, 2009; Flyvbjerg, 
2006). Interviewees included architects, planners, politicians, and association or NGO 
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members and activists. Interviewees were encouraged to discuss the appropriateness 
of conservation planning in their local contexts given other urban pressures. The final 
sample includes 30 interviews, approximately six for each analysed city. Interviews were 
kept to under one hour and recorded, and interviewees were guaranteed anonymity 
(Creswell, 2009). This design allowed the participants to express diverse ideas and 
allowed us to react and follow up on emerging viewpoints.  
In Section 2, our paper proceeds with a review both of urban heritage definitions in the 
theoretical literature and its different values. A clear theoretical sense of the units of 
analysis is necessary before initiating comparative analysis. This section also rationalises 
the use of an interpretative approach to compare conservation planning systems and 
explains why it is appropriate in bridging the gap between the formalised – urban law – 
and the intrinsic – value.  Given the complexity of these issues, the goal of this paper is 
not to provide a thorough description of each national conservation planning system 
(for which references will be provided), but to disentangle the elements, which will be 
most likely to influence how urban heritage is valued beyond its policy. Specific cities for 
each chosen case-study will be used to illustrate these elements.  These have been 
arranged into two sections (3 and 4) based on their ‘geographic’ location (i.e. Global 
North and Global South) and their legal planning families with four Napoleonic cases 
(Paris, Milan, Beirut and Rio de Janeiro) and one British case (London) used as a control.  
We have chosen to present them in this way to better illustrate the complexities of 
conceptualising cities and their regulation and to illustrate that there is no simple binary 
or model of planning as variegation always exists.  
Section 3 will compare conservation planning in England (London), France (Paris) and 
Italy (Milan), highlighting the differences between systems that have been considered 
best practice examples of conservation planning (Albrecht & Magrin, 2015; Cornu et al., 
2013). Our chosen interpretative approach assists us in asking a series of sub-questions, 
which shed light on both the production of heritage values and the implementation of 
these values through policy. For example, i) how have theoretical and spatial constructs 
of urban heritage been translated into conservation planning systems? ii) And in turn, 
how then does local history and culture influence the evolution of these systems? iii) At 
what level of government is urban heritage designated and to what extent are locals 
consulted? iv) And, once implemented, to what extent are conservation policies binding? 
Our European case-studies will reveal that although conservation planning originates in 
associated legal families, it is influenced by planning cultures and national frameworks, 
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specifically the opportunities and constraints of national planning systems, which vary 
greatly (Clarke, 2012; Keller, Koch, & Selle, 1996; Nadin & Stead, 2008). In practice, 
conservation planning thus assumes many different meanings, and seems to be more 
closely linked to context than the authors would originally have thought, even in 
neighbouring European settings (Friedmann, 2011; Newman & Thornley, 1996). Our 
survey of case-studies suggests that local urban heritage value differs widely according 
to geographical location and historical context (Albrecht & Magrin, 2015; Balbo, 2012; 
Batista & Macedo, 2010; Cornu et al., 2013). If this is so, value systems are linked to the 
evolution of policy, which reacts to both location and history. 
The appreciation that heritage is historically and geographically constructed inevitably 
makes it a political enterprise and is at the origin of our title; this is reinforced in the 
consideration of specifically urban heritage, as the city is a political actor in itself 
(Palermo & Ponzini, 2010; Poulot, 2006). Thus, this historic and geographic construction 
establishes the un-designation or disregard for heritage as an equally political choice, 
which confirms that undesignated heritage is not necessarily without value. We build up 
these arguments in section 4, which details the conservation planning systems in two 
Southern contexts: Lebanon (Beirut) and Brazil (Rio de Janeiro).  
Finally, we discuss our understanding of the place of conservation within planning in 
current urban policy and what our findings suggest about how urban heritage is valued 
throughout different contexts. In concluding, we bring out more of the parallels 
between our northern and southern case-studies, to suggest there is no simple model 
that is particularly Northern or Southern. 
2.1.2  ‘Heritage creation’ and its link to value 
At least in the European context, the conversion of the material city into an object of 
historic knowledge was provoked by the extensive and rapid transformation of urban 
space after the industrial revolution. This radical moment in the evolution of cities 
provoked the investigation and interrogation of the ‘old city’ creating a context in which 
the ‘monument’, the ‘listed building’ or the ‘building of architectural value’ became the 
starting point for conservation efforts. Definitions, speed of development and political 
appetite naturally varied across countries but the underlining principle of the retention 
of a sense of cultural and architectural inheritance remains the same (Cornu et al., 2012; 
Cornu et al., 2013; Earl, 2015).  
As heritage preservation became more embedded in policy it moved beyond the ambit 
of antiquaries and architects and took on a broader scope, encompassing building 
  
40 
ensembles, public spaces such as streets, stairs, green and open spaces and even entire 
neighbourhoods (Bernier, Dormaels, & Le Fur, 2012; Choay, 1992; Habitat III, 2015; 
Tunbridge, 1984). In part, this was a recognition that it is the area and the setting that 
often creates social, cultural economic and environmental value in a city (Dalmas, 
Geronimi, Noël, & Tsang King Sang, 2015; Larkham, 1992; Licciardi & Amirtahmasebi, 
2012; Lowenthal, 1985; Pendlebury, 2009; Smith, 2006).  This is because urban fabric 
often characterises an historic urban example, a unique population density, street 
pattern or other important urban morphological or cultural features (Tweed & 
Sutherland, 2007). This paper will analyse planning policy focussing on urban heritage 
areas (UHAs), given that urban landscapes, and as a result conservation areas, should 
not be treated as a mere context for individual monuments.   
The question then turns to the identification of urban heritage, or ‘heritage creation’ as 
defined by Pendlebury (2009, 7). This typically results in a legal recognition or technical 
obligation to conserve urban heritage. As we shall see, the buildings, districts and other 
spaces designated by national, regional or local government will conceive spatial 
constructs in diverse ways. Some will be in line with the latest academic 
conceptualisations of urban heritage, while others will not. This will ultimately result in 
the diverse physical evolution of cities. The preservation of this stock includes 
stabilisation, rehabilitation, restoration, and other supportive activities, which vary 
greatly. In contexts where ‘heritage creation’ is effectively integrated into planning 
systems, conservation policy helps to underpin value by legally establishing protection 
for UHAs. It is therefore possible to unpick what is valued by the interpretation of policy 
documents.  
Bearing in mind that legislation is known to follow some way behind public or societal 
attitudes (Larkham, 1992, 96), there is a broader conceptualisation of what is meant by 
the historic environment, which goes beyond what is designated by a governmental 
body. As noted by Rautenberg (2003), heritage specification is predicated on two 
processes; the first is founded in heritage legislation, which creates ‘nationally 
legitimate’ and ‘legally binding’ specifications with the second linked to socio-cultural 
factors emanating from what ‘counts’ as heritage to the population. For Rautenberg 
(2003), it is the social process of valuing that precedes the creation of legally binding 
designation.  Therefore, before designation occurs, a form of appropriation materialises 
through actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community based 
organisations (CBOs) in the planning policy process (Balbo 2014, 272). In certain 
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Southern contexts, these actors have increasingly filled the role of legislative agencies 
in light of a wide-range of government limitations. To facilitate an effective comparative 
exercise, however, this paper will limit itself to formalised processes, as it is within these 
moments of codification that societal preferences and values are formally underpinned.  
We accept the limits of our study – it will not address civil society as a part of the 
governance system directly, in order to make the cases more easily comparable. We will, 
however, identify in which cases actors are more significant than others in terms of their 
formal and informal roles and powers (Minnery, Storey, & Setyono, 2012). As suggested 
by Balbo (2014, 282), we need to be aware in our reflection, of who is leading the 
governance of conservation within each of our reviewed planning systems. In cases 
where state governance is lacking, it may have been taken over by alternative entities. 
The underlining factor is that urban heritage is an active process of identification (Smith, 
2006). As this paper will show, although the starting point for conservation planning is 
the same in most case-studies presented, the evolution is perhaps not so surprisingly, 
quite different. This is natural as the process of identification is necessarily linked to 
cultural, political and economic principles, which affect the intrinsic values of urban 
heritage. If these principles change or evolve, as argued by Pendlebury (2009, 7)  “…not 
only can heritage identification change but it can also be contested”.10 The process 
becomes more complex when you consider the multitude of factors linked to 
conservation planning. For example, who is actually identifying urban heritage? And how 
does this change how value is determined? Is it central government, local government 
or communities? Moreover, how is value justified? For example, although urban heritage 
was traditionally linked to cultural concerns, (Pendlebury, 2009) this has changed as 
culture has been overtaken by issues like economic development or even sustainability.  
Here we see the frame of heritage subtly mutate in order to take on the dominant 
concerns of the day so that it remains relevant and maintains a certain gravitas (Gayego, 
2014). 
As this paper looks at both Northern and Southern examples of conservation planning, 
it is particularly important to appreciate that urban heritage is also geographically and 
historically specific (Pendlebury, 2009; Poulot, 2006). Values will unavoidably vary 
according to local historical and geographical frameworks. Given the past dominance of 
the North in shaping planning theory and practice (Watson, 2015), a comparison with the 
                                                             
10 By intrinsic values we mean all intangible values associated with a given urban heritage, 
whether they be cultural, historical, social, or environmental. 
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South can be useful in unpicking taken-for-granted assumptions about how planning 
addresses certain issues and re-questions differences between the North and South 
(McFarlane, 2010; Roy, 2009).  
Cities of the South are often conceptualised as a less-developed, which frequently 
implies an underdevelopment of their regulatory and governance systems (Roy, 2009). 
Comparative analysis between the North and South has therefore often been a question 
of policy transfer – where the adaptation of a Northern model to a Southern context is 
assessed. This vision is stressed within a heritage discourse, where the notion of 
patrimonialisation is repeatedly said to be a European one (Choay, 1992). Although the 
notion was certainly born in Europe, it seems unfair to presuppose that every effort to 
embed heritage conservation in the planning regimes of Southern cities derives from a 
European notion of patrimonial consciousness and an attempt to adapt this to a non-
European context. As discussed, ‘heritage creation’ is an active process. It may certainly 
start as an exogenous concept coming from colonial compulsions, but the development 
of heritage in the planning paradigm deserves the benefit of doubt when considering 
national policies (Hanna, 2010). Moreover, it will allow us to assess the adoption of 
economic and culturally specific planning tools for every given city through the same 
lens: a view supported by many (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; James and Lodge 2003; 
Balbo 2014, 270).  
As we shall see, because every example is different, one cannot even identify a specific 
‘Northern’ model that would apply to every Northern example, as there will always be 
variegation.  Therefore, if we are to examine Northern cases through this lens expecting 
variation there is no reason not to apply this logic to Southern cases as well.  In fact by 
proceeding in this manner we may more easily form an iterative loop whereby Southern 
case studies might offer insights into the re-theorisation of planning in the North 
(McFarlane, 2010; Roy, 2011). The lens will also help us to avoid problems linked with 
post-colonial theorisation and explore new theoretical possibilities (McFarlane, 2010). 
Comparative thinking is a well-suited strategy for revealing the distinctiveness and limits 
of particular theoretical claims, and also for formulating new lines of inquiry (Clarke, 
2012; McFarlane, 2010; Sanyal, 2005). Only through such comparisons can an 
understanding of the place of conservation within planning in current urban policy be 
teased out, in order to speculate on future progression and possible responses (Balbo 
2014, 270; Minnery et al. 2012). 
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2.1.3 Market and non-market values  
In our arguments above we have made the case that there are clear linkages 
between planning, heritage identification and certain intrinsic cultural values that help 
to bring about and further embed regulation.  We have also alluded to the role that 
heritage may play in local economic development.  In this section of the paper we move 
to consider urban heritage’s use values. As has been well established, markets and 
regulation interact in cities (Holman and Ahlfeldt 2015; Balbo 2014), making it necessary 
to analyse the relationships between planning systems and urban heritage’s use values 
as well as its non-use values. 
2.1.3.1 Opposing values 
Stemming from capital theory, Throsby (2006) describes heritage as an asset. The 
notions of ‘capital’ and ‘heritage’ present a number of similarities, they are both stocks 
of material assets, or of wealth, which can offer a source of income (Vernieres et al., 
2012). Moreover, heritage as capital requires investment to maintain it (Ost, 2009). And 
conservation can, although this is not always the case, facilitate an investment process 
of allocating resources over time. For example, heritage buildings are re-used for 
contemporary activities or develop a framework for tourism. Investment, however, also 
highlights the opposition between economic and intrinsic values of heritage and how 
they evolve at different rates (Throsby, 2010; Vecco, 2007). If we consider only the 
economic value, through revenue extraction and tourism exploitation of heritage, its 
other values will decrease slowly every year as we can see from Figure 1 (left side); the 
more urban heritage is exploited, the greater the loss of its intrinsic values (Zouain, 2002, 
221). The search for an equilibrium, that maximises economic contribution while 
respecting the patrimonial aspects – the junction point of the two curves – is thus 
necessary for a ‘living’ urban heritage, and in practice proves difficult. The paradox of 
urban heritage in the economy of any given city is that it is precisely the recognition 
intrinsic heritage values that allows for economic exploitation (Ost, 2009).11  
In reality the relation between intrinsic and economic value of heritage is not as linear as 
depicted on the left side of Figure 1. Economists have elaborated more realistic 
theoretical relationships. As we see in Figure 1 (right side) after a subjective growth of 
intrinsic value, there is a corresponding rise in economic use-value12 (accessibility, use of 
                                                             
11 Non-use values are a pre-requisite to use values in heritage cases; without non-use values 
market transactions would not be generated and additional economic value would not be 
created. 
12 Here we are speaking specifically of use value in its economic sense taken from environmental 
economics, rather than ‘use-value’ from the perspective of Marxian political economy.  
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the good) of urban heritage.  The pursuit of this economic value begins to diminish the 
intrinsic value through its consumption (Zouain 2002) causing its shrinkage.  Despite this 
the economic value is partially retained, as cities are still able to use structures even if 
the building stock loses its heritage related values.  Given that conservation planning 
necessarily influences the determination of value through its identification process, it is 
important to consider these relationships. In fact, as we shall see, distinct conservation 
planning systems will give weight to one value over another determined in large part by 
societal desires. The stability of an urban ecosystem that integrates heritage into 
development decisions will therefore require a system of planning, be it state or non-
state led, to manage this process. 
Figure 1 Intrinsic and economic values 
 
Note: Figure 1 is adapted from Zouain (2002) 
2.1.3.2 Total Economic Value 
Although we have established that urban heritage values sometimes work in opposition, 
we need to delimit their multidimensional character (Navrud & Ready, 2002; Vernieres 
et al., 2012). If we considered only the use-value of heritage buildings, their value would 
often be lower than that of new builds and the restoration of urban heritage would 
always be considered an expenditure of resources that could be better used in other 
ways (Provins et al., 2005; Tuan & Navrud, 2007). Urban heritage values are most simply 
understood through the well-known delineation of Total Economic Value (TEV) adapted 
from environmental economic theory where forms of value are monetary but also social, 
cultural/aesthetic, environmental and historical (Provins et al., 2005; Serageldin, 1999; 
Vernieres et al., 2012). Scholars have arranged TEV’s diagram in several ways in its 
adaptation to heritage. Figure 2 is our attempt to delimit the TEV of urban heritage and 
link it to conservation planning. It naturally cannot delineate all the elements (column 5) 
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that conservation planning could support that would influence urban heritage values, 
and has therefore summarised them in 4 overarching categories. 
Figure 2 Total Economic Value 
 
Note: Figure was altered and expanded by the authors following Vernières et al. (2012) and Serageldin 
(1999). UH refers to ‘Urban Heritage’ in this Figure. 
 
As we can see from Figure 2, TEV considers both use and non-use values of urban 
heritage, appealing to the marketable and non-marketable sides of the equation 
(Pagiola, 1996). The use values of a heritage asset are the direct economic benefits that 
derive from it such as revenues or service transactions that increase in value because of 
their presence in heritage buildings (Vernieres et al., 2012). Lack of accommodation and 
supply of goods and services in an urban heritage environment can result in missed 
opportunities for induced growth, development and welfare. Non-use values, which we 
have divided between environmental, cultural, social and historic are often interlinked 
and refer to the assets people attach intrinsic socio-cultural values to (existence value), 
or that are closely associated with a way of life and its legacy (bequest value) 
(Serageldin, 1999; Smith, 2006). Existence value can be defined as the value placed upon 
the knowledge that a heritage asset exists. For a good to have existence value there are 
two necessary conditions: uniqueness and irreversibility. If these conditions are not 
present, then the good in question probably has a small or zero existence value.  
As Figure 2 denotes, these values are often tied to identity, aesthetic or architectural 
qualities, social structures and community values but also to more general urban 
atmospheres that are typical of specific urban environments. Finally, option value is 
heritage’s ‘insurance policy’, referring to a heritage asset’s possible future value or the 
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value of the information we can derive from it (OECD, 2007). It supposes that even if 
there is no imminent plan for a heritage asset, its destruction will result in an irreversible 
impact and loss; there is a high value associated with not making irreversible decisions. 
Although TEV considers the values of urban heritage holistically, it cannot reflect them 
all nor explain all the relationships. Especially as, all cases are different; certain examples 
of urban heritage may present greater social values while others greater cultural ones. 
Conservation planning systems and how restrictive they are will vary according to which 
urban heritage values they stress. Few planning systems will enforce regulations 
preserving all values, for if they did we would be left with static historic cities not 
responding to contemporary urban needs. Indeed, the identification of all these values 
does not imply their use in practice (Vernieres et al., 2012, 72). TEV does, however, help 
to identify the different values that contribute to decision-making, these decisions are 
typically informed by conservation planning or the lack of such a system. For an overview 
of the relationship between TEV and decision-making see Provins et al. (2008). 
Conservation planning is made complex as each value ascribed to urban heritage is 
contested by a variety of stakeholders participating in the ‘heritage creation’ process. 
This appeals to one of the old tales of planning: given a reality, can planning powers 
intervene to shift the balance of forces toward social goals in the ongoing processes of 
urban restructuring and, if so, with what tools? (Friedmann 2008, 250; Palermo and 
Ponzini 2012). In order to bridge conservation planning with the construct of value, we 
must attempt to explain the complex way in which value links back to the planning 
paradigm. 
2.2 Conservation planning in the North: England (London), France 
(Paris) and Italy (Milan) 
2.2.1 European comparative planning  
There is a long and rich history of comparative planning studies in Europe driven by 
propinquity, common historical antecedents (e.g. industrialisation and the Second 
World War) and more recently Europeanisation (Newman & Thornley, 1996; Watson, 
2009). We are therefore limiting our comparison of conservation planning in the Global 
North as it relates to urban heritage in England, France and Italy using London, Paris and 
Milan to work through specific examples of how heritage is valued in these local 
contexts. However, this should not be read as an endorsement of a belief in any 
particular common approach to European planning for as Nadin and Stead (2008) 
remind us, each planning system has its own peculiar starting point borne out of specific 
societal conditions and social models.  In part this is what makes comparative planning 
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lead by an interpretive approach (Bevir & Rhodes, 2006) that takes value seriously 
(Ahlfeldt & Holman, 2015; Holman et al., 2018; Pani, 2017), such a fascinating window into 
how societies value particular aspects of physical and social infrastructure as it is these 
‘soft cultural’ aspects of what is and is not valued that have for a large part produced 
differences in very similar planning systems (Ernste, 2012). Our goal therefore in this 
section is to build a picture of the various regulations and definitions of heritage in each 
urban context in order to reveal how societies value heritage, how they address 
challenges to these values and how systems, challenges and values are variegated 
across local contexts.   
2.2.2 Heritage creation 
2.2.2.1 Identification and the evolution of legislative systems 
The state of conservation of buildings and spaces can reflect many things: level of 
income, education, social and behavioural habits, ultimately the stratification of factors 
that contribute to defining the unique characteristics of a community. All these aspects 
are, however, in most cases, heavily influenced by the planning systems that underline 
the realities of conservation in a given country. The market has not proven to be a 
reliable institution for allocating present and future consumption; urban heritage is 
therefore strongly dependent upon regulation to pin down value and help determine 
supply (Ahlfeldt & Holman, 2015; Rizzo & Towse, 2002). 
In the cases of England, France and Italy, the first examples of urban heritage legislation 
appeared over a century ago. Each system started with listed building designation and 
then evolved to include its own unique interpretation of UHAs. In England the process 
began with the 1882 Ancient Monument’s Protection Act, updated in 1953 with the 
Historic Buildings and Monuments Act (Historic England, 2015a; UK Parliament, 1967). In 
France a first law was introduced in 1887 and updated in 1913 with amendments that 
made provisions to classify buildings of historic or artistic value to the public without the 
owner’s consent, public or private, and entailing the obligation to not modify the 
building, or any section of it without obtaining permission from local government (Cornu 
et al., 2013; Devernois, Muller, & Le Bihan, 2014). In Italy the Legge Nasi (n. 185/1902) first 
established a list of national monuments and was further developed by the Legge Bottai 
(n. 1089/1939) which addressed the needed protection of structures of artistic or historic 
interest (Carughi, 2012). From 2004, all Italian public buildings constructed 70 or more 
years ago were automatically listed to avoid the loss of cultural values provided by civic 
architecture (Ministero dei beni culturali e delle attività culturali e del turismo, 2017). In 
each case, the legislative framework started with punctual architectural inscriptions 
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within a heritage legislative framework that valued punctual inscriptions, where 
individual buildings are classified or listed in the French case, given a Grade I, II or II* in 
the English case, or classified as being of ‘great cultural interest’ (monumenti) or of 
minor architectural value or ‘other interest’ (beni architettoici) in the Italian case 
(Ministero dei beni e delle attività culturali e del turismo, 2016). In all these case-studies, 
urban heritage was first ‘created’ through the recognition of individual architectural 
examples and frequently tied to notions of nationhood and culture (Choay, 1992; 
Pendlebury, 2009) . The non-use values of urban heritage, notably the cultural, social and 
historic values making the continued existence of these buildings important, were thus 
the first to be emphasised by conservation planning. The differentiation of the various 
levels of importance of these buildings highlighted the idea that even structures of 
humble origins may also carry significance. 
From their inception, up and to the introduction of modern town planning systems in 
Italy (1942), England (1947) and France (1954), conservation policy grew slowly but 
progressively (Mehl-Schouder, Driard, & Ibanez, 2015; Newman & Thornley, 1996; 
Scattoni & Falco, 2011). During this period, the notion of heritage areas slowly took 
shape.  In England, this came in the shape of the 1931 Ancient Monuments Act, which 
introduced the idea of preservation schemes and extended this to the area directly 
surrounding an ancient monument controlling development nearby. In the cases of 
France and Italy, although UHAs were not identified within urban codes, they were 
identified from an environmental perspective, including adding UHAs into valued natural 
environments. In Italy the law (n.1497/1939) refers to ‘natural goods’ including ‘beautiful 
ensembles’13 which are ‘complexes of immobile things (buildings) that hold aesthetic or 
traditional values’ (Carughi, 2012; Giannini, 1976).  
In France, a similar definition relating to the idea of a ‘heritage ensemble’ is inscribed 
through the 1906 lois des sites (updated in 1930). This law complemented the 1913 
historic monuments law by extending protection to historic sites (Assemblée Nationale, 
2017). By definition, it protected areas presenting landscape value, both rural and urban 
– it is the oldest indication of value being attributed to landscape addressing another 
layer of urban heritage non-use values (Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication - 
Direction Générale des Patrimoines, 2012). This law is part of the French environmental 
code, and although, as specified, it isn’t directly addressed at UHAs it has resulted in the 
protection of many equivalent areas. One of the most famous is in Paris (Figure 4) and 
                                                             
13 Denominated in Italian legislation as ‘bellezze d’insieme’. 
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was inscribed in 1975. It covers 4400 ha (42% of the surface area of Paris) including almost 
all of the 11 first arrondissements and parts of the 16th and 17th (APUR, 2004; IAU-IDF, 
2013). Both these initial Italian and French laws indicate that although urban heritage 
areas are conceptually separate from natural preserved areas, they have links that 
should not be overlooked. Indeed, the reason why techniques for the economic 
valuation of natural amenities have been successfully transposed to the historic 
environment lies in their many similarities (Provins et al., 2008). 
The shift in the conception of UHAs as an integral part of cities happened at a later date 
and varies within our three northern case-studies. In England, the 1967 Civic Amenities 
Act (updated in 1990) marked this transition by establishing conservation areas (CA) 
having ‘special architectural or historic interest, the character or appearance of which is 
desirable to preserve or enhance’ (UK Parliament, 1967, 1). This transition is closely tied 
to England’s post-war demolition and rebuilding, which spurred many communities to 
take action. As we shall see this is reflected in the local nature of where power lies in the 
designation process.  
Since their creation in 1967, CAs in England have evolved through different policy 
documents. Until recently, central government set the stage for the planning system 
through Planning Policy Statements and Guidance (PPG and PPS) (DCLG, 1994, 2010). 
PPG15 first laid out government policies for the identification and protection of historic 
buildings and conservation areas (DCLG, 1994). It explained how development and 
conservation generally needed to be considered together and broke down the links 
between the planning system and conservation policy (DCLG, 1994). It was replaced by 
PPS5, which highlighted planning’s central role in conserving heritage assets in the 
perspective of using them in creating sustainable cities and preserving quality of life 
(DCLG, 2010). These policies, among others, were replaced in 2012 by the National 
Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) (DCLG, 2012). The NPPF sets out core principles that 
should underpin plan making, and includes the historic environment under the umbrella 
of the environmental role of the three dimensions of sustainable development (DCLG 
2012, 2). It aimed at simplifying the national planning framework and was often 
described by interviewees as similar to the PPS5 but much less detailed. Whilst the 
borough policy officers we interviewed were concerned with the loss of detail between 
PPS5 and the NPPF there is striking evidence to suggest how powerful the heritage 
lobby was in securing a good outcome for conservation policy within the NPPF as the 
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framework went through various stages of drafting  (GLA2 and Historic England 
Interview) (Lennox, 2013).   
In France, the legislative jump is not as clear-cut, the structure for the protection of UHAs 
has been characterised as a millefeuilles, a culinary metaphor that reflects the multiple 
(and many argue redundant) layers of regulation that result in numerous legislative tools 
protecting urban areas (Bleyon, 1981). Interviewees described it as extensive, binding 
and containing wide-ranging constrictive measures (STAP Paris Interview). The French 
attempt at solving this was the creation of the Code du Patrimoine in 2004, which 
brought together all the scattered texts on the protection of heritage (Negri & Cornu, 
2010). 
The 1943 act extended state control by establishing an easement to protect a 500m 
perimeter around all historical monuments (Devernois et al., 2014). This measure is part 
of the heritage code and can be considered a French forerunner to the conservation 
area, but more importantly, it is a measure still implemented today. As emphasised by 
Planchet (2009), addressing the outskirts of historic buildings through an administrative 
constraint is far from linking monument legislation to town planning law. The technique 
strengthens the singularity of monuments and is based on the misleading assumption 
that conservation in the immediate vicinity of a monument remains bound to the historic 
monument (Choay, 1992; Le Louarn, 2011). None of our other northern examples apply 
such a restrictive measure. The concept of curtilage exists around listed buildings in 
England but, as recommended by Historic England, no line is ever drawn and the 
boundaries of the spatially protected area are up for interpretation (Historic England, 
2015b). In fact, as written, the policy relating to curtilage and which structures may or 
may not be protected within it is rather vague and, like much of England’s town planning 
regulation, has been further specified by case law rather than codification (Moore, 
1987). 
The 1943 law also restricts urban areas by adding sight line restrictions to the field of 
vision around the monument: within these areas any action changing the appearance of 
both buildings as outdoor spaces, cannot take place without the prior authorisation of 
the Architect of the Buildings of France (ABF) (Devernois et al., 2014). This role is one of 
the few remaining positions that permits individuals to hold sovereign power, a power 
superior with respect to local mayors or prefects. This power is called the avis conforme 
and denotes the ABF’s power to accept or decline any proposal to change or demolish 
buildings in curtailed areas around monuments (Art. 7. R425-18) (Devernois et al., 2014). 
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Given the large number of historical monuments in France (about 40,000 across the 
country), this measure results in the ABF being in control of nearly 3 million hectares of 
land, which is roughly 5% of France (Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication, 
2013). The law’s most recent evolution (7 July 2016), finally limited the avis conforme14 to 
a smaller sector delimited around the monument by the ABF, leaving him with a avis 
simple in the rest of the area (Figure 3) (Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication, 
2016) . The reality of this amendment in the law is, however, as discussed with 
interviewees, that the state does not have the means to draw new individual specified 
perimeters for each of its 40,000 monuments (STAP Paris Interview). A coordination 
problem will thus arise between ABFs and local mayors, who will now need to take 
responsibility for all modifications in the newly created ‘simplified sightlines’ (avis simple 
areas). It is worth noting that a similar regulation exists in the UK context but applies 
only in London where specific sightlines are controlled to create viewing corridors to key 
monuments in the capital (GLA, 2012) . 
The French legislative system specifies an astonishing three other ways to designate 
UHAs. Secteurs Sauvegardés15 were introduced as an instrument in 1962 in a period in 
which heritage conservation was far from being at the top of the political agenda. Now 
part of the French urbanism code, they are part of the Plan de sauvegarde et de mise en 
valeur (PSMV)16 which replaces the local urban plan. With the decentralisation of the 
state in 1983 came the creation of protection zones for architectural and urban heritage 
and landscapes (ZPPAUP), now part of the heritage code (Cornu, 2003). Although the 
ZPPAUP aimed at designating UHAs, it did not entirely break from the pattern of 
protecting neighbourhoods around historic monuments. Although areas were now 
designated, they were not conceived as holistic landscapes in their own right but were 
an attempt to improve the 1943 law.  
By 201o policy had evolved and the ZPPAUP were replaced by the aires de valorisation de 
l’architecture et du patrimoine (AVAP)17 (Negri & Cornu, 2010). The biggest marker of this 
evolution was the inclusion of concepts of well-being within a sustainable development 
framework. AVAP also required a management plan only partially subsidised by the 
state, which takes the form either of a Plan de Sauvegarde et de Mise en Valeur (PSMV) 
                                                             
14 The avis confrome is the French administrative action of giving assent and represents the 
irrefutable power to accept or decline any proposal to modify buildings. The avis simple is simply 
on the other hand closer to giving advice. 
15 Preserved sectors (Translated by the authors) 
16 Protection and enhancement plan (Translated by the authors) 
17 Areas of enhancement of architecture and heritage (Translated by the authors) 
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or of a heritage PLU (Rouillon, 2014). An attempt to simplify the urban heritage 
designation system was finally made in 2016 with a legislative amendment that regroups 
the secteurs sauvegardés, ZPPAUP and AVAP into one category: the Site Patrimoniales 
Remarquables (SPR)18 (Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication, 2016). Although 
the details of the implementation of this most recent amendment to the legislation are 
still unclear, interviewees confirmed that if certain areas were prone to more than one 
UHAs legislation in the past, the most restrictive one would be applied (Ministry of 
Culture France Interviews).  
Article 9 of the Italian Constitution states the need to protect and enhance both the 
landscape, historical and artistic heritage of the nation (Cosi, 2008). Conservation 
planning has a unique place in the Italian context, so much so, that some have argued 
that the principles and practises of conservation planning are one of Italian urbanism’s 
contributions to the field (Balducci & Gaeta, 2015). The Italian architect Gustavo 
Giovannoni coined the term ‘urban heritage’ in the 1930s as obtaining its value not as an 
individual and autonomous object but as part of the overall character of urbanism 
(Choay, 1992).  
Interestingly, the Italian system did not develop an UHAs designation strategy that 
resembles the English conservation areas or French ZPPAUP. The vincoli paesaggistico19 
are derived solely from the 1939 environmental law mentioned earlier, which later 
received modifications in the 1980s (n. 431/1985 "Aree tutelate per legge") and in 1999 
(n. 490/99 ‘Testo Unico’) (Ministero dei Beni e della Attività Culturali e del Turismo, 
2016). The Cultural Heritage and Landscape code later (22 January 2004 n. 42) integrated 
these previous norms in an attempt to simplify legislation. Within this code, Article 136 
and Article 142 apply to landscapes. Article 136 identifies buildings and areas of 
significant public interest20 while Article 142 identifies the areas having natural interest. 
Even though this construct is tied initially to environmental rather than socio-cultural 
historical values, it includes restrictions linked to heritage more holistically. For Example, 
the neighbourhood of Brera, one of Milan’s historic quarters, is protected by a vincoli 
paesaggistico and within its specifications it considers the preservation of its historic 
character by controlling things like the appearance and décor of buildings (MiBAC 
Interview) (Gazzetta Ufficiale, 2009). Therefore, even though this legislative feature 
                                                             
18 Remarkable heritage sites (Translated by the authors) 
19 Landscape protection (Translated by the authors) 
20 These include a. good of specific administrative use b. ‘immovable things’, ‘villas and gardens’, 
‘parks’ c. and d. ‘complex of properties’, ‘areas of scenic beauty’  
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does not classify the area as a culturally valuable one, it identifies it as being significant 
to people’s identity and in so doing, as noted by our interviewees, the area’s character 
and form can be protected through the imposition of measures to protect 
“…historicism, décor, view and perspective” (MiBAC and conservation legislation 
specialist Interviews).  
What is unique about urban heritage ‘creation’ in Italy, however, is the conception of the 
historic centre – centro storico – as the area retaining urban heritage value. Although this 
is true in other countries where UHAs are clustered in the centre of a city such as London 
(see Fig. 5) Italy is the only country that institutionally defines these areas. The 
Commissione Franceschini in 1964 undertook a census of cultural property and underlined 
the value of the centri storici as settled urban structures that constitute cultural 
ensembles and the original and authentic part of settlements (Cosi, 2008; Olivetti et al., 
2008). ANCSA (Associazione Nazionale Centri Storici Artistici), on the other hand, 
appealed the need to classify historical centres as a whole as unique examples of history 
where the phases of development could be clearly identified in light of a low number of 
modern replacements (Bonfantini 2015). In fact, the concept of Italian historic centres 
was thought of as a way to preserve both the physical and social body of historic centres 
in order for these to remain interlinked (Albrecht & Magrin, 2015). 
The 1967 Legge Ponte (Law n. 765) officially included historic centres as part of overall 
city planning, delimiting them by the notation ‘Zone A’ in Italian Master plans or PRGs 
which delimits zoning areas, buildable exploitation and the areas to be allocated to 
public services (Venuti & Oliva, 1993).21 Although this has evolved today, as historic 
centres are now defined on a case by case basis through their urban plans and with more 
complex zoning techniques, it underlines the significant value accorded to them in the 
Italian case. Various authors and interviewees (Politecnico Interview) (Bonfantini, 2012, 
2013; Mioni & Pedrazzini, 2005) stressed how historic centres are in no way replaceable, 
differing visually and perceptively from the rest of Italian settlements, because of their 
display of unmistakable patterns, underscoring the traits of strong spatial cohesion that 
is immediately morphologically recognisable. Italian conservation planning is thus 
emphasising historic centres’ option value. Several interviewees stressed how the 
conception of Italian conservation planning is deeply seeded in the country’s history and 
geography: the historic centre being a distinctive urban characteristic of the Italian 
urban landscape (UNESCO/ANCSA and CE Interview). Similar arguments could be made 
                                                             
21 PRGs (Piano Regolatore Generale) are general regulatory plans for the city. 
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about certain historic centres in England or France, but they are not legislatively 
recognised in the same manner: in Italy, the temporal threshold is given much more 
weight.  
There is, moreover, a clear distinction to be made between the vincoli paessagistici and 
historic centres. While the former presents elements both of valorisation and 
safeguarding, the latter are almost solely about promotion and valorisation (Art. 117, 
comma 3, of the Italian Constitution) (Fantini, 2014). In practice, many historic centres 
are partially superimposed by vincoli paessagistici (Figure 5). The dangers of Italian 
historic centres are linked to the possible isolation and transformation of this central 
area, for in designating these central islands of land, there is a risk that the intangible 
values are gradually lost as they become areas for tourism and not for everyday people, 
referring back to the opposition of economic and intrinsic values as illustrated in Figure 
1. When the vincoli paesaggistici cover the whole of historic centres, the risk of this 
isolation happening is high, as argued by several interviewees in the case of cities like 
Florence and Venice (UNESCO/ANCSA and CLS Interviews). As Bandarin (2015) argues, 
there is no purpose in maintaining architectural appearance If you turn the city into an 
empty shell. Instead of going towards inclusiveness and the living nature of heritage, 
‘the historic centre creates insularisation’ (Lombardy Region Interview) as a result of 
constraints tied to it and ‘dangerously transforms the area into a theme park’ (Italian 
historic centre specialist). This essentially describes the tipping point of the right hand 
side of Figure 1, where the pursuit of this economic value (through tourism) begins to 
diminish the intrinsic value of UHAs through its consumption. 
It is clear from this analysis of the evolution of urban heritage legislation in England, 
France and Italy that context plays a substantial role in how urban heritage is ‘created’. 
Even though the beginning of conservation planning is very similar between these 
neighbours, planning cultures and historical geography influence national definitions of 
urban heritage, meaning that these built forms are somehow valued differently.  
2.2.2.2 From cultural to holistic non-use values 
As we have seen in the previous section, the reasons behind why monuments and UHAs 
are designated is tied to different types of value associated with these different heritage 
forms. While single heritage designations appear to be tied to historic and cultural 
values, UHAs are first conceived from an environmental value perspective in Italy (vincoli 
paesaggistici) and France (sites inscrits) and from the perspective of cultural-historical 
value in England. These initial values, however, have evolved both through the 
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conceptual evolution of these first designations and also through the creation of new 
regulatory tools.  
Our review of multiple policy documents for this paper suggests that the policy trend 
altered from being concerned primarily with cultural and historic urban heritage values 
to having a more holistic understanding of what urban heritage might be. The joint 
consideration of socio-cultural, historical, environmental, and economic values becomes 
predominant and inscribes heritage into the sustainable development discourse (Council 
of European Union, 2014; Gayego, 2014; Vernieres et al., 2012) . This suggests at least a 
partial incorporation of urban heritage values as understood through TEV delineation 
into national policies. 
In England, the NPPF is now the key document linking urban heritage to sustainability. It 
highlights ‘the wider social, cultural, economic and environmental benefits that 
conservation of the historic environment can bring’ (DCLG, 2012, 126). It also states that 
local planning authorities should take into account the positive contribution that 
conservation of heritage assets can make to sustainable communities including their 
economic vitality (DCLG, 2012, 131), clearly appealing to both use and non-use values of 
urban heritage. The NPPF also included the historic environment under the 
environmental umbrella within the three dimensions of sustainable development, 
associating urban heritage with environmental values when initially conservation areas 
were underpinned and valued for their historical and architectural interests (DCLG 2012, 
2).  This illustrates the evolution of heritage policy in England, which has, over the years 
been able to shift itself with the leitmotif of the day going from the promotion of 
conservation for its own sake, to the promotion of heritage based on its value as a tool 
for economic and placed based regeneration to now as a promoter of sustainable 
growth. 
In France, the biggest change in the evolution of urban heritage came with the 
progression from the ZPPAUP to the AVAP in 2010. The Loi de Grenelle (2010) introduced 
sustainable development notions through the AVAP that were not previously present, 
establishing a national engagement to the environment and altering the underlining 
values of UHAs in France (ICOMOS France, 2010). The AVAP also included well-being into 
its conceptualisation, introducing the notion that the value of UHAs is linked to urban 
emotional perceptions (Negri & Cornu, 2010). The evolutions in English and French 
conservation planning thus present similarities in repositioning themselves closer to 
discourses of sustainability and emphasizing the multidimensionality of values. It seems 
  
56 
governments were keen to streamline conservation planning by linking it to 
sustainability and making it part of a more popular and accessible discourse.  
In Italy, the theoretical jump in legislation is less specified but still present. Art 143 of the 
updated Cultural Heritage and Landscape code mentions the necessity to find ‘correct 
ways to insert modern elements in landscape areas’ in order to ‘sustainably develop 
these areas’ (Carughi, 2012). Moreover, although the historic centre is a concept linked 
to the history of a given city, it has been argued that it also supports notions of 
sustainability through its links to the UNESCO 2011 Recommendations on the historic 
urban landscape (Bonfantini, 2015). Therefore, although Italian conservation planning 
doesn’t specify sustainability’s role in related legislative documents, or in practice, as 
commented by one of our interviewees (CLS Interview) it has subtly attempted to 
include it within the conservation discourse. 
These evolutions suggest two things. First that the international push to include urban 
heritage into the sustainable cities discourse was successful given that national policies 
rephrased urban heritage in this perspective. Agenda 21 for Culture’s Fourth Pillar of 
Sustainable Development (by United Cities and Local Governments) exemplifies this 
movement, followed by the inclusion of heritage in the sustainable cities discourse of 
the Sustainable Development Goals ’s (SDG) and its inclusion in the recent United 
Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III 2015; 
UCLG 2005). The evolution of conservation planning in our case-studies suggests that 
the concepts of these movements have effectively trickled down to national policies.  
Secondly, it can be argued that as conservation is a ‘luxury’ of planning, its inclusion into 
a sustainability discourse might therefore have been orchestrated to give it more 
gravitas, not unlike earlier shifts toward more economic language. The restoration and 
maintenance of urban heritage is often considered an expenditure of resources that 
could better be used in other ways. Conservation is thus intricately tied with the cost of 
an alternative that must be forgone in order to preserve heritage buildings (Provins et 
al., 2005; Serageldin, 1999; Tuan & Navrud, 2007). If a high proportion of a city’s economy 
is linked to construction and/or real-estate development, net income sacrificed to 
conservation will be high and cities in urgent need of economic growth will not be willing 
to make the sacrifice (Barton, Blumentrath, Bernasconi, Pinto, & Tobar, 2013). This is 
especially true in places where weak governance systems do not enforce planning as we 
shall see in the second part of this paper. We cannot forget that there is often a 
prevalent political rhetoric favouring economic maximisation over other social 
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constructions of value, which occurs in both the Global North and the Global South 
(Ahlfeldt & Holman, 2015; R. Lee, 2011).  
Perhaps in order to overcome this rhetoric, conservation has often gained importance 
not as a cultural variable within planning but as one inserted into the sustainable 
development discourse, thus attracting more attention by modifying how it is included 
in policy. This could also be why heritage is often classified as an urban amenity, as a way 
of boosting attractiveness (Finco & Nijkamp, 2001; Glaeser, Kolko, & Saiz, 2001). Even 
organisms like UNESCO have somehow compromised, adjusting their interpretations of 
historic landscapes to be much more inclusive, to use the words of Bandarin (2015, 14) a 
‘much more flexible, open-ended and people driven approach to conservation’.  
2.2.3 Heritage in space 
2.2.3.1 Heritage Counts 
Spatially we see these regulations impacting on our case study cities in the following 
ways. Listed buildings in both London (16,420) and Paris (3,842) are great in number and 
were designated over an extended period of time going back as far as the 1850s. Milan 
counts 1677 listed buildings however data on their year of designations is unfortunately 
not readily available. UHAs in Paris (22) and Milan (31) only reach a maximum of 6 
designated areas a year, while London (965) sees high number of designations from the 
1970s. However, despite London’s large number of UHAs this does not mean that 
London in necessarily more constrained than Paris. Not only are UHAs in Paris more 
spatially extensive, English CA policy can, in many cases, be less restrictive given it is 
locally arbitrated and locally enforced. 
2.2.3.2 UHAs as a spatial construct 
Figure 3,Figure 4Figure 5 demonstrate how the size UHAs and the details of their spatial 
demarcations vary in light of the evolution of legislations discussed above. CAs in 
England are relatively small, delimited areas, they usually do not map full city centres but 
several, even many specific areas within them. In large cities, such as London, they are 
clustered in the centre of the city, marking its most historic part despite the absence of 
other regulations, with the exception of strategic protected views in London, which are 
designated by the Mayor. These strategic views are focused on St Paul’s Cathedral, the 
Palace of Westminster and the Tower of London and are broken into the categories of: 
Panorama; River Prospects and Townscape. In practice, these views are protected from 
development that may obscure them.  This does not mean that new development is not 
possible, only that any development should be sensitive to these sightlines.  Historical 
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centres usually count several CA’s such as a range of houses or a square and its 
surrounding buildings. The delimitations are particularly specific, presenting an 
attempted reconciliation between conservation planning and mainstream modern town 
planning. They allow the construction of new builds both within and between them and 
they are not integrated into local urban plans (Rodwell 2007). Some areas like South 
West London do have contiguous CAs that create larger designated areas, but these are 
locally controlled and managed meaning that the rigidity of policy is, to some extent, 
locally varied. 
Figure 3 London 
 
The superposition of French conservation areas results in 93,5% of Paris being subject to 
some form of regulation. The Secteurs Sauvgardés are typically neighbourhoods, in Paris 
the 7th arrondissement and the Marais. What used to be the SPR range from the size of 
small neighbourhood to half a city. None are found in Paris itself but there are over 40 
in the Ile-de-France area, many of which are show in the ‘Grand Paris’ areas in Figure 4. 
Paris not only has an extensive site inscrit, as mentioned earlier, it also has a series of 
sites classes which include all the parks in Paris as well as some of the most important 
perspectives in the city such as the Invalides esplanade. When asked why Paris does not 
have ZPPAUP/AVAP, interviewees responded that the wide range of conservation 
planning present within the inner walls of Paris made it unnecessary (STAP Ile-de-France 
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Interview). In fact, throughout the whole site inscrit the ABF has an avis confome on all 
demolition. Moreover, the superposition of 2000 historic monuments, an inscribed site, 
and two secteurs sauvegardés and various smaller site classes there is very little that 
needs further conservation. As an interviewee said: there are 2150 conservation 
constraints on 1950 buildings (Paris Municipality Interview). 
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Figure 4 ‘Grand Paris’ and Central Paris  
Note: SPRs are the Sites Patrimoniales Remarquables, PSMV are the Secteurs Sauvegardés. The second image zooms in on central Paris and illustrates the 500m perimeters which have been 
omitted in the left image for clarity.  
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Figure 5 Milan 
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Vincoli paesaggistici have similar spatial delimitations to English conservation areas. For 
example, Milan has 31 vincoli paessagistici including the neighbourhood of Brera, the 
area around the Castello Sforzesco and the area di via Francesco Sforza e Largo Richini. 
The greatest difference in the Italian demarcation of urban heritage can be observed 
through the historic centre. It is characterised by its insularity, which is quite striking as 
we can see in Figure 5 (Bonfantini 2013). This has led, in recent urban plans, to the 
transition from the notion of historic centre to that of historic city as colourfully argued 
by Bonfantini (2012, 2). The difficulty arises, however, with the recognition of the 
historic environment, which is not part of the historic centre in a given context. 
Conservation planning cannot simply equate to the widening of cartographic 
boundaries of a historic centre based on the extension of a temporal threshold as has 
sometimes been done (Bonfantini 2012). In Naples the local authority (LA) decided to 
extend the historic centre perimeter from the 19th century to the early 20th century, 
bringing the historic centre beyond its traditional definition or pre-industrial urban 
fabric (Argan 1990). The danger of this simple extension is the creation of static museum 
cities, which have been highly criticised by heritage specialists (Bandarin, 2015; 
Bonfantini, 2012). 
It is clear that there is not one way of defining and thus ‘creating’ UHAs even between 
countries with similar planning origins such as France and Italy. Although common 
delimitations of UHAs exist in different planning systems, the extent of their 
specification and the details of their spatial demarcations vary greatly. Urban fabric is 
thus valued differently according to geographical context and suggests that policies 
need to be interpreted within their own context and not through policy transfer.  
Our hyper-factual approach has helped us demonstrate that heritage is morphologically 
valued differently in London, Paris and Milan (Ridley in Rhodes 1997). While historic 
centres and large neighbourhoods are valued in Milan, smaller concentrated UHAs 
allowing for greater building flexibility are appreciated in London and numerous layers 
of conservation systems are applied in Paris resulting in almost no flexibility. Upon 
reflection, not only are these differences observable to the naked eye in these cities, 
but they result in some urban fabrics being more coherent that others in light of the 
dissimilar spatial protections. This suggests that although the planning system is not the 
only element, which will determine heritage value, it will implicitly change how urban 
heritage is viewed by the population. Valuing urban heritage is therefore necessarily 
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rooted in the analysis of country planning systems where zoning plays a major role as it 
results in different integrations of urban heritage in the city. 
Urban heritage is thus engrained in local history both conceptually and spatially and this 
inevitably modifies its construction within planning. As such, heritage is a social 
construction dependent upon spatial and temporal interpretations of the past: this 
implies that its meaning is likely to change through time and across space, adding to its 
complexity.  
2.2.4  ‘Quanto é vincolato?’22: reflections on conservation planning 
constraints  
The extent of the constraints these various conservation planning systems present, 
together with the degree to which they are enforced, also speaks to how urban heritage 
is valued within a given context. The principal actors defining and enforcing the systems 
are necessarily involved. Values alter depending on the level of government deciding 
heritage constructs, shapes and restrictions. In other words, who decides what is 
valuable? Does the mayor, the local authority, the residents or central government 
decide? And if different actors are involved does this lead to coordination problems? As 
argued by Rhodes (2007), not only do patterned, interdependent, and bargained 
behaviours of government vary between contexts but so does their configuration, 
building different policy networks. 
English conservation planning is underlined by notions of compromise and balance. The 
tendency to use the word ‘significance’ in previous planning documents such as PPS5 
and PPG15 changed to the predominant use of the word ‘interest’ in the NPPF, as an 
interviewee argued, implicitly altering the weight given to urban heritage assets 
(Historic England Interview). As noted by Historic England (2015b, 3) conservation is not 
a stand-alone exercise, it must be negotiated and balanced with other local and national 
priorities. Although the NPPF states that ‘local planning authorities should set out a 
strategy for the conservation and enjoyment of the historic environment’ in their Local 
Plan (Paragraph. 126 DCLG 2012, 15) and should recognise it as irreplaceable, the 
document also clearly addresses a negotiation between conservation of heritage assets 
and necessary developments (Paragraph. 61 DCLG 2012, 15). A scale with existence value 
on one side and direct use values of land on the other is thus established. A compromise 
is immediately put forward between the protection of urban heritage and the evolution 
                                                             
22 Common question in Italian conservation planning that asks to what extent a good is 
bound/restricted. 
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of the modern city.  As with most elements in the English system, which is based on 
case-law, this leaves a great amount of space for interpretation. Local Planning 
Authorities (LPAs), which hold planning control, are given the option of permitting 
partial loss of heritage in CAs according to their judgement. LPAs must, however, ‘not 
permit loss of the whole or part of a heritage asset without taking all reasonable steps 
to ensure the new development will proceed after the loss has occurred’ (Paragraph. 
136, DCLG 2012, 15). Loss of existence value is thus only justified if direct use values of 
land are exploited.  
Despite the NPPF stating that the planning system is to contribute to the achievement 
of sustainable development through its economic, social and environmental 
dimensions, many authors consider English planning to be fixed on a growth-imperative 
model wishing to limit further planning power (DCLG, 2012; R. Lee, 2011; Rydin, 2013). 
Centring on economic profit has made social constructs of the built environment such 
as urban heritage preservation unpopular, criticised as mechanisms hampering the 
market by restricting land supply and leading to rising house prices (Cheshire & Hilber, 
2008; Hilber, 2015). This ‘negotiation’ between conservation planning and 
development, is much rarer in the French or Italian systems, where the possibility of 
compromise especially in terms of new builds within UHAs is much more restricted. In 
fact, in comparing the three systems, the strong tensions between conservation and 
growth, especially noted in London, seem disproportionate (Cheshire & Dericks, 2014). 
Demolition and new build are controlled in the English context, but their local 
determination, available local resources and local values and attitudes create far more 
variation in the ultimate outcome of their conservation (Bottrill, 2005). As we will see in 
the next section, negotiation between conservation and development is much more 
widely found in our Global South case-studies  
The English system must be applauded for making this negotiation local. The NPPF 
eliminated the regional planning apparatus (except for London) and introduced 
neighbourhood planning providing, a set of tools for local people to ensure the 
developments in their areas reflect community motivations (Paragraph. 184 DCLG 2012). 
LPAs are responsible for the designation and supervision of CAs, making urban heritage 
designation in England a locally defined system. If urban heritage is ultimately for 
people, especially those who live in and around an UHA, power residing with local 
governments seems appropriate. In fact, criteria for selection of CAs varies from region 
to region, making the value attached to heritage interpreted through specific sites and 
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places (Lee, 2006). The designation process in England thus reflects the interests of 
local society; locally defined places are then provided protection under national 
planning legislation (Ahlfeldt & Holman, 2015, p. 174). This underlines the complexities 
of valuing urban heritage across one country, and touches on the complexities of values 
that will arise in analysing examples from wide-ranging contexts in this paper 
(Pendlebury, 2009). In fact, interviewees who dealt with heritage at a national level 
found it difficult to generalise what aspects of CAs were valued with many local choices 
viewed as peculiar or unexpected in terms of designation (Historic England Interview) .  
 In practice, LPAs have only limited resources in terms of enforcement and typically the 
system is reactive rather than proactive with officers only checking work where 
complaints are made (Harris, 2013). This makes CA integrity incredibly reliant on 
collaboration between communities and local planners (Ahlfeldt & Holman, 2015). 
Interviewees commented that the control of conservation areas is not what it should 
be (GLA 1 and Hackney Borough Interviews). The loss of front gardens, replacement of 
windows and doors are a common feature when private houses do not demolish but 
radically change a building’s appearance without asking for permission. Interviewees 
commented that this ties to a political idea in England that an individual’s house is their 
castle, and therefore unless the CA has an Article 4 Directive (a legal proviso, which 
extends and strengthens planning control) the council is not able to enforce higher 
standards. LPAs have the right to withdraw permitted developments under Article 4 
directives, which compromised in 2009 about 13% of all CAs in England (Ahlfeldt & 
Holman, 2015). This demonstrates the inherent role LPAs have in the protection, or not, 
of UHAs and the criticality local attitudes and values as support within the process. In 
France, the opposite was noted by interviewees: owners might lay claim to the right to 
dispose of their good as they see fit but the concept of public good is so engrained in 
the law and in society that the ‘existence value’ of the heritage for the public will almost 
always succeed (STAP Paris Interview). 
As discussed earlier in this paper, French conservation planning is characterised by 
heavy restrictions and the layering and juxtaposition of legislation, resulting in a building 
often being subject to more than one regulation. It is difficult to ascertain where 
heritage ‘creation’ lies in French conservation planning. Each of the multiple UHA 
designations is tied to an authority. Listed buildings are linked to the conservateurs des 
monuments historiques; what were the 500m perimeters, the ZPPAUP and secteurs 
sauvegardés, are the responsibility of the Architect of the Buildings of France (ABFs); 
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while the management of the sites is a matter handled by the Minister of the 
Environment. The ABF’s power certainly encompasses the most land. In Paris the ABF 
holds absolute planning control over 90% of the territory as well as an avis simple for all 
building permits and urban planning certificates etc. This power denotes the 
importance of history in the conception of conservation planning, for it comes out of a 
post-war concern to preserve areas that had not been damaged during the war (STAP 
Ile-de-France Interview). As an interviewee noted, such a measure would never be 
allowed today, as it evokes regal institutionalism, but remains as a result of history 
(STAP Paris Interview). In some ways, therefore, the French conservation planning 
system has opted to ‘maintain such power with heritage experts and (make it in a way 
undemocratic) to protect it’ (STAP Ile-de-France Interview). 
 The system has often been criticised as presenting an arrangement characterised by 
too many checks and balances. The 2016 legislative amendment finally simplified and 
clarified things by eliminating the simultaneous imposition of codes (Ministère de la 
Culture et de la Communication, 2016). From 2016 onwards areas where two codes 
existed would be subject to the most restrictive only. For example, if a building is in a 
site inscrit and in the perimeter of a historic monument, it will only be subject to 
restrictions by the historic monument, because it is the most restrictive (Heritage code) 
(Figure 3). On the other hand, if the building is a site inscrit but not in the perimeter of a 
monument it will be subject to the environmental code. Other simplifications to the 
system are also occurring, not only with the limitation of the 500m perimeter, as 
discussed in section 3.2.1. of this paper, but with the first de-designation of an urban 
heritage asset in Paris.  For example, a public consultation is currently underway to de-
designate the entrance to the Bois de Boulogne in proximity of the Suresnes bridge 
(Prefet de la Région d’Ile de France, 2017). Interviewees confirmed that there is little 
reason for this listing, designated in 1922, to exist (MSD France Interview). The cast iron 
bridge, built between 1873 and 1874, was destroyed and replaced by a reinforced 
concrete bridge in 1951. In addition, this area of the city has been profoundly 
transformed, to the point that the epicentre of the perimeter of protection turns out to 
be a major road. This consultation on de-designation has been made possible by recent 
changes to the environmental code as it relates to the total or partial de-designation of 
a monument of a site classé.  
Just like the French system is characterised by the power held by the ABF, the Italian 
system is characterised by the role of the soprintendeza. This body decides all detail 
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related to vincoli architettonici and buildings surrounding them in an ad-hoc perimeter. 
In practice, they decide many elements of the décor of urban areas, vastly limiting the 
freedom to build or modify in designated areas. These include binding procedures 
related to building work, with restoration only carried out by qualified staff – disputes 
have arisen between the state and the region on the training such staff should have 
received (MiBAC interview). Restrictions in Italy also vary whether a building is public or 
private. When the building is private there is an obligation to conserve it and the 
soprintendeza can impose works to be carried out on buildings (Ministero dei Beni e le 
Attività Culturali, 2016). The restrictions and confinements of vincoli paesaggistici are not 
much less invasive (Politecnico Interview). The vincoli paesaggistici are nominated by 
the region, who identifies and starts the designation process, establishes specific 
guidelines which are then delegated to municipalities after the approval of the 
soprintendeze. Restrictions are detailed in the plan and are controlled by regional 
government. The danger in the Italian system thus lies in too much restriction, 
suggesting too high a price is legislatively placed on the existence value of all urban 
heritage. Owners usually prefer their buildings not to be within UHAs and work on 
properties within UHAs is often done without permission to avoid extra costs (ISTAT, 
2015). Fiscal advantages did exist but are now only reflected in a 50% discount on 
ownership tax and a 19% reimbursement of works carried out on buildings from one’s 
taxes.  
The Italian system is also characterised by institutional regional disparity, both in terms 
of amount of designations and in enforcement of regulation in practice. ISTAT (2013) 
statistics suggest how the country’s regional division and disparate economic 
possibilities result in different conditions of the urban historical environment. Regions 
such as Tuscany and Umbria have 3 out of 4 historic buildings in an excellent or good 
condition where in Campania, Calabria and Sicilia fewer than half of all heritage assets 
are in a good state (ISTAT, 2015). The Commissione Franceschini (1964) was the first 
governmental body to denounce the degradation, the state of abandonment and the 
lack of development of urban heritage in Italy in the 1960s. Today, while some regions 
adhere to the restrictive regulations, others, especially in southern regions are 
characterised by a laxer application of these and thus a deterioration of the historic 
environment. There are many reasons why southern regions are characterised by 
degradation, amongst these are: lack of political will to enforce regulation, lack of 
compliance resulting in resident-led illegal amendments and construction and/or a lack 
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of local investment in UHAs (Bonfantini 2012) (For a larger discussion, see Pietrostefani 
(2019)). Interviewees remarked that some regional governments have worked much 
more than others with regard to their historical urban environments. Clearly, there is a 
lack of geographical consistency within the system (MIBAC and UNESCO/ANCSA 
Interviews). In some regions, the Italian case presents an over estimation of intrinsic 
values of heritage which results in a very limited usage of its use values. While in others, 
lack of enforcement as well as residents and developers disrespecting regulation results 
in illegal amendments and modifications to historic properties and built environments. 
This trend introduces a theme that will surface further in the Global South section of 
this paper. The opportunities and constraints linked to planning will not only depend on 
how regulations are set up, but in what context and to what degree they are 
implemented. The formality of policy and value are not immediately tied, the difficult 
reality of political activity and governance intervenes between them. When regulation 
is not enforced, conservation is in many ways a political decision, tied to the value of 
actors within cities with regulation enforced or ignored based on the values of these 
actors (Tunbridge, 1984). As Bevir, Rhodes, and Weller (2003, 193) argue ‘we cannot 
properly understand a political practice solely by its legal character’, and so we must 
attempt to consider how it actually plays out. In analysing how conservation planning 
compares between northern and southern cities, we must attempt to unpick the 
element of governance that follows regulation in the hierarchy of political will. As 
suggested by Balbo (2014, 282), we need to be aware in our reflection, of the 
reassessment of the government versus urban governance; in cases where state 
governance is lacking, it may have been taken over by independent entities.  
2.2.5 Conclusion Northern case-studies 
Reflecting on our three northern cases we see an English system of urban heritage areas 
that are very much locally driven and typified like all of English planning by discretion 
and broad principles rather than codification.  Heritage in terms of value has often been 
adapted to the leitmotiv of the day and in this way has maintained momentum in a 
political culture that is often hostile to planning.  This flexibility has allowed for areas to 
develop and retain their cultural dynamism but has also meant that many conservation 
areas have become so degraded as to no longer hold the values that once gained them 
designation.   
The French system with its precise codification and overlapping designations is 
particularly byzantine in its approach. In terms of historic buildings, the main difference 
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with the English and Italian system are the de-facto (500m) protected areas around 
heritage buildings, in the other two systems there are case-by-case boundaries. 
Although the system has been simplified over the years, it remains strict in terms of the 
constraints it inscribes. It has been streamlined by linking it to urban sustainability and 
well-being, but generally has received little opposition. In Paris urban heritage is 
engrained in the city and national heritage, architectural change has taken place more 
in terms of punctual occurrences than changing buildings or transforming areas. The 
newly conceived skyscrapers in Paris (not yet built) have received heavy opposition. In 
terms of enforcement, the power held by a single entity – the ABF – suggests a system 
where the confidence lies in educated expertise rather than local opinion/impressions. 
Like France the Italian system is also typified by precise codification, which is heavily 
enforced and does not leave room for interpretation.  Italy presents, however, a simpler 
system, its idiosyncrasies are that all public buildings constructed 70 or more years ago 
are designated, and that both rural and urban conservation areas are inscribed through 
the same policy. Like the French system it has attempted to simplify its codification 
system over the years, but constraints remain stringent. It is also characterised by 
advocating for the protection of its historic centres specifically more than England or 
France. Its other main difference is in scale of governance.  In Italy policies are regionally 
enforced and as Italy presents great administrative disparities between north and 
south, this brings very different outcomes both in terms of scale and type of area 
designations. 
2.3 Conservation planning in the South: Lebanon (Beirut) and 
Brazil (Rio de Janeiro) 
2.3.1 Comparative planning in the Global South 
Studies comparing planning systems in the Global South have grown steadily in recent 
years, addressing issues ranging widely - from urban growth (Minnery et al., 2012)  to 
equity (Sotomayor & Daniere, 2018). 
In addressing questions of conservation planning in the Global South, two difficulties 
become immediately apparent. The first is linked to the rapid urbanisation and 
development pressures that have been a prominent characteristic of many cities of the 
Global South in the last 100 years (Marchettini, Brebbia, Pulselli, & Bastianoni, 2014). The 
benefits of urban heritage are often overrun by more pressing needs tied to urban 
growth, resulting in conservation being a loosely integrated variable in planning – a 
luxury not necessarily being advocated as an intrinsic part of contemporary urban fabric 
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(Tweed & Sutherland, 2007; Watson, 2015). The second difficulty is a theoretical one: to 
avoid post-colonial discourses in addressing conservation in the Global South given that 
conservation is most often first formalised through legislation backed by colonial 
governments or similar. As we shall see, however, although the starting point for 
conservation planning in our southern case-studies is often adopted from western 
discourses, the systems evolve differently in light of contextual parameters, similar to 
our northern cases. Because every example is different, we are able to continue our 
exercise by adopting the same lens to our southern case-studies as we did our northern 
cases (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; James and Lodge 2003; Balbo 2014, 270). Via this 
comparative analysis (Clarke, 2012; Sanyal, 2005), we denote relationships across and 
between ‘northern’ and ‘southern’ models allowing us to develop new theoretical 
models that avoid valorising western perspectives of planning (McFarlane, 2010). 
In the same manner as our Global North section, we are limiting our comparison of 
conservation planning in the Global South as it relates to urban heritage in Lebanon and 
Brazil, using Beirut and Rio de Janeiro to work through two examples of how heritage 
is valued in these two different southern contexts. We have chosen case-studies from 
the Napoleonic planning model from different regions of the world as it is often argued 
that Latin America has appropriated the conservation planning discourse much further 
than other southern contexts, while the Arab World have few examples of countries 
that have truly attempted integrating heritage within their planning systems (Balbo, 
2012) (UNESCO/ANCSA and IAUV interviews). Although we will not be able to evaluate 
this, as a much more extensive study of solely southern conservation planning systems 
would have to be undertaken, we will argue that in the cases of Rio de Janeiro and 
Beirut, even though the former presents a more developed formalised conservation 
system than the latter, the outcomes ‘on the ground’ are in some ways comparable. 
Both conservation systems present similar hurdles, namely real-estate pressure and 
exploitation of land values – a factor also present in our English case-study; a point we 
will return to later. Accordingly, the underlying question of this section is: what does it 
mean for urban heritage value when societies formalise the physical and social 
infrastructure of urban heritage at very different rates, but despite the differences in 
formalisation (legislations), outcomes appear to be so similar? 
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2.3.2 Heritage creation 
2.3.2.1 First identifications of urban heritage  
Similar to our European cases, the legislative framework in Brazil and Lebanon started 
with punctual architectural inscriptions. In both cases, the first examples of urban 
heritage legislation appeared in the 1930s (Table A1 in Appendix). The first conservation 
law in Lebanon dates back to the French mandate (1920–1942) and stipulates the 
protection of urban heritage within all artefacts dating before 1700 through the 
Antiquities Law (166/LR - 7/11/1933) (Audrerie, 2000; Tyan, 2012). It also declared that 
immoveable objects dated after 1700 may be preserved if special public interest of 
historic or artistic value can be ascertained (Toubekias & Dentzer, 2009, 16). Despite the 
vagueness of this initial legislation, 20 years after the monuments law in France, 
Lebanon had introduced a law that recognised the diverse values of stand-alone 
buildings, both historic and artistic. Similar to its northern counterparts, the legislation 
specified two ways of inscription. In Lebanon a building could either be inscribed by 
ministerial decree or classified by the Head of State (Article 26) on an inventory of 
historic monuments managed by the General Directorate of Antiquities, a part of the 
Ministry of Culture (Hanna, 2010; Tyan, 2012). 
The first reference to immoveable heritage in Brazil is in the Constitution of 1934. It 
states that ‘it is the responsibility of the Union and the States to protect natural beauties 
and monuments of artistic and historical value’ (Castriota, 2008; Silva, 2012, 120) The 
1937 Constitution then transmitted the responsibility to protect historic monuments to 
municipalities and swiftly recognised the natural value of landscapes  (F. F. da Silva, 2012, 
120). Decree-Law 25/1937 created the four Livros de tombo (Inscription books), which 
interestingly divided heritage assets both by category and type of values between 
Archaeology, Ethnography and Landscape, History, Fine Arts and applied arts (Batista 
& Macedo, 2010; Camara dos Deputados, 2010; Dos Santos & Telles, 2017). Heritage 
buildings or monuments could thus, in theory, be listed in one or more of these 
registers. This is different from other formaliations of value we have analysed, as the 
division of the books underlined the importance of identifying the principle type of 
value recognised in a building. According to the legislation, an asset recognised for its 
historical value needs to be inscribed in appropriate book and not in another one, at the 
risk of invalidating the inscription (F. F. da Silva, 2012, 124).  
In both our southern case-studies urban heritage was thus first ‘created’ through the 
recognition of the intrinsic values of individual architectural examples. According to 
  
72 
both Brazilian and Lebanese legislation, assets must be legally preserved and their 
owners should maintain their original features. In the Lebanese case, no alternations 
should be carried out without the approval of the General Directorate of Antiquities. In 
Brazil, there are different categories of building listing, similar to our northern case-
studies. The first, called tombamento stipulates the conservation of all original elements 
of the building, interior or exterior. The second, bem preservato, only protects exterior 
elements of the building (facades, roofs, etc). The third category, bem tutelado, are 
buildings only semi-protected, demolition or changes are permitted, however new 
construction needs to follow the general aesthetics of the surrounding (R. C. M. Da 
Silva, 2012). As in the European cases, social concerns are thus formalised through the 
recognition of non-use values of urban heritage making the continued existence of 
these buildings important. 
There is, however, a divergence in the values being recognised and the elaboration of 
the legislation. While the Lebanese law remains vague, specifying solely historic and 
artistic values, its Brazilian counterpart includes all the modern values, even at this early 
stage, of urban heritage conservation: economic, cultural, historic and natural (Dalmas 
et al., 2015). As Canani (2005) explains the 25/1937 law specifies that when verifying each 
building or monument, it is necessary to question what values it represents, which 
attributes justify its existence, and what kind of relationship it fosters with the local 
people, thus addressing the existence, bequest and option values of urban heritage. 
Decree-Law 25/1937 also made a first allusion to the concept of historical areas, 
neighbourhoods, sub-cities or city-centres (tombamento do conjunto urbano) to be 
inscribed in any of the four books. Article 17 of 25/37 specifies that in the neighbourhood 
of the listed building ‘it is not possible to … make a construction that prevents or 
reduces visibility’ (Presidência da Republica Brasil, 1937). Similar to the English and 
Italian cases, this perimeter around listed buildings exists but remains ad-hoc. The 25/37 
Law has been commended by many (Batista & Macedo, 2010; F. F. da Silva, 2012). 
Despite its age, its concepts, regulations and purpose are clear, remaining relevant even 
now. On the other hand, the Lebanese law, which has only been partially updated since 
its inception in 1933 presents many limitations.  While heritage is logically included in its 
mandate, it is not specifically addressed making the protection it lends the historic 
environment debateable.    
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2.3.2.2 The evolution of legislative systems 
Conservation planning evolved very differently in our two southern contexts. While 
notions of heritage areas in Brazil developed similarly to our northern case-studies, in 
Lebanon the political will towards conservation was sporadic and rarely followed 
through.  
Following the 1937 law, Brazilian municipalities started pursuing conservation at the 
local level in the 1970s. In Rio, Lucio Costa lobbied to change the concept of urban 
conservation from isolated buildings to urban heritage areas. Contemporaneously 
Rodrigo Mello Franco was active within the National Institute of the Historical and 
Artistic Heritage (IPHAN) based in Rio, and advocated the concept of urban fabric and 
buildings as homogenous ensembles (Batista & Macedo, 2010; R. C. M. Da Silva, 2012). 
Efforts were then made to advance conservation planning through urban law. Similar 
to the French and Italian systems, Brazil inserted conservation within its zoning policies. 
Brazilian zoning delimited areas of historic, artistic or environmental value (Afonso da 
Silva, 1968). Law 3.289/1983 created zoning for the protection of urban areas of cultural 
or landscape value and demarcated them as undevelopable. Law 10.829/1987 outlined 
that all urban master plans should have four areas. The most relevant for our study was 
the monumental zone, the area featuring the main characteristics of the city’s urban 
design (F. F. da Silva, 2012). In many ways this is very similar to Italian historic centres, 
however, it does not receive as much attention in the literature. 
In Lebanon, similar efforts were made to advance conservation planning, partly through 
laws of urbanism and construction. Beirut’s Urban Master Plan (1964) initiated a 
concern for conservation of historic areas. During Amin Gemayel’s (1982-88) mandate 
as president, two decree-laws were issued. The law of urbanism 9/9/1983 n°69 required 
the delimitation of archaeological areas and other historic zones presenting aesthetics, 
historic or ecological value (Hamdan, Lamy-Willing, & Yazigi, 2012). The law of 
construction 16/9/1983 n° 148 subjects buildings of historical importance to construction 
permits to be evaluated by the General Directorate of Antiquities (Fischfisch, 2011). 
Other attempts in Lebanon were through decentralisation efforts. Article 74 of the 
municipal law of 1977 stipulates that the mayor has the obligation to protect historic 
monuments. The municipality was given responsibility to financially participate in the 
conservation of both public and private buildings in their municipal perimeters (Hamdan 
et al., 2012; Hanna, 2010).  
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Although our case-studies present similarities, while historical zoning was incorporated 
in many city plans in Brazil, the zoning of Lebanon today covers only 16% of the territory 
(UN-Habitat, 2011). The non-regulated parts are entirely developable, and policies 
applied to regulated sections are commonly disregarded (whether addressing 
conservation or other urban concerns) (CDR Interview) (Tyan, 2012). This lack of 
regulation gives way to high exploitation coefficients, parcel amalgamation and the 
construction of large highways through historic urban areas (SBH and APLH Interviews). 
Beirut’s Master Plan has not been updated since 1964, and most efforts to amend it or 
to introduce a new Master Plan have been hindered by political pressure (Ashkar, 2018). 
Examples of municipalities who conceptualise urban heritage’s touristic economic 
potential are rare (Akl & Davie, 1999). Very few municipalities comply with the 1983 
policy and countless road routes that disrupt the historic urban fabric have been 
approved by local authorities (CHUD Interview).  
During the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) the centre of Beirut was gravely damaged. 
Many buildings, such as those constructed under the French mandate, were perceived 
as symbols of a blamed political order rather than as part of the nation’s identity and 
were the target of hostile factions (Tabet, 2001). Beirut as a whole, however, 
maintained a certain coherence, with only an estimated 10% of buildings destroyed 
(Tabet, 2001). It is in fact often argued that although the destruction of Lebanon’s urban 
heritage began during the war, it only really boomed during its reconstruction (Akl & 
Davie, 1999; Davie, 2001, 2004). This is in contrast to Europe, where the urban 
destruction of the Second World War led to the development of modern town planning 
with conservation as part of the conversation, suggesting different outcomes for 
conservation planning depending on the nature of war (civil or between nations).  This 
echoes the work of Bevir and Rhodes (2006, 89) who note how inherited traditions can 
be disrupted by crises of identity making it difficult to formalise these values. 
The shift in the conception of UHAs as an integral part of cities was attempted after the 
war with little successes. It was not until 2008 that a new law was established to enlarge 
the conservation of urban fabric (Hanna, 2010). This legislative project was led by 
Ghassan Salamé, Minister of Culture (2000-2003) with the aim of recognising the notion 
of architectural value and urban ensemble to be protected and developed with a master 
plan for cities adapted to the Lebanese case (LOCE and UNESCO-LB Interviews). Article 
2 of the 2008 N.37 law on cultural goods enlarged the heritage sector to cover urban 
fabric, it recognised the ‘historical, scientific, aesthetic, architectural or symbolic value, 
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whether religious or secular’ of many immoveable properties including ‘structures, 
landmarks, edifices, buildings, or part thereof’ (International Foundation for Art 
Research (IFAR), 2014). Although a more inclusive definition of urban heritage was now 
ratified, underlining the different intrinsic values of immoveable objects, bylaws were 
never issued to provide a framework for its operation and management (SBH 
Interview). As yet no precedent has been set for its application, making it very difficult 
to be used to protect UHAs. This is one of many examples that characterises the 
evolution of conservation planning in Lebanon, although societal desires are present, 
as seen in NGO activism (SBH and APLH interviews), political will is rare, and most often 
lacks follow through mainly because of the aggressiveness of real estate as Lebanon’s 
biggest economic driver (Hanna, 2010; Krijnen, 2010; Krijnen & Fawaz, 2010). The 
economic and intrinsic values of urban heritage are secondary to economic exploitation 
of land and financial speculation (Figure 1) and the potential of urban heritage to create 
prestige or revenue is not taken into account, as the culture and local values of the 
market do not support this. 
The shift in the conception of UHA’s in Brazil has been more successful. Article 215 and 
216 of the Constitution of 1988 departed from the use of the word monument to refer 
to ‘urban complexes and sites manifesting artistic-cultural value’ (F. F. da Silva, 2012). It 
also expanded the definition of value by stating that heritage is all things ‘bearing 
reference to identity, action, memory of Brazilian society’ (Batista & Macedo, 2010). It 
further designated all sites retaining historic references to quilombos communities 
(slaves) (F. F. da Silva, 2012), reflecting the incorporation of diversity into the values that 
underpin conservation in Brazil (PROURB Interview). The 1988 Constitution also laid the 
groundwork for the 2001 evolution of conservation planning. Although Brazil does not 
place urban heritage within the remit of environmental, as does Italy and France, Article 
225 of the 1988 Constitution underlined the right of everyone to an ecologically 
balanced environment, requiring federal entities or municipalities to include 
environmental analysis in their creation of conservation areas (Castriota, 2008). 
The 10.237/2001 Estatuto da Cidade - City Statute law builds on the 1988 Constitution to 
create a new legal urban order to provide land access and equity in large urban cities. 
The main concept behind many of the instruments of the City Statute is that all property 
has a social function and in that manner, land is seen as much as a public good as a 
marketable one, recognizing the existence and bequest values of areas (R. C. M. Da 
Silva, 2012; F. F. da Silva, 2012). Special Interest Districts (SID) can be registered within 
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this law with different foci: social, environmental, cultural or functional. Cultural Special 
Districts are most often the ones more closely tied to urban heritage, and include 
specifications of the types of preservation for each building within them (R. C. M. Da 
Silva, 2012). Districts inscribed for cultural values are known as APAC in the city of Rio 
de Janeiro and are most often established by the Rio General Department of Cultural 
Heritage (DGPC) which is part of the Municipal Secretary of Cultures (R. C. M. Da Silva, 
2012). Article 123 of the City Statute specifies that urban areas can also be inscribed for 
their environmental value, for example, in Rio de Janeiro, vegetation plays an important 
role in the memory and identity of the city (Batista & Macedo, 2010).  Article 123 
therefore promotes and respects locally derived values of preservation. 
In Lebanon other attempts were made to further conservation at a city level. In 1995 in 
Lebanon, the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), at the request of the 
Minister of Culture Michel Eddé and with the assistance of the Lebanese Association for 
the Protection of Sites and Historic Monuments (APSAD), inventoried 1,016 houses built 
between 1860 and 1943 in the peri-central area of Beirut and proposed classification 
(Tyan, 2012). The list formed the first reference of a census of heritage buildings in 
Beirut, and the basis on which the Ministry of Culture requested the Governor of the 
city to take temporary measures to freeze demolition. This measure led to a massive 
campaign organised by the owners, in which they demanded that the state either 
overturn its decision or provide compensation for the injustice and subsequent 
economic damage caused by the freeze (CDR Interview) (Akl & Davie, 1999). Giving way 
to socio-political pressure, and the values of private property and highest and best use, 
the CDR restricted the inventory, whereby 592 properties were freed from registration 
and only 459 buildings divided into five categories (A, B, C, D & E) remained (Resolution 
No. 97/12 on 2/6/1997) (Table 3 Appendix).  
In 1999, after continuing pressure, D and E were also eliminated from the list by official 
decree (No. 32 on 3/3/1999).  This was done by claiming that the buildings lacked a 
cultural  component, thus limiting urban heritage’s definition and thereby its embedded 
value to a cultural one (Council of Ministers Lebanese Republic, 2010). A decree was also 
later signed that closed this inventory, meaning that no institutional entity could add 
buildings to be protected (SBH and APLH Interviews). In 2010, the Council of Ministers 
commissioned the CDR to conduct a comprehensive study of the buildings under frozen 
demolition, recommending the release of buildings not having a cultural component. 
This progression reflected negatively on the unity of the few remaining traditional 
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neighbourhoods in the city of Beirut. As interviewees lamented (CDR, UNESCO-LB, SBH 
Interviews), in Beirut, conservation planning never really took on a broader scope and 
has mostly failed in recognizing the value of urban heritage fabric, with some successes 
for isolated buildings. Some ad-hoc conservation measures succeeded in providing 
protection for some small contiguous areas of urban fabric. For example, the Director 
of the DGU, Joseph Abdel Ahad, succeeded in establishing the perimeter of Gemmayze 
before he retired (2010) thus limiting the coefficient of exploitation for the area (APLH 
Interview).  
Most recently, a cleverly-contextual legal attempt was made to protect the few 
remaining heritage buildings by utilising the nation’s tendency towards land 
exploitation. This approach is closely tied to the TCE (Total Coefficient of Exploitation) 
of the city, which determines how high one can build on a parcel of land. In 1971 Beirut 
changed the TCE of its city centre to 6, approximately 160-180m high, equivalent to the 
buildings of La Défense in Paris (Ashkar, 2018; Hanna, 2010). This very high coefficient 
was later suppressed and planning law accorded no coefficients or formal height 
restrictions: the sky was the limit. This law approved on 12/10/2017, allows for the 
Transfer of Development Rights (TDR), meaning that an owner may sell the 
undevelopable portion of their protected parcel (air rights) to someone else who is then 
allowed to build the same quanta of development elsewhere in the city (Hilton, 2017; 
Saade, 2017). This allows owners to keep their heritage building while benefiting from 
the development value of their land. In return, selling the TDR gives owners the 
necessary revenue to engage in renovating their building (Beirut Municipality Interview) 
(Saade, 2017). Although this approach in no way attempts to preserve the few 
remaining heritage areas as a whole, it is a last resort to protect individual buildings. We 
cannot comment on the implementation of this legislation, as the government has yet 
to ratify it, similar mechanisms have been successful in contexts presenting similar land 
exploitation difficulties. In Brazil, the City Statue includes clauses regarding the 
purchase and transfer of property rights for buildings having to maintain their original 
form (R. C. M. Da Silva, 2012). The TDR makes possible to transfer or sell the unused 
portion of a building to a site in another area defined by the city’s urban master plan (R. 
C. M. Da Silva, 2012). An Interviewee commented that such mechanisms should be 
further developed in contexts like Rio de Janeiro to create a better balance between 
those who profit from urban development and heritage building owners, for a more 
equal city paradigm (Rio Municipality Interview). This regulation offers an excellent 
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window into locally derived values that seek to both preserve heritage as a living 
memory in the city, but also acknowledge the financial costs of doing so.  
2.3.3 Heritage in space  
2.3.3.1 Heritage counts 
Spatially, conservation planning in our two southern contexts plays out very differently. 
Lebanon’s attempts at classifying historic buildings is very sporadic, with only 37 
monuments and architectural elements classified through decree on the General 
Inventory of Historical Monuments between 1934 and 2002, and 1,367 listed through 
orders for the entire country (DGA Interview) (Toubekias & Dentzer, 2009). Data on the 
number of nationally listed buildings in Beirut is unavailable and just over 200 buildings 
from categories A, B, C of Resolution No. 97/12 on 2/6/1997 have escaped demolition 
(APLH Interview). There are no formally inscribed UHA’s areas in Beirut, a few streets 
were identified as part of the only real attempt to further UHA legislation in the 1990s, 
but the only result was the Municipality’s marking of roads in question with signs saying 
‘Rue à caractère traditionnel’ (road with traditional character). Rio de Janeiro on the 
other hand, presents numbers much closer to our European examples. The General 
Department of Cultural Heritages (DGPC), part of the Municipal Secretary of Cultures, is 
Responsible for preservation of over 2,000 listed buildings (bens tombados), 10,000 
minor listed buildings (bens preservados), and over 90 UHAs (APAC), numbers close to 
the amount of listed buildings in London (IRPH, 2018). 
2.3.3.2 Spatial Construct 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 demonstrate the great differences in size and extent of UHAs in 
Beirut and Rio de Janeiro determined by the evolution of legislation. APACs in Rio de 
Janeiro are concentrated in the Central and Southern districts of the city, with a few 
recently inscribed in suburban neighbourhoods such as the APAC de Marechal Hermes 
(N° 37.069/2013) (IRPH, 2018). UHAs range from small delimited areas, similar to 
London, to much larger areas such as the APAC of Santa Teresa (L.495 - 09/01/1984 Nº 
5.050/1985), which not only covers Rio’s Montmarte typical 19th century and belle-
époque buildings, but also part of the mountain going up to Cristo Redentor (IRPH, 
2018). Part of the Santa Teresa APAC was also inscribed as a Cultural Landscape on the 
World Heritage List in 2012 (UNESCO, 2012). In the central areas of the city, many of the 
APAC have contiguous borders, resulting in larger designated areas, for example the 
Corredor Cultural neighbours the Cruz Vermelha APAC and the Arcos de Lapa (Borde & 
Sampaio, 2012). Unlike our European case-studies (with the exception to some extent 
  
79 
of England and the mezzogiorno in Italy), despite the considerable spatial extent of 
UHAs within Rio, the enforcement of the regulation varies greatly, this often depends 
on the local population’s support of the preservation of their neighbourhood and is not 
helped by the lack of management plans for any of the Rio UHAs (PROURB and Rio 
Municipality interviews). 
Figure 6 Rio de Janeiro 
 
Note: Data from Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro 
 
Between all our case studies, Beirut presents the weakest example in terms of the 
spatial extent of its conservation planning. As illustrated in Figure 7, of the individual 
buildings locally listed in 1997 (Resolution No. 97/12 on 2/6/1997) few remained in 2009 
and even fewer today (Pietrostefani, 2015). The UHA clearly identified around these 
clusters of heritage buildings are marked by signs denoting ‘roads with traditional 
character’ but remain mostly as nostalgic reminders of a historic urban fabric which is 
no longer intact, and their protection is in no way enforced (CDR and APLH Interviews).  
  
  
80 
Figure 7 Beirut 
 
Note: Data from Majal – Academic Urban Observatory. Academie Libanaise des Beaux Arts. Red points mark 
buildings identified and listed in 1997 that are now demolished. Green points mark buildings identified and 
listed in 1997 that were still existing in 2009, few of which still remain today. 
We observe clear differences in the spatial demarcations of UHAs in our two southern 
examples. While UHAs in Rio are well-defined and spatially extensive, in Beirut although 
an effort at defining UHAs was attempted, its formalisation through legislation was not 
followed-through. Heritage is morphologically valued differently in Beirut and Rio.  
Despite different evolutions of conservation between Rio and Beirut, in practice, as we 
shall see in section 4.4, the planning issues at stake present many parallels. In Rio, even 
though spatially preservation is extensive, in practice regulation is not necessarily 
respected and conservation of heritage buildings is in many cases more closely tied to 
local will and real-estate pressure than legislative presence (PROURB Interview). Borde 
& Sampaio (2012) observe discontinuity within the Rio’s urban fabric, typified by 
significant morphological contrasts: narrow lanes of the original neighbourhoods cut by 
wide avenues of the twentieth century; heritage houses preserved as a backdrop of 
recent skyscrapers driven by densification (Guimaraens, 2002); urban voids and 
buildings in an accelerated state of degradation driven by the densification of the centre 
of Rio (Guimaraens, 2002). The extensive legislative mapping is thus not necessarily 
what can be observed with the naked eye and is not representative of conservation 
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planning in practice, highlighting the paradoxes of the Carioca urban planning process. 
Similar tensions are also wide-spread in Beirut’s urban fabric. 
2.3.4 The value of land vs. urban heritage value 
While for our northern case-studies, systems are characterised by the extent of 
conservation planning constraints and differences in designation according to the level 
of government involved. In our southern case-studies, we become more aware of the 
luxury of conservation in light of the greater need for urban development in fast-
growing cities (Cheng, Yu, & Li, 2017; S. L. Lee, 1996). We are also continuously reminded 
of the pronounced economic and political choice to value land and economic 
speculation, over valuing urban heritage. Therefore, conservation planning in our 
southern cities is characterised by a pitched conflict between the value of land for 
redevelopment and the value of heritage practiced through regulation. This is of course, 
a struggle that exists in our northern cities as well, as previously illustrated in the case 
of London (section 3.4) but is more muted in this case. Having discussed the extent of 
the constraints of northern conservation planning, we now find ourselves unpicking the 
degree to which an absence of constraints illustrate how urban heritage is valued within 
our southern contexts. 
2.3.4.1 The role of public officials 
Despite the advancement of conservation planning in Brazil, a series of institutional and 
economic complications make its implementation difficult. Castriota (2008) argues a 
disarticulation of the various bodies responsible for the preservation and administration 
of Brazilian cities. In the case of Rio, the federal (IPHAN), state (INEPAC (State Institute 
of Cultural Heritage)), and municipal (of DGPC (Municipal Council - General Department 
for Cultural Heritage) authorities often do not successfully collaborate. Interviewees 
(IRPH and PROURB) argued that this dis-articulation has generated a large number of 
un-registered buildings and limited the efficient implementation of legislation in 
practice. They noted that land division has contributed not only to changing the spatial 
configuration of Rio but has created difficulties that go far beyond conservation. This 
suggests a conflict between the urban heritage values recognised in legislation and how 
value recognition plays out in practice. 
Beirut is characterised by the opposite tendency. While Rio presents too many actors 
and the lack of coordination between them, Beirut reveals a system where the decision 
to value UHA can be overturned by one person. The Lebanese Council of Ministers pass 
legislation, but its implementation falls to the Ministry for Culture. Proceedings of 
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conservation planning therefore depend greatly on the minister in charge and so are 
intimately tied to personal agendas and changing political will (Hamdan et al., 2012). The 
formality of policy and value are thus not immediately intertwined, the difficult and 
capricious reality of politics, especially when tied to an individual, can therefore disrupt 
this relationship. When regulation is not enforced, conservation is often rendered an 
even more political decision, especially in cities which are ultimately political actors 
(Tunbridge, 1984). Actors may comply with a policy that is inconsistent with, even 
opposed to, their beliefs, or they may sidestep the implementation of policy because of 
their convictions (Bevir, Rhodes, and Weller 2003, 193). The opportunities and 
constraints linked to conservation planning not only depend on how regulations are set 
up, but in what context and to what degree they are implemented. As Bevir, Rhodes, 
and Weller (2003, 193) argue ‘we cannot properly understand a political practice solely 
by its legal character’, and so we must attempt to consider how it actually plays out. 
Although regulation is often a key first step: it is difficult for conservation, unlike some 
other urban concerns, to be effected through informal means.  
2.3.4.2 A tendency towards demolition 
As conservation often entails keeping exploitation rates low, maintaining conservation 
areas in highly dense cities is another challenge for public officials. This marks a difficulty 
in integrating heritage in urban policies in practice (Batista & Macedo, 2010; Castriota, 
2008). 
In the 1940s, the creation of the Avenida Presidente Vargas in Rio, justified the 
demolition of hundreds of townhouses, entire blocks of colonial fabric, a ninety-meter 
strip of one of Rio’s parks (Campo de Santana), and the dismantling of two churches 
(Borde & Sampaio, 2012; Ribeiro & Simao, 2014). Praça Onze, another space of great 
symbolic value for Carioca urban culture, a site of carnival parades and a public space 
for immigrants and newly freed slaves, was also eliminated. The decision was 
controversial as it prioritised urban redevelopment and modern aesthetics over an 
urban fabric with evident sociocultural value (Borde and Sampaio, 2011). This was the 
beginning of a trend, which flourished in the 1970s, where high-rise buildings became 
symbols of progress and modernity (R. C. M. Da Silva, 2012). As a consequence many 
important historical buildings were demolished and substituted for modern ones 
(Rojas, 1999). Accounts from the Monroe Palace demolition in 1975 frame it as an effort 
to remove decay and abandonment from the city, placing these values above the 
historic importance of the site (Paraizo, 2004). However, an interviewee (PROURB) 
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argued that this, as many other examples, was just a justification for clearance, which 
concealed more speculative and political ambitions. Moreover, damage was not limited 
to buildings. In 8/18/2009 Judge Herman Benjamin in the Brazilian Superior Court of 
Justice stressed how damage is not limited to structural harm, but includes mores 
systemic damage to the environment as a whole (Miranda, 2017). These comments were 
being applied to the irregular conduct of a real-estate company in Rio de Janeiro who 
had damaged the vegetation of an UHA, affecting the environmental value of the 
location.  
This tendency to demolish, indicating how land and its exploitation is valued more than 
urban heritage value, is also present in Beirut. Recent work by Gebara, Khechen, & 
Marot (2016) maps Beirut’s demolition-based urban restructuring where approximately 
78% of authorised construction was based on redevelopment, much of this on plots that 
contained heritage buildings. This figure rises in the neighbourhoods of Mazraa (90% of 
urban reconstruction is demolition-based) and in the historic quarter of Zokak-El-Blat 
(85% demolition). This is also illustrated in Figure 7 in section 4.3.2. Owners of heritage 
buildings in Beirut often see no point in renovating in the absence of subsidies and given 
they are unable to increase ground rent from these buildings, they often engage in legal 
or illegal demolition (Krijnen, 2018b). This tendency towards demolition suggests that 
in many cases, land value and the economic benefits to be made from it trumps the 
preservation of urban heritage values.  
In the introduction of this paper we proposed that the more urban heritage is exploited, 
the greater the loss of its intrinsic value (Zouain, 2002, 221). Thus, to support a ‘living’ 
urban heritage, there is a constant search for equilibrium between the two curves that 
allows for economic benefit to occur and patrimony to be respected. However, while 
the over-regulation of urban heritage or ‘museumifying’ UHA may be argued for the 
cases of northern Italy and France (Choay, 1992), in our southern case-studies, economic 
exploitation does not come from the building itself but from the land it is built on (Ost, 
2009). The greater the exploitation of land, the greater the loss of all heritage values, 
both intrinsic and economic, where a heritage asset’s possible future value is lost 
(OECD, 2007).  
2.3.4.3 Dissonance between legislation and practical urbanism  
In the 2000s legislation for new building construction became more flexible in Rio, 
stimulating the construction business. Real-estate developers wanted to maximize 
legally permitted land use (R. C. M. Da Silva, 2012). Since 2005, the central area of Rio de 
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Janeiro has therefore seen increasing real estate projects. State led infrastructure 
projects have also contributed to accelerating the processes of urban transformation 
(Borde & Sampaio, 2012). Although many buildings escaped demolition through 
regulation, many others, especially in economically challenged UHAs suffered from 
deterioration and obsolescence. Townhouses in these areas are often internally 
demolished to respond to the expanding demand for parking, and given the growing 
demand for housing, old buildings in degraded conditions are often occupied (IPHAN 
Interview).  
The port zone of Rio (APA SAGAS) for example retains significant historic references to 
quilombos communities (ex-slaves). However, it has undergone great transformation. 
Substandard and informal housing predominates in much of this area, with heritage 
buildings abandoned and degraded (PROURB Interview). The Municipality of Rio then 
pushed for rehabilitation of the district in an effort to reintegrate it in the more dynamic 
sections of the city through the Projeto Porto do Rio published in 2001 (Soares & 
Moreira, 2007). The plan has been implemented very slowly and it is argued that the 
area’s urban heritage is de-naturalised and under-protected because of Olympic 
investments (Borde & Sampaio, 2012) (PROUB Interview). Moreover, the lack of public 
resources for social housing represent a great threat to the permanence of local families 
and heritage streets such as Rua São Francisco da Prainha.  
In fact, although many neighbourhoods in Rio welcomed APACs for the protection they 
afford built heritage, in some areas there was fierce opposition. The elected mayor in 
2001, Cesar Maia, promised a suspension of licensing of new buildings in his campaign, 
and once elected as he could not change legislation he declared an APAC though 
mayoral decree (R. C. M. Da Silva, 2012). The neighbourhood of Leblon was thus 
designated. This started a power struggle between local NGOs and pressure-groups and 
construction firms who argued this suffocated the real estate market and would bring 
unemployment and economic losses. Much of the local population was also not happy, 
as APAC prevented modifications to their properties and hindered them from selling 
(Rio Municipality Interview).  
Similar examples exist in the Beiruti context. Real-estate promoters able to operate 
with impunity have destroyed many buildings with high heritage value (Akl & Davie, 
1999). In 2004, the Lebanese building law (Law 646/2004) allowed for more intensive 
land exploitation (El-Achkar, 2011; Krijnen & Fawaz, 2010), increasing potential ground 
rents, especially in areas of the city characterised by low-rise rent-controlled (often 
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heritage) buildings (Krijnen, 2018a; Krijnen & Fawaz, 2010). Real estate developers 
started acquiring multiple plots, merging these in order to create larger ones to 
circumvent maximum building heights (Krijnen, 2018a; Krijnen & Fawaz, 2010). The 
economic logic of land thus became much stronger than the recognition of patrimonial 
value; urban heritage is in fact rarely exploited in a commercial logic through boutique 
hotels and restaurants in Beirut (Ziad El Samad, 2016; Zouain, Liatard, & Fournier, 2011). 
As argued by Barton et el (2013), if a high proportion of a city’s economy is linked to 
construction, net income sacrificed to conservation will be high and cities in urgent need 
of economic growth will not be willing to make the sacrifice. In 2017, the real estate 
sector made nearly 15 % of the Lebanese GDP with no capital investment in 
infrastructure and transport (CEIC, 2017; Fransabank, 2017).  
As in the case of Leblon in Rio, local NGOs, neighbourhood associations and academics 
have put pressure on the local government in Beirut in an attempt to halt new 
developments in neighbourhoods considered to have heritage value, even those not 
formally inscribed. So too in Mar Mikhael, heritage based activism was widespread 
(Ashkarian, 2012; Fawaz, Krijnen, & El Samad, 2018). However, given the lack of 
legislation or municipal will to limit high-rise development the neighbourhood’s 
morphology has changed significantly (APLH Interview), as evidenced by the Laziza 
factory complex, the first brewery of the middle east, which was demolished in (2017) 
to construct high-end condos (Ghorayeb, 2017). In both Rio and Beirut, non-
governmental and community based organisations have thus increasingly filled the role 
of government agencies in light of questionable enforcement or lack of legislation (R. 
C. M. Da Silva, 2012; Hanna, 2010). The necessity for civil action in both cases is warranted 
and again suggests that it is not possible to determine value purely through legislation 
(Rojas, 2002). In many ways, NGOs are leading the governance of conservation planning 
Balbo (2014, 282). Huybrechts & Verdeil (2005) have argued that Lebanon is a weak state 
with a strong society: value is present but a pattern of appropriation not designation 
shows more about urban heritage value (Rautenberg, 2003). Heritage appropriation is 
key to survival of Lebanese urban heritage, despite this method’s obvious limitations of 
being easily halted by government (CDR and CHUD Interviews).  
2.3.5 Conclusion southern case studies 
Reflecting on our southern case-studies we see two conservations systems that despite 
diverging greatly in terms of the development of their formalisations (legislations), 
present many comparable outcomes on the ground. The Brazilian conservation 
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planning system is comparable in detail and geographical extent to some of its 
European counterparts, presenting a system of consistent inscription mentioning all 
intrinsic values. Indeed, from the first instance, Brazilian legislation envisions 
conservation planning as an integral part of urban planning. The Lebanese system, on 
the other hand, is characterised by outdated and un-enforced legislation. Even recently 
proposed laws lack the related bylaws to provide a framework for the operation of 
urban heritage areas, or indeed the protection of single heritage buildings. Despite 
these differences, in practice, both contexts present cases where exploitation of land 
values often precedes the integration of conservation planning in city dynamics. The 
development of new cities trumps conservation and land value and the economic 
benefits to be made from it outplay valuing urban heritage. 
Some could argue that the reason why this imbalance is more pronounced in our 
southern examples than our northern ones may be linked to the historicism of 
conservation in our European examples. Did conservation planning not develop fast 
enough in the Global South? Given the advanced development of the Brazilian system, 
we suspect this is not the case. The imbalance is more likely driven by questions of 
economic growth rather than legislative development. The question of the preservation 
of our cities is more political than legal in these cases and determining value solely 
through legislation is difficult. Non-governmental bodies or social movements often 
advocate for conservation more than formal planning bodies and are very significant in 
our understanding of value of UHAs (Krijnen & Fawaz, 2010; Minnery et al., 2012). As 
defined by Rautenberg (2003), before designation occurs, a form of appropriation 
materialises through non-governmental actors. In cases where the state is weak or 
lacking, urban governance, including when it comes to questions of urban heritage 
value, may have been taken over by independent entities (Balbo, 2014; Mitlin & 
Satterthwaite, 2013). This does not mean legislation should be overlooked as a tool that 
identifies value altogether. Interviewees maintained that the degree of articulation of 
urban and patrimonial policies remains fundamental to the viability and success of its 
management, mainly because non-governmental bodies could not guarantee continuity 
(LOCE and PROURB Interviews) (Borde & Sampaio, 2012). The greater number of 
successes found in Rio compared to Beirut were certainly aided by the viability of the 
conservation system.  
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2.4 Conclusion 
Our paper illustrates the complexities of heritage conservation, its integration into 
planning regulation, the implementation of these regulations and ultimately what this 
tells us about how society defines value in the context of conservation.  We did this 
through an analysis of five case studies located in both Global North and Global South 
cities so that the complexities of regulation and context could better emerge. As we 
have shown there is no simple model that is particularly Northern or Southern, as 
variegation always exists.  All of our cases began their journeys from similar points of 
departure, but each then proceeded in slightly different directions based on local 
contexts, producing different results.  This is perhaps not unexpected, but it lends 
further weight to the work that eschews ideas that patrimonialisation is a European 
ideal merely applied in colonial contexts (Choay, 1992).  While it may be true that 
‘heritage creation’ emerged first in Europe, the development of regulations, the 
implementation of these rules and the histories and communities surrounding them are 
very much local and therefore produce place specific outcomes.  We contend that the 
embedded histories of urbanism, planning regulation and the invention of a 
conceptualisation of what heritage means develop both separately and in parallel in 
each nation state. Whether urban planning and its practice links itself to the destruction 
of urban heritage ensembles or whether it attempts to preserve them, the concept of 
heritage emerges as a factor in opposition to dominant real estate models by becoming 
either an obstacle to the production of highest value or an element that needs to be 
factored into urban development. 
In most of our case studies we can see to a greater or lesser extent how the exploitation 
of land values can create pressures to limit the importance of heritage.  This is perhaps 
most pronounced in the Global South because there is greater dissonance between 
existing regulation and implementation of the policies in question.  But there are also 
cultural and historical differences. In our European cases, UHA regulations gained 
significantly in prominence after the destruction of World War II (Mehl-Schouder et al., 
2015; Scattoni & Falco, 2011). The reality of bomb damage and loss of patrimony helped 
to reinforce and solidify conservation, at least in part challenging a reification of highest 
and best use.  France and Italy pursued stringent policies where UHAs became 
overlapping webs of protection or museumifying historic centres. In England UHAs were 
predominantly developed as a reaction against the destruction caused by the 
movement for housing modernisation after the war, which saw slum clearance layered 
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with bomb damage. War brought different results in Lebanon, here buildings of the past 
were imagined as undervalued assets of a previous era and thus society valorised 
development more fully than it did heritage. These issues indicate the importance of 
context and history in the production of heritage value. 
We therefore must take notions of context very seriously as it plays a substantial role in 
how urban heritage is ‘created’ and how it actively evolves (Smith, 2006). Planning 
cultures and historical geography influence national definitions of urban heritage 
privileging some built forms over others thus valuing them differently. In practice, 
conservation planning assumes many different meanings, bound in local context and 
the operation of the planning systems more broadly. Societal values impact planning 
decisions and in turn the outcomes of these decisions, further embed societal values 
until these values are disrupted through internal or external events.  
Whilst historic monuments appear to be valued in all our contexts more heavily despite 
the evolution of legislation, the same cannot be said for UHA, where across the case 
studies, varying levels of valuation are apparent.  This might be the expectation in our 
southern case studies, however what is interesting here is that adequate protection is 
not always or necessarily tied to an elision between the planning system and 
conservation regulations.  For example, in our Northern cases contextual factors like 
corruption, lagging local economies and issues with enforcement have seen in some 
cases, considerable levels of heritage decline. As we see, the split between northern 
Italy with its more rigid application of existing regulations and the south where views 
are laxer has resulted in the abandonment and degradation of listed buildings in the 
mezzogiorno. In England, where UHAs are inscribed more locally and where planning 
enforcement is often a case of spotting an infraction with a fairly under-resourced team; 
conservation areas can often quickly degrade leading them to be put on the 
Conservation Areas at Risk register (in 2018 roughly 5% of all CAs were considered to be 
at risk).  
As noted by McFarlane (2010), there is a tendency in certain strands of urban planning 
to seek out models and apply them in different contexts. Most dangerously following 
on a rhetoric of northern policy models, being applied and often failing in southern 
contexts. Our paper has continued in the line of research attempting a critique of such 
trajectories, towards a comparative urbanism of all urban national contexts as distinct 
units, explaining similarities and differences between them. By revealing ‘assumptions, 
limits and distinctiveness’ (McFarlane, 2010) of conservation systems, we support the 
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formulation of new lines of inquiry and more situated accounts, ultimately encouraging 
systems to learn from each other. When explaining the ultimate scope of this paper to 
interviewees, many indicated the final comparative output would be useful to inform 
the limits and advantages of their own conservation planning practices.  
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patrimoine culturel. Paris: CNRS Éditions. 
Cornu, M., Negri, V., Bady, J.-P., & Leniaud, J.-M. (2013). 1913 Genèse d’une loi sur les 
monuments historiques: Mémoire des grandes lois patrimoniales. (La Documentation 
Française, Ed.). 
Cosi, D. (2008). Diritto dei beni e delle attività culturali. (Aracne, Ed.). Roma. 
Council of European Union. (2014). Conclusions on cultural heritage as a strategic resource 
for a sustainable Europe, 32(0), 1–7. 
Council of Ministers Lebanese Republic. (2010). Proceedings of meeting of the Council of 
Ministers, Lebanon. In 19. 
Creswell, J. (2009). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods 
Approaches. SAGE. 
Da Silva, R. C. M. (2012). Politicas para a preservaçao do patrimonio cultural em face do 
desenvolvimento urbano no Rio de Janeiro. In R. L. Cavallazzi & R. C. Paraizo (Eds.), 
Patrimonio, ambiente e sociedad: novos desafios espaciais (PROURB, pp. 117–133). 
Dalmas, L., Geronimi, V., Noël, J.-F., & Tsang King Sang, J. (2015). Economic evaluation of 
urban heritage: An inclusive approach under a sustainability perspective. Journal of 
Cultural Heritage, 16(5), 681–687. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.culher.2015.01.009 
Davie, M. F. (2001). Beyrouth 1825-1975: un siècle et demi d’urbanisme. Beirut: Ordre des 
Ingénieurs et Architectes de Beyrouth. 
Davie, M. F. (2004). Le patrimoine architectural et urbain au Liban: prise de conscience, 
idéologies de protection et éléments de prospective. Lebanon. 
DCLG. (1994). Planning Policy Guidance 15 : Planning and the historic Environment. 
DCLG. (2010). Planning Policy Statement 5: Planning for the Historic Environment. 
DCLG. (2012). National Planning Policy Framework. London, UK: Communities and Local 
Government. 
Devernois, N., Muller, S., & Le Bihan, G. (2014). Gestion du patrimoine urbain et revitalisation 
des quartiers anciens : l’éclairage de l’expérience française. (AFD, Ed.), A Savoir. 
Dolowitz, D. P., & Marsh, D. (2000). Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in 
Contemporary Policy-Making. Governance, 13(1), 5–23. https://doi.org/10.1111/0952-
1895.00121 
Dos Santos, H. M., & Telles, M. F. de P. (2017). Livros do Tombo. 
Earl, J. (2015). Building conservation philosophy. 
El-Achkar, H. (2011). The Role of the State in initiating gentrification: the case of the 
neighbourhoofd of Achrafieh. Lebanese University. 
Ernste, H. (2012). Framing Cultures of Spatial Planning. Planning Practice and Research, 27(1), 
87–101. https://doi.org/10.1080/02697459.2012.661194 
Fantini, S. (2014). Il centro storico come bene paesaggistico a valenza culturale. In Aedon. 
Gubbio. 
  
92 
Fawaz, M., Krijnen, M., & El Samad, D. (2018). A property framework for understanding 
gentrification: Ownership patterns and the transformations of Mar Mikhael, Beirut. 
City, 22(3), 358–374. https://doi.org/10.1080/13604813.2018.1484642 
Finco, A., & Nijkamp, P. (2001). Pathways to urban sustainability. Journal of Environmental 
Policy and Planning, 3(4), 289–302. https://doi.org/10.1002/jepp.94 
Fischfisch, A. (2011). Formes urbaines et architecturales de Beyrouth (depuis le XIXe siec̀le 
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2.6 Appendix: The politics of conservation planning 
Table A1 List of Interviews  
# Institution or Organisation Ref. within text Country City 
1 Historic England Historic England UK London 
2 Greater London Authority GLA 1 UK London 
3 Greater London Authority GLA 2 UK London 
4 Hackney Borough - London Hackney 
Borough 
UK London 
5 Ministry of Cultural- National Directorate of Heritage and 
Architecture  
Ministry of 
Culture France  
France Paris 
6 Territorial services of architecture and heritage (Services 
Territoriaux de l'Architecture et du Patrimoine STAP) Paris 
STAP Paris France Paris 
7 Territorial services of architecture and heritage Services 
Territoriaux de l'Architecture et du Patrimoine STAP) Ile-de-
France 
STAP Ile-de-
France 
France Ile-de-
France 
8 Paris Town Hall (Mairie de Paris) Paris Municipality  France Paris 
9 Ministry of Sustainable Development (Ministère de l'Écologie 
et du Développement durable) 
MSD France France Ile-de-
France 
10 IAUV (Academic) IAUV Italy GN/GS 
11 MiBAC Milano (Regional Ministry of Culture) MiBAC  Italy Milano 
12 Lombary Regional Government Lombardy 
Region  
Italy Milano 
13 Urban heritage legislation expert CLS Italy Milano 
14 Constitutional and urban heritage law expert CE  Italy Milano 
15 Politecnico di Milano expert Politecnico  Italy Milano 
16 Representative of UNESCO and ANCSA UNESCO/ANCSA Italy/France Paris 
18 Cultural Heritage and Urban Development in Lebanon Project  CHUD Lebanon Beirut 
19 Representative Permanent Delegation of Lebanon to UNESCO  UNESCO-LB Lebanon Paris 
20 Representative of the Association for the protection of 
Lebanese Heritage NGO 
APLH Lebanon Beirut 
21 General Directorate of Antiquities, Lebanese Ministry of 
Culture  
DGA Lebanon Beirut 
23 Project Manager at Council for Development and 
Reconstruction 
CDR Lebanon Beirut 
24 Beirut Municipality Council Beirut 
Municipality 
Lebanon Beirut 
25 Save Beirut Heritage NGO SBH Lebanon Beirut 
26 Lebanese Order of Civil Engineers LOCE      
27 Rio Heritage Institute (Instituto Rio Patrimonio da 
Humanidade) 
IRPH Brazil Rio 
28 National Historical and Artistic Heritage Institute Brazil IPHAN Brazil Rio 
29 PROURB - Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro PROURB Brazil Rio 
30 Municipality of Rio Rio Municipality Brazil Rio 
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Paper II 
 
3 Conservation Planning and Informal 
Institutions 
3.1 A story of heterogeneity 
Architectural beauty, whether historic or modern, can be considered a local public good 
and amenity. Urban heritage is the category of heritage that most directly concerns the 
environment of every person. Living within or in close proximity to urban heritage areas 
is thought to provide a number of welfare benefits. Similarly to other planning policies 
addressing local public goods, heritage preservation policies solve an economic 
coordination problem. Conservation planning corrects for market failures and 
internalizes positive externalities, by preserving spaces of particular heritage value or 
architectural beauty which might otherwise be subject to considerable urban change 
because of market pressures to exploit land in attractive places. 
Italy is famously known for the richness of its urban heritage, which has been argued to 
be a valuable public asset throughout the country by countless experts (Albrecht & 
Magrin 2015; Bonfantini 2012; Bandarin & Oers 2012). Italy presents a longstanding 
conservation planning system, with well-developed policies and strict regulations. 
Article 9 of the Italian Constitution states the need to protect and enhance both the 
landscape and the historical and artistic heritage of the nation (Cosi 2008; Trentini 2016). 
Conservation policy takes three main forms in this context: individual architectural 
designations (Nasi Law n. 185/1902), Landscape Areas (LAs) (Law n.1497/1939) 
protecting landscapes in both natural and urban settings, and Historic Centres (HCs) 
embedded in Italian urban policy through zoning (Bonfantini 2012). These regulations 
impose considerable limitations on how the urban environment can be modified within 
these areas, in order to preserve the sociocultural and historic values of urban fabrics. 
It has in fact been argued that conservation planning is one of the contributions to have 
been made by Italian urbanism (Balducci & Gaeta 2015).23   
Non-compliance with planning policy undermines its effects. Little is known, however, 
as to how much harm non-compliance actually does. Italy presents a context where, 
                                                             
23 ‘The Italian modern movement not only saw the historic city as unreplaceable part of the city 
to be preserved, but as a model of inspiration for the design of the modern city’ Giuseppa Fera 
in Ernesti et al. (2015). 
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despite stringent planning regulation, the conditions of the urban environment vary 
widely throughout the country, including within protected areas (ISTAT 2015). The 
presence of such heterogeneity in conservation areas has not, to this author’s 
knowledge, been empirically explored to date, and neither have hypotheses that this 
variation could stem from non-compliance embedded in informal institutions. 
Abusivismo (AB) – illegal or unauthorized building and construction – is often argued to 
be behind heterogeneity in urban environmental conditions (Zanfi 2013), potentially 
undermining planners’ efforts to preserve heritage externalities. This paper will explore 
the heterogeneity in urban heritage effects, delimited through conservation planning, 
and attempt to show how, at least partially, AB levels explain this heterogeneity. Is 
abusivismo putting one of the major urban amenities of Italian cities at risk? 
Illegal or informal building is present in many countries; however, the precise 
phenomenon of AB is quite specific to Italy. AB is widespread, to the extent that it has 
assumed social and political importance (Biffi, Ciafani, Dodaro & Muroni 2014; Trentini 
2016). AB can be described as a type of informal institution, given that it goes beyond 
simply ad hoc informal building behaviour and refers to practices which are widely 
followed and embedded within Italian societies. This follows Helmke & Levitsky (2004) 
who define informal institutions as socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are 
created, communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels.24 
Specifically, this paper identifies AB as a competing informal institution, as defined by 
Helmke & Levitsky (2004), given its coexistence with ineffective formal institutions and 
divergent outcomes. Competing informal institutions structure incentives which are 
incompatible with formal rules, creating alternative norms (Della Porta & Vannucci 
1999).  
As an outcome measure of economic value, I concentrate on property prices which 
reflect the value buyers attach to all property characteristics, including the architectural 
or heritage value of a property itself and the area. By using the economic value 
embedded in property prices as an outcome variable, this hedonic approach has the 
advantage of building on a tradition of research estimating the capitalization effect of 
a wide range of local public goods or policies (Cellini et al. 2010; Eriksen & Rosenthal 
2010; Gibbons & Machin 2008; Gibbons et al. 2013). The paper is divided into two 
subsequent analyses. I first investigate whether heterogenous price premiums can be 
                                                             
24 This definition borrows from Brinks (2003) and is consistent with Carey (2000), Lauth (2000) 
and Christiansen & Neuhold (2012). 
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observed across the 55 cities and the 296 neighbourhoods under investigation, the 
underlying question being what this suggests about how urban heritage is valued across 
Italian regions. Robust evidence on potential benefits of conservation planning is 
scarce, and crucial for the economic justification of such planning policies. I then 
examine what drives the heterogeneity of heritage price premiums across cities, and 
attempt to assess whether heritage price premiums are reduced by rates of AB. This 
hypothesis can be substantiated empirically, the underlying premise being that places 
with higher AB are less compliant with urban policy and consequently experience lower 
external benefits. Conservation planning is a good example to examine because of the 
stringency of the policies attached to it. I hope this analysis will motivate other 
investigations of the relationship between restrictive zoning systems and citizen 
compliance. Despite recent efforts and the political will to fight AB and other forms of 
widespread illegal attitudes in Italy over the last 20 years, AB rates, among other 
outcomes, have not substantially dropped (ISTAT 2015). 
To assess the heterogeneity of heritage price premiums and thereafter the reasons 
behind such variation, I make use of a two-step strategy which recovers price premiums 
by city in the first step and regresses the recovered premiums on AB rates in the second 
step. This methodology can in theory be applied to other contexts with stringent 
policies and which present similar heterogeneities. To collect price premiums by city for 
both Italian conservation policies (LAs and HCs), I exploit the fine spatial nature of a 
novel Italian data set of house prices and draw on the regression discontinuity design 
literature, in particular work that has exploited discontinuous changes at spatial 
boundaries (Gibbons et al. 2013; Ahlfeldt & Holman 2017). I establish a boundary 
discontinuity-inspired design (BDD) which allows me to account for unobserved 
location characteristics that could confound the heritage effect. In the second step, I 
explore how AB and other covariates affect both LA and HC price premiums.  
I face two possible estimation challenges in this city-level second step. On the one hand, 
returns to abusive behaviour could be larger in highly valued areas, presenting a 
possible reverse causality issue and a negative bias in the results. On the other hand, 
possible omitted variables could be affecting both the heritage premium and abusive 
behaviour: AB is likely correlated with unobserved city characteristics. I address these 
endogeneity concerns using an instrumental variable approach. The main instrument 
used is a legal attitudes index (LAI) created by Tabellini (JEEA 2010) in his longstanding 
work on informal institutions. This index incorporates measures of trust, respect, 
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control and obedience. The instrument mechanically gets around a possible reverse 
causality problem since it is unlikely to be affected by price premiums. It also addresses 
the omitted variable problem as it measures a range of attitudes which are good 
predictors of AB but not of price premiums. As predicted, results using the LAI as an 
instrument have slightly larger magnitudes than the OLS estimates. The estimates are, 
however, consistent overall, suggesting that the OLS results are quite robust. 
Accordingly, I re-run the entire analysis at neighbourhood level, using an alternative 
measure of AB that I am able to construct at a smaller spatial scale using census data. 
This alternative measure of AB is an index of urban law compliance, constructed by 
exploiting differences in numbers of pre-1919 buildings between 2011 and 2001, which 
are strictly protected by law. Re-rerunning my analysis at neighbourhood level allows 
me to identify the effect of interest from a comparable source of variation at a finer 
spatial scale (within cities), and to include city fixed effects to confirm that heritage 
price premiums are, at least partially, significantly reduced by non-compliance. 
Comparing the discontinuities in property prices at the boundaries of both HCs and LAs, 
I find an average capitalization of about 6.5% (€160 extra per square metre) for LAs, and 
an estimated average premium of 3.5% (€86 extra per square metre) for HCs. Results 
show significant variation in heritage price premiums across Italian cities, with some 
trends according to geographical location. The analysis also reveals different effects in 
terms of magnitude for HCs and LAs. LA premiums tend to be significant and positive at 
larger magnitudes in northern cities, and significant and negative at smaller magnitudes 
in central and southern cities, while HC premiums tend to be significant and positive in 
northern and central cities, but significant and negative at smaller magnitudes in 
southern cities and island cities. There are, however, many exceptions within these 
geographical trends. The second step of the analysis reveals that premiums are on 
average lower in regions with higher rates of AB, suggesting that places with higher AB 
are less compliant with conservation planning and consequently experience lower 
external benefits. More specifically, a 1% increase in AB is associated with an expected 
depreciation effect of 0.64 percentage points in HC price premiums, while a 1% increase 
in AB is associated with an expected depreciation effect of 0.14 percentage points in LA 
price premiums. The results therefore confirm that, at least partially, illegal building and 
construction levels explain this heterogeneity. The important implication from these 
findings is that planning policies capable of solving the free-market coordination 
problem related to the architectural externalities are undermined in the Italian context 
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by illegal attitudes. This underlines the necessity to either re-address policies limiting AB 
or, and perhaps jointly, re-address cutting red tape to remove some of the 
administrative burdens within conservation areas. These findings can also have external 
policy implications in suggesting the magnitudes at which illegal attitudes can 
undermine urban policy effects. 
This study generally follows two strands of literature. It contributes to literature that 
has assessed the amenity value of cities (Glaeser et al. 2005; Gyourko & Tracy 1999; 
Albouy 2009) and neighbourhoods within cities (Cheshire & Sheppard 2005; Coulson 
2008). The study more specifically contributes to literature evaluating urban heritage 
and architectural amenity capitalization effects on property prices (Noonan 2007; van 
Duijn & Rouwendal 2015; van Duijn et al. 2016; Ahlfeldt & Holman 2017; Ahlfeldt et al. 
2017; Hilber et al. 2017). In comparison with these studies, this analysis explores the 
heterogeneity of urban heritage effects across two conservation policies – 933 LAs and 
236 HCs. The analysis is unique in terms of the number of cities compared, and in the 
spatial detail of the data set for the Italian territory. Lack of previous evidence for the 
Italian context can be attributed to the challenge of compiling large micro data sets for 
this territory. The analysis of capitalization effects of conservation policies is in itself 
interesting in the Italian context because of the particular stringency of the planning 
system, especially compared to other European systems such as the English one 
(Pietrostefani & Holman 2017).  
Exploiting the Italian context also allows this study to investigate the relationship 
between a restrictive zoning system and informal institutions, creating a link between 
two literature strands. The paper generally inserts itself in a growing body of evidence 
suggesting that illegal behaviour within both formal and informal institutions is one of 
the major causes of the degradation of natural and built environments, diluting policy 
effects (Wilson & Damania 2005). Traditionally, economists have been reluctant to 
consider informal practices as possible determinants of economic outcomes. More 
recently, however, a growing body of empirical work has measured how socially shared 
rules and attitudes – sometimes denominated as ‘culture’ – matter for a variety of 
economic outcomes (Alesina & Giuliano 2015; Tabellini 2010; Guiso et al. 2006; Bisin & 
Verdier 2001). This paper specifically contributes to this literature, as well as building on 
empirical studies that have investigated the role of other illegal activities on house 
prices (Roy 2005; Krijnen & Fawaz 2010). Studies have found considerable discounts on 
homes in high crime areas (Pope & Pope 2012; Buonanno et al. 2013; Gibbons 2004; 
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Lynch & Rasmussen 2001) and historical crime rates have also been shown to have 
persistent effects on the price of real estate (Frischtak & Mandel 2012). Studies have 
also only very recently analysed the effect of organized crime on choice of living location 
and house price behaviour (Maggio 2018). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the unique data 
set and its various sources as well as the institutional and policy setting of our analysis 
by giving a short overview of conservation planning and illegal building and 
construction in the Italian context. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy and 
econometric specifications for the analysis, followed by Section 4 which reveals and 
discusses the results. The final section present the conclusions.  
3.2 Data and Institutional Setting  
3.2.1 Property and Location Data 
The empirical analysis relies on a novel data set constructed from a wide-range of 
sources. Over 60,000 geo-localised house sales advertisements with a wide range of 
attributes spanning from 2011 to 2018 were collected from Immobiliare.it, the largest 
online portal for real-estate services in Italy. Data sampling focused on residential units 
for sale monitored from the time they were created up to the time they were removed 
from the database.25  
This paper is among the first to exploit this database, which presents various 
advantages to the data provided by the real estate market observatory of the Italian 
Tax Office (OMI data). The OMI data is aggregated at neighbourhood level and is 
therefore insufficient for the study of localized phenomena. Moreover, it has limited 
information about the physical characteristics of the transacted housing units. The 
collected Immobiliare data has the advantage of including a long list of structural 
attributes including floor space (m2), date posted on website, year, month, type 
(building, villa, house, apartment, loft, attic, box), number of rooms and bathrooms, 
type of kitchen, floor, garage of parking facilities, presence of a lift, year built, state of 
property, type of heating, AC facilities, energy classification, presence of a 
balcony/terrace and optic fibre facilities. Loberto, Luciani and Pangallo (2018)’s recent 
comparison between the OMI zone data and the Immobiliare.it database found the 
                                                             
25 In 2016 the number of housing transactions in provincial capitals on Immobiliare.it was 183,000 
units (about one-third of all housing transactions in Italy). The majority of transactions in these 
cities is brokered by real estate agents – who are more likely to upload adds on Immobiliare.it 
than private citizens –, whereas in small towns sales are less likely to need brokerage and so 
representativeness is potentially a problem. 
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latter broadly consistent with official sources with an approximate 12% discount to be 
interpreted between the Immobiliare data and the OMI data. The use of house price 
data from advertisements – as opposed to data from actual sales – is not problematic 
in this case given the paper’s focus on large cities (the 3 most population capitals in each 
region). I do not need to worry about large quantities of properties not advertised on 
Immobaliare.it which is the case in smaller Italian cities. As demonstrated by Loberto et 
al (2018), who use a similar data-set, the advertised price is close to an unbiased forecast 
of actual sales prices that does not vary across the cities under consideration (and 
includes a constant premium). Details on the compilation of the hedonic data and city 
selection are illustrated in section 3 of the appendix. 
A long list of locational controls in order to diminish omitted variable bias in the baseline 
regressions were collected from the Italian census (2011), the Italian National Geoportal 
of the Environment, various Italian open data regional geo-portals (when available), the 
Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Culture and Open Street Map. They include geo-
localised micro-data such as building height and average typology of buildings on the 
street, a range of natural and commercial amenities, parking and transport controls, as 
well as the locations of schools. These were all matched to the hedonic data through 
GIS. The mid-point of the main commercial street of each city was also recorded to act 
as a proxy for the CBD of each city. The main road construct applies well to medium 
Italian cities and for larger cities such as Milan, Rome and Naples two or more points 
were recorded (Borruso & Porceddu 2009). Socio-economic variables such as 
population density, migrant percentages and level of education were obtained and 
joined to the hedonic data from the 2011 Italian census (please see section 3 of the 
appendix for a full list of covariates and further clarifications).  
3.2.2 A very short summary of conservation planning in Italy 
Conservation planning in Italy is made up of three highly restrictive legislative strands: 
individual architectural designations26 and their relative perimeters, Landscape Areas 
(LAs)27 and Historic Centres (HCs) (Carughi 2012; Bonfantini 2012; Olivetti et al. 2008; 
Giannini 1976). Conservation planning has a unique place in Italian urban policy; some 
have even argued that the principles and practises of conservation planning are one of 
Italian urbanism’s few contributions in the field (Balducci & Gaeta 2015).  
                                                             
26 Known in Italian as vincoli architettonici. 
27 Known in Italian as vincoli paesaggistici. 
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Individual architectural amenities are the most restrictive of the three legislative strands 
(Nasi Law n. 185/1902) (Carughi 2012). The Italian system differentiates between 
monuments – buildings with high levels of architectural significance – and buildings of 
‘minor’ architectural value which nonetheless carry historic or socio-cultural significance 
(Ricci 2007).28 In 2004, public buildings constructed before 1919 were also all 
automatically listed to avoid the loss of urban cultural values (Ministero dei beni culturali 
e delle attività culturali e del turismo 2017). This paper exploits the nature of this binding 
law and the availability of data from the Italian building census, to construct an index of 
urban law compliance ∆𝑈𝐵𝐿𝑐 = 𝐿𝐵𝑐𝑡2 − 𝐿𝐵𝑐𝑡1by calculating the difference in pre-1919 
buildings in a good or excellent state between 2011 (𝐿𝐵𝑐𝑡2) and 2001 (𝐿𝐵𝑐𝑡1) per 100 
buildings by census tract, accounting for changes in census unit boundaries. The 
constructed index thus measures the respect of the law protecting all buildings built 
before 1919 and is indicative of places where changes have occurred in the historic urban 
environment at a very fine spatial level despite the national law. The index presents an 
alternative measure to the AB rates primarily used in this paper. Census data also allows 
me to construct an index estimating positive or negative variations of housing stock by 
census tract in the same manner (∆𝐻𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑐 = 𝐻𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑐𝑡2 − 𝐻𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑐𝑡1) to control for 
the development tendencies of each area (Cortese 2013).  
Landscape Areas (LAs) (Law n.1497/1939) protect landscapes in both natural and urban 
settings, in the latter specifically ‘complexes of immobile things (buildings) that hold 
aesthetic or traditional values’ (Giannini 1976; Carughi 2012). This aspect of Italian 
conservation planning is included in the Cultural Heritage and Landscape Code (22 
January 2004 n. 42) as Article 136, identifying buildings and areas of significant public 
interest29 (Ministero dei Beni e della Attività Culturali e del Turismo 2016). Most LAs were 
designated between 1950 and 1970, with fewer but constant inscriptions in the last 20 
years, as well as boundary and extension updates of many of the earlier inscriptions 
(Pietrostefani & Holman 2017) (see section 2 in the appendix). There are over 6000 LAs 
of various sizes in the Italian territory, many of which are situated in urban areas. LAs go 
                                                             
28 The data-set used distinguishes between monuments, palaces, houses, portals, walls, 
courtyards and other types of architectural amenities (Ministero dei beni e delle attività culturali 
e del turismo 2016). The dataset also specifies whether the cultural value of the architectural 
good has been verified by the relevant governing body – in many cases, because of the limited 
resources, it has not been verified. 
29 These include a. good of specific administrative use b. ‘immovable things’, ‘villas and gardens’, 
‘parks’ c. and d. ‘complex of properties’, ‘areas of scenic beauty’.  
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beyond the protection of built form, they designate and attribute value to streets, 
sidewalks, piazzas and minor elements of the urban fabric.  
Figure 1 Examples of the Italian conservation planning system 
 
Note: Historic Centres (HCs) are in denoted in orange. Landscape Areas (LAs) are in pink/red.  
 
Historic Centres (HCs) are the third strand of Italian conservation planning and are 
imbedded in Italian urban policy through zoning (Bonfantini 2012). The 1967 Legge Ponte 
(Law n. 765) included historic centres as part of overall city planning, delimiting them 
by the Zone A in Italian Master plans which demarcates zoning areas, buildable 
exploitation and areas to be allocated to public services (Campus-Venuti & Oliva 1993).30 
The regulatory plans of each city protect HCs and impose a series of restrictions on 
them. HCs are delimited in a logic of historical consistency where there is a clear 
differentiation in building age between buildings inside Zone A and outside Zone A. As 
shown in Figure 1, in practice many historic centres are partially superimposed by LAs. 
Given fragmented historical geography of Italy, there are over 8,000 Italian cities, most 
of which, both large and small, have at least one historic centre (Ricci 2007). HCs often 
spatially overlap with the city centres of Italian metropolitan areas, thus hosting the 
large part of economic activity, however, larger cities have often switched to a more 
polycentric nature by adopting a second economic hub.  
This paper explores 55 provincial capitals which include 933 Landscape Areas, more than 
236 Historic Centres and over 43,000 individual architectural designations. Geo-localised 
data on listed architectural amenities was provided by the Istituto Superiore per la 
                                                             
30  PRCs (Piano Regolatore Comunale) or PRGs (Piano Regolatore Generale) are general regulatory 
plans for the city. 
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conservazione ed il restauro in the Ministry of Culture. The Landscape Area shapes were 
traced through the Direzione generale archeologia, belle art e paesaggio WMS services 
on ArcGIS. This last data is known to present a series of spatial errors and in order to 
avoid the definition of incorrect boundaries, the data was checked with regional 
datasets when available. The Historic Centres for each of the 55 cities were drawn from 
the metropolitan zoning plans on ArcGIS by geo-referencing each zoning plan. 
The restrictions imposed on these areas are characterised by the role played by the 
soprintendenza – the regional cultural heritage authority. The soprintendenza, with 
recommendations from the regional authority, have absolute control over individual 
architectural amenities and their ad-hoc perimeters. They approve building 
modifications, reserve the right to order suspension of works and can impose work on 
private buildings. They also generally determine many elements of urban design, and in 
practice new developments and building modifications are heavily controlled. The 
regional authority also leads the enforcement of restrictions related to LAs. Constraints 
are itemised in the plan attached to each designated area and are subject to inspection 
by the soprintendenza. Local municipalities cannot grant building permits without the 
approval of the soprintendenza. Permits are typically difficult to obtain in light of 
extensive red-tape and are a source of common complaint among citizens. It is well-
known that residents often opt to illegally modify their homes or buildings instead of 
facing the administrative labyrinth of gaining permission for possible alterations as this 
comes with monetary costs and long delays (Grignetti 2017). The Italian conservation 
planning system is thus characterised by a top-down approach and too much restriction, 
typically associated with the role of the soprintendenza. Recent research (Pietrostefani 
& Holman, 2017) has remarked on the system’s traditionalist nature, where the potential 
of both urban heritage areas and buildings is not exploited because too much restriction 
is imposed.  
3.2.3 Informal attitudes and behaviours 
Despite the presence of identical policies and similar budgets and human resources 
available between Italian regions, the conditions of the urban environment vary widely 
throughout the country, including within protected areas (ISTAT 2015). Several 
important strands of social science research suggest that real world institutions seldom 
function according to formal institutional rules alone, but are shaped by powerful 
informal rules and norms (Beers 2010; Ostrom 2005; North 1991). Pioneered by Friedman 
(1975), the legal culture literature clearly acknowledges the role of informal rules and 
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norms—both within legal institutions (“internal” legal culture) and in the broader 
society (“external” legal culture). Informal building practices are present in many 
contexts, and in Italy abusivism is engrained in society to the extent that it has assumed 
considerable social and political importance (Zanfi 2013; Biffi et al. 2014). It is often 
argued that AB is behind this heterogeneity in urban environment conditions (Zanfi 
2013), potentially undermining planners’ efforts to preserve positive heritage 
externalities. 
The term informal institutions has been applied to wide-ranging phenomena. This paper 
follows Helmke and Levitsky (2004) in delimiting informal institutions as capturing as 
much of the universe of informal rules as possible, but narrow enough to distinguish 
informal rules from other, non-institutional informal phenomena (Christiansen & 
Neuhold 2012; Brinks 2003). By contrast, formal institutions are rules and procedures 
that are created, communicated, and enforced through channels widely accepted as 
official. Within Helmke and Levitsky’s (2004) typology of informal institutions, AB most 
closely identifies with what are defined as competing informal institutions. In such 
cases, formal rules and procedures are not systematically enforced, which enables 
actors to ignore or violate them. Competing informal institution structures coexist but 
are incompatible with formal rules, creating alternative norms (Della Porta & Vannucci 
1999). Clientelism, clan politics, and corruption are a few examples of such informal 
institutions. 
3.2.3.1 Widespread self-building practices and policies responding to AB 
Approximately a quarter of the buildings constructed in Italy between the 1960s and 
the 1980s were unauthorised (CER & Ministero dei Lavori Pubblici 1986). Since 2008, 
Italy has witnessed a sharp downsizing of construction as illustrated in Figure 2. 
However, while legal construction shrank by over 60%, the illegal component did so by 
less than 30% (ISTAT 2016b). This pattern continued and since 2014 the number of 
authorized new constructions dropped by 16.3% with unauthorized construction falling 
by only by 6.1%. The recession also created a favourable climate for AB, leading the 
number of illegal buildings to rise in specific years, for example from 15.2% to 17.6% in 
2014 (ANAC 2013; Grignetti 2017). These numbers suggest a lack of control over the 
process of urbanisation, aggravated by informal development both in the form of 
building extensions and new constructions. Furthermore, this is taking place not only in 
buildable areas but also in areas subject to protective regulations, including landscape 
and archaeological areas (ISTAT 2014). 
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Before the reinforcement of the landscape area law (Galasso law 1985), there were on 
average 437 buildings per square kilometre along coastlines. Twenty years later, 
building density reached 540 per square kilometre (+23,6%) (ISTAT 2015; Legambiente 
2014), with particularly large increases in the regions of Calabria, Sicily and Marche. The 
stringent urban planning system is thus opposed in many cases by a tacit laissez faire 
attitude where individuals work on their own solutions taking advantage of weak formal 
institutions despite strict national policies. This suggests that the heterogeneity in the 
conditions of the urban environment in both Landscape and Historic Areas across the 
Italian territory may be inversely correlated with AB. The principle measure of AB used 
in this paper are the abusivism rates created by CRESME – the Italian Centre for Social 
and Economic Research of the Construction and Real-estate market, which measure 
number of illegal dwellings constructed for every 100 dwellings in a given year. 
Estimates are available from 2004 to 2017. Cities with high scores on the CRESME index 
sometimes present values as high as 70 percent of buildings constructed abusively in a 
given year, while cities with low values range at approximately 5 percent of buildings 
constructed illegally in a given year.  
Figure 2 Evolution of un-authorised vs. authorised building 
 
Note: Authorised and abusive constructions in Italy, thousands of new construction for residential 
use. Years 2004-2014. 
There has been a general North-South polarization in AB trends as shown in Figure 3. 
AB has maintained higher levels in southern regions compared to the rest of the Italy. 
In Calabria, unauthorised construction accounted for no less than 70 percent of total 
buildings in the 1970s (Zanfi 2013). Although these estimates have dropped since, AB 
indices are still very high: 45-60% of authorised buildings between 2012-2014 in Molise, 
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Campania, Calabria and Sicily. In  the same period, the average values of AB also doubled 
compared to the previous three years in the central regions of Umbria and Marche 
(from 9 to 17.6% and from 5.1 to 10.6% respectively). Significant increases were also 
recorded in Tuscany (from 7.9% to 11.5%), Lazio (from 9.7% to 15.1%) and Liguria (from 
12.4% to 15.6%) (ISTAT 2013). Figure 3 also illustrates similar trends in people’s perception 
of degradation of the urban environment. There is more perceived degradation in 
regions with high rates of AB, and higher disrespect of the 1919 historic building law 
(UBL index) in regions also exhibiting higher values of AB (ISTAT 2013). Section 2.2 of 
the appendix provides further information on the evolution of illegal building trends. 
Figure 3 North-South divide in non-compliance 
 
Note: Data standardized for comparability – x* = (x-m)/sd + 2. °Northern Regions #Central Regions *Southern and 
Island Regions. Abusiveness: Average rate of abusivism 2004-2016 – number of new abusive constructions of 
residential use for every 100 legal constructions. Perception of Degradation: Average 2010-2016 – Individuals of 
14 or more years that consider the urban environment in the place which they live in to be affected by evident 
degradation (for every 100 people). Disrespect of 1919 Law (2001-2011) – difference in pre-1919 buildings in good 
or excellent state between 2011 and 2001 per 100 buildings. Figure A3 in appendix shows how abusiveness does 
not substantially diminish over recent years. Source: author’s elaboration of CRESME and ISTAT Data. 
Informal and illegal building practices in Italy are principally motivated by local necessity 
driven by the will to bypass administrative red-tape and difficulties obtaining permission 
to build or modify structures (Zanfi 2013). It is also more generally part of a Do It Yourself 
(DIY) culture aimed at avoiding monetary and time costs (Schneider & Williams 2013). 
The literature thus principally ties AB to local attitudes and preferences. Studies have, 
however, also linked AB to local building collusion both to provide work to unemployed 
and unskilled population, and to consolidate the power base of local mafia groups. Out 
of the 19.1 billion euros part of the Italian eco-mafia market in 2016, 16.4% were linked to 
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illegal building (Legambiente 2017).31 In addition to marking the landscape, AB feeds the 
illegal cement industry (from quarries, to concrete plants, to construction companies). 
I construct a mafia-crime index as a covariate for the second step of the empirical 
strategy to account for this. The index is constructed from ISTAT province capitals crime 
data and accounts for rates of mass casualty crimes (usually linked to bombs or similar), 
voluntary mafia homicides and kidnappings.  
The best deterrent to AB has been argued to be the restoration of legality through the 
demolition of outlawed buildings. Recurrent building amnesties, 1985, 1994 and 2003 
have, however, not helped metropolitan administrations to remember that demolishing 
illegal buildings is not optional, but an obligation according to Presidential Decree 
380/2001 (Biffi et al. 2014). A more recent Law 68/2018 on environmental crimes has 
seen better outcomes with an increase of arrests by 20% and a decrease in illegality by 
7% (Marra 2017). AB continues, however, given the ineffectiveness of demolitions. Of 
the 46,700 demolitions ordered by the state judiciary in 2012, only 14% have been carried 
out to date (see section 2 of the appendix for a breakdown). Between 2004-2018, 
Campania only followed through on 496 (2.9%) of its 16,596 demolition injunctions, 
while other regions with much lower rates have carried out much higher numbers of 
demolitions, Lombardy and Piedmont 37% and 30% of their 4,895 and 3,456 injunctions 
respectively (Biffi et al. 2018). Moreover, even though lack of funds for demolition costs 
is used to justify the inaction of the public administration, the law clearly states that 
costs associated with demolitions are the responsibility of building owners. 
3.3 Empirical Framework 
The starting point of my empirical strategy is the assumption that in spatial equilibrium 
all costs and benefits associated with residing in a property of a certain type and at a 
certain location capitalise into property prices. This assumption follows a long tradition 
of hedonic research, which assumes that residents are fully mobile and there is perfect 
spatial competition (Rosen 1974; Tolley & Diamond 1982). As argued by Ahlfeldt & 
Holman (2017), Cheshire et al. (2017) and Levkovich et al. (2018) among others, this 
assumption is plausible when identifying spatial variation at a very fine scale which our 
novel Italian data-set allows. Market price 𝑃𝑖 is fully described by vectors of structural 
𝑆′, locational 𝐿′ components and regulatory components 𝐻′ making a property more of 
                                                             
31 The term eco-mafia, in the Italian language, is a neologism coined by the environmental 
association Legambiente (2014) to indicate the illegal activities of criminal organizations, mostly 
mafia, which cause damage to the environment. 
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less attractive (zoning, height restriction or other). In this case, the regulatory 
components are Historic Centres and Landscape Areas. When denoting whether a 
property i is sold within the boundaries of a historic centre 𝐻𝐶, or within the boundaries 
of Landscape Area 𝐿𝐴, the respective coefficients indicate the different effects of the 
heritage areas. Following exploratory regressions (see section 5.1 of the appendix), 
estimates suggest there is enough variation between LAs and HCs to separately identify 
the effects of these two policies. 
My first fundamental identification problem arises because of possible unobserved 
amenities inside or near HCs or LAs. I draw on the regression discontinuity design 
literature, in particular recent literature utilising property price discontinuities at spatial 
boundaries (BDD), a special case of the more general RDD (Gibbons et al. 2013; Ahlfeldt 
& Holman 2017). This allows me to account for unobserved location characteristics that 
could confound the heritage effect. I exploit the precise knowledge of the rules 
determining treatment of two border zones 𝑧 = (1, 2) across the boundaries of HCs 
and LAs, where the border 𝑥0 is the known cut-off, and where 𝑧 = 1 and 𝑧 = 2 are 
geographically close, whilst ensuring they are on different sides of the regulation 
boundary (Angrist & Pischke 2009). The difference in prices between 𝑧 = 1 and 𝑧 = 2  
is fully described by the differences in structural and locational attributes, as well as 
regulatory features. I further assume that the two areas immediately inside and outside 
of LAs and HCs are the same in terms of locational attributes such as accessibility to the 
city centre, transport infrastructures, natural amenities, schools or other unobserved 
variables, i.e. 𝐿𝑧=1 =  𝐿𝑧=2 . I therefore assume that the variation in the areas immediately 
inside and outside of LAs and HCs is primarily related to heritage or architectural 
characteristics, and that the areas at both sides of the boundary are similar in most other 
respects. As stipulated in Ahlfeldt & Holman (2017) this assumption is easily accurate at 
the boundary that separates two zones.  
Given the precise policy intervention, where areas are purposefully drawn to protect 
coherent areas of urban fabric presenting valued architectural styles, we can expect 
abrupt changes between 𝑧 = 1 and 𝑧 = 2 . The critical restrictive differences between 
buildings inside and outside urban heritage areas, as described in section 2.2, further 
supports this argument. It is therefore sensible to expect, as argued by Ahlfeldt & 
Holman (2017), a sharp discontinuity in the appearance of buildings at the boundary of 
LAs and HCs in cities presenting low levels of AB where I anticipate conservation 
planning to be respected. A smaller or lack-of discontinuity is on the other hand 
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expected in cities presenting high levels of AB, given that policy restrictions would not 
necessarily be followed. It is fair to acknowledge, however, that there could also be very 
localised spill-over effects from heritage areas to nearby areas. 
The empirical strategy relies on the estimation of two econometric specifications. In the 
first step, I use the spatial nature of the policies under investigation to graphically 
explore discontinuities at the boundaries of both Landscape Areas and Historic Centres. 
I then estimate average boundary price premiums across the 55 cities in my sample 
controlling as comprehensively as possible for other factors. This allows me to explore 
the heterogeneity of heritage effects. Throughout the econometric specifications, my 
approach to control for unobserved locational factors is inspired by the spatial 
boundary discontinuity design (BDD). In the second step, I explore variables driving the 
heterogeneity in price premiums and regress the recovered premiums on a series of 
city-level controls, notably abusivism rates. I address endogeneity concerns in the 
second step by using an instrumental variable approach. As a robustness test, I then re-
run the entire analysis at neighbourhood level using an alternative measure of AB. 
3.3.1 Price premiums at the boundary  
In identifying heritage capitalisation effects by city, I concentrate on property prices 
that fall within a 200-metre buffer inside and outside LA and HC boundaries. I create 
dummies of the buffer areas around LA and HC borders, specifically 𝐿𝐴𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 takes 
the value of one if 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐿𝐴𝑖 >  −200 & 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐿𝐴𝑖 < 200, and 𝐻𝐶𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 takes the 
value of one if 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐻𝐶𝑖 > −200 & 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐻𝐶𝑖 < 200. I also create dummies of the area 
immediately inside both LA and HC borders, specifically 𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎 takes the value of one if 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐿𝐴𝑖 < 0  and 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐿𝐴𝑖 > −200, and 𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎 takes the value of one if 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐻𝐶𝑖 <
0 & 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐻𝐶𝑖 > −200. The inclusion of both these dummies within my equation allows 
me to recover the coefficients of 𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎 and 𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎 as the boundary effects.32 I thus 
mitigate the problem of unobserved area effects by differencing the data between 
close-neighbouring properties to eliminate area-specific unobservable. By interacting 
𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎 and 𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎 with city dummies, I then easily collect average boundary effects by 
city. This strategy achieves the collection of lower bound estimate price premiums given 
it considers small areas on each side of the policy border: estimates are thus less-likely 
to be influenced by locational spill-over which might be present if wider areas on each 
side of the boundary were considered (Koster & Rouwendal 2017; Koster et al. 2012). 
                                                             
32 This is equivalent to taking the difference of coefficients 𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎 and 𝐻𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑎 if 𝐻𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑎 took 
the value of one if 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐻𝐶𝑖  > 0 & 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐻𝐶𝑖 < 200. 
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For example, if considering wider areas on each side of the policy demarcation, a greater 
variety of heritage amenities would in many cases be present within inner areas of the 
spatial policies, possibly inflating the estimates.  
To estimate the boundary effect first step, I therefore use the following specification: 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖𝑎𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎 ×  𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑎 + 𝜌𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎 ×  𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑎 +  𝜆𝐻𝐶𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 ×  𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑎
+ 𝛾𝐿𝐴𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 ×  𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑎  + 𝛿𝑆𝑖𝑎 + 𝜃𝐿𝑖𝑎 + 𝜖𝑖𝑎𝑡 
(1) 
 
, where 𝑃𝑖𝑎𝑡 is the price per square metre of floor space of a property i advertised in year 
t in city a.  𝑆𝑖 and 𝐿𝑖 are typical structural and locational amenities controls and 𝛼𝑡  are 
year effects. a can be substituted by n for neighbourhoods in an alternative version of 
the model. 𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎 and 𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎 are the boundary effect dummies and my two key 
variables of interest, with  𝐻𝐶𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 and 𝐿𝐴𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 are limited areas on both side 
of the boundary respectively controlling for un-observables. The model thus accounts 
for unobserved amenities and heterogeneity of preferences among households. For 
convenience, I assume a semi-log relationship as it infers a premium in percentage terms 
and has proven to suit data in many hedonic house price studies (Halvorsen & Palmquist 
1980). 
3.3.2 How does abusivisim affect both LA and HC price premiums? 
The second step concentrates on how city variation influences border price premiums. 
It specifically focuses on how abusivism affects both LA and HC heritage premiums as 
hypothesised in section 2 of the paper. The specification takes the following form: 
?̂?𝑎 = 𝐴𝐵𝑎𝛿+ 𝐵𝑎𝑓 + 𝜖𝑎                                                                            (2a) 
?̂?𝑎 = 𝐴𝐵𝑎𝜃 + 𝐵𝑎𝑔 + 𝜅𝑎                                                                   (2b) 
, where ?̂?𝑎 and ?̂?𝑎 are the boundary effects for city a recovered in (1). 𝐴𝐵𝑎𝛿 and 𝐴𝐵𝑎𝜃 
are measures of abusivism and 𝐵𝑎𝑓 and 𝐵𝑎𝑔  are other city a characteristics which could 
be theoretical influencing price premiums. The latter include covariates such as level of 
education, number of buildings in bad condition, building height, new building growth 
and an environmental degradation index focusing on natural amenities such as water 
and air quality. A mafia-crime index is also tested as a covariate (as defined in section 
2.3.1) given the theoretical basis that AB might be partially motivated by informal 
organizations (Helmke & Levitsky 2004). A number of variations of the equation are run 
to arrive to a preferred model. These equations allow me to assess whether heritage 
price premiums are reduced by AB rates, the underlining premise being that places with 
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higher AB are less-compliant to urban policy and consequently experience lower 
external benefits. 
3.3.2.1 Instrumental variable (IV) estimation 
I face two possible estimation challenges in this city-level second step. To address these 
issues, I use an instrumental variable approach to substantiate my results.  
On one hand, returns to abusive behaviour could be larger in highly valued areas, 
presenting a possible reverse causality issue. Developers might want to build in high 
premium areas, because the larger the premium the more the motivation to extend 
development for larger gains.  Higher heritage premiums could thus cause more 
abusiveness. If this is the case, a negative bias in the results would be expected, and a 
suitable instrument would slightly increase the magnitude of relative coefficients. On 
the other hand, an omitted variable problem is also possible, affecting both the heritage 
premium and abusive behaviour. There may well be unobserved factors determining 
both preference for heritage (heritage appreciation) (a) and preference for abusive 
behaviour (legal attitudes) (b), resulting in the effect of unknown attitudes influencing 
both price premiums and abusive behaviour. In this case, a negative bias in the results 
would also be expected, and a suitable instrument is needed to separate out (a) from 
(a)+(b). 
Both sources of endogeneity can be addressed through instrumental variables. The 
main instrument used to address these challenges is a legal attitudes index (LAI) 
conceptually created by Tabellini (JEEA, 2010). Drawing on a large sociological (Bisin & 
Verdier 2001; Benabou & Tirole 2006) and economic (North 1991) literature that 
addresses informal institutional questions, Tabellini (2010) refers to this measure as a 
‘cultural’ index. However, the index actually focuses on four related but distinct 
measures of preference and attitudes where measurable counterparts can be found: 
trust, respect, control and obedience. Trust and respect encourage welfare-enhancing 
social interactions such as participation in the provision of public goods and are likely to 
improve the functioning of government institutions. Both trust and respect thus 
motivate strong negative relationships with abusivism, given how AB is linked to mis-
trust in local administration and is essentially a form of illegality (marking lack of 
respect). Control and obedience measure confidence in the virtues of individualism and 
are symptomatic of an entrepreneurial environment where individuals seek to take 
advantage of economic opportunities. They also strongly influence AB given its 
rootedness in ‘Do it Yourself’ culture (Tabellini 2010, p.683). The selection of the traits 
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which compose LAI has some unavoidable arbitrariness, but hopefully it does not 
matter too much. The traits are all highly relevant to AB given they measure factors 
which necessarily influence attitudes towards law enforcement.  
The instrument thus mechanically gets around a possible reverse causality problem 
since it is unlikely to be affected by price premiums. In measuring a range of attitudes 
which are good predictors of AB, but probably less so of price premiums (heritage 
preferences), LAI also addresses the omitted variable problem. Indeed, preferences for 
urban heritage are traditionally highly correlated with education, income-level and place 
of origin (Dalmas et al. 2015), and not with attitudes influencing illegal practices. 
Measures of trust, respect, control and obedience very similar to the ones used by 
Tabellini (JEEA, 2010) are obtained from the Aspects of Daily Life Survey (2013-2016) at 
province level. This survey is chosen, instead of the World Value Surveys as it has much 
larger sampling for the Italian territory (20,000 observations per year) and data at 
province level is available. I also report an alternative, notably an instrument measuring 
early political institutions in 15-17th century Italy in the spirit of Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales (2016). Such instruments have been argued to be effective predictors of 
tendency towards illegal attitudes as they embody the institutional cultural transmitted 
from generation to generation, and are in this case, evidently not correlated with price 
premiums (Alesina & Giuliano 2015; Putnam et al. 1993).  
3.3.2.2  Robustness Checks and Neighbourhood Level Analysis 
Given estimates using the LAI instrument suggest the OLS results are quite conservative 
and robust, I re-run equation (1) substituting a by n for neighbourhoods to recover price 
premiums at neighbourhood level. Equations (2a) and (2b) are then estimated at 
neighbourhood level using the urban compliance (UBL) index, described in section 2.2 
of this paper, as an alternative measure of abusivism. This approach allows me to include 
city fixed effects to my analysis and confirm my results at neighbourhood level. I also 
discuss a range of supplementary estimations, notably how other more disaggregated 
neighbourhood level characteristics across LA and HC borders could be affecting price 
premiums at a smaller spatial level.  
3.4 Estimation Results 
3.4.1  Descriptive statistics and overall average effects 
Table 1 presents some key descriptive statistics. The first four columns summarise key 
variables of the full data set, while the four following columns summarise the sample 
within HC and LA boundaries. The average price per square meter of the full data is 
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€2,463, inside HC and LA the mean price is respectively about €950 (38%) and €690 (28%)  
higher. Table A2 in section 3.3 of the appendix provides a full overview of the descriptive 
statistics of the data-set. Panel 1 of Figure 4 presents an easy comparison of house sales 
advertisements between control groups (outside Landscape and Historic Areas) and 
treatment groups (inside Landscape and Historic Areas). In line with previous research 
on conservation areas (Ahlfeldt et al. 2012) the price trends reveal a relative premium for 
properties inside both HCs and LAs compared to the control groups. I observe rather 
stable trends in mean prices per square metre for both LAs and HCs, which corresponds 
to Italian real-estate trends during the considered period (Banca D’Italia 2017). More 
specific comparisons of variables between treatment and control areas are analysed in 
Table A3 of the appendix. Panel 2 of Figure 4 compares the distribution of transactions 
by price per square metres for properties located inside and outside LAs and HCs. The 
figure indicates a larger proportion of relatively more valuable properties inside LAs and 
HCs compared to the control groups, and this is slightly more pronounced for LAs than 
HCs. 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
First Step 
 Full data set  Inside HC Inside LA  
 mean sd min max mean sd mean sd 
Price 315,420 500,869 1,000 3.00e+07 475,898 796,277 463,857 693,100 
Price SQM 2,463 1,726 .54 20,000 3,414 2,444 3,158 2,002 
Ln price SQM 7.61 0.63 -.60 9.90 7.89 0.73 7.87 0.65 
Year built a  3.85 0.99 1 5 3.15 1.17 3.55 1.15 
Height building b 14.04 8.04 1 89.3 16.60 7.61 13.12 7.18 
Distance to Archc 346 734 .10 42,276.65 90 199 245 547 
Distance to CBDd 2,338 2,026 1.94 45,821.32 1,121 982 2,377 2,135 
N 53,572   14,334  8,320  
Second Step 
 mean sd min max N    
AB rate e 20.08 15.56 3.68 52.52 55    
∆UBL f -2.32 2.38 -11.84 3.79 296    
Note: N refers to the number of observations, in the First step these refer to property prices, in the Second step to 55 Cities 
and 296 neighbourhoods within these cities. a Year built is defined as follows: 1 -1700 and before, 2 – 1700 to 1919, 3 – 1920 
to 1950, 4 – 1951-1980, 5 1980 to now. b Building height is in metres. c Distance to architectural designations is in metres  d 
Distance to CBD is in metres. e Abusivism rates (AB) created by CRESME - number of illegal dwellings constructed for every 
100 dwellings in a given year, average of estimates between 2004 and 2017. f UBL Index - the difference in pre-1919 buildings 
in good or excellent state between 2011 and 2001 per 100 buildings by census tract. 
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Figure 4 Distribution of house prices offers by price 
 
Note: Kernel density estimates. To improve visibility, the figure focuses on the price segment below €15,000/sqm. 
 
I begin by evaluating differences in price premiums by simply denoting properties inside 
HCs and LAs with a dummy. These exploratory regressions, which can be found in 
section 5.1 of the appendix, suggest there is enough variation between HCs and LAs to 
separately identify effects. I then more precisely identify differences in premium 
between LAs and HC. In Table 2 I report estimates of a simplified version of equation 1 
where I do not interact inside and buffer variables by city a, in order to estimate the 
average effect across all 55 Italian cities for each type of heritage area. Dummies of the 
buffer areas around LA and HC borders, as well as dummies of the area immediately 
inside both LA and HC borders are created as explained in section 3.1.1. The inclusion of 
both these dummies within my equation allows me to recover the coefficients of 𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎 
and 𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎 as the boundary effects.  
Results are consistent in columns 1-4, where I progressively add neighbourhood fixed 
effects, building and amenity controls. Overall, the regression results suggest a positive 
effect of being within a heritage area. The different magnitudes of the coefficients 
suggest slightly different premiums for properties depending on the type of policy. 
Results also suggest that policy effects do not substantially influence each other as 
coefficients maintain similar magnitudes whether I include them together or separately 
in the equation (columns 7 and 8). I also observe that areas inscribed for a longer 
number of years have higher premiums as explored in Table A5 of the appendix. I test 
the sensitivity of my sample by limiting observations to 1km and 2km from LA and HC 
boundaries to ensure I am getting relevant local estimates. As expected, I observe very 
minor changes in my results, the trends observed hold throughout the estimations. On 
average for the whole of Italy, properties just inside a Landscape Area are about 6.5% 
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(€160 extra per square metre) more expensive than properties just outside, while the 
estimated premium for Historic Centre is on average 3.5% (€86 extra per square metre). 
Table 2 Overall average effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ln price m2 FULL FULL FULL FULL 2km 1km FULL FULL 
         L in 200m 0.0868** 0.0705*** 0.0688*** 0.0660*** 0.0646*** 0.0624***  0.0669*** 
 (0.0421) (0.0215) (0.0214) (0.0202) (0.0198) (0.0192)  (0.0214) 
H in 200m 0.0619† 0.0440*** 0.0429*** 0.0355** 0.0339** 0.0327** 0.0406*
* 
 
 (0.0323) (0.0164) (0.0165) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0104) (0.0188)  
Observations 53,572 53,572 53,572 53,572 50,259 44,493 53,572 53,572 
R-squared 0.378 0.703 0.704 0.707 0.710 0.713 0.705 0.706 
S controlsa YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
B controlsb NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
A controlsc NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: a Structural controls  b Building controls  c Amenity Controls.  Outliers in the sample were dropped. Standard 
errors clustered at neighbourhood level for all regression. Columns (5) and (6) kept observations 2km and 1km from 
the border respectively. Neighbourhoods are defined as the sub-municipal areas identified by the Italian Census (sub-
municipal areas or neighbourhoods) (ISTAT 2016a). Neighbourhood Fixed effects (N FE) affect Landscape Area 
estimates less because these areas are usually much smaller than neighbourhood within cities, whereas Historic 
Centres can in some cases comprise more than one Neighbourhood. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † p < 0.15 
 
3.4.2 Boundary discontinuities: Graphical Illustrations 
By exploiting discontinuous variation in property prices at the boundaries of LAs and 
HC, where the architectural character of the area changes abruptly, I am able to control 
for unobserved locational characteristics and achieve a robust identification of the 
heritage effect. Figure 5 and Figure 6 illustrate the variation in prices and boundary 
discontinuities for Historic Centres and Landscape Areas respectively. The four panels 
plot coefficients which control for observable structural and locational characteristics, 
against distance from the HC and LA boundaries and differentiating between trends 
inside and outside policy boundaries. The grey dots plot the point estimates of 50-
metre-bin effects. The dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals based on standard 
errors clustered at neighbourhood level. The plots are restricted to 1km inside and 2km 
outside heritage areas for clarity. I allow for quadratic distance trends and semi-non-
parametric specifications in an attempt to find the best fit for the distance bin effects. 
The equation is estimated for all cities, and then subsequently between cities with high, 
medium and low levels of AB scores.  
Figure 5 andFigure 6 quickly show that although discontinuities are observed at distance 
zero for both HCs and LAs, the distance price decays present different trends. The key 
insight that emerges from Figure 5 is the existence of a much larger jump (price 
discontinuity) at the boundary of cities with low AB rates, with the jump becoming 
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progressively smaller in average and high AB rate cities. While the overall estimated 
boundary effect is 5%, it is close to zero for cities where the reported AB rates are large 
(AB rate > 25.40).  The boundary effect is 4% for cities with moderate AB rates ( 8.38 < 
AB rate < 25.40) but increases to 10% for cities with low AB rates (AB rate < 8.38). Given 
the fluctuation of the price premium according to type of city, and as hypothesized, 
Figure 5 suggests there is negative relationship between differences in prices across HC 
boundaries and respective AB rates. It also more generally suggests, that in cities where 
abusiveness is high I observe no jump because high AB entails that urban heritage 
amenities are either badly preserved, severely modified or may no longer exist, resulting 
in a lack of or even a negative price premium effect. 
Figure 5 Discontinuities in Prices at Historic Centres boundaries by AB rates 
 
Note: Coefficients are from regression (1) - natural log of price per square metre against structural and 
locational controls, year fixed effects and neighbourhood-fixed effects. Grey dots plot the point estimates 
of ‘100 metre bins from the boundary’ effects. The solid lines are illustrations of the parametric estimates 
and the dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at neighbourhood 
level. a) represents overall equation estimated b), c) and d) are the same equation estimated for cities with 
Low, Average and High AB rates. AB rates range from 3.24 abusive buildings per 100 buildings (on average 
for a city) to 52.52 abusive buildings per 100 buildings (on average for a city). Cities are equally divided 
between cities with low AB rates (AB < 8.38), moderate AB rates ( 8.38 < AB < 25.40) and high AB rates (AB 
> 25.40).  
 
Figure 6 suggests that discontinuities in prices at LA boundaries also decrease as AB 
rates increase. A capitalisation effect at the boundary of cities with low AB rates is about 
9%, this effect becomes much smaller already for cities with moderate AB rates at 1.5%, 
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and close to zero for cities with high AB rates. Overall, Figure 5 and Figure 6 show that 
the benefits from designation decay smoothly across heritage area boundaries, as 
expected, since these are based on the preservation of a visual amenity. In the overall 
panels of Figures 5 and 6 (top-left), the designation effect becomes zero after about 1.5 
kilometres for HCs owing to the large size of these areas, and becomes zero after about 
500 metres for LAs, which is close to existing evidence relative to the decay in heritage 
externalities (Lazrak et al. 2014). In cities with low AB rate (top-right of both Figure 5 
and 6), I am also able to detect positive effects of greater magnitude towards the centre 
of LAs and HCs suggesting greater urban heritage densities, which is also in line with 
existing evidence (Ahlfeldt et al. 2017).   
Figure 6 Discontinuities in Prices at Landscape Area boundaries 
 
Note: Coefficients are from regression (1) - natural log of price per square metre against structural and 
locational controls, year fixed effects and neighbourhood-fixed effects. Grey dots plot the point estimates 
of ‘50 metre bins from the boundary’ effects. The solid lines are illustrations of the parametric estimates 
and the dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at neighbourhood 
level. a) represents overall equation estimated b), c) and d) are the same equation estimated for cities with 
Low, Average and High AB rates. AB rates range from 3.24 abusive buildings per 100 buildings (on average 
for a city) to 52.52 abusive buildings per 100 buildings (on average for a city). Cities are equally divided 
between cities with low AB rates (AB < 8.38), moderate AB rates ( 8.38 < AB < 25.40) and high AB rates (AB 
> 25.40).  
 
In the left panel of Figure 7, I specifically plot the negative relationship between 
differences in prices across HC and LA boundaries and respective AB rates by city. This 
corresponds to using estimates of the border effects by city from specification (1) and 
plotting them against AB rates. Despite a few outliers, notably Naples and Reggio 
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Calabria, the negative correlation, although moderate, is reasonably defined. In the 
right panel of Figure 7, I plot the similar negative relationship between differences in 
prices across HC and LA boundaries and respective UBL rates by neighbourhood used 
as an alternative measure to AB in the last section of this paper. While more robust 
estimates are discussed in section 4.4 of this paper following specifications (2a) and 
(2b), these simple and transparent scatterplots provide some interesting insights. There 
is a positive intercept, implicating that in cities with the lowest rates of non-compliance 
heritage areas appreciate the value of a property by about 8.7% or €27.4k and by about 
7.5% or €23.8k for HCs and LAs respectively. A 10-percentage point increase in AB, so 
from having no AB to 10% of abusive buildings, all else equal, decreases heritage price 
premiums by about 3.2 and 1.7 percentage points for HCs and LAs respectively. In 
standard deviation terms, a one unit increase in AB decreases prices by about 4.9 and 
2.7 percentage points for HCs and LAs respectively.  
Figure 7 Border Price Premium versus Non-Compliance Measures 
 
Note: Left Panel - Unit of observation is city. Border effect (unweighted) is obtained by regressing log of 
price against structural and location controls, dummies delineating limited areas on both side of the 
boundary, boundary effect dummies and year effects (specification 2). Standard errors clustered at 
neighbourhood level. Right Panel – Unit of observation is neighbourhood. Same approach is employed to 
calculate border effects but at neighbourhood level.  
 
There is a similar positive intercept in the right panel, plotting the relationship with UBL, 
implicating that in neighbourhoods with the lowest UBL rates heritage areas appreciate 
the value of a property by about 3.9% or €12.5k for HCs and 1.6% or €5.3k for LAs. A one 
standard deviation in the UBL index is associated with a depreciation effect of about 3.1 
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and 0.18 percentage points for HCs and LAs respectively. The negative effect increases 
when weighting the border effects although I do not report this in Figure 7 to improve 
clarity. 
3.4.3 Heterogeneous heritage effects  
Before further analysing the relationship between price premiums and non-compliance 
measures, I explore the variation in differences in prices across LA and HC boundaries 
in more depth, estimated according to specification (1) by city. 37 out of 55 cities achieve 
a positive premium for Historic Centres, 18 of which are significant estimates, while 18 
out of 55 cities achieve a negative premium, 11 of which are significant estimates. 30 out 
of 55 cities achieve a positive premium for Landscape Areas, 18 of which are significant 
estimates, while 22 out of 55 cities achieve a negative premium, 8 of which are 
significant estimates. There is therefore significant variation in the price premiums of 
the two conservation policies under consideration, with a noteworthy variation in 
premium magnitudes. The comprehensive list of estimates by city are reported in Table 
A7 of the appendix. I can tentatively suggest that the price effect is at least partially 
driven by architectural externalities, but the estimates also suggests there are 
contextual differences between both landscape and historic areas resulting in negative 
or positive price premiums.  
Taking the average of coefficients by region and geographical area reveals some trends. 
The left panel of Figure 8 illustrates how per geographical area (north-west, north-east, 
centre, south and islands) LA premiums are on average consistently significant and 
positive at larger magnitudes in northern cities than in central and southern cities. It 
also illustrates how HC premiums are on average consistently significant and positive in 
northern and central cities but on average significant and negative in southern and 
island cities. The right panel of Figure 8 breaks these trends down, revealing that at 
regional level there are many exceptions within these trends. Although the effects 
suggest that less value is attributed to heritage areas in southern rather than in northern 
regions, cities such as Savona and Livorno present negative significant estimates in the 
north (Table A7 in the appendix) while cities such as Bari and Messina present positive 
and significant estimates in the south (Table A7 in the appendix). I hypothesise that 
these differences stem from informal building behaviour, which although generally 
more present in southern regions, has risen in other cities over Italy. 
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Figure 8 Summary of border effects 
     
 
Note: The left panel of Figure 8 illustrates the mean by geographical area of coefficients of specification (2) at 
city level. The right panel of Figure 8 repeats the same exercise but illustrates the mean by the 20 Italian regions, 
going from the most northern regions on the left side to the more southern at the right side, and the islands of 
Sardinia and Sicily at the end. 
 
3.4.4 Does abusivism drive heritage price premiums ? 
Once recovered, the boundary coefficients are then run in the two second steps 
regressions (2a) and (2b) to evaluate the forces driving the heterogeneity in price 
premiums. Price premiums are weighted by the inverse of their relative standard errors 
to account for the significance of estimated effects. In Table 3 I report estimates of 
specification (2a) and (2b) in columns (1) – (7) and (8) – (14) respectively. The first 7 
columns show a consistent and significant negative effect of AB on price premiums for 
HCs. A 1% increase in AB is associated with an expected depreciation effect of 0.510-0.68 
percentage points in HC price premiums, given the average premium is 3.5% this is a 
considerable depreciation. The OLS results remain relatively consistent after controlling 
for education, population density, building height and environmental quality, which 
progressively increase the magnitude of the effect. Given that AB, as motivated earlier 
in the paper, is influenced both by informal institutions and mafia influences, I control 
for mafia from column (4), which allows me to isolate the effect that runs from AB to 
heritage premiums because of informal institutions and not because of mafia. The 
addition of a mafia-crime index contributes to increasing the magnitude of the effect of 
AB but is not in itself significant. 
In columns (5) to (7), I address endogeneity. To repeat, I expect the main sources of 
endogeneity to be reverse causality, returns to abusive behaviour could be larger in 
highly valued areas, or an omitted variable problem affecting both the heritage 
premium and abusive behaviour thus decreasing the magnitude of my coefficients. 
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Column 5 duplicates column 4 but uses an instrument for AB exploiting the legal 
attitudes index (LAI) conceptually created by Tabellini (JEEA, 2010) as explained earlier 
in the paper. This allows me to isolate attitudes affecting abusive behaviour from ones 
affecting price premiums. The results for the IV estimation in column (5) increases the 
magnitude of the coefficient of AB but does not appear to affect the rest of the 
regression, suggesting the presence of a slight negative bias in the OLS results, likely 
driven by the possible reverse causality where higher heritage premiums could cause 
more abusiveness. An instrument measuring early political institutions in 15-17th century 
Italy in the spirit of Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2016), is used in column 6 yielding 
similar results. Finally, column 7 uses both LAI and historical instruments to estimate a 
coefficient of 0.59 percentage points, further confirming the relative magnitude of the 
results. I test for weak-instruments using the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic. In all 
cases, the F-statics imply that our instruments are strongly correlated with the variable 
of interest. To test for overidentification, I report Hansen’s J-statistic in column 7, the 
null-Hypothesis is not rejected indicating that the instruments are valid and therefore 
uncorrelated with the error term. Overall, the results indicate that the OLS estimates 
are quite conservative and robust. 
Columns (8) – (14) show a consistent negative effect of AB on price premiums in 
Landscape Areas, however, not only is AB weakly associated with premiums in this case, 
the association is only very weakly significant. The results remain consistent after 
controlling for education, population density, building height and environmental 
quality, but the identification is only improved after AB is instrumented suggested some 
omitted variable bias most likely linked to the specific nature of LAs which comprehend 
areas of both natural and architectural value. The effect remains just shy of significance 
in the OLS estimations. Unlike in the HC results, the mafia index variable is negative and 
significant. This is driven by the mafia-led abusivism happening in costal LAs present in 
my sample, as the significance of the effect disappears when coastal cities are dropped. 
My preferred estimate in the case of LAs is that a 1% increase in AB is associated with an 
expected depreciation effect of 0.25-0.63 percentage points in LA price premiums. 
Although this is a slightly smaller effect than the effect of AB on HC premiums, it is still 
a considerable depreciation given the average premium is 6.5% .  
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Table 3 AB effect on price premiums 
Historic Centre price premiums (weighted) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS IV LAI IV HIST IV 
AB rate a -0.00273** -0.00236* -0.00445*** -0.00505*** -0.00689*** -0.00580** -0.00596*** 
 (0.00126) (0.00132) (0.00155) (0.00164) (0.00180) (0.00205) (0.00158) 
Mafia Index b    -9.10e-05 -8.77e-05 -9.41e-05 -9.08e-05* 
    (5.68e-05) (5.77e-05) (5.91e-05) (5.39e-05) 
First-stage  – – – – 46.35 41.80 45.26 
Hansen J  
p-value 
– – – – – – 0.88 
Observations 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
R-squared 0.364 0.367 0.437 0.438 – – – 
Education c YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pop density d YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Build. Height e – YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Env. Qual. f – – YES YES YES YES YES 
Landscape Areas price premiums (weighted) 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS IV LAI IV HIST IV 
AB rate -0.00122 -0.00144 -0.00142 -0.00257† -0.00635** -0.00427* -0.00535** 
 (0.00116) (0.00132) (0.00197) (0.00112) (0.00270) (0.00234) (0.00220) 
Mafia Index    -0.000162 -0.000231** -0.000193* -0.000213** 
    (0.000108) (0.000104) (9.96e-05) (9.91e-05) 
First-stage  – – – – 42.87 35.25 45.7 
Hansen J  
p-value 
– – – – – – 0.43 
Observations 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
R-squared 0.304 0.307 0.307 0.345 – – – 
Education YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pop density YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Build. Height – YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Env. Qual. – – YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Price premiums are obtained by regressing log of price against structural and location controls, 
dummies delineating limited areas on both side of the boundary, boundary effect dummies and year effects 
(specification 2). The coefficients are then weighted by the inverse of their relative standard errors to 
account for the significance of estimated effects.  a AB rates range from 3.24 abusive buildings per 100 
buildings (on average for a city) to 52.52 abusive buildings per 100 buildings (on average for a city). b The 
index is constructed from ISTAT province capitals crime data and accounts for rates of mass casualty crimes 
(usually linked to bombs or similar), voluntary mafia homicides and kidnappings. c Share of population 
holding a university degree.  d Population density by neighbourhood. e Building height is in metres. f Quality 
of the environment index evaluating air, water and other natural variables (mean=2.83 std=.16, higher 
numbers indicate better environmental quality). The first-stage statistics is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 † p < 0.15 
 
Collateral findings to my analysis include observations about the effect of education and 
population density on price premiums. Share of population holding a university degree 
has a consistent positive effect on price premiums in HC, which is consistent with other 
findings that more educated people value heritage amenities more and confirms 
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amenity-based sorting (Ahlfeldt & Holman 2017). This effect is on the other hand 
insignificant for LAs. Population density also has a small but significantly positive effect 
on both HC and LA price premiums, suggesting that heritage price premiums are 
positively associated with the presence of higher densities, possibly alluding to the 
importance of intangible heritage present in such areas.  Building height also has a 
consistently negative effect on HC price premiums suggesting that taller buildings are 
not valued in historic centres. See Table A8 in the appendix for a full tabulation of 
estimates. 
3.4.5  Neighbourhood Level Analysis and Robustness Checks 
Given estimates using the LAI instrument suggest the OLS results are quite conservative 
and robust, I re-run the entire analysis at neighbourhood level according to specification 
(1), and subsequently (2a) and (2b) using the urban compliance (UBL) index as an 
alternative measure of illegal and informal building behaviour, as described in section 
2.2 of this paper. This approach allows me to include city fixed effects to my analysis and 
confirm my results at neighbourhood level. It also allows me to focus on how other 
neighbourhood level characteristics across LA and HC borders could be affecting price 
premiums.  
Results in Table 4 confirm a consistent and significant negative effect of non-compliance 
(in this case ∆UBL) on price premiums for Historic Centres, and a negative and weakly 
significant effect of ∆UBL on price premiums in Landscape Areas. The magnitudes of 
the coefficients are, given the smaller neighbourhoods under consideration, larger but 
generally in line with city estimates in Table 3. The addition of city fixed effects in 
columns (3) increase the magnitude of the effect of ∆UBL on HC price premiums, 
similarly to the city level regressions including instruments, while in column (6) fixed 
effects bring the effect of ∆UBL on LA price premiums to significance. Overall, the 
results support the estimates in Table 3, confirming a consistent negative effect of non-
compliance especially in the case of HCs. A one standard deviation in UBL is associated 
with a depreciation effect of up to 7 percentage points for HCs price premiums. The 
insignificant effect on LA price premiums, is most likely linked to the nature of the UBL 
index (change in number of pre-1919 buildings which by law should not be demolished).  
LA policy (Law n.1497/1939) protects landscapes in both urban and natural settings, 
specifically complexes of immobile things with aesthetic or traditional values, it is 
therefore consistent with the nature of the policy that a change in the historicism of 
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buildings would affect LAs less than HCs, given the former policy is not as tied to 
historical buildings specifically, but to the value of urban and natural settings as a whole.  
Table 4 Neighbourhood Level estimates  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price premium  HC HC HC  LA LA LA  
∆UBL a -0.0519** -0.0508** -0.0795*** -0.0106 -0.0211 -0.0377* 
 (0.0202) (0.0207) (0.0277) (0.0224) (0.0211) (0.0175) 
Arch. density b  0.00938 0.0119  0.0273** 0.0412** 
  (0.0108) (0.0290)  (0.0134) (0.0197) 
Higher Edu c 0.0212 0.0561 0.0180 0.0319 0.226 0.256 
 (0.140) (0.149) (0.226) (0.178) (0.210) (0.288) 
Pop Density d 4.30e-06 4.50e-06 3.36e-06 2.45e-06 1.02e-06 1.31e-07 
 (3.41e-06) (3.50e-06) (5.08e-06) (3.19e-06) (3.42e-06) (3.44e-06) 
Build. Bad e -0.241* -0.226* - 0.0179† -0.0642 -0.0928 -0.287 
 (0.123) (0.115) (0.0187) (0.148) (0.143) (0.206) 
Build. Height f -0.00403 -0.00355 -0.0103 -0.00303 -0.00294 -0.00126 
 (0.00654) (0.00647) (0.0119) (0.00617) (0.00625) (0.00736) 
△ NBG g -0.000872 -0.00278 -0.00123 -0.00818*** -0.00568* -0.00650† 
 (0.00650) (0.00690) (0.0136) (0.00306) (0.00308) (0.00424) 
△ empty build h -0.00163 -0.00181* -0.00315 -0.000488 -0.000283 -0.00360*** 
 (0.00102) (0.000965) (0.00254) (0.00106) (0.00105) (0.00135) 
Year Built i 0.0250 0.0231 0.00734 -0.0142 -0.00499 0.0391 
 (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0424) (0.0195) (0.0199) (0.0284) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 
R-squared 0.098 0.102 0.479 0.035 0.055 0.526 
City FE NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Cities 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Note: Price Premiums are obtained by regressing log of price against structural and location controls, dummies 
delineating limited areas on both side of the boundary, boundary effect dummies and year effects (specification 2). 
The coefficients are weighted by the inverse of their relative standard errors to account for the significance of 
estimated effects. aUBL Index (standardized) - the difference in pre-1919 buildings in good or excellent state between 
2011 and 2001 per 100 buildings by census tract.  bK-density (quantiles) of buildings with recognised architectural 
value. cShare of population holding a university degree. dPopulation density by neighbourhood. ePercentage of 
buildings in fair or bad state. fBuilding height is in metres. gNew Build Growth - change in number of residential 
buildings after 1991. hChange in number of empty units. iYear built is defined as follows: 1 -1700 and before, 2 – 1700 
to 1919, 3 – 1920 to 1950, 4 – 1951-1980, 5 1980 to now. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 † p < 0.15 
 
The neighbourhood level analysis also allows me to explore other variables driving 
heterogeneity at a smaller spatial scale. In Italy, buildings inscribed for their 
architectural value are not just historical monuments, but all buildings of architectural 
significance, often referred to as ‘minor architectural goods’ (Cosi 2008). My results 
show, as anticipated, that density of these architectural goods positively and 
significantly influence price premiums across LA borders. The disaggregated results also 
confirm that higher levels of education positively affect HC premiums, as suggested in 
the city-level results, although the effect is insignificant. Buildings in bad condition 
negatively affect both HC and LA price premiums, and while building height is negative, 
as in the city-level results, coefficients remain insignificant throughout. The same is 
observed for population density, although coefficients are positive, they remain 
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insignificant in all estimation unlike the city-level regressions. New building growth has 
a small negative effect on price premiums, which is significant for LAs, which is in line 
with the spatial nature of the policy as LA are much smaller than HC, and new building 
growth would thus much more significantly affect their appreciation. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Italy is famously known for the richness of its urban heritage, which is a valuable public 
asset throughout the country. This paper exploits the Italian context to examine the 
heterogeneity of urban heritage value through two conservation policies - Landscape 
Areas and Historic Centres. To then examine the extent to which non-compliance 
undermines conservation effects.  
This paper presented a two-step strategy which recovers price premiums by city or 
neighbourhood in the first step and regresses the recovered premiums on AB among 
other variables in the second step. Comparing the differences in property prices along 
the boundaries of both HCs and LAs, I find an overall average capitalisation of about 
6.5% (€160 extra per metre square) for Landscape Areas, and as estimated average 
premium of 3.5% (€86 extra per metre square) for Historic Centres. Results also indicate 
substantial heterogeneity in heritage price premiums, suggesting that despite 
nationally imposed stringent planning regulations there are other forces driving a 
disparity in values. In the second step and by using an instrumental strategy to 
substantiate estimates, results confirm that at least partially abusivism levels explain the 
heterogeneity of price premiums, limiting the capitalisation of architectural public 
goods and putting one of the major urban amenities of Italian cities at risk. A one 
percent increase in AB is associated with an expected depreciation effect of 0.50-0.68 
percentage points in HC price premiums, which is considerable given the magnitude of 
the capitalisation effect. Furthermore, a one percent increase in AB is associated with a 
depreciation of 0.25-0.63 percentage points in LA price premiums. Within my analysis, I 
further control for mafia effects, which allows me to separate out the effect that runs 
from AB to heritage premiums because of informal institutions from the effect that runs 
from AB to heritage premiums because of mafia.  
Results imply that informal institutions tied to illegal attitudes and behaviour undermine 
the positive economic outcomes of these heritage areas, and places with higher AB thus 
experience lower external benefits of urban heritage. The evidence we provide is 
particularly relevant for internal policy. The results suggest an impoverishment of the 
physical appearance of heritage areas in many cities, which in turn assumes other 
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negative outcomes such as fewer economic benefits from tourist industries in locations 
with high AB, or losses of intangible socio-cultural customs and values which are often 
tied to the preservation of historic areas (Tweed & Sutherland 2007; Lazrak et al. 2014). 
Results are also relevant to the recent governmental push to limit abusivism. The 
evidence suggests that given past building amnesties, people still rely on the possibility 
of future measures granting legal status to unauthorised buildings, and implies efforts 
limiting AB have evidently not been localised enough. This underlines the necessity to 
re-address policies limiting AB, in order to provide stronger motivations towards the 
compliance of construction regulations, and to re-address red-tape and high-costs to 
obtain permissions within conservation areas, in order to better protect areas where 
public goods such as heritage buildings and landscapes are found. Without 
administrative burden reduction policies the costs from greater compliance will most 
likely be too high for average residents. This paper contributes more generally to 
furthering understanding of urban illegalities , which exist in many contexts, and how 
they can affect the urban policy outcomes. I hope this study will motivate other 
investigations of the relationship between restrictive zoning systems and citizen 
compliance. 
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Levkovich, O., Rouwendal, J. & Brugman, L., 2018. Spatial Planning and Segmentation of the 
Land Market: The Case of the Netherlands. Land Economics, 94(1), pp.137–154. 
Loberto, M., Luciani, A. & Pangallo, M., 2018. The potential of big housing data: an 
application to the Italian real-estate market. Banca D’Italia Working Papers 1171, April. 
  
136 
Lynch, A.K. & Rasmussen, D.W., 2001. Measuring the impact of crime on house prices. 
Applied Economics, 33(15), pp.1981–1989. 
Maggio, G., 2018. Shooting Down the Price: Evidence from Mafia Homicides and Housing 
Market Volatility. In LUISS Seminar Economics and Finance. Rome. 
Marra, A., 2017. Abusivismo edilizio, Legambiente: 17 mila nuovi edifici fuorilegge nel 2016. 
Edilportale. Available at: 
http://www.edilportale.com/news/2017/08/ambiente/abusivismo-edilizio-
legambiente-17-mila-nuovi-edifici-fuorilegge-nel-2016_59138_52.html [Accessed June 
14, 2018]. 
Ministero dei beni culturali e delle attività culturali e del turismo, 2017. Vincoli in Rete. 
Available at: http://vincoliinrete.beniculturali.it/VincoliInRete/vir/utente/login# 
[Accessed March 24, 2017]. 
Ministero dei Beni e della Attività Culturali e del Turismo, 2016. SITAP. Available at: 
http://www.sitap.beniculturali.it/ [Accessed September 14, 2016]. 
Ministero dei beni e delle attività culturali e del turismo, 2016. Vincoli in Rete. Available at: 
http://vincoliinrete.beniculturali.it/VincoliInRete/vir/utente/login [Accessed 
September 15, 2016]. 
Noonan, D.S., 2007. Finding an Impact of Preservation Policies: Price Effects of Historic 
Landmarks on Attached Homes in Chicago, 1990-1999. Economic Development 
Quarterly, 21(1), pp.17–33. 
North, D.C., 1991. Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1), pp.97–112. 
Olivetti, L., Della Pepa, C., Abram, J., Guccione, M., Guido, M., Prosperetti, F. & Spitz, E., 2008. 
Strategie di valorizzazione e gestione per il patrimonio architettonico: sguardi e proposte 
Fondazione Adriano Olivetti, ed., Roma. 
Ostrom, E., 2005. Understanding institutional diversity, Princeton University Press. 
Pietrostefani, E. & Holman, N., 2017. The politics of conservation planning. Working paper. 
Pope, D.G. & Pope, J.C., 2012. Crime and property values: Evidence from the 1990s crime 
drop. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 42(1–2), pp.177–188. 
Della Porta, D. & Vannucci, A., 1999. Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources, and Mechanisms 
of Political Corruption, New York: Edward Elgar. 
Putnam, R.D., Leonardi, R. & Nanetti, R., 1993. Making democracy work : civic traditions in 
modern Italy, Princeton University Press. 
Ricci, M., 2007. Centri storici minori, i percorsi della valorizzazione. Urbanistica, 133, pp.7–41. 
Rosen, S., 1974. Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure 
Competition. Journal of Political Economy, 82(1), pp.34–55. 
Roy, A., 2005. Urban informality: Toward an epistemology of planning. Journal of the 
American Planning Association, 71(2), pp.147–158. 
Schneider, F. & Williams, C.C., 2013. The shadow economy, Institute of Economic Affairs. 
  
137 
Tabellini, G., 2010. Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of 
Europe. Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(June), pp.677–716. 
Tolley, G.S. & Diamond, D.B. (Douglas B., 1982. The Economics of urban amenities, Academic 
Press. 
Trentini, A., 2016. Il vincolo paesaggistico e l’abusivismo edilizio. Studio Cataldi. Available at: 
https://www.studiocataldi.it/articoli/21324-il-vincolo-paesaggistico-e-l-abusivismo-
edilizio.asp [Accessed June 14, 2018]. 
Tweed, C. & Sutherland, M., 2007. Built cultural heritage and sustainable urban 
development. Landscape and Urban Planning, 83(1), pp.62–69. 
Venuti, G.C. & Oliva, F., 1993. Cinquant’anni di urbanistica in Italia : 1942-1992 Laterza, ed., 
Roma-Bari. 
Wilson, J.K. & Damania, R., 2005. Corruption, political competition and environmental policy. 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 49(3), pp.516–535. 
Zanfi, F., 2013. The Città Abusiva in Contemporary Southern Italy: Illegal Building and 
Prospects for Change. Urban Studies, 50(16), pp.3428–3445. 
 
 
  
  
138 
3.7 Appendix : Conservation Planning and Informal Institutions 
3.7.1 Introduction Appendix 
This appendix complements the main paper by providing additional detail not included 
in the main paper for brevity. To facilitate comprehension, it partially duplicates parts 
of the prose in the main text. Section 2 provides further details regarding the 
institutional setting presented in the main paper. Section 3 comprises additional 
material on data collection and collation as well as the presentation of some descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 includes additional detail on the empirical strategy, with the 
presentation of maps that illustrate the spatial setting of the study. Section 5 presents 
complementary results that are not essential for the message of the main paper but 
may be of interest to some readers, as well as several robustness checks. The appendix 
is designed to complement arguments and specifications in the main paper, it is not 
designed to stand alone or replace the reading of the main paper. 
3.7.2 Institutional Setting 
3.7.2.1 The evolution of the Italian conservation planning system 
Conservation planning in Italy is made up of three highly restrictive legislative strands: 
individual architectural designations33 and their relative perimeters, Landscape Areas 
(LAs)34 and historic centres (HCs) (Bonfantini, 2012; Carughi, 2012; Giannini, 1976; Olivetti 
et al., 2008). There are almost 200,000 architectural restrictions in Italy, the listed 
buildings are divided between verified buildings, others that are under consideration, 
and others that are not yet verified (Ministero dei beni e delle attività culturali e del 
turismo, 2016). There are over 6000 vincoli paesaggistici of various sizes many of which 
are situated in urban areas (Ministero dei Beni e della Attività Culturali e del Turismo, 
2016). Given fragmented historical geography of Italy, there are over 8,000 Italian cities, 
90% of which have fewer than 15,000 inhabitants; just about all of them, both large and 
small, have a least one historic centre (Ricci, 2007). This results in a phenomenal 22,698 
historic centres (Ministero dei Beni e le Attività Culturali, 2016). 
Conservation planning has a unique place in Italian urban policy; some have even argued 
that the principles and practises of conservation planning are one of Italian urbanism’s 
main contributions in the field (Balducci & Gaeta, 2015). The Italian architect Gustavo 
Giovannoni coined the term ‘urban heritage’ in the 1930s as obtaining its value not as an 
individual and autonomous object but as part of the overall character of urbanism 
                                                             
33 Known in Italian as vincoli architettonici. 
34 Known in Italian as vincoli paesaggistici. 
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(Choay, 1992). Article 9 of the Italian Constitution states the need to protect and 
enhance both the landscape, historical and artistic heritage of the nation (Cosi, 2008).  
From its inception, up and to the introduction of modern town planning in Italy (1942), 
conservation policy grew slowly but progressively. Although urban heritage areas were 
not identified within urban codes, they were recognised from an environmental 
perspective. Indeed, the Landscape Areas are derived solely from the 1939 
environmental law, which later received modifications in the 1980s (n. 431/1985 "Aree 
tutelate per legge") and in 1999 (n. 490/99 ‘Testo Unico’) (Ministero dei Beni e della 
Attività Culturali e del Turismo, 2016). This law (n.1497/1939) refers to ‘natural goods’ 
including ‘beautiful ensembles’35 which are ‘complexes of immobile things (buildings) 
that hold aesthetic or traditional values (Carughi, 2012; Giannini, 1976). The Cultural 
Heritage and Landscape code later (22 January 2004 n. 42) integrated these previous 
norms in an attempt to simplify legislation. Within this code, Article 136 and Article 142 
apply to landscapes. Article 136 identifies buildings and areas of significant public 
interest36 while Article 142 identifies the areas having natural interest. Even though this 
construct is tied initially to environmental rather than socio-cultural historical values, it 
includes restrictions linked to heritage more holistically. For example, the 
neighbourhood of Brera, one of Milan’s historic quarters, is protected by a vincoli 
paesaggistico and within its specifications it considers the preservation of its historic 
character by controlling things like the appearance and décor of buildings (Gazzetta 
Ufficiale, 2009).  
There is, moreover, a clear distinction to be made between the vincoli paessagistici and 
historic centres. While the former presents elements both of valorisation and 
safeguarding, the latter are almost solely about promotion and valorisation (art. 117, 
comma 3, of the Italian Constitution) (Fantini, 2014). The 1967 Legge Ponte (Law n. 765) 
included historic centres as part of overall city planning, delimiting them by the Zone A 
in Italian Master plans which demarcates zoning areas, buildable exploitation and areas 
to be allocated to public services (Venuti & Oliva, 1993).37 The regulatory plans of each 
city protect HCs and impose a series of restrictions on them. HCs are delimited in a logic 
of historical consistency where there is a clear differentiation in building age between 
                                                             
35 Denominated in Italian legislation as ‘bellezze d’insieme’. 
36 These include a. good of specific administrative use b. ‘immovable things’, ‘villas and gardens’, 
‘parks’ c. and d. ‘complex of properties’, ‘areas of scenic beauty’  
37  PRCs (Piano Regolatore Comunale) or PRGs (Piano Regolatore Generale) are general regulatory 
plans for the city. 
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buildings inside Zone A and outside Zone A. In practice, many historic centres are 
partially superimposed by vincoli paessagistici (Figure 1 of main paper).  
Figure A1 shows the evolution of LA listings throughout Italy by geographical area. I 
observe a peak of designations after the introduction of modern town planning, and 
notably after the end of the Second World War. As noted, by Pietrostefani & Holman 
(2017) this is closely tied to post-war demolition and rebuilding, which spurred 
communities and nations to strengthen conservation planning.  There is an overall 
decreasing trend in designations after 1960, with a few peaks just before the 1990s and 
in recent years. Figure A1 thus demarcates the historicism of the LA system in Italy. In 
some exploratory regressions, presented in Table A5 of the appendix,  we consider how 
the years since designation of a LA affect price premiums. 
Figure A1 Evolution of Landscape Area designation by year  
 
Notes: Presents the distribution of conservation areas by year of designation by geographical area of Italy.  
 
Figure A2 presents the geographical distribution of Landscape Areas per region and 
percentage of area LA cover per total regional area. I observe some heterogeneity in 
terms of percentage of land covered by LAs, however there is no distinct pattern by 
geographical location.  
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Figure A2 Landscape areas per Region 
      
 
3.7.2.2 Abusivism and policies addressing it 
There is, on the other hand, a clear North-South polarization in AB trends as shown in 
Figure 3 in the main paper. Figure A3 further illustrates the rates of AB in southern 
regions, and much lower rates in Central and Northern regions. From 2008, as shown in 
Figure 2 there is a sharp reduction in building production, but a much more contained 
decline in abusive construction, in line with a slight rise of AB not only in southern 
regions but central ones as well as shown in Figure A3. The rise is particularly marked in 
the south, specifically in Campania, Calabria and Sicily (where between 2012-2014 the 
number of illegally constructed buildings was estimated as varying from 45 and 60% of 
authorized ones). A worrying trend characterises Umbria, where average AB rates have 
doubled compared to the previous three-year period and, in 2015, reached more than 
28% (+3.8 points). Significant increases are also recorded in Lazio (from 19.6% to 22.4%) 
and in Liguria (from 16.5% to 18.5%). 
The best deterrent to AB has been argued to be the restoration of legality through the 
demolition of outlawed buildings. AB continues, however, given the ineffectiveness of 
demolitions in many regions. Figure A4 illustrates the percentage of demolitions per 
region which have yet to be carried out. These numbers are especially high in Campania 
and Calabria at 97% and 94% respectively. Throughout Italy, of the 46,700 demolitions 
ordered by the state judiciary in 2012, only 14% have been carried out to date (see section 
2 of the appendix for breakdown). Between 2004-2018, Campania only carried out 496 
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(2.9%) of its 16.596 demolition injunctions, while other regions with much lower AB rates 
have carried out much higher numbers of demolitions, Lombardy and Piedmont 37% and 
30% of their 4.895 and 3456 injunctions respectively (Biffi, Dodaro, Morabito, & 
Pergolizzi, 2018).  
Figure A3 Evolution of Illegal Building by Geographical location 
 
Notes: Index of abusiveness by geographical region. Years 2002-2015. Number of new abusive 
constructions of residential use for every 100 legal constructions. Source: Author’s elaboration of CRESME 
data 
 
Figure A4 Abusivism Policy map and comments 
   
Notes: Source: Author’s elaboration of Legambiente (2017) data 
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3.8 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This section of the appendix provides detail on data collection and collation not included 
in the main paper. 
3.8.1 Examples of Posts and Location 
The empirical analysis relies on a novel data set constructed from a wide-range of 
sources. Over 60,000 geo-localised house sales advertisements with a wide range of 
attributes spanning from 2011 to 2018 were collected from Immobiliare.it, the largest 
online portal for real-estate services in Italy. Data sampling focused on residential units 
for sale monitored from the time they were created up to the time they were removed 
from the database. In 2016 the number of housing transactions in provincial capitals on 
Immobiliare.it was 183,000 units (about one-third of all housing transactions in Italy). 
The majority of transactions in these cities is brokered by real estate agents, who are 
more likely to upload adds on Immobiliare.it than private citizens, whereas in small 
towns sales are less likely to need brokerage and so representativeness is potentially a 
problem.  
Given this website’s coverage and the paper’s focus on large cities (the 3 most capitals 
with largest populations in each region), I do not need to worry about 
representativeness of the sample of properties advertised on Immobaliare.it. Figure A5 
presents examples of posts from Immobiliare.it and the attributes scraped from the 
HTML code of these adds.  
Figure A6 presents an example of the geo-localisation of an advert on the Immobiliare.it 
website. Figure A7 presents two examples of post locations, Milan on the left panel and 
Naples on the right panel. As we can see properties are evenly spread out across space. 
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Figure A5 Examples of posts 
 
Figure A6 Example of geo-localised location of one advert 
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Figure A7 Insert Image of location of posts 
 
 
3.8.2 Property data collection and description 
Until recently, micro-geo-localised house price data was not available for the Italian 
territory. Immobiliare.it was used given it is the largest online portal for real-estate 
services in Italy to get access to the biggest source of geo-localised sale advert data. 
Each post has a unique identifier, a short text describing the sale and various 
standardized tables presenting the most important characteristics of each property. A 
first table presents the principle characteristic of each property,  the surface area, the 
number of rooms, the price, the floor number and type of building (Figure A5). A second 
table presents the price and cadastral information and a third lists year of construction, 
general state of property, type of heating, availability of air conditioning as well as 
energy class (Figure A5). The next section presents internal amenities the property has 
been tagged with, which can be used as key words in order to find additional 
information such as the presence of a balcony or terrace, WIFI, window exposure 
among other facilities. Finally, the geo-localisation of the property is shown on a map 
enabled by OpenStreetMap (Figure A6). 
To get the data from the website, I use Python to create programs that mimic a web 
browser request. First, I randomly select URL’s of posts by city, to the extract Hypertext 
Markup Language (HTML) of each page from the server, including the coordinates of 
the property in order to later geo-localise it on ArcGIS. The data is immediately collected 
into an excel file with set columns, however, a great deal of cleaning and restructuring 
is still needed to get an analysable format for each post. The source data obtained from 
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Immobiliare.it is contained in yearly files. The database is then saved and imported into 
STATA. Overall the scraping operation takes between an hour and a day depending on 
the period of time and the internet connection. Initially the process was carried out with 
a google plug-in called Webscraper twice a year from 2013 to 2015, and then using the 
Python from 2015 to 2018 every 3 months. 
The files were then compiled, cleaned and checked for duplicates through the website’s 
unique identifier for each add. When a change of price was tracked, the final most 
conservative price was recorded. A recent paper by Loberto, Luciani and Pangallo (2018) 
which focused on the comparison between Immobiliare data and the OMI data provided 
by the real estate market observatory of the Italian Tax Office, found the Immobiliare 
data providing a picture of the housing market broadly consistent with official sources, 
with an approximate 12% discount to be interpreted between the Immobiliare data and 
the OMI data. Although this paper uses a different sample from the same source, both 
datasets overlap in timing and in the methodology followed for their collection. I am 
thus confident that the advertised price data is close to an unbiased forecast of actual 
sales prices that does not vary across the cities under consideration and includes a 
constant premium. 
Table A1 provides an overview of the variables, some of the missing values were filled 
by using the textual description of the ads. For example, over 1,000 properties were 
geo-localised from their addresses given latitudes and longitudes were missing. 
Table A1 Content of the ads dataset 
Type of data Variables 
Identifiers Unique ad identifier, date in which the ad was created in the 
database, date in which the ad was removed from the 
database, date in which one of the characteristics of the ad 
was modified for the last time 
Numerical Price, floor area, rooms, bathrooms, year built 
Categorical Property type, kitchen type, heating type, maintenance status, 
floor, air conditioning, energy class 
Type of building Elevator, garage/parking spot, building category 
Geographical  Longitude, Latitude, address 
Temporal Ad posted, ad removed, ad modified 
Contractual Foreclosure auction 
Textual Description 
Notes: Variables in italic are complemented using semantic analysis on the textual description of the ad. 
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3.8.3 Choice of 55 cities 
This paper focuses on a subset of the Italian province capitals. Within the 118 provincial 
capitals, the 3 most populated capitals in each region were selected, always including 
the regional capital, resulting in 55 cities. Better data is available within this list of cities, 
which is not to be overlooked as data availability in Italy is extremely heterogeneous 
and there are over 8000 urban areas (Ricci, 2007). For Umbria, Trentino-AltoAdige, Valle 
d’Aosta, Basilicata and Molise there were less than 3 provincial capitals, they were thus 
all selected. In Lombardia, the city of Monza was only recently separated from Milan as 
a provincial capital (declared in 2004, in practice in 2009), and was therefore added as a 
4th urban area for the region. Figure A8 illustrates the 55 selected urban areas. The 
geographical area of study is the municipal area, rather than the whole province 
territory.  
Figure A8 55 provincial capitals 
 
 
3.8.4 Creating an exhaustive set of controls 
Before using instruments or relying on the temporal dimension of the data, my first 
strategy is to collect and consider an exhaustive set of control variables, which has not 
been done as such a fine spatial scale for such a large part of cities in the Italian territory. 
A long list of locational controls in order to diminish omitted variable bias in the baseline 
regressions were collected from the Italian census (2011), the Italian National Geoportal 
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of the Environment, various Italian open data regional geo-portals (when available), the 
Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Culture and Open Street Map. They include geo-
localised micro-data such as building height and typology of buildings on the street, a 
range of natural and commercial amenities, parking and transport controls, as well as 
the locations of schools. These were all matched to the hedonic data in ArcGIS.  
The mid-point of the main commercial street of each city was also recorded to act as a 
proxy for the CBD of each city. The main road construct applies well to medium Italian 
cities and for larger cities such as Milan, Rome and Naples two or more points were 
recorded (Borruso & Porceddu, 2009). Socio-economic variables such as population 
density, migrant percentages and level of education were obtained and joined to the 
hedonic data from the 2011 Italian census. Table A2 presents the summary statistics for 
all the main structural and location variables used as controls.  
Table A3 presents summary statistics of property prices, structural, social and urban 
environment variables inside and outside HCs and LAs (mean, standard deviation [S.D.], 
min. and max.), to compare the two groups. Table A4 compares prices between 
different areas of Italy and illustrates a gap between average prices between the north 
and south of Italy. Largest standard deviations are exhibited in the Central regions, for 
example for transactions outside LAs the average price is €5,900 with a standard 
deviation of €81,737. This is most likely because of the presence of the capital city, Rome, 
has much higher prices than the other provincial capitals of the area. 
3.8.5 Matching census data 
To assess whether urban heritage areas attract certain types of households more than 
others and to partially control for the effects associated with such sorting, I spatially 
match neighbourhood characteristics to the hedonic data. This data refers to census 
spatial statistical units whose boundaries are typically much smaller than LAs or HC and 
are also smaller than city neighbourhoods. Figure A9 illustrates how LA and HC 
boundaries are much larger than the census units, I can therefore expect than even the 
smaller LAs comprise at least a few census areas and am therefore able to test 
differences across boundaries. To merge the data, I spatially match the hedonic data to 
the census unit it falls within. 
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Figure A9 LAs, HCs and Census Unit Boundaries  
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Table A2 Summary Statistics 
Variable mean sd min max 
Price €  320,049 760,617 1,000 130,000,000 
Price SQM 3,543 52,030 1 7,200,000 
Ln Price 12.25 0.85 6.91 18.68 
Ln Price SQM 7.62 0.67 -0.60 15.79 
Year 2016 1.81 2011 2018 
SQM 123.18 136.35 1.00 7,344.00 
Property type 4.02 0.71 1 7 
# of rooms 2.80 1.30 1 5 
# of bathrooms 1.51 0.69 0 3 
Kitchen type 1.46 0.70 0 2 
Floor 2.01 2.61 -1.00 12.00 
Parking dummy 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Lift Dummy 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Property condition 2.19 1.08 0 4 
Heating type 0.93 0.73 0 2 
AC dummy 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Energy band 0.87 0.83 0 3 
Year built  2.49 2.01 0 5 
Height building 14.52 8.36 1.00 89.30 
HC dummy 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
LA dummy 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Distance to HC 968 1,674 -2,893 44,986 
Distance to LA 1,338 4,457 -4,791 53,794 
Distance to Arch. 346 734 0 42,277 
K-density arch.  0.00007 0.00019 0.00000 0.00649 
Island 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Distance to Green 4,305 6,647 0 46,513 
Distance to Water 1,537 1,865 0 12,928 
Distance to Beach 334,734 172,189 13 659,975 
Distance to View 10,812 19,965 3 114,766 
distance to Uni. 27,782 50,316 7 204,310 
Distance to transport 756 3,082 1 48,682 
Distance to out. Trans. 1,751 6,018 1 65,272 
Distance to Airport 17,174 17,594 0 84,399 
Distance to CC 14,489 25,858 0 137,379 
Distance to Churches 407 730 0 38,624 
Distance to public schools 994 6,897 0 76,705 
Motorway buffer dummy 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Industrial area dummy 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Distance to construction 9,126 19,821 0 94,979 
K-density car amenities 0.00000 0.00001 0.00000 0.00007 
K-density financial amenities 0.00000 0.00001 0.00000 0.00005 
K-density bars & rest. 0.00003 0.00005 0.00000 0.00060 
K-density health amenities 0.00000 0.00001 0.00000 0.00006 
Distance to CBD 2,340 2,027 2 45,821 
N 53,728    
Notes: 1. Box, 2. Attic, 3. Loft 4. Apartment, 5. House, 6. Villa, 7. Building. 1. Needs refurbishment, 2. Good, 
3. Refurbished. 4. New. 1. 700 and before, 2. 800 until 1919, 3. 1920-1950, 4. 1951-1980, 5. 1980-Now. Distances 
are in metres. 
 151 
Table A3 Summary of variables by LA and HC:  price, structural, social and urban environment tendencies. 
Transaction 
inside LA 
mean sd min max Transaction 
outside LA 
mean sd min max T-test diff.  
Price SQM 5,745 93,871 1 6,500,000 Price SQM 3,138 39,784 3 7,200,000 -2607.5*** (-4.21) 
Property type 4.07 0.78 1 7 Property type 4.01 0.70 1 7 -0.0607*** (-7.17) 
# of rooms 3.00 1.37 0 5 # of rooms 2.76 1.28 0 5 -0.238*** (-15.45) 
# of bathrooms 1.67 0.77 0 3 # of bathrooms 1.49 0.68 0 3 -0.186*** (-22.63) 
Year built  2.28 1.94 0 5 Year built  2.53 2.02 0 5 0.251*** -10.51 
Height building 13.72 7.70 1 57.8 Height building 14.65 8.46 1 89.3 0.939*** -8.68 
Distance to 
Arch. 
246 548 0 10,081 Distance to 
Arch. 
364 761 0 42,277 118.8*** -13.62 
Parking dummy 0.33 0.47 0 1 Parking dummy 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.00103 -0.18 
△ empty build 3.78 24.07 -470 226 △ empty build 3.55 20.21 -476 351 -0.228 (-0.87) 
△ new build 1.14 5.61 -54 172 △ new build 1.24 6.21 -56 158 0.104 -1.35 
Pop. density 10,258 9,422 0 114,381 Pop. density 15,351 14,464 0 643,273 5092.9*** -30.79 
Migrants 0.08 0.09 0 1 Migrants 0.10 0.11 0 1 0.0140*** -10.59 
Build. Bad  0.11 0.18 0 1 Build. Bad  0.12 0.20 0 1 0.0121*** -5.11 
Higher Edu. 0.57 0.14 0 1 Higher Edu. 0.51 0.15 0 1 -0.0641*** (-34.74) 
inside HC mean sd min max outside HC mean sd min max diff.  
Price SQM 5,842 87,850 3 7,200,000 Price SQM 2,702 29,514 1 4,700,000 -3140.7*** (-6.20) 
Property type 3.94 0.63 1 7 Property type 4.05 0.74 1 7 0.111*** -16.01 
# of rooms 2.76 1.32 0 5 # of rooms 2.81 1.29 0 5 0.0499*** -3.95 
# of bathrooms 1.56 0.72 0 3 # of bathrooms 1.50 0.68 0 3 -0.0632*** (-9.34) 
Year built  1.93 1.79 0 5 Year built  2.70 2.04 0 5 0.770*** -39.94 
Height building 16.92 7.64 1 61.6 Height building 13.56 8.45 1 89.3 -3.360*** (-40.47) 
Distance to 
Arch. 
90 199 0 7,799 Distance to 
Arch. 
440 829 0 42,277 349.2*** -50 
Parking dummy 0.18 0.39 0 1 Parking dummy 0.39 0.49 0 1 0.207*** -45.93 
△ empty build 3.71 21.20 -470 210 △ empty build 3.54 20.69 -476 351 -0.168 (-0.80) 
△ new build 0.39 3.19 -40 62 △ new build 1.54 6.89 -56 172 1.150*** -18.76 
Pop. density 17,636 17,114 0 643,273 Pop. density 13,445 12,383 0 148,424 -4191.0*** (-30.93) 
Migrants 0.10 0.11 0 1 Migrants 0.09 0.11 0 1 0.00697*** (-6.43) 
Build. Bad  0.15 0.24 0 1 Build. Bad  0.11 0.18 0 1 -0.0489*** (-25.45) 
Higher Edu. 0.57 0.17 0 1 Higher Edu. 0.50 0.14 0 1 -0.0745*** (-49.80) 
Notes: T statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4 Comparison of mean sales between by urban heritage areas and geographical location  
Transaction 
inside LA 
 
 Price (€/m2) Transaction 
outside LA count % 
Price (€/m2) Difference  
count % Mean  S.D Min Max Mean  S.D Min Max €/m2 % 
Centre 2490 19.66 7,551 109,080 1 4,700,000 Centre 10176 80.34 5,900 81,737 5 7,200,000 1650 21.86 
Islands 646 11.03 1,853 883 88 12,957 Islands 5212 88.97 1,588 1,521 55 59,800 264 14.27 
North-east 1390 14.25 9,755 176,264 100 6,500,000 North-east 8364 85.75 2,156 3,319 3 283,333 7599 77.90 
Nord-west 2754 18.57 3,915 5,798 125 230,000 Nord-west 12077 81.43 3,150 16,052 5 1,050,000 765 19.54 
South 1069 10.08 3,403 24,836 4 812,500 South 9532 89.92 1,884 7,328 3 690,000 1519 44.62 
                
Transaction 
inside HC count % 
Price (€/m2) Transaction 
outside HC count % 
Price (€/m2) Difference  
Mean  S.D Min Max Mean  S.D Min Max €/m2 % 
Centre 3,961 31.27 9,878 128,146 4.76 7,200,000 Centre 8,707 68.73 4,561  61,092 0.54 4,700,000 5318 53.83 
Islands 608 10.36 1,641 1,208 234.63 19,666 Islands 5,260 89.64 1,614 1,492 55.15 59,800 27 1.64 
North-east 2,613 26.79 6,441 128,587 2.66 6,500,000 North-east 7,142 73.21 2,066 3,558 6.21 283,333 4375 67.92 
Nord-west 3,208 21.63 5,492 25,247 125 1,050,000 Nord-west 11,625 78.37 2,684 9,909 5.38 700,000 2809 51.13 
South 4,004 37.76 2,375 13,144 3.33 812,500 South 6,600 62.24 1,832 8,532 3.73 690,000 544 22.88 
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3.9 Empirical Strategy 
Section 4 includes additional detail on the empirical strategy, with the presentation of 
maps that illustrate the spatial setting of the study. 
3.9.1 Spatial illustrations of data 
In identifying heritage capitalisation effects by city, I then concentrate on property 
prices that fall within a 200-metre buffer inside and outside LA and HC boundaries as 
specified in section 3.2.2 of the main paper. I create dummies of the buffer areas around 
LA and HC borders, specifically 𝐿𝐴𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 takes the value of one if 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐿𝐴𝑖 >  −200 
& 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐿𝐴𝑖 < 200, and 𝐻𝐶𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 takes the value of one if 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐻𝐶𝑖 >
−200 & 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐻𝐶𝑖 < 200. I also create dummies of the area immediately inside both LA 
and HC borders, specifically 𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎 takes the value of one if 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐿𝐴𝑖 < 0 and 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐿𝐴𝑖 > −200, and 𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎 takes the value of one if 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐻𝐶𝑖 < 0 & 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐻𝐶𝑖 >
−200. These buffers and inside variables are illustrated in Figure A10, showing that a 
200m distance from the boundary typically does not include more than three to five 
aligned buildings from HC or LA border and therefore indicates a small restricted area, 
which is suitable to Regression Discontinuity Design strategies. 
Figure A10 Visualising border discontinuities 
Notes: LA and HC borders mark the delimitations of Landscape and Historic Areas. LA and HC inside 200m 
denote the areas 200m inside the border, and LA and HC buffers denotes 200m both inside and outside the 
borders.  
 
3.10 Estimation Results 
This section of the appendix presents complementary results that are not essential for 
the message of the main paper but may be of interest to some readers, as well as several 
robustness checks.  
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3.10.1 Baseline regression – just dummies 
Before establishing establish a boundary discontinuity inspired design (BDD), I first 
explore if there is enough variation between LA and HC premiums to suggest that these 
effects are separately identifiable. In Table A5 I present results of exploratory 
regressions where I simply create dummies (LA=1 and HC=1) when property prices are 
inside each of these heritage areas. I then include a large set of control variables 
including structural and amenity variables, characteristics of the built environment and 
socio-economics variables. Neighbourhood and city fixed effect are added in alternative 
version of the specification to account for unobserved across-neighbourhood or across-
city differences.  
A variable accounting for LA years since inscription is also included in the specification 
to evaluate the effect of time passed since designation given the historicism of the 
policy as illustrated in Figure A1. Although the results are not significant before the 
inclusion of neighbourhood fixed effect, results in columns (9) to (11) of Table A5 
suggest that it is in fact years since inscription which are driving the positive price 
premium in LAs when accounting for unobserved across-place differences. Older LAs 
are characterised by higher price mark ups, suggesting that the effect of inscription may 
be almost null at first inscription and rises with time. These findings are consistent with 
the logic of cumulative effect of designation over time (Ahlfeldt, Holman, & Wendland, 
2012). 
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Table A5 Baseline results  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Ln price m2  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Inside LA  0.223*** 0.212*** 0.361*** 0.257*** 0.237*** 0.243*** 0.245*** 0.193*** -0.0140 -0.0429* -0.0179 
 (0.0500) (0.0484) (0.110) (0.0827) (0.0797) (0.0797) (0.0766) (0.0696) (0.0308) (0.0349) (0.0293) 
Inside HC  0.253*** 0.290*** 0.286*** 0.234*** 0.211*** 0.190*** 0.199*** 0.182*** 0.0430*** 0.102*** 0.0433*** 
 (0.0740) (0.0730) (0.0715) (0.0706) (0.0677) (0.0732) (0.0713) (0.0633) (0.0137) (0.0285) (0.0134) 
K-density arch. 0.0118 0.0234** 0.0240** 0.0118 0.00147 -0.000342 0.00184 -0.00216 0.00966*** 0.0133*** 0.00949*** 
 (0.00997) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.00842) (0.00831) (0.00792) (0.00800) (0.00772) (0.00237) (0.00270) (0.00235) 
LA years since inscription   -0.00311 -0.00251 -0.00179 -0.00189 -0.00209 -0.00217 0.00172*** 0.00323*** 0.00173*** 
   (0.00195) (0.00154) (0.00151) (0.00151) (0.00147) (0.00138) (0.000639) (0.000888) (0.000613) 
UNESCO site a      0.209 0.240 0.273* -0.0236 0.0558 -0.0259 
      (0.192) (0.182) (0.161) (0.0335) (0.0695) (0.0327) 
Build. Bad b       -0.326*** -0.195*** -0.0873*** -0.122*** -0.0852*** 
       (0.0495) (0.0398) (0.0131) (0.0195) (0.0131) 
△ empty build c       -0.000742** -0.000742** -9.03e-05 -0.000315** -8.99e-05 
       (0.000346) (0.000332) (0.000130) (0.000159) (0.000128) 
NBG d       -7.07e-05 -0.00105 0.000530 0.000210 0.000487 
       (0.000729) (0.000665) (0.000347) (0.000361) (0.000343) 
Higher Edu. e        0.693*** 0.326*** 0.509*** 0.322*** 
        (0.0596) (0.0252) (0.0341) (0.0251) 
Migrant % f        -0.310*** -0.341*** -0.449*** -0.338*** 
        (0.0829) (0.0410) (0.0386) (0.0404) 
Pop. Density g        -2.89e-06*** -2.42e-06*** -3.13e-06*** -2.35e-06*** 
        (6.09e-07) (4.23e-07) (5.25e-07) (4.11e-07) 
Observations 53,572 53,572 53,572 53,572 53,572 53,572 53,572 53,572 53,572 53,572 53,572 
R-squared 0.335 0.348 0.350 0.480 0.492 0.496 0.507 0.543 0.720 0.682 0.723 
CBD control NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
S controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
A controls NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Amenity densities NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
City FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO 
N FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO YES 
Notes: Inside LA and HC are simply dummies if a property is found within the respective heritage areas. a UNESCO site is a dummy if a property is found within a UNESCO heritage site. 
bPercentage of buildings in fair or bad state. cChange in number of empty units. dNew Build Growth - change in number of residential buildings after 1991. eShare of population holding a 
university degree. f Share of migrant population . g Population density by neighbourhood. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 † p < 0.15
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Table A6 reports the estimates of distance from HCs and LAs boundaries both 
separately and jointly, results also include second and third order polynomials to 
evaluate the linearity of best fit lines. I simply estimate distance trends allowing for 
quadratic and semi-non-parametric specifications. The equation is estimated including 
both LA and HC distances variables first, then evaluating the distance trends for each 
policy separately, and then including them jointly with quadratic specifications. Only 
modest differences are found that do not significantly alter the results. 
Table A6 Distances 
Ln price m2 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Distance HC -2.88e-05*  -6.40e-
05*** 
-5.96e-
05***  (1.66e-05)  (1.88e-05) (1.8 e-05) 
Distance LA -1.52e-05* -3.35e-05***  -2.45e-05** 
 (8.59e-06) (1.12e-05)  (1.12e-05) 
LA 2nd order poly  2.71e-09**  5.34e-10 
  (1.17e-09)  (1.22e-09) 
LA 3rd  order poly  -2.76e-14  8.55e-16* 
  (2.28e-14)  (2.21e-14) 
HC 2nd order poly   6.45e-09*** 6.77e-09*** 
   (1.24e-09) (1.39e-09) 
HC 3rd  order poly   -1.30e-13*** --1.25e-13*** 
   (2.64e-14) (2.74e-14) 
Observations 53,572 53,572 53,572 53,572 
R-squared 0.705 0.705 0.706 0.706 
S controls YES YES YES YES 
A controls YES YES YES YES 
Amenity densities YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
N FE YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Standard Errors clustered at Neighbourhood level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A7 First Step full estimates 
 TORINO Novara Alessandria AOSTA Savona GENOVA La Spezia MILANO Bergamo Brescia Bolzano 
    (1)       (2)       (3)       (4)       (5)       (6)       (7)       (8)       (9)      (10)      (11)    
HC 200m in 0.172*** 
(0.0321)    
0.177*** 
(0.0435)    
0.012 
(0.0387)    
0.045 
(0.0500)    
-0.149*** 
(0.0397)    
-0.045 
(0.0347)    
-0.077** 
(0.0345)    
0.230*** 
(0.0194)    
0.124*** 
(0.0261)    
0.128*** 
(0.0376)    
-0.029 
(0.0566)    LA 200m in 0.111***
(0.0228)    
0.166***
(0.0334)    
- .287***
(0.0832)    
0.009 
(0.0598)    
0.116** 
(0.0518)    
0.364*** 
(0.0229)    
0.122***
(0.0414)    
0.156***
(0.0145)    
0.328***
(0.0251)    
0.158***
(0.0355)    
- . 03 
(0.0787)                
 TRENTO Verona VENEZIA Padova Udine TRIESTE Parma Modena BOLOGNA Pesaro ANCONA 
   (12)      (13)      (14)      (15)      (16)      (17)      (18)      (19)      (20)      (21)      (22)    
HC 200m in 0.017 
(0.0675)    
0.207*** 
(0.0473)    
0.017 
(0.0463)    
0.106 
(0.0887)    
0.009 
(0.0359)    
0.042 
(0.0365)    
0.152*** 
(0.0246)    
0.117*** 
(0.0439)    
0.062** 
(0.0301)    
0.078 
(0.0478)    
-0.005 
(0.0504)    LA 200m in 0.019 
(0.0930)    
0.142*** 
(0.0378)    
- . 39 
(0.0544)    
- .200 
(0.1502)    
0.149 
(0.2108)    
0.134*** 
(0.0383)    
0.117 
(0.1104)    
- .632***
(0.1642)    
0.042 
(0.0361)    
0.02  
(0.0571)    
0.069** 
(0.0340)                
 Ascoli FIRENZE Livorno PERUGIA Terni Viterbo ROMA Latina Caserta NAPOLI Salerno 
   (23)      (24)      (25)      (26)      (27)      (28)      (29)      (30)      (31)      (32)      (33)    
HC 200m in 0.119*** 
(0.0411)    
0.040 
(0.0372)    
-0.149*** 
(0.0315)    
0.159*** 
(0.0311)    
0.211*** 
(0.0658)    
0.001 
(0.0439)    
0.023 
(0.0245)    
-0.015 
(0.0541)    
0.011 
(0.0466)    
0.121*** 
(0.0198)    
0.059 
(0.0464)    LA 200m in - .193***
(0.0548)    
- . 21 
(0.0223)    
0.3 7***
(0.0384)    
0.054**
(0.0257)    
- .197** 
(0.0931)    
- .165*** 
(0.0504)    
- .122*** 
(0.0238)    
0.169** 
(0.0793)    
- .109 
(0.0750)    
0.285*** 
(0.0203)    
0.078 
(0.0515)                
 L'AQUILA Teramo Pescara CAMPOBAS Foggia BARI Taranto POTENZA Matera Cosenza CATANZAR 
   (34)      (35)      (36)      (37)      (38)      (39)      (40)      (41)      (42)      (43)      (44)    
HC 200m in 0.006 
(0.0528)    
-0.031 
(0.0398)    
0.239*** 
(0.0332)    
-0.325*** 
(0.0797)    
0.061 
(0.0434)    
0.106*** 
(0.0225)    
-0.071** 
(0.0347)    
-0.045 
(0.0745)    
0.033 
(0.0564)    
-0.376*** 
(0.1123)    
-0.173*** 
(0.0424)    LA 200m in - .126 
(0.0780)    
0.260 
(0.2150)    
- .126***
(0.0428)    
- .154***
(0.0514)    
x - . 4  
(0.0919)    
- .179 
(0.1250)    
x - . 01 
(0.0604)    
- .033 
(0.1502)    
- . 9  
(0.2580)                
 Reggio PALERMO Messina Catania Sassari Nuoro CAGLIARI Pordenone Isernia Prato Monza 
   (45)      (46)      (47)      (48)      (49)      (50)      (51)      (52)      (53)      (54)      (55)    
HC 200m in 0.221*** 
(0.0311)    
-0.118*** 
(0.0358)    
0.144** 
(0.0607)    
-0.139*** 
(0.0391)    
-0.227*** 
(0.0535)    
0.156 
(0.1640)    
-0.053 
(0.0600)    
0.238** 
(0.0930)    
-0.278*** 
(0.0676)    
0.035 
(0.0402)    
0.365*** 
(0.0543)    LA 200m in 0.178***
(0.0511)    
0.007 
(0.0699)    
- . 59 
(0.0888)    
0.014 
(0.0313)    
0.01  
(0.0962)    
- .307* 
(0.1763)    
- . 08 
(0.0400)    
0.286***
(0.0990)    
x 0.030 
(0.0402)    
0.1 4** 
(0.0492)     
 HC 500m in  LA 100m in   Outside boundary controls YES 
 Lin100m 0.101*** (0.0066)   Hin500m 0.054*** (0.0071)     Year FE YES    
 
Observations 50409 
 
Observations  50409 
 
Structural, Amenity and Amenity density controls YES    
 
R-squared 0.677 
 
R-squared  0.665    
 
Robust st. errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.10.2 City-level additional estimates 
 
Table A8 Abusivism’s effect on price premiums – full regression unweighted 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Price premiums HC HC HC HC HC LA LA LA LA LA 
AB rate -0.00403** -0.00409*** -0.00358** -0.00594*** -0.00644*** -0.000961 -0.000981 -0.000930 -0.000436 -0.000859† 
 (0.00157) (0.00141) (0.00150) (0.00157) (0.00165) (0.000972) (0.00110) (0.00119) (0.00163) (0.00072) 
Education 0.404 0.450* 0.383* 0.436* 0.572* 0.0990 0.0361 0.0429 0.0541 0.0598 
 (0.290) (0.243) (0.147) (0.248) (0.292) (0.414) (0.366) (0.358) (0.359) (0.417) 
Pop. density  2.53e-05*** 3.05e-05*** 2.68e-05*** 3.80e-05***  3.45e-05*** 3.51e-05*** 3.58e-05*** 4.53e-05*** 
  (8.04e-06) (8.73e-06) (8.58e-06) (1.18e-05)  (9.57e-06) (1.06e-05) (1.08e-05) (1.68e-05) 
Build. Height   -0.00871 -0.0171*** -0.0145**   -0.000889 -0.000860 -0.00302 
   (0.00611) (0.00613) (0.00618)   (0.00847) (0.00865) (0.00933) 
Env. Qual.    -0.427*** -0.511***    0.0892 0.0178 
    (0.118) (0.133)    (0.151) (0.170) 
Mafia Index     -0.000100     -8.48e-05 
     (6.37e-05)     (9.39e-05) 
Constant -0.0910 -0.156 -0.0283 1.312*** 1.475*** 0.0850 -0.00362 0.00941 -0.271 -0.132 
 (0.149) (0.130) (0.149) (0.427) (0.431) (0.213) (0.198) (0.213) (0.507) (0.516) 
Observations 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
R-squared 0.194 0.277 0.296 0.405 0.419 0.008 0.114 0.114 0.117 0.124 
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Paper III 
 
4 The economic effects of density: A synthesis 
4.1 Introduction 
The degree of concentration of economic activity in urban areas is striking as they host 
more than 50% of the world’s population (United Nations 2014) on only an approximate 
2.7% of the world’s land (GRUMP 2010; Liu et al. 2014).38 There is a consensus among 
planners and policymakers, however, that even higher densities within cities and urban 
areas are desirable, at least on average (Boyko & Cooper 2011; OECD 2012). Most 
countries pursue policies that implicitly or explicitly aim at promoting “compact urban 
form”, reflecting the concern that unregulated economic markets will fail to deliver 
allocations of uses and infrastructure that are efficient and equitable (IAU-IDF 2012; 
Holman et al. 2014). It is difficult to ascertain, however, to what extent this normative 
statement prevailing in the policy debate can be substantiated by evidence (Neuman 
2005).  
To our knowledge, no attempt has been made to synthesise the evidence on the 
economic effects of density and to compare the variety of costs and benefits across a 
comprehensive range of outcome categories. It seems fair to state that the dominating 
“compact city” policy paradigm, which aims at shaping the habitat of the urban 
population over the decades to come, is not well-grounded in evidence. We make four 
contributions to address this notable gap in the literature.  
Our first contribution is to provide a unique summary of the quantitative literature on 
the economic effects of density. Our evidence base contains 347 estimates (from 180 
studies) of the effects of density on a wide range of outcomes including accessibility (job 
accessibility, accessibility of private and public services), various economic outcomes 
(productivity, innovation, value of space), various environmental outcomes (open space 
preservation and biodiversity, pollution reduction, energy efficiency), efficiency of 
public service delivery, health, safety, social equity, transport (ease of traffic flow, 
sustainable mode choice), and self-reported well-being.  
                                                             
38 The estimates of the global urban land reported in the literature vary widely, from less than 0.3 
to 3% primarily because of the different definitions of urban land and data used (night light data, 
Landsat data etc.) (Angel et al. 2005; GRUMP 2010; Liu et al. 2014). In 2010, the global urban land 
was close to 3%, while the global built-up area was approximately 0.65%. 
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While the evidence base is shared with a companion paper (Ahlfeldt & Pietrostefani 
2017), the results presented in the two papers are mutually exclusive. In the companion 
paper, we analyse the effects of a variety of compact city characteristics (including 
morphological features and land use mix), restricting the interpretation to qualitative 
results in order to explore the full evidence base. In this paper, we focus on a 
quantitative comparison, and, therefore, restrict the analysis to results that can be 
expressed as density elasticity estimates. For more than 100 cases, we conduct back-of-
the-envelope calculations to convert the results into a comparable metric or obtain 
results that had not previously been published from the relevant authors. Borrowing 
techniques from meta-analytic research, we analyse within-category heterogeneity with 
respect to characteristics such as the methods used, the citations adjusted for years 
since publication, or the geographic setting of the analysis. In some instances, we make 
admittedly ambitious assumptions to translate results published in fields such as 
engineering and medical research into a format that is compatible with the conventions 
in economics and related disciplines.  
Our second contribution is to provide original elasticity estimates where the evidence 
base is thin or inconsistent. We provide transparent density elasticity estimates based 
on a consistent econometric framework and OECD data that refer to 16 distinct outcome 
variables (from 10 outcome categories). For some outcomes, such as the density 
elasticity of preserved green space, our estimates are without precedent. We provide an 
estimate of the elasticity of density with respect to city size, which facilitates a better 
comparison of the results from studies analysing the effects of density and city size. To 
reconcile the evidence on the effects of density on wages, rents, and various 
(dis)amenities, we also provide novel estimates of the density elasticity of construction 
costs. 
Our third contribution is to condense this broad evidence base into a set of 15 category-
specific density elasticity estimates. Specific to each category, we either recommend the 
weighted (by adjusted citations) mean across the elasticity estimates in our evidence 
base, an estimate from a high-quality original research paper or one of our original 
estimates. Along with the recommended elasticities, we provide a critical discussion of 
the quality and the quantity of the evidence base, highlighting priority areas for further 
research. The compact presentation of a variety of density elasticity estimates in a 
consistent format is unique in terms of accessibility and coverage and represents a 
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convenient source for research engaging with the quantitative interpretation of density 
effects. 
Our fourth contribution is to monetise the economic effects of density. For each of the 
15 outcome categories, we compute the per capita present value (PV, at a 5% discount 
rate) of the effect of a 1% increase in density for a scenario that roughly corresponds to 
an average metropolitan area in a developed country. For this purpose, we combine our 
recommended density elasticity estimates with several valuations of non-marketed 
goods such as time, crime and mortality risk, or pollution, among many others. The 
monetary equivalents allow for a novel accounting of the costs and benefits of density 
and how the net effect of density across a broad range of amenity and dis-amenity 
categories aligns with estimates of quality of life based on cost-earning differentials.39 
Our analysis reveals sizeable benefits and costs of density. A log-point increase in density 
leads to (log-point effects in parenthesis) higher wages (0.04), higher rent (0.15) and 
lower average vehicle mileage (0.06), but also higher pollution concentration (0.13) and 
lower average speed (0.12). For other outcomes, existing estimates are better 
interpreted as associations in the data since the causal interpretation would rest on the 
strong assumption that differences in density are historically determined by factors that 
have no contemporaneous effects on outcomes. A log-point increase in density is 
associated with (log-point effects in parenthesis) higher patent activity (0.21), 
consumption variety value (0.12), preservation of green spaces (0.28), as well as lower 
car use (0.05), energy consumption (0.07), crime (0.085), and costs of providing local 
public services (0.17). Density, however, is also associated with higher construction costs 
(0.55), skill wage gaps (0.035), mortality risk (0.09) as well as lower self-reported well-
being (0.004).  
Studies that are more frequently cited, or use more rigorous methods, find less positive 
density effects (in a normative sense). The estimates also become less positive over 
time, possibly reflecting a trend towards the application of more rigorous methods. 
Although more evidence would be desirable to substantiate our findings, our analysis 
reveals some insights into geographic heterogeneity in density elasticity estimates. For 
non-high-income countries, the estimated density elasticity of wages, at 0.08, is twice as 
large for high-income countries, on average. Mode choice is less likely to change with 
                                                             
39 The indirect inference of quality of life from relative wages goes back to the work pioneered 
by Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) which has spurred a growing literature (see Albouy & Lue 
2015 for a review). 
  
163 
density, whereas the gains from density in terms of domestic energy consumption 
appear to be larger. Compared to other developed countries, density in the US is 
associated with larger skill wage gaps and higher rather than lower crime rates. Our 
review of the literature also suggests that the effect of density on rents may not be log-
linear. Estimates of the density elasticity of rent increase by 0.063 for every increase in 
population density by 1000 inhabitants per square kilometre. We do not find a similar 
non-linearity in the estimated effects of density on wages, suggesting that convex costs 
lead to a bell-shaped net-agglomeration benefits curve (Henderson 1974). 
In our illustrative scenario, a 1% increase in density leads to an increase in the per capita 
present value (infinite horizon, 5% discount rate) of wages and rents of $280 ($190 after 
taxes) and $347. Summing up the monetary equivalents of all amenity and dis-amenity 
categories we find a clearly positive value, which is, however, not as large as the 
“compensating differential” (rent effect – after-tax wage effect). While density seems 
to be a net amenity, our admittedly imperfect accounting also suggests that part of the 
rent increase may be attributable to the higher cost of providing space in addition to 
enjoyable amenities. Policy-induced densification may lead to aggregate welfare gains. 
However, there may be a collateral net-cost to renters and first-time buyers.40 This effect 
adds to a potentially regressive distributional impact due to a widening skill wage gap.  
Our analysis unifies important strands in the economics literature on the spatial 
organisation of economic activity. We provide an explicit comparison of the magnitude 
of agglomeration benefits on the production (e.g. Combes et al. 2012) and consumption 
side (e.g. Couture 2016), the effects of urban form on innovation (e.g. Carlino et al. 2007), 
housing rent (e.g. Combes et al. 2018), quality of life (e.g. Albouy & Lue 2015), driving 
distances (Duranton & Turner 2018), road speeds (Couture et al. 2018), public spending 
reduction (e.g. Hortas-Rico & Sole-Olle 2010), energy consumption (Glaeser & Kahn 
2010), skill-wage gaps (Baum-Snow & Pavan 2012) and self-reported well-being (Glaeser 
et al. 2016), in addition to a range of density effects on outcomes that have remained 
under-researched in the economics literature. Our findings also have important policy 
implications as they suggest that densification policies are likely efficient but not 
necessarily equitable. 
Some words are due on the limitations of this ambitious synthesis. The fundamental 
challenge the literature faces is to separate the effects of density from unobserved 
                                                             
40  To be theoretically consistent this interpretation requires that residents are not fully mobile 
(e.g. because they have location-specific preferences). 
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factors that determine density. As mentioned above, a causal interpretation often 
requires the strong identifying assumption that contemporary density is not 
endogenous to factors that have direct effects on outcomes. Moreover, for individual-, 
firm-, and unit-based outcomes (e.g. wages, innovation, rent, wellbeing), the collected 
density elasticity estimates often capture composition effects. In general, the 
quantitative results are best suited for an evaluation of the effects of densification 
policies applied to individual cities (as opposed to all cities in a country) in the long run. 
Compared to wages and mode choice, the evidence base for the other outcomes is 
generally underdeveloped. While for some categories selected high-quality 
contributions are available, the nature of the evidence is at best preliminary for others. 
Significant uncertainty surrounds any quantitative interpretation in the categories urban 
green, income inequality, health, and well-being. We view these outcomes as priority 
areas for further research into the effects of density. In general, the extant evidence 
base consists of point estimates, so that heterogeneity in density effects across contexts 
and the density distribution remains a key subject for future original research and 
reviews.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we provide an 
introduction into the origins of density and some ancillary estimates that help with the 
interpretation of density effects. In section 3, we lay out how the evidence base was 
collected and classified. Section 4 summarises the evidence by outcomes and attributes. 
Section 5 presents a discussion of our original density elasticity estimates. Section 6 
condenses the evidence (including our original estimates) to 15 outcome-specific density 
elasticity estimates. Section 7 discusses the monetary equivalents of an increase in 
density. The final section (8) concludes. We also provide an extensive technical appendix 
with additional results and explanations, which is essential reading for those wishing to 
use our quantitative results in further research (recommended elasticities and monetary 
equivalents). 
4.2 Background 
In this section, we provide some theoretical background and ancillary empirical 
analyses that will guide the interpretation of the evidence base.  
4.2.1 Origins of density 
The first columns of Table 1 summarise the distribution of population density by OECD 
functional urban areas (FUA), comparing the US to the rest of the world. While, on 
average, density in US cities is relatively low, the variation, at a coefficient of variation of 
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about one, is similarly striking in both samples. Another notable insight from 0 is that the 
variation in density within US FUAs is about two and a half times the variation across 
FUAs. 
Table 1 Variation in density  
 
(1) FUA, Non-US (2) FUA, US (3) FUA, US  (4) Census tract, US 
 OECD data OECD data Census data Census data 
 
Pop. Density Pop. density 
Pop. Density 
(PD) 
Tract PD - FUA 
mean 
  Level Ln Level Ln Level Ln Level Ln 
Min 36 3.58 27 3.29 34 3.54 -1,947 -10.99 
p1 55 4.01 27 3.29 34 3.54 -1,201 -3.18 
p25 330 5.80 100 4.60 163 5.10 369 0.57 
p50 580 6.36 179 5.19 371 5.92 1,295 1.44 
p75 994 6.90 386 5.96 648 6.47 2,831 2.37 
p99 4,652 8.44 1,661 7.42 1,947 7.57 31,388 4.28 
Max 4,851 8.49 1,661 7.42 1,947 7.57 209,187 5.87 
Mean 814 6.33 274 5.23 451 5.76 2,907 1.36 
SD1 798 0.90 268 0.89 370 0.90 5,890 1.49 
CV2 98.03% - 97.81% - 82.06% - 202.58% - 
N 211   70   70 
 
34,123 
 
Note: Population density in inhabitants per square kilometre. Functional urban area (FUA) data from OECD 
(Columns 1 and 2). Census data matched to FUA shapefiles on GIS, aggregated to FUA (Columns 3 and 4) – 
data includes only core FUA, excluding the commuting zones around them. City cores are defined using the 
population grid from the global dataset Landscan (2000). 1 Standard Deviation. 2 Coefficient of variation. 
Economic theory offers a range of explanations for this large variation in density. In a 
world without internal or external scale economies, density naturally results from the 
fundamental productivity and amenity value of a location. Exogenous geographic 
features such as fertile soil, moderate climate, or access to navigable rivers attract 
economic activity, leading to growing cities. Classic urban economics models predict 
that larger cities will be denser since positive within-city transport costs limit horizontal 
urban expansion (Brueckner 1987). Urban growth, therefore, drives up the average rent 
in a city, leading to lower use of space and a substitution effect on the consumption side. 
Since building taller becomes profitable, higher rents lead to densification due to a more 
intense use of land and a substitution effect on the supply side. Within cities, densities 
are higher close to desirable locations (such as the CBD) where rents are particularly high 
to offset for transport cost. Transport innovations (e.g. mass-produced cars) allow for 
horizontal expansion and, ceteris paribus, reduce urban density.  
Reflecting the shift towards knowledge-based urban economies (Michaels et al. 2018), 
recent models feature agglomeration externalities (Lucas & Rossi-Hansberg 2002; 
Ahlfeldt et al. 2015) making density a cause and an effect of productivity and utility. This 
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class of models features multiple equilibria so that cities may be dense and monocentric 
or polycentric and dispersed. Yet, due to agglomeration-induced path dependency, 
contemporary economic geography often follows features that were important in the 
past, e.g. agricultural land suitability (Henderson et al. 2018) or portage sites (Bleakley & 
Lin 2012). Similarly, the compact monocentric city structure that is characteristic for 
historic cities has been argued to be more resilient to shocks (e.g. natural disasters, or 
transport innovations) in cities that were already large about a century ago, the time 
when external returns and mass-produced cars presumably started to become 
increasingly important (Ahlfeldt & Wendland 2013).  
In practice, and at the heart of the policy dimension of this paper, density is also 
determined by various land use regulations, such as urban growth boundaries, 
preservation policies, as well as height, floor area ratio, and lot size regulations, which 
often have their origins in history (McMillen & McDonald 2002; Siodla 2015). For a 
comprehensive review of the role of history in urban economics research, see Hanlon & 
Heblich (2018). 
Given the endogeneity of density, separating the effects of density on an economic 
outcome from the effects of location fundamentals represents an identification 
challenge. Natural experiments such as the division of a city due to exogenous political 
reasons (Ahlfeldt et al. 2015) are rare. Plausible instruments for density are often difficult 
to find, although some researchers have exploited geology as a factor that likely impacts 
on the distribution of economic activity, but not on an economic outcome of interest 
(Combes et al. 2010). Our reading is that, for the most part, the literature implicitly 
exploits the idea that much of the spatial variation in density is rooted in history. Many 
of the results summarised below are informative to the extent that density is 
determined by factors that were relevant in the past and have a limited direct effect on 
economic outcomes today.  
4.2.2 Density and city size 
The relationship between city size and density is critical to the interpretation of our 
evidence base. Given the theoretical link discussed above, it is perhaps not surprising 
that the literature refers to actual density, the population normalised by the geographic 
size of a city, and city size, the total population, interchangeably.  
Some researchers have attempted to disentangle the effects of density and city size 
(Cheshire & Magrini 2009). At the heart of such a separation is the idea that different 
types of agglomeration economies operate at different spatial resolutions (Rosenthal & 
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Strange 2001). Separating the effects of city size and density corresponds to separating 
the effects of different agglomeration economies (and diseconomies), some of which 
operate over large distances (such that city size matters), while others are more 
localised (such that density matters). While separating the effects of density and city 
size is interesting, it is also challenging because the geographic size of an integrated 
urban area cannot grow infinitely, which implies that density and city size cannot vary 
independently.  
Our reading of the literature is that in most studies identifying density effects from 
between-city (as opposed to within-city) comparisons, city population implicitly changes 
as city density changes (and vice versa). The evidence from between-city comparisons 
reviewed here should be interpreted in that light, since compact-city policies aiming at 
changing density while keeping population constant may result in smaller effects, if 
there is a genuine city-size effect that is independent from density. As an example, if 
productivity gains from labour market pooling operated at the city scale over relatively 
large commuting distances without spatial decay, increasing density while holding 
population constant would not increase productivity. Reassuringly, the estimates from 
between-city and within-city studies (which hold population constant) tend to be quite 
similar conditional on us making the following adjustment.  
To translate estimated city size elasticities from the literature into density elasticity 
estimates, we use an estimate of the elasticity of (population) density with respect to 
city size (population) derived from a multi-country FUA-level data set (OECD 2016) and 
the following empirical specification: 
ln(𝐴𝑖,𝑐) = 𝑎 ln(𝑃𝑖) + 𝜇𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐, (1) 
where 𝐴𝑖,𝑐 is the geographic area of FUA i in country c, 𝑃𝑖 is the land area of the FUA, and 
𝜇𝑐  is a country fixed effect. The city size elasticity of density is implicitly determined as 
𝑑 ln(𝑃𝑖/𝐴𝑖) /𝑑 ln(𝑃𝑖) = 𝛼 = 1 − 𝑎 . Compared to using the log of density as dependent 
variable, this estimation strategy avoids the mechanical endogeneity problem that arises 
if population shows up on both sides of the equation. Our preferred estimate of a is 0.57, 
which implies a city size elasticity of density of 𝛼 = 0.43. Therefore, we expect density 
elasticity estimates to be slightly more than twice as large as population elasticity 
estimates if the underlying economic mechanisms are the same. We note that our 
estimate of a is broadly consistent with the 0.7 estimate for French cities by Combes et 
al (2018). Details related to the estimation of equation (1), the estimation results, and 
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the various transformations used to standardise the results reported in the literature are 
reported in section 2 of the appendix. 
4.2.3 Density and the supply side 
As discussed above, the positive city size elasticity of density results from an interplay of 
the demand side and the supply side of the urban economy. Higher rents in larger cities 
lead to higher densities. Higher densities, in turn, imply that it is more expensive to 
provide space, pushing rents up. Larger cities are therefore theoretically expected to be 
denser and have higher rents, with the latter being the cause and effect of higher 
construction costs. The empirical evidence is generally in line with these expectations. 
Helsley and Strange (2008) provide anecdotal evidence of larger cities having taller 
buildings. Gyourko and Saiz (2006) show that constructing a standard home is more 
expensive in denser areas, even after controlling for differences in geography (high hills 
and mountains), regulatory regimes (housing permits, regulatory chatter), and labour 
market conditions (e.g. wages, unionisation). According to Ellis (2004), midrise stacked 
flats are twice as expensive to construct as single-family detached housing. Ahlfeldt & 
McMillen (2018) estimate a height elasticity of construction cost of 0.25 for small 
structures (five stories and below), and even higher elasticities for taller structures. 
However, estimates of the effect of density on construction cost that capture the 
changes in the composition of building types (a structure effect) as well as changes in 
the cost of building equivalent units (a location effect) to our knowledge do not exist to 
date.  
To substantiate the interpretation of our evidence base, we therefore provide novel 
estimates of the density elasticity of (per-unit) construction costs. We combine a micro-
data set on building constructions from Emporis with census tract level population and 
area data from the 2010 US Census and the American Community Survey (ACS). In an 
alternative approach, we create a construction cost index using structure-type-specific 
construction cost estimates from Ellis (2004) and information on the structure-type 
composition from the ACS (Ruggles et al. 2017). This index exclusively captures variation 
in construction costs due to the composition of structure types (the structure effect). 
The estimated density elasticity of this index can be combined with the estimated 
density elasticity of the cost of a standard home (the location effect) from Gyourko and 
Saiz (2006) to give an estimate of the gross density effect.  
From the results of both analyses, we conclude that 0.04–0.07 represent a conservative 
range for the density elasticity of construction cost in the US. This estimate is a gross 
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estimate that includes all structure effects and location effects that are associated with 
density (including differences in regulation, geology and labour market conditions that 
may be cause or effects of density). A detailed discussion of the effects of density on 
construction cost is in appendix 2.2. We will return to this parameter when reviewing the 
evidence on the effects of density on rents, wages and amenities.  
4.3 The evidence base 
4.3.1 Collection 
In line with standard best-practice approaches of meta-analytic research, as reviewed by 
Stanley (2001), our literature search is carried out in several stages.41 We do not impose 
any geographical restrictions (with respect to the study area) and consider various 
geographic layers (from micro-geographic scale to cross-region comparisons). 
First, we conduct 260 separate searches for various combinations of category-specific 
keywords (combinations of outcomes and empirically observed variables) in academic 
databases (EconLit, Web of Science, and Google Scholar) and specialist research 
institute working paper series (NBER, CEPR, CESIfo, and IZA). Second, we expand on 
relevant research strands by conducting an analysis of citation trees. Third, we ask 
colleagues in our research networks to recommend relevant research (by personal mail 
and a call circulated in social media) and add studies that were previously known to us 
or came up in discretionary searches.42 We keep track of the stage at which the evidence 
is added to control for a bias due to a potentially selective research network. To prevent 
publication bias, we explicitly consider studies that were published as edited book 
chapters, PhD theses, reports, in refereed journals or in academic working paper series 
(we were also open to other types of publications). This process, which is described in 
more detail in the appendix to this paper and in Ahlfeldt & Pietrostefani (2017), results 
in 268 relevant studies, which include 473 conceptually distinct analyses. We typically 
keep multiple estimates (analyses) from the same study if they refer to different 
dependent variables or geographic areas.  
A restriction to elasticity estimates that are explicitly reported in publications shrinks the 
sample by about 50% to 242 analyses in 127 studies. We make some effort, however, to 
increase the evidence base. We infer density elasticity estimates from reported city size 
                                                             
41  Recent examples of classic meta-analyses in economics include studies by Eckel and 
Füllbrunn (2015), Melo et al. (2009), and Nitsch (2005). 
42  At this stage, we were pointed to a literature on urban scaling in which city size is related 
to a variety of outcomes. This literature is not part of this review, because unlike with the bulk of 
the evidence base, the analysis is purely descriptive and not concerned with density (Bettencourt 
& Lobo 2016; Batty 2008; Bettencourt 2013).   
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elasticity estimates using the estimated elasticity of city size with respect to density 
discussed above. Similarly, we conduct back-of-the-envelope calculations to 
approximate density elasticity estimates if results are reported as estimated marginal 
effects in levels, semi-elasticities, or in graphical illustrations. We also make some 
adjustments to allow for a consistent interpretation within categories. As an example, 
we convert estimates of the density elasticity of land price into estimates of the density 
elasticity of housing rent assuming a Cobb-Douglas housing production function (Epple 
et al. 2010) and a land share of 0.25 (Combes et al. 2018; Ahlfeldt et al. 2015). Finally, some 
authors kindly provided density elasticity estimates on request, which were not reported 
in their papers (e.g. Couture 2016; Tang 2015; Albouy 2008). This way, we increase the 
quantitative evidence base by more than 100 estimates to 347 analyses in 180 studies. 
The final quantitative sample is comparable to the full sample (473 analyses from 268 
studies) across a range of characteristics that we introduce in the next subsections (see 
appendix section 2).  
A more complete discussion of the various adjustments made to ensure comparability 
of the evidence is in appendix section 2. A complete list of studies along with the 
encoded attributes introduced in the following sections is provided in a separate 
appendix to this paper. 
4.3.2  Attributes 
We choose a quantitative approach to synthesise our broad and diverse evidence base. 
As with most quantitative literature reviews we use statistical approaches to test 
whether existing empirical findings vary systematically in the selected attributes of the 
studies, such as the geographic context, the data or the methods used. Therefore, we 
encode the results and the various attributes of the reviewed studies into variables that 
can be analysed using statistical methods.  
The typical approach in meta-analytic research is to analyse the findings in a very specific 
literature strand. The results that are subjected to a meta-analysis are often parameters 
that have been estimated in relatively similar econometric analyses. In such instances, it 
is useful to collect specific information concerning the econometric setup. In contrast, 
the scope of our analysis is much broader. Our aim is to synthesise the evidence on the 
economic effects of density across a range of outcome categories. We consider studies 
from separate literature strands that naturally use very different empirical approaches. 
The information we collect is, therefore, somewhat more generic and includes the 
following attributes: 
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i) The outcome category, one for the 15 categories (see Table A1 for details, 
appendix section 1) 
ii) The dependent variable, e.g. wages, land value, crime rate 
iii) The study area, including the continent and the country 
iv) The publication venue, e.g. academic journal, working paper, book chapter, 
report 
v) The disciplinary background, e.g. economics, regional sciences, planning, 
etc. 
vi) The stage (1–3) at which an analysis is added to the evidence base (see Table 
A2 ) 
vii) The period of analysis 
viii) The spatial scale of the analysis, i.e. within-city vs. between-city  
ix) The methodological approach as defined by the Scientific Maryland Scale 
(SMS) used by the What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth (2016) 
The variable can take the following values: 
0. Exploratory analyses (e.g. charts). This score is not part of the original 
SMS 
1. Unconditional correlations and OLS with limited controls 
2. Cross-sectional analysis with comprehensive controls 
3. Good use of spatiotemporal variation controlling for period and 
individual effects, e.g. difference-in-differences or panel methods 
4. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation, e.g. by use of instrumental 
variables, discontinuity designs or natural experiments 
5. Reserved to randomised control trials (not in the evidence base) 
x) The cumulated number of citations, adjusted for the years since publication, 
which we generate using yearly citations counts per study from Scopus. For 
non-journal publications, we impute the citation index using data from 
Google Scholar. Expectedly, our study-based index is closely correlated with 
journal quality as measured by the SNIP (Source Normalised Impact per 
Paper) score (Scopus 2016) and the SCImago Journal Rank (Scimago 2017). 
A detailed discussion is in appendix 1.2. 
It is worth pointing out that, in the present context, a higher SMS score does not 
necessarily imply a higher quality of the evidence. While exploiting plausibly exogenous 
variation (SMS 4) is certainly desirable to separate the effects of density from 
unobserved location fundamentals, it is less clear that having a greater set of covariates 
(SMS 2) improves the analysis if the controls are potentially endogenous. One example 
frequently found in the literature that gives cause for concerns is the inclusion of 
multiple variables that capture different shades of urban compactness such as 
population density, building density and job centrality. Similarly, the inclusion of spatial 
fixed effects (SMS 3) does not improve the identification if the fraction of the variation 
in density that is most likely exogenous is cross-sectional, because it is determined by 
history (see discussion in section 2.1). Given these ambiguities, our preferred measure 
for weighting the elasticities in the evidence base is the citation index, which captures 
the impact an analysis has had within the research community. 
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In Table 2 we tabulate the distribution of analyses included in this review by selected 
attributes (as discussed above, one study can include several analyses). While our 
evidence base to some extent covers most world regions, including the global south, 
there is a strong concentration of studies from high-income countries and, in particular, 
from North America. The clear majority of studies have been published in academic 
journals. The evidence base is diverse with respect to disciplinary background, with 
economics as the most frequent discipline, accounting for a share of about 30%.  
Table 2 Distribution of analyses by attributes I 
World region 
 
Publication 
 
Discipline 
 
North America 208 Academic Journal 266 Economics 100 
Europe 86 Working Paper 62 Transport 72 
Asia 34 Report 14 Planning 48 
South America 7 PhD 4 Urban Studies 42 
World 4 Book chapter 1 Other 34 
OECD 3 - - Regional Studies 24 
non-OECD 3 - - Health 14 
Oceania 1 - - Economic Geography 9 
Africa 1 - - Energy 4 
Note: Assignment to disciplines based on publication venues. Studies contain multiple analyses if density 
effects refer to multiple outcomes.  
Figure 1 Distribution of study period and quality of evidence  
 
Note: Kernel in the left panel is Gaussian. 2008 is the median year of publication. Scientific Methods Scale 
(SMS) defined above (higher values indicate more rigorous methods).  
In Figure 1, we illustrate the distribution of publication years, the study period, and the 
type of methods used, according to the SMS. The evidence, overall, is very recent, with 
the great majority of studies having been published within the last 15 years, reflecting 
the growing academic interest in the topic. Most studies use data from the 1980s 
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onwards. A clear majority of studies score two or more on the SMS, which means there 
is usually at least some attempt to disentangle density effects from other effects, often 
including unobserved fixed effects and period effects. Distinguishing between studies 
published before or after the median year of publication (2008) reveals a progression 
towards more rigorous methods that score three or four on the SMS.  
4.4 Density elasticity estimates in the literature 
4.4.1 Results by outcome category 
In Table 3 we summarise the quantitative results in our evidence base. We made an 
effort to condense the elasticity estimates into a limited number of outcome groups. 
Because of the great variety of outcomes in the evidence base we frequently report 
more than one elasticity per outcome category to which we will refer to in the remainder 
of the paper (indicated by ID). Throughout this paper, all outcomes are expressed such 
that positive values imply economic effects that are typically considered to be positive 
in a normative sense in the relevant literatures.  
Given the variety of outcomes we do not discuss each result here but leave it to the 
interested reader to pick their finding of relevance. We note, however, that there is 
significant variation in the quantity of the evidence base (N) and the quality of the 
underlying evidence (as well as other attributes) and we urge these differences to be 
taken into account when considering the evidence. Caution is warranted, not only when 
the evidence base is quantitatively small (small N), but also when it is inconsistent. A 
useful indicator is a standard deviation (SD) that is large compared to the mean, like, for 
example, pollution reduction. We also note that the results summarized in Table 3 
cannot generally be interpreted as causal estimates since the estimated density effects, 
in many cases, may capture the effects of correlated location fundamentals. For a 
selected set of outcome groups (one per category) we provide a critical discussion of 
the quantity and the quality of the evidence in section 4 of the appendix. We report the 
mean elasticity weighted by our citation index in Table 3. The interested reader will find 
results using alternative weighting schemes in section 2 of the appendix.  
4.4.2 Results by attributes 
For a pooled analysis of the sources of heterogeneity in the evidence base, we normalise 
category-specific elasticity estimates so that they have a zero mean and a unit standard 
deviation within the outcome groups listed in Table 3. Figure 2 reveals that density 
elasticity estimates tend to decline in the year of publication, the citation index, and the 
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SMS score. This pattern is in line with the increasing popularity of more rigorous 
methods displayed in Figure 1. 
In Figure 3, we illustrate how the distribution of normalised elasticity estimates varies in 
selected attributes. At the bottom of each panel we report (two-sided) Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test statistics and significance levels. We find a statistically significant difference 
in the distributions with respect to publication venue (less positive elasticities in 
journals) and citation index (less positive elasticities for higher index values), which may 
reflect publication bias or quality of peer review. Estimated elasticities from higher-
density contexts are larger, on average. 
Figure 2 Normalised elasticity estimates vs. publication year and quality of 
evidence 
 
Note: Elasticity estimates (e) are normalised within outcome elasticity groups (listed in Table 3) to have a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Citation index defined in section 2.2. Marker size 
proportionate to number of observations. Linear fits (dashed lines, parametric results at the bottom) are 
frequency weighted by observations. °/*/**/*** indicates insignificant/significant at the 10%/5%/1% level 
(robust standard errors). 
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Table 3 Density elasticity estimates in the literature 
 Elasticity of outcome  Proportion Med. Mean Elasticityg 
ID with respect to density N Poora Ac.b Econ.c Withd Yeare SMSf Mean S.D. 
1 Labour productivity 47 0.19 0.79 0.74 0.06 2007 3.02 0.04 0.04 
1 Total factor productivity 15 0.13 0.87 0.80 0.20 2004 2.80 0.06 0.03 
2 Patents p.c. 7 0.00 1.00 0.14 0.00 2006 2.86 0.21 0.11 
3 Rent 13 0.00 0.69 0.62 0.62 2013 3.00 0.15 0.13 
4 Commuting reduction 36 0.03 0.56 0.08 0.56 2005 2.17 0.06 0.12 
4 Non-work trip reduction 7 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.86 2005 2.00 -0.20 0.44 
5 Metro rail density 3 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 2010 3.33 0.01 0.02 
5 Quality of life 8 0.38 0.88 1.00 0.13 2014 3.00 0.03 0.07 
5 Consumption amenities 1 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2015 4.00 0.19 - 
5 Variety price reduction 2 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2016 4.00 0.12 0.06 
6 Public spending red. 20 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.00 2007 2.00 0.17 0.25 
7 90th-10th pct. wage gap 
reduction 
1 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2004 4.00 0.17 - 
7 Black-white wage gap 
reduction 
1 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 2013 2.00 0.00 - 
7 Diss. index reduction 3 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.00 2009 3.33 0.66 0.94 
7 Gini coef. reduction 1 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2010 4.00 4.56 - 
7 High-low skill wage gap 
reduction 
3 0.00 0.67 1.00 0.00 2013 4.00 -0.13 0.07 
8 Crime rate reduction 13 0.00 0.69 0.15 0.92 2014 2.54 0.24 0.47 
9 Foliage projection cover 1 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 2015 1.00 -0.06 - 
10 Noise reduction 1 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2012 1.00 0.04 - 
10 Pollution reduction 18 0.44 0.33 0.33 0.39 2014 2.83 0.04 0.47 
11 Energy reduction: 
Domestic & driving 
21 0.10 0.90 0.38 0.24 2010 1.81 0.07 0.10 
11 Energy reduction: Public 
transit 
1 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 2010 1.00 -0.37 - 
12 Speed 2 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 2016 4.00 -0.12 0.01 
13 Car usage reduction 22 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.95 2004 2.00 0.05 0.07 
13 Non-car use 76 0.05 0.79 0.00 0.86 2006 2.03 0.16 0.24 
14 Cancer & other disease 
reduction 
5 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.60 2000 2.40 -0.33 0.20 
14 KSI & casualty reduction 4 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2003 2.00 0.01 0.61 
14 Mental-health 1 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 2015 2.00 0.01 - 
14 Mortality reduction 3 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2010 2.00 -0.36 0.17 
15 Reported health 3 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2013 1.00 -0.27 0.11 
15 Reported safety 1 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 2015 2.00 0.07 - 
15 Reported social 
interaction 
6 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.00 2007 3.50 -0.13 0.19 
15 Reported wellbeing 1 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 2016 3.00 0.00 - 
 Sum 347         
Note: a Poor countries include low-income and median-income countries according to the World Bank 
definition. b Published in academic journal. c  Belongs to the economics discipline. d Exploits within-city 
variation. e Year of publication. f Scientific Methods Scale (SMS) defined in section 3.2 (higher values indicate 
more robust methods). g Weighted by the citation index introduced in section 3.2 and appendix section 1.2. 
Outcome categories correspond to ID as follows: 1: Productivity; 2: Innovation: 3: Value of space; 4: Job 
accessibility; 5: Services access; 6: Efficiency of public services delivery; 7: Social equity; 8: Safety; 9: Open space 
preservation and biodiversity; 10: Pollution reduction; 11: Energy efficiency: Domestic & driving; 12: Traffic flow: 
13: Sustainable mode choice; 14: Health; 15: Well-being. 
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Figure 3 Distribution of normalised elasticity estimates by attributes 
 
Note: Elasticity estimates normalised within outcome elasticity groups (listed in Table 3) to have a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of one. Non-high-income include low-income and median-income countries 
according to the World Bank definition. The citation index (CI) defined in section 2.2. °/*/**/*** indicates 
insignificant/significant at the 10%/5%/1% level based on a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality 
of distribution functions.  
Table 4 presents the results of a multivariate analysis simultaneously controlling for all 
attributes considered in Figure 3. We first run a pooled regression using the normalised 
estimated density elasticity as an outcome. Being published in an academic journal 
decreases the estimated elasticity by a 0.4 standard deviation. In addition, a one 
standard-deviation increase in the citation index results in a 0.09 standard deviation 
reduction in the estimated elasticity. The conditional effect of a high SMS score is 
insignificant, but the point estimate is negative. So, in line with Figure 2 and Figure 3, the 
overall impression is that higher quality is associated with less positive density elasticity 
estimates.  
In the remaining columns of Table 4, we perform meta-analyses (Stanley & Jarrell 1989; 
Melo et al. 2009) of the raw elasticity estimates in some of the more populated outcome 
categories. The first interesting finding is that once we control for study fixed effects, 
we find that the estimated density elasticity of wages in non-high-income countries is 
about twice as large as for high-income countries (column 3). It is worth noting that this 
effect is identified from one multi-country study covering Brazil, China, and India, in 
addition to the US (Chauvin et al. 2016), which is why we do not add further controls to 
save degrees of freedom. However, the unconditional citation-weighted mean in the 
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evidence base is 0.08 for non-high-income countries (from 9 analyses), confirming the 
100% premium over high-income countries (see Table A11 in the appendix for a tabulation 
of mean elasticity estimates by high-income and non-high-income countries).  
The important second insight is that if the population density in the studied area 
increases by 1000 inhabitants per square kilometre, the estimated density elasticity of 
rent increases by 0.063, on average. This effect is qualitatively and quantitatively 
consistent with recent evidence from French cities. Combes et al. (2018) show that the 
estimated elasticity can vary from 0.205 for a small urban area to 0.378 for an urban area 
of the size of Paris. Applying the 0.063-estimate from Table 4, column (4), this 
corresponds to an increase in density by 2,750 inhabitants per square kilometre, which 
in turn corresponds to going from cities like Grenoble or Lens (1000/km²) to a city like 
Paris (3,700/km²) (Demographia 2018). In line with Glaeser & Gottlieb (2008), we do not 
find a similar effect of density on the estimated density elasticity of wages. So it appears 
that increasing cost of density rather than decreasing productivity gains curb 
agglomeration benefits, leading to a bell-shaped net-agglomeration benefits curve 
(Henderson 1974).  
The third relevant finding is that the density elasticity estimates of sustainable mode 
choice are significantly lower for non-high-income countries. A potential explanation 
that is consistent with the large estimated density elasticity of wages in developing 
countries is an indirect income effect that works in the opposite direction of the direct 
density effect. While a compact urban form ceteris paribus may favour alternative 
modes, higher incomes in more urbanised areas increase the affordability of car trips. 
Fourth, the mean estimated density elasticity of energy consumption reduction is much 
larger when identified from studies exploring within-city variation. In this context, it is 
worth noting that the citation-weighted unconditional mean density elasticity of energy 
consumption reduction, at 0.16, is much larger for non-high-income countries than for 
high-income countries. Given the small numbers (two estimates from non-high-income 
countries), it is difficult to separate the within-city and non-high-income country effects. 
It may be that within cities, population density is generally more strongly correlated with 
the share of multi-family houses, which tend to be more energy efficient. This 
relationship might be particularly strong in developing countries where often high 
densities imply formal housing as opposed to informal housing (Henderson et al. 2016).  
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Table 4 Meta-analysis of density elasticity estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Normalis
ed 
density 
elasticity 
estimate 
Estimate
d density 
elasticity 
of wages 
Estimate
d density 
elasticity 
of wages 
Estimate
d density 
elasticity 
of rent 
Estimate
d density 
elasticity 
of 
commuti
ng 
reduction 
Estimate
d density 
elasticity 
of energy 
use 
reduction 
Estimate
d density 
elasticity 
of 
sustainab
le mode 
choice 
Category ID All 1 1 3 4 11 13 
Non-high-
income country 
-0.111 
(0.25) 
0.025 
(0.02) 
0.050*** 
(0.00) 
- -0.247 
(0.21) 
-0.195 
(0.26) 
-0.162*** 
(0.04) 
Not published in 
academic 
journal 
0.401** 
(0.19) 
0.004 
(0.02) 
 
 
-0.021 
(0.07) 
0.150 
(0.13) 
0.364*** 
(0.10) 
0.164 
(0.16) 
Non-economics 
discipline 
0.043 
(0.18) 
0.007 
(0.02) 
 
 
-0.081 
(0.07) 
0.041 
(0.07) 
0.003 
(0.06) 
- 
Round 3 a 0.077 
(0.18) 
0.022* 
(0.01) 
 
 
-0.109+ 
(0.06) 
0.003 
(0.06) 
0.101* 
(0.05) 
-0.178** 
(0.07) 
Within-city 
variation 
-0.136 
(0.18) 
-0.020+ 
(0.01) 
 
 
-0.146 
(0.10) 
-0.071 
(0.07) 
0.187** 
(0.07) 
-0.085 
(0.11) 
Citation index 
normalised by 
s.d. 
-0.091* 
(0.05) 
-0.005+ 
(0.00) 
 
 
0.307+ 
(0.18) 
0.058 
(0.05) 
-0.010 
(0.01) 
0.030 
(0.04) 
SMS >=3 -0.203 
(0.16) 
-0.014 
(0.01) 
 
 
-0.040 
(0.08) 
-0.025 
(0.05) 
0.070 
(0.07) 
-0.007 
(0.09) 
Pop. density in 
study area 
(1000/km²) 
-0.008 
(0.01) 
-0.005 
(0.00) 
 
 
0.063** 
(0.03) 
0.011 
(0.07) 
0.017 
(0.04) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
Constant 0.000 
(0.05) 
0.048*** 
(0.01) 
0.048*** 
(0.00) 
0.131*** 
(0.02) 
0.051** 
(0.02) 
0.115*** 
(0.02) 
0.183*** 
(0.04) 
Study effects - - Yes - - - - 
N 337 47 47 13 36 21 76 
r2 0.043 0.126 0.846 0.805 0.306 0.763 0.131 
Note: Normalised elasticity estimates in (1) are normalised within outcome groups (those listed in Table 3) 
to have a zero mean and a unity standard deviation. Citation index normalised by the global standard 
deviation. All explanatory variables are normalised to have a zero mean within outcome groups. 10 
observations drop out in (1) due to normalisation within categories with singular observations. Non-high-
income countries include low-income and median-income countries according to the World Bank definition. 
Population density in study area is from Demographia World Urban Areas (2018). a Round  3 consists of 
previously known evidence and recommendations by colleagues. Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
clustered on studies (one study can contain multiple analyses, the unit of observation). + p < 0.15, * p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
4.5 Original density elasticity estimates 
While the evidence base on the quantitative effects of density summarised above is rich 
and reasonably consistent for outcomes like productivity or mode choice, it is thinner 
and less consistent for many other outcomes. To enrich the evidence base in some of 
the less-developed categories, we contribute some transparent elasticity estimates 
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using data from the OECD functional urban area and regional statistics database and the 
following regression model: 
 
ln(𝑌𝑖,𝑐) = 𝛽 ln (
𝑃𝑖
𝐴𝑖
) + 𝜏 ln (𝐺𝑖
𝑃𝑖
) + 𝜇𝑐 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑐,                          (2) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑐 is an outcome in city i in country c, 𝑃𝑖, 𝐴𝑖, 𝜇𝑐  are population, geographic area, 
and country fixed effects as in equation (1), and 𝐺𝑖  is GDP. The coefficient of interest is 
𝛽, which gives the estimated density elasticity of an outcome controlling for GDP per 
capita and unobserved cross-country heterogeneity. Where either population or area 
forms part of the dependent variable, we instrument population density using the (ln) 
rank within the national population density distribution as an instrument. Table 5 
summarises the key results. Full estimation results, in each case for a greater variety of 
model specifications, are in the appendix (section 3).  
We find a negative association between well-being and density, which seems to be more 
pronounced across countries than within. Still, the results support the singular 
comparable result found in the literature (Glaeser et al. 2016). Our results further 
support the average findings in the evidence base, in that innovation (number of 
patents) increases in density and crime rates, energy use (carbon emissions), and 
average road speeds decrease in density.  
Conflicting with the mean elasticities in the evidence base reported in Table 3, we find 
that pollution concentrations are higher in denser cities. At the local level, the effect of 
concentrating sources of pollution in space dominates the effect of reduced aggregate 
emissions (due to shorter car trips and more energy-efficient housing). Our estimate has 
been confirmed by two recent studies (Carozzi & Roth 2018; Borck & Schrauth 2018). 
Furthermore, our results consistently suggest that income inequality increases in 
density. Our results are qualitatively and quantitatively (see the results for US cities 
reported in section 3.3 in the appendix) consistent with Baum-Snow et al. (2017). But 
there is some contrast to the reviewed literature that has found mixed results, with 
many studies pointing to lower inequalities at higher levels of economic density. To 
reconcile the evidence, we note that the evidence base contains several case studies on 
a within-city scale, but our comparison is across economic areas. It seems plausible that 
the mechanisms affecting equity dimensions are different on a within-city (segregation) 
and a between-city (skill complementarity) scale, but further research is required to 
substantiate this intuition. We note that the statistically insignificant effect of density on 
crime (conditional on country fixed effects), masks heterogeneity across US and non-US 
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cities. In line with Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999), we find that crime rates increase in 
density for US cities, whereas the opposite is true for other OECD countries (see 
appendix 3.4). 
Table 5 Original elasticity estimates 
 Ln patents p.c.a Ln broadband p.c.b Ln income quintile 
ratiob 
Ln Gini coefficient b 
Ln dens. 0.349*** 0.129* 0.034*** 0.01 0.024 0.035** -0.007 0.025*** 
FE - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes 
IV - Yes - Yes - - - - 
 
Ln poverty rateb 
Ln poverty rateb Ln homicides p.c.b 
Ln green densityb 
(administrative) 
Ln urban green densitya 
(functional economic) 
Ln dens. -0.013 0.032 -0.166*** -0.048 -0.267*** -0.245*** 0.283** 0.761* 
FE - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes 
IV - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes 
    Ln speeda,d 
 Ln green p.c.c Ln pollution (PM2.5)b Ln CO2 p.c.b freeway arterial 
Ln dens. -0.717*** -0.239 0.220*** 0.124*** -0.224*** -0.173*** -0.008 -0.063*** 
FE - Yes - Yes - Yes - - 
IV - Yes - - - Yes - - 
 Ln mortality rateb 
Ln mortality rate: 
transportb 
Ln life expectancy 
at birthb 
Ln self-reported well-
beingb 
Ln dens. -0.046*** -0.017 -0.150*** -0.099*** 0.013*** 0.007* -0.023*** -0.007** 
FE - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes 
IV - Yes - Yes - - - - 
Note: Density (dens.) is population density (population / area). All models control for ln GDP p.c. Fixed 
effects (FE) are by country. IV is rank of a city in the population density distribution within a country.a Data 
from OECD.Stat functional economic areas.b Data from OECD.Stat administrative boundaries (large 
regions).c Data from OECD.Stat administrative boundaries (small regions, excluding GDP control due to 
unavailability of data for the US) d Speed data from Lomax et al (2010). Poverty line is 60% of the national 
median income. Speeds are measured during peak time. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, with standard errors 
clustered on FE where applicable.  
Our estimates of the relationship between green coverage and population density are 
without precedent. The elasticity of green density with respect to population density 
qualitatively depends on the spatial layer of analysis. At regional level (administrative 
boundaries) the spatial units cover both urban and rural areas. The negative elasticity 
estimate likely reflects that an increase in population implies a larger share of urban, at 
the expense of non-urban land. Functional economic areas are designed to cover 
exclusively urban areas. The positive elasticity estimate likely reflects that within an 
urbanised area, increasing population density preserves space for urban parks and 
suburban forests. Because we focus on the effects of urban form in this paper, the latter 
is our preferred estimate. We note that the relatively large elasticity estimated 
conditional on country fixed effects is driven by a suspiciously large elasticity estimated 
across US cities (>1.4), whereas the within-country elasticity estimate for the rest of the 
world is in line with the baseline elasticity estimate from the cross-sectional model 
excluding fixed effects. Therefore, in this case we prefer the conservative non-fixed 
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effects model. The estimated elasticity of per capita green area with respect to 
population is negative, as expected. Our preferred elasticity estimate (-0.283) is of 
roughly the same magnitude as the estimated elasticity of green space value with 
respect to population density of 0.3 (Brander & Koetse 2011) suggesting that congestion 
(number of users) and the value of green space increase at roughly the same rate.  
4.6 Recommended elasticity estimates 
In Table 6 we condense the quantitative evidence, including our original estimates, into 
recommended density elasticity estimates which we provide for each outcome 
category. Specific to each category, we either recommend a citation-weighted mean 
across the elasticity estimates in our evidence base as reported in Table 3, an estimate 
from a high-quality original research paper or one of our original estimates. The selected 
dedicated analyses use comprehensive data and make sensible choices in the research 
design, i.e. they avoid excessive “overcontrolling” for endogenous variables and exploit 
plausibly exogenous variation. In general, we prefer the citation-weighted mean in the 
evidence base as well as estimates from dedicated high-quality original research papers 
over our original estimates. We also prefer estimates from dedicated high-quality papers 
over the weighted means in the evidence base if the evidence base is thin or 
inconsistent, in particular if the recommended elasticity estimate is in line with our 
original analysis of OECD data. 
Our aim is to provide a compact and accessible comparison of density effects across 
categories. The baseline results are best understood as referring to high-income 
countries. Where possible, we acknowledge cross-country differences in Table 6. 
Nevertheless, we wish to remind the reader that we likely miss substantial context-
specific heterogeneity. Moreover, the quality and quantity of the evidence base is highly 
heterogeneous across categories. We strongly advise to consult section 4 in the 
appendix, which provides a discussion of the origin of each of the recommended 
elasticity estimate against the quality and quantity of the evidence base, before applying 
any of the elasticity estimates reported in Table 6 in further research. In a nutshell, we 
see sufficient evidence that seriously engages with separating the effects of density 
from the effects of correlated unobserved fundamentals to allow for a causal 
interpretation in the following categories: 1: Wage and productivity; 3: Rent, 4: Vehicle 
miles travelled; 10: Pollution reduction; 12: Average speed. For the other categories, the 
estimated elasticities are better interpreted as associations in the data.  We stress that 
significant uncertainty surrounds the effects of density on income inequality, urban 
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green, health, and self-reported well-being. In general, the recommended elasticities are 
best understood as describing area-based effects that include composition effects. 
There is an important additional elasticity estimate that is implicitly determined by the 
elasticity estimates reported in Table 6. Assuming perfect mobility and competition in all 
markets, all benefits and costs in urban area offers must be compensated by wages and 
rents (Rosen 1979; Roback 1982). The relative quality of life of a place can be inferred 
from the relative real wage (income after taxes and housing expenditures) residents are 
willing to give up to enjoy living there, i.e. dln 𝑄 = 𝜌 dln 𝑟 − 𝛵 dln 𝑤, where dln 𝑄, 
dln 𝑟,and dln 𝑤 are differentials in quality of life, rents, and wages (in natural logs), 𝜌 is 
the housing expenditure share and 𝛵 is one minus the tax rate. The elasticity of quality 
of life with respect to density can be expressed as: dln 𝑄
dln(𝑃/𝐴)
= 𝜌 dln 𝑟
dln(𝑃/𝐴)
− 𝛵 dln 𝑤
dln(𝑃/𝐴)
.  
Applying conventional values of 𝜌 = 1/3 and 𝛵 = 0.66 (Albouy & Lue 2015) and the 
elasticity estimates reported in Table 6, the resulting quality-of-life elasticity estimate at 
0.04 is close to the citation-weighted mean from the evidence base (0.03). However, we 
must note that there is considerable variation in the collected quality-of-life elasticity 
estimates including both negative (Chauvin et al. 2016) and positive effects (Albouy & 
Lue 2015).  
  
  
183 
Table 6 Recommended elasticity estimates by category 
ID Elasticity Value Comment 
1 Wage 0.04 Citation-weighted mean in review, roughly in line with Melo et 
al. (2009). 0.08 for non-high-income countries. Net of selection 
effects, elasticity estimates about halve (Combes & Gobillon 
2015). 
2 Patent intensity 0.21 Citation-weighed mean in review, in line with original analysis of 
OECD data. 
3 Rent 0.15 Citation-weighed mean in review. In line with evidence from 
the US (dedicated analysis based on Albouy & Lue, 2015 data). 
Estimated elasticity increases in density (original meta-
analysis) and is 0.21 for France (Combes et al. 2018). 
4 Vehicle miles travelled 
(VMT) reduction 
0.06 Citation-weighted mean in review, roughly in line with Duranton 
& Turner (2018) and Ewing & Cervero (2010).  
5 Variety value (price 
index reduction)  
0.12 Dedicated analysis on request using data from Couture (2016), 
in line with Ahlfeldt et al. (2015). 
6 Local public spending 0.17 Citation-weighted mean in review, roughly in line with 
dedicated high-quality paper (Carruthers & Ulfarsson 2003). 
7 Inter-quintile wage gap 
reduction  
-0.035 Original analysis of OECD dataa. -0.057 for the US. US estimate 
in line with dedicated high-quality paper (Baum-Snow et al. 
2017) (section 3 in appendix).  
8 Crime rate reduction 0.085 Dedicated analysis on request (Tang 2015), in line with original 
analysis of OECD non-US city data. Dedicated high-quality paper 
(Glaeser & Sacardote) and original analysis suggest a negative 
value for the US. 
9 Green density 0.28 Original analysis of OECD data (evidence base non-existent) 
10 Pollution reduction -0.13 Dedicated high-quality paper (Carozzi & Roth 2018). In line with 
Borck & Schrauth (2018) and original analysis of OECD data   
11 Energy use reduction 0.07 Citation-weighted mean in review 
12 Average speed -0.12 Citation-weighted mean of two (no further evidence) high-
quality papers (Duranton & Turner 2018; Couture et al. 2018) 
13 Car use reduction 0.05 Citation-weighted mean in review  
14 Mortality rate 
reduction 
-0.09 
Dedicated paper (Reijneveld et al. 1999) 
15 Self-reported well-
being 
-0.0037 Only direct estimate in literature (Glaeser et al. 2016). In line 
with original analysis of OECD data 
Note: Density elasticity estimates are best understood as referring to large cities in high-income countries. 
In general, they represent correlations and not necessarily causal estimates. If our recommended elasticities 
differ between US and non-US cities, we report the former as the baseline and mention the latter in the 
comments, because, as shown in Table 1, the density distribution of US cities is not representative. a Original 
analysis uses the wage gap between 80th and the. 20th percentile. 1: Productivity; 2: Innovation: 3: Value of 
space; 4: Job accessibility; 5: Services access; 6: Efficiency of public services delivery; 7: Social equity; 8: 
Safety; 9: Open space preservation and biodiversity; 10: Pollution reduction; 11: Energy efficiency; 12: Traffic 
flow: 13: Sustainable mode choice; 14: Health; 15: Well-being. See appendix section 4 for a critical discussion 
of the evidence base by category. 
4.7 Monetary equivalents 
For a quantitative comparison of density effects across categories, we conduct a series 
of back-of-the-envelope calculations to express the effects that would result from a 1% 
increase in density as per capita PV dollar effects, assuming an infinite horizon and a 
conventional 5% discount rate (de Rus 2010). We summarise the results in Table 7. As 
most of the parameters used in the back-of-the envelope calculations are context-
dependent, the table is designed to allow for straightforward adjustments. The 
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monetary effect in the last column (8) is simply the product over the elasticity (3), the 
base value (5), the unit value (7), a 1% increase in density and the inverse of the 5% 
discount rate (e.g. 0.04 × $35,000 × 1 × 1%/5% for the wage effect). By changing any of the 
factors a context-specific monetary equivalent can be calculated. 
The exercise summarised in Table 7 is ambitious and there are some limitations. First, the 
monetary equivalents are estimates that most closely refer to large metropolitan areas 
in high-income countries. In drawing conclusions for a specific institutional context, we 
strongly advise that the assumptions made in appendix section 5 are evaluated with 
respect to their applicability. Second, the results in Table 7 do not necessarily correspond 
to the short-run effect of a policy-induced change in density. As an example, an increase 
in population holding the developed area constant will increase population density, but 
not necessarily the green density. However, the green density will be higher than in a 
counterfactual where the population growth was achieved holding density constant. 
Third, the effects implied by the elasticities apply to marginal changes only, i.e. they 
should not be used to evaluate the likely effects of extreme changes (e.g. a 100% increase 
in density) in particular settings. Fourth, while for the not genuinely area-based 
outcomes we would ideally apply density effects that come net of selection effects, the 
literature only offers such estimates in the productivity category. So, for consistency 
across categories, we strictly apply the baseline elasticities capturing area-based effects 
from Table 6. Section 5 in the appendix provides a more detailed discussion of the 
evidence base that should be consulted before there is any further use of the suggested 
monetary equivalents in Table 7.  
Despite these limitations, Table 7 offers novel insights into the direction and the relative 
importance of density effects. The density effect on wages, which has been thoroughly 
investigated in the agglomeration literature, is large, but not as large as the effect on 
rents, on average.43 Density generates costs in the form of higher congestion and lower 
average road speeds, which are, however, more than compensated for by the cost 
reductions due to shorter trips. Agglomeration benefits on the consumption side due to 
larger and more accessible consumption variety are quantitatively important and 
amount to more than one-third of agglomeration benefits on the production side 
(wages). Other quantitatively relevant benefits arising from density include cost savings 
in the provision of local public services, preserved green spaces, lower crime rates 
                                                             
43 The results by Combes at al. (2018) suggest that this result may not apply to small cities as the 
rent elasticity increases in city size. 
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(outside the US), and reduced energy use, which creates a sizeable social benefit 
(reduced carbon emissions) in addition to private cost savings. Besides the 
aforementioned congestion effects, the cost of density comes in the form of increased 
pollution concentration, inequality, adverse health effects and reduced well-being.  
Table 7 Present valuea of a 1% increase in density I: Category-specific effects  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Category Quantity, p.c., year Unit value  PV of 1%  
ID Outcome Elast. Variable Value Unit Value dens. incr. 
Incr.inc.inc. 
($) 
1 Wage 0.04 Income ($) 35,000 - 1 280 
2 Patent intensity 0.21 Patents (#)  2.06E-04 Patent value ($/#) 793K 7 
3 Rent 0.15 Income ($) 35,000 Expenditure share 0.33 347 
4 VMTb reduction 0.06 VMTb (mile) 10,658 Priv. cost $/mile 0.83 107 
5 Variety valuec 0.12b Income ($) 35,000 Expenditure shared 0.14 115 
6 Local public spending 0.17 Total spending ($) 1,463 - 1 50 
7 Wage gape reduction  -0.035 Income ($) 35,000 Inequality premium 0.048 -12 
8 Crime ratef reduction 0.085 Crimes (#) 0.29 Full cost ($/#) 3,224 16 
9 Green density 0.28 Green area (p.c., m²) 540 Park value ($/m²) 0.3 100 
10 Pollution reduction -0.13 Rent ($) 11,550 Rent-poll. elasticity 0.3 -90 
11 Energy use reduction  
(private and social 
effects) 
0.07 Energy (1M BTU) 121.85 Cost ($/1M BTU) 18.7 32  
0.07 CO2 emissions (t) 25 Social cost ($/t) 43 15 
12 Av rage speed -0.12 Driving time (h) 274 VOT ($/h) 10.75 -71 
13 Car use reduction 0.05 VMTb 10,658 Social cost ($/mile)g 0.016 2 
14 Health -0.09 Mortality risk (#) 5.08E-04 Value of life ($/#)h 7M -64 
15 Self-reported well-beingj -0.004 Income ($) 35,000 Inc.-happ. elasticity 2 -52 
Note: Monetary equivalents represent area-based effects, including selection effects. a The per-capita 
present value for an infinite horizon and a 5% discount rate. bVehicle miles travelled. cReduction in price index 
of consumption varieties. d Local non-tradeables: home, entertainment, and apparel and services. e 
Assuming a wage gap of high-skilled vs. low-skilled that corresponds to the 80th vs. 20th percentiles in the 
wage distribution. fAll crimes against individual and households, gEmissions externality hStatistical value of 
life. iPre-mature (> 70) mortality rate. j Self-reported well-being. See appendix section 5 for a discussion of 
the assumptions on quantities and unit values by category.   
Given that we have gone a long way in computing category-specific estimates of costs 
and benefits that are comparable across categories, a natural question arises: Do the 
benefits of density exceed the costs and, if so, by how much? To address this question, 
we conduct a simple accounting exercise in Table 8. We distinguish between private 
(columns 1–5) and external (column 6) costs and benefits, which residents do not 
directly experience and likely do not pay for via rents (such as reductions in carbon 
emissions that have global rather than local effects). To avoid double-counting, we 
exclude gasoline costs in computing the benefits of shorter average trips (category 4) 
as this cost-saving is already accounted for by reduced energy consumption (category 
11). Also, we correct consumption benefits (category 5) to reflect the pure gains from 
variety and not savings due to shorter car trips, which are already itemised in category 
(4). Since health effects are itemised in 14, we use an estimate of the health cost arising 
from density-related pollution from Carozzi & Roth (2018) to restrict the pollution effect 
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to an amenity channel. The external effect from sustainable mode choice (13) is already 
itemised in the external benefit of reduced energy use (11) and is thus not counted 
separately. In the baseline scenario (Sum row), we assume that public services are 
nationally funded. In an alternative accounting (indicated in the bottom of the table), 
we assume that public services are locally funded, so that density-induced cost savings 
fully capitalise into rents (via lower taxes). 
The standard urban economics framework builds on the spatial equilibrium assumption, 
which implies that individuals are fully mobile and competition in all markets is perfect. 
In this framework, rents reflect the capitalised values of productivity and utility so that 
the sum over rents and wages (column 1) amounting $627, p.c. can be interpreted as a 
welfare gain to which the external welfare effects of $60 in column (6) can be added. 
The spatial equilibrium framework is also the theoretical fundament for the economic 
quality-of-life literature mentioned above, which infers place-specific amenity values 
from compensating differentials. With perfectly elastic demand, an increase in rent that 
exceeds an increase in disposable income necessarily reflects a positive quality-of-life 
effect.  
If mobility is not perfect and/or there is heterogeneity in the preference for locations, 
rents will not only reflect demand-side conditions (here, amenities), but also supply-side 
conditions, because local demand is downward-sloping (Arnott & Stiglitz 1979). 
Increases in density – or the policies that enforce increased density – may then also 
increase rents because the cost of supplying space is higher. By implication, observed 
rent increases do not necessarily reflect demand-driven capitalization effects 
exclusively, but potentially to some extent spatial differences in the slope of the supply 
curve (Hilber & Vermeulen 2016; Hilber 2017). Distinguishing these scenarios is 
notoriously difficult, but it is informative to compare the quality-of-life effect inferred 
from wages and rents to the aggregate amenity effects across categories. If the 
accounting was precise and complete and demand was perfectly elastic, we would 
expect the aggregate amenity effect to equal the quality-of-life effect.  
The amenity effect reported in column (3) with an PV of $100 per capita, is substantial, 
but smaller than the after-tax compensating differential ($156) in column (2), suggesting 
a role for the supply side (as long as demand is locally downward-sloping). The role of 
self-reported well-being is controversial as it is regarded either as a proxy for individual 
utility (Layard et al. 2008) or as a component in the utility function that is traded against 
the consumption of goods and amenities (Glaeser et al. 2016). Indeed, the amenity effect 
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and the quality-of-life effect are closer if we exclude the well-being effect as a 
(dis)amenity category. Similarly, the gap shrinks if we treat local public services as fully 
locally financed, which implies that the savings are passed on to individuals and are 
capitalised into rents.  
To assess the potential relevance of density effects on rents that originate from the 
supply side, we assume a share of structural value in housing of 75% (Ahlfeldt et al. 2015; 
Combes et al. 2018) and compute a range for the monetary equivalent of the effect of a 
1% density increase on construction cost as 0.04–0.07 (estimated density elasticity of 
construction cost, see section 2.3) x $35k (income) x 75% (share of structure value) x 33% 
(expenditure share on housing) x 1% (change in density) / 5% (discount rate) = $70–120. 
Thus, density-induced increases in the cost of housing supply are a plausible explanation 
for the gap between the estimated amenity and quality-of-life effects if demand is locally 
downward sloping. A complementary channel that strengthens the supply-side 
argument is a scarcity land rent that results from policies that restrict the amount of 
usable land to increase density (Gyourko et al. 2008; Mayer & Somerville 2000). A 
detailed discussion of the effects of density on construction costs is in appendix section 
2.2. 
In columns (4) and (5) we change the perspective and ask how a policy-induced marginal 
increase in the density of a city would affect residents. Because costs and benefits of 
density capitalise into rents, the individual net-benefit depends on housing tenure. Given 
the positive amenity affect from column (5), it is immediate that homeowners gain, on 
average, as they receive an amenity benefit without having to pay a higher rent. If they 
were moving to another area, they would leave the amenity gain behind, but would 
benefit from a higher housing value. Renters would be negatively compensated for the 
amenity gain by higher rents, making the implications more ambiguous (Ahlfeldt & 
Maennig 2015). The net benefit to homeowners is positive with a combined amenity and 
wage effect of $291 or more (if there are tax savings or we abstract from the well-being 
effect). There is a net cost to renters of up to $56 if we include well-being effects and 
assume that there are no tax effects due to savings in public services. If we exclude the 
well-being effect and allow for cost savings in public services to be passed on to renters 
via lower taxes, the net benefit remains negative, but is close to zero. Of course, the 
flipside is that there is a positive external benefit to land owners and given the non-
linearity in the density effect on rent documented in Section 4.2 the effect on renters 
may be positive in supply-elastic markets. 
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Table 8 Present valuea effects of a 1% increase in density II: Accounting  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Outcome Factor Quality Amenity Effect on  External 
ID Category Incomes of life value Owner Renter welfare 
1 Wage 280 -190b 0 190c 190c 0 
2 Innovation 0 0 0 0 0 6 
3 Value of space 347 347 0 0 -347 0 
4 Job accessibility 0 0 87d 87d 87d 0 
5 Services access 0 0 99e 99e 99e 0 
6 Eff. of pub. services delivery 0 0 0 0 0 50 
7 Social equity 0 0 0 0 0 -12 
8 Safety 0 0 16 16 16 0 
9 Urban green 0 0 100 100 100 0 
10 Pollution reduction 0 0 -47f -47f -47f 0 
11 Energy efficiency 0 0 32 32 32 15 
12 Traffic flow 0 0 -71 -71 -71 0 
13 Car use reduction 0 0 0 0 0 0g 
14 Health 0 0 -64 -64 -64 0 
15 Self-reported well-being 0 0 -52 -52 -52 0  
Sum 627 152 100 291 -56 60  
Excl. subj. well-being - - 152 342 -4 60 
 Locally financed pubic 
services 
- 106 
 
 340 -6   
Factor incomes and 
externality 
686 - - - - - 
 Locally financed pubic 
services 
637 - - - - - 
Note: a The present value per capita for an infinite horizon and a 5% discount rate. All values in $. bAmenity 
equivalent of after-tax wage increase assuming a marginal tax rate of 32% as in Albouy and Lue (2015). cAfter-
tax wage increase as discussed in b. d Excludes $19.18 of driving energy cost ($0.15/mile gasoline cost) 
discounted at 5%, which are itemised in 11 e Assumes a 10.2% elasticity to avoid double-counting of road trips 
already included in 4. f Amenity effect, excludes health effect itemised in 14. g Set to zero to avoid double 
counting with 11. Numbers reported in the “Locally financed pubic services” row assume that cost savings 
in local public services are fully passed on to residents via lower taxes. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that density is a net amenity. This does not imply, 
however, that everybody necessarily benefits from densification policies. Renters may 
be net losers of densification because of rent effects that exceed amenity benefits. The 
negative net-effect is consistent with a negative density effect on well-being if 
individuals are attached to some areas more than others. If one is willing to believe that 
there are strong forces that prevent renters from moving, a supply constraining effect 
of density can shift renters to a lower utility level, consistent with a negative effect on 
well-being (or happiness). This is, however, an ambitious interpretation of the evidence 
as it is impossible to claim full coverage and perfect measurement of amenity effects. It 
is important to acknowledge that the difference between the amenity effect (in 
column 3) and the quality-of-life effect (in column 2) of density could simply be due to 
measurement error (e.g. missing items column 3). Research into the well-being effects 
of density differentiated by tenure would be informative, but to our knowledge, has yet 
to be conducted.   
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4.8 Conclusion 
We provide the first quantitative evidence review of the effects of density on a broad 
range of outcomes. Synthesising the reviewed evidence and a range of original 
estimates, we report recommended density elasticity estimates for 15 distinct outcome 
categories along with monetised values of density effects for application in research and 
policy analysis. While there are sizeable benefits and costs associated with increases in 
density, the former exceed the latter for a typical large city in the developed world.  
In general, much work lies ahead of the related research fields to consistently bring the 
evidence base to the quantity and quality levels of the most developed outcome 
categories productivity and mode choice. For all other categories, more research is 
required – even if selected high-quality evidence exists – to substantiate the 
recommended elasticities. At this stage, significant uncertainty surrounds any 
quantitative interpretation in the categories urban green, income inequality, health, and 
well-being. 
As research progresses and the quantity of the evidence base increases, evidence 
reviews and meta-analyses become a more important aspect of knowledge generation. 
Regrettably, the scope of this review was constrained because it was frequently not 
possible to translate results into a comparable metric. To increase the scope of future 
reviews and meta-analyses, we encourage researchers to complement the presentation 
of their preferred results by density elasticity estimates that are comparable to those 
collected here. Minimally, complete summary statistics need to be provided to allow for 
a conversion of reported marginal effects. Another feature that hinders comparisons 
across studies is the common practice of analysing more than one aspect of urban form 
at once, i.e. simultaneously using multiple spatial variables such as population density, 
building density and job centrality. Disentangling the sources of the effects of compact 
urban form is important. But it is difficult to compare such conditional marginal effects 
estimated under the ceteris paribus condition across studies if the measures of urban 
form co-vary in reality because they are simultaneously determined. To facilitate future 
reviews and meta-analyses we encourage researchers to complement their 
differentiated analyses with simple models that exclusively consider the most 
conventional measure of urban form, which is density.  
We provide suggestive evidence that the costs and benefits of agglomeration may be 
larger in developing-country cities. However, because the evidence from non-high-
income countries is scarce, it is not possible to property evaluate whether our key result 
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that density is a net-amenity generalises to non-high-income countries. An important 
challenge that lies ahead of the research community is to generate a deeper 
understanding of heterogeneity in density effects across contexts and the density 
distribution itself, a necessary condition for inference on optimal levels of density. 
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4.10 Appendix : The economic effects of density: A synthesis 
4.10.1  Introduction to appendix 
This appendix complements the main paper by providing additional detail not reported 
in the main paper for brevity. To improve the flow of the presentation it partially 
duplicates discussions in the main text. The appendix, however, is designed to 
complement, not replace the reading of the main paper.  
4.10.2 Evidence base 
4.10.2.1 Collecting the evidence  
In order to determine the selection of keywords to collect our evidence base we 
developed a theory matrix through a transparent and theory-consistent literature search 
which can be found in a companion paper (Ahlfeldt & Pietrostefani 2017). The theory 
matrix establishes the economic channels connecting 15 outcome categories to three 
compact city characteristics. We use combinations of keywords that relate to each 
outcome and compact city characteristic. Where appropriate, we use empirically 
observed variables specified in the companion paper (Ahlfeldt & Pietrostefani 2017).  
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Table A1  Organisation of keyword search 
 Compact city effects  Compact city characteristics   
# Outcome category  Residential and employment Density Morphological Density Mixed use 
1 Productivity  density; productivity; wages; urban - - 
   density; productivity; rent; urban - - 
2 Innovation  density; innovation; patent; urban - - 
   density; innovation; peer effects, urban - - 
3 Value of space  density; land value; urban building height; land value; urban  - 
   density; rent; urban building height; rent; urban - 
   density; prices; urban building height; prices; urban - 
4 Job accessibility  density; commuting; urban land border; commuting; urban - 
5 Services access  density; amenity; distance; urban street; amenity; distance; urban mixed use; amenity; distance; urban 
   density; amenity; consumption; urban street; amenity; consumption; urban mixed use; amenity; consumption; 
urban 6 Eff. of public services  density; public transport delivery; urban building height; public transport delivery; urban - 
   density; waste; urban street; waste; urban - 
7 Social equity  density; real wages; urban building height; real wages; urban - 
   density; segregation; urban building height; segregation; urban - 
   density; “social mobility”; urban street; “social mobility”; urban - 
8 Safety  density; crime; rate; urban  building height; crime; urban - 
   density; open; green; space; urban land border; open; green; space; urban - 
9 Open space   density; green; space; biodiversity; urban land border; green; space; biodiversity; urban - 
10 Pollution reduction  density; pollution; carbon; urban  building height; pollution; carbon; urban  mixed use; pollution; carbon; urban  
   density; pollution; noise; urban building height; pollution; noise; urban mixed use; pollution; noise; urban 
11 Energy efficiency  - building height; energy; consumption; urban mixed use; energy; consumption; urban 
12 Traffic flow  density; congestion; road; urban Street layout; congestion; road; urban mixed use; congestion; road; urban 
13 Mode choice  density; mode; walking; cycling; urban street; mode; walking; cycling; urban mixed use; mode; walking; cycling; 
urban 14 Health  density; health; risk; mortality; urban - - 
15 Well-being  density; well-being; happiness; perception; 
urban  
space; well-being; perception; urban mixed use; well-being; perception; 
urban Note: Each outcome- characteristics cell contains one or more (if several rows) combinations of keywords each used in a separate search. In each cell we use a combination of 
keywords based on effects (related to the outcome category or typically observed variables) and characteristics (related to residential and employment density, morphological 
density or mixed use). Outcome-characteristics cells map directly to Table A1.
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We usually use the term density in reference to economic density and a more specific 
term to capture the relevant aspect of morphological density. In several instances, we 
run more than one search for an outcome-characteristics combination to cover 
different empirically observed variables and, thus, maximise the evidence base. We 
note that because this way our search focuses directly on specific features that make 
cities “compact,” we exclude the phrase ‘compact city’ itself in all searches. Adding 
related keywords did not improve the search outcome in several trials, which is intuitive 
given that, by itself, “compactness” is not an empirically observable variable. In total, 
we consider the 52 keyword combinations (for 32 theoretically relevant outcome-
characteristic combinations) summarised in Table A1 which we apply to five databases, 
resulting in a total of 260 keyword searches. We note that Google Scholar, unlike the 
other databases, tends to return a vast number of documents, ordered by potential 
relevance. In several trials preceding the actual evidence collection, we found that the 
probability of a paper being relevant for our purposes was marginal after the 50th entry. 
Therefore, in an attempt to keep the literature search efficient, we generally did not 
consider documents beyond this threshold. 
In a limited number of cases we reassign a paper returned in a search for a specific 
outcome category to another category if the fit is evidently better. Studies referring to 
economic density may thus have sometimes been found through searches focused on 
other compact city characteristics. Occasionally, a study contains evidence that is 
relevant to more than one category in which case it is assigned to multiple categories. 
We generally refer to such distinct pieces of evidence within our study as analyses. We 
do not double count any publication when reporting the total number of studies 
throughout the paper and the appendix.  
Based on the evidence collected in step one, we then conduct an analysis of citation 
trees in the second step of our literature search. An important number of papers were 
added to the productivity, innovation, job accessibility and mode choice categories 
through the citation tree analysis (Table A2 ). For papers that were not accessible 
through online resources, we reached out to citing and cited authors. In a hand full of 
cases, we did not receive a response, the studies therefore remain excluded. Upon 
inspection (excluding empirically irrelevant work, duplications of working papers, and 
journal articles, etc.) this systematic literature search resulted in 195 studies and 313 
analyses.  
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Up to this point, our evidence collection is unbiased in the sense that it mechanically 
follows from the theory matrix (Ahlfeldt & Pietrostefani 2017) and is not driven by our 
possibly selective knowledge of the literature, nor that of our research networks. For 
an admittedly imperfect approximation of the coverage we achieve with this approach 
we exploit the fact that the search for theoretical literature already revealed a number 
of empirically relevant studies that were not used in the compilation of the theory 
matrix unless they contained significant theoretical thought. From 19 empirically 
relevant papers known before the actual evidence collection, we find that step one 
(keyword search) and two (analysis of citation trees) identified six, i.e., 31%. 
In the final step 3 of the evidence collection we add all relevant empirical studies known 
to us before the evidence collection as well as studies that were recommended to us by 
colleagues working in related fields. To collect recommendations, we reached out by 
circulating a call via social media (Twitter) and email (to researchers within and outside 
LSE). 22 colleagues contributed by suggesting relevant literature. Further studies were 
suggested to us during presentations of this paper and following our submission of this 
paper for publication. This step increases the evidence base to 268 studies and 473 
analyses (160 additional observations). The evidence included at this stage may be 
selective due to particular views that prevail in our research community. However, 
recording the stage at which a study is added to the evidence base allows us to test for 
a potential selection effect. 
Panel 1 of Table A2  summarises the collection process of the evidence base. We present 
the number of studies found by category and the stage at which they were added to 
the evidence base. Panel 2 of Table A2 summarises the distribution of analyses collected 
by outcome categories and compact city characteristics. The large majority of 353 out 
of 473 analyses are concerned with the effects of economic density, on which we focus 
in this paper. After restricting the sample to analyses for which we are able to infer 
density elasticity estimates, this number is reduced to 347. Table A3 compares the 
subsample of analyses for which we were able to compute outcome elasticity estimates 
with respect to density to the universe of analyses, revealing only moderate differences. 
The analyses in the elasticity subsample have a slightly higher propensity of being added 
in the third evidence collection stage, a slightly higher mean SMS score (proxy for 
evidence quality), and a somewhat higher propensity of showing positive (qualitatively) 
results.  
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Table A2  Evidence base by collection stage and research topic 
Panel 1 
# Outcome 
Google 
Scholar 
Web of 
Science EconLit 
CesIf
o 
Step 
2  
Step 
3 Total 
1 Productivity 9 3 3 0 25 17 57 
2 Innovation 3 1 2 1 5 1 13 
3 Value of space 6 1 6 1 2 10 26 
4 Job accessibility 3 1 3 0 19 5 31 
5 Services access 2 0 1 0 0 8 11 
6 
Efficiency of public services 
delivery 2 0 1 0 0 4 7 
7 Social equity 3 1 0 0 4 3 11 
8 Safety 2 3 0 0 3 3 11 
9 
Open space preservation and 
biodiversity 4 1 0 0 0 0 5 
10 Pollution reduction 2 1 1 0 2 4 10 
11 Energy efficiency 5 2 2 0 7 6 22 
12 Traffic flow 2 0 0 0 1 1 4 
13 Sustainable mode choice 7 3 1 0 27 5 43 
14 Health 2 1 0 0 5 1 9 
15 Well-being 2 0 1 0 0 5 8 
 Total 54 18 21 2 100 73 268 
Panel 2 
  Compact city effects  Compact city characteristics 
# Outcome category  Economic 
density 
Morph. 
density 
Mixed  
land use 
Total 
1 Productivity  67 - - 67 
2 Innovation  14 1 - 15 
3 Value of space  18 8 2 28 
4 Job accessibility  32 15 11 58 
5 Services access  16 2 0 18 
6 Efficiency of public services delivery  21 2 - 23 
7 Social equity  13 0 - 13 
8 Safety  19 4 - 23 
9 Open space preservation and biodiversity  2 5 - 7 
10 Pollution reduction  18 3 0 21 
11 Energy efficiency  26 8 1 35 
12 Traffic flow  4 2 1 7 
13 Sustainable mode choice  76 33 17 126 
14 Health  13 3 - 16 
15 Well-being  14 2 0 16  
Total  353 88 32 473 
Note: Panel 1: Google Scholar, Web of Science, EconLit, CesIfo searches all part of evidence collection step 
one. Step 2 contains results from studies which were collected during step one but corresponded to a 
different outcome to the one suggested by the keyword search they were found with, and studies from 
citation trees. Step 3 consists of previously known evidence and recommendations by colleagues. Evidence 
base by outcome category and compact city characteristic. Panel 2: All numbers indicate the number of 
analyses collected within an outcome-characteristics cell. “0” indicates missing evidence in theoretically 
relevant outcome characteristic cell. “-“ indicates missing evidence in theoretically irrelevant relevant 
outcome characteristic cell. 
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Table A3  All analyses vs. elasticity estimates sample 
 All analyses  Elasticity estimates sample 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Non-high-income country a 0.11 0.31 0.084 0.28 
Academic journal 0.79 0.41 0.77 0.42 
Economics 0.26 0.44 0.29 0.45 
Within-city 0.47 0.5 0.47 0.5 
Round 3 d 0.34 0.47 0.4 0.49 
Year of publication 2007 8.4 2008 6.9 
Citation index 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.4 
SMS (methods score) 2.2 1 2.4 0.86 
Positive & significant b 0.67 0.47 0.69 0.46 
Insignificant b 0.14 0.34 0.15 0.36 
Negative & significant b 0.19 0.4 0.16 0.37 
Qualitative result score c 0.48 0.8 0.53 0.76 
N 473  347  
Note: Elasticity estimates sample is the sample of analyses from which a density elasticity estimate could 
be inferred. a Non-high-income include low-income and median-income countries according to the World 
Bank definition. b Qualitative results (positive, insignificant, negative) is a category-characteristics specific 
and defined in Table A4. c Qualitative results scale takes the values of 1 / 0 / -1 for positive / insignificant / 
negative. d Round 3 consists of previously known evidence and recommendations by colleagues. 
4.10.3 Citation weights 
For the SMS-based quality measure, we use a mapping of methods to quality ranks. 
Although we closely follow an existing approach (What Works Centre for Local 
Economic Growth (WWC) 2016), the assignment of methods to quality scores involves 
individual judgement that is potentially controversial. Moreover, the method used is at 
best an imperfect measure of the quality of a research piece. Given these limitations, 
we develop, as an alternative, a citation-based quality measure that is objective in the 
sense that it avoids individual judgements. With this approach, we delegate the quality 
judgement to the wider research community, assuming that better papers receive more 
attention. Still, to obtain a measure that is comparable across papers we need to 
account for the obvious time trend in the probability of being cited. For this purpose, 
we recover a paper’s cumulated citation count adjusted for the years since publication 
as the fixed effect component 𝜇𝑝 from the following regression: 
ln 𝐶𝑝𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑌𝑆𝑃𝑝) + 𝜇𝑝 + 𝜀𝑝𝑡 
, where 𝐶𝑝𝑡 = ∑ 𝑐𝑝𝑡𝑧𝑧≤𝑡 , 𝑐𝑝𝑡𝑧 is the number of citations of a paper p in year t, 𝜀𝑝𝑡 is an 
idiosyncratic component, and 𝑓(𝑌𝑆𝑃𝑝𝑡) is a function that describes how a paper’s 
cumulative citation count increases in the years a paper has been out. 
To allow for non-linearities, given the lack of theoretical priors identifying the functional 
form, we use a linear spline specification: 
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𝑓(𝑌𝑆𝑃𝑝𝑡) = 𝛼1𝑌𝑆𝑃𝑝𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼2(𝑌𝑆𝑃𝑝𝑡 − 𝑛) × (𝑌𝑆𝑃𝑝𝑡 − 𝑛 > 0)
𝑛=2,5,10,20
 
, where (𝑌𝑆𝑃𝑝𝑡 − 𝑛 > 0) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the condition 
is true and zero otherwise. In the figure below, we compare the fit provided by a linear 
spline function allowing for changes in the marginal effect after 2, 5, 10, and 20 years 
since publications (dashed lines) to a more flexible semi-non-parametric function (black 
circles). In this alternative specification, we estimate a bin effect 𝛼𝑚 for every group of 
papers with the same number of years since publication: 
𝑓(𝑌𝑆𝑃𝑝𝑡) = ∑ 𝛼𝑚(𝑌𝑆𝑃𝑝𝑡 = 𝑚)
𝑚>0
 
, where (𝑌𝑆𝑃𝑝𝑡 = 𝑚) is a dummy variable that is one if the condition is true, and zero 
otherwise. Figure A1 suggests that the spline function overall provides a reasonable fit 
to the data generating process. The bin effects are somewhat noisier for larger values 
of the year since publication because only a fraction of papers in our data base have 
been out for such a long time, introducing some selection effects. For this reason, we 
prefer the parametric spline function as a control for year-since-publication effects.  
We collect citation counts from Google Scholar and Scopus. The data was collected 
from the summary tables of citation counts that both Google Scholar and Scopus 
provide starting from the year of publication to today. Total number of citations for 
each source was also collected. Figure A1 suggests that the rate at which citation counts 
increase in both data bases is roughly comparable, although Google counts tend to be 
larger on average and increase a bit faster over time for papers that have been out for 
a while.  
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Figure A1 Cumulated citation counts vs. years since publication (within-paper 
effects) 
 
Note: Predicted values (excluding fixed effects) from regressions of the cumulated citation count of a paper 
against bin effects and a spline function controlling for paper fixed effects. Dot size proportionate to the 
number of papers in a bin.  
In Figure A1, we compare the fixed effects components recovered from the Google 
Scholar and the Scopus citation count regressions. The adjusted citation measures are 
highly correlated, which is reassuring given neither data base provides full citations 
coverage. We select Scopus as a baseline source because their counts are considered 
more reliable for a variety of reasons. Scopus only indexes articles published in journals 
affiliated with its databases, but is the largest abstract and citations database of peer-
reviewed literature including research from science, social sciences, humanities and 
other fields (Guide 2016). It not only includes citations counts for journal articles but also 
trade publications, books and conference papers. Although Google Scholar is 
increasingly used as a tool to collect citation impact, it has been shown to inflate 
numbers of citations, be prone to double counting and does not have a clear indexing 
policy (Moed et al. 2016; Harzing & Alakangas 2016). To achieve full coverage, we impute 
26 missing values in our Scopus-based adjusted citation measure using the Google-
based adjusted citation measure. In particular, we use predicted values from 
regressions of the Scopus measure against the Google measure (corresponding to the 
dashed line in Figure A2).  
                202 
 
Figure A2 Google Scholar vs. Scopus adjusted citation indices 
 
Note: Solid line is the 45-degree line. Dashed line is the linear fit. Sample restricted to observations with 
positive Google Scholar and Scopus citation counts.   
In Table A4 , we correlate our adjusted citation index with the Source Normalised 
Impact per Paper (SNIP) published by Scopus. This is a citation-based journal quality 
measure and it should be positively correlated with our paper-based quality measure to 
the extent that our year-since-publication adjustment results in a sensible 
approximation of the long-run impact of a paper. Indeed, we find such a positive and 
statistically significant correlation. We also find that the there is a significant trend in 
our (adjusted) citation count measure. Controlling for year-since-publication effects, a 
paper published one year later attracts approximately 5% more citations.  
The effects of the SNIP score and the publication year seem to be independent as the 
marginal effects remain within close range across columns (1-3). The effects also remain 
within close range if we control for differences in average number of citations across 
disciplines (4). Our adjusted citation index is also positively correlated with the SCImago 
Journal Rank (5-6)   
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Table A4  Adjusted citations by paper vs. Scopus journal measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln Scopus 
citation 
adjusted 
for years 
since 
publication 
Ln Scopus 
citation 
adjusted 
for years 
since 
publication 
Ln Scopus 
citation 
adjusted 
for years 
since 
publication 
Ln Scopus 
citation 
adjusted 
for years 
since 
publication 
Ln Scopus 
citation 
adjusted 
for years 
since 
publication 
Ln Scopus 
citation 
adjusted 
for years 
since 
publication 
Ln SNIP score 0.798***  
(0.17) 
 0.834***  
(0.14) 
1.001***  
(0.14) 
 
 
 
 
Year – 2000  
 
0.051***  
(0.01) 
0.052***  
(0.01) 
0.054***  
(0.01) 
 0.055***  
(0.01) 
Ln SJR score  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.360***  
(0.08) 
0.523***  
(0.10) 
Constant -0.332***  
(0.12) 
-0.186**  
(0.09) 
-0.654***  
(0.12) 
-0.759***  
(0.07) 
-0.063  
(0.08) 
-0.462***  
(0.05) 
Discipline effects - - - Yes - Yes 
r2 0.112 0.203 0.325 0.398 0.072 0.371 
N 225 225 225 225 225 225 
Note: Sample includes a subset of studies for which Scopus journal quality measures are available. Citation 
scores adjusted for years since publications (in columns 1 and 3) are the study fixed effects recovered from 
regressions of study-year Google citation counts against years since publication (a spline function) and 
study fixed effects. A small number of observations is imputed using an auxiliary regression of the Google-
based citation measure against a similarly constructed Scopus-based measure. Citation scores adjusted for 
year of publication and discipline are the residuals from a regression of the measures used in columns (1) 
and (3) against discipline fixed effects and a yearly trend variable with a zero value in 2000. Disciplines are 
defined based on outlets (journals and working paper series). SNIP is the Source Normalised Impact per 
Paper and SJR is the SCImago Journal Rank, both published by Scopus. Scopus scores are averaged over 
2011-2015. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
In Table A5 , we compare our adjusted citation index to the SMS methods score. A one 
step increase on the SMS, on average, is associated with an increase in adjusted 
citations by some notable 14% (1). The effect becomes insignificant once we control for 
discipline fixed effects, but the point estimate increases (2). Once we control for the 
publication year trend, the positive association disappears (3), suggesting that the 
positive correlation in (1) is driven by a common time trend and that the two alternative 
quality measures are orthogonal to each other (in the cross-section). Similarly, the 
journal-based SNIP is unrelated to the methods that prevail in the published literature 
once we control for discipline effects (5-6).  
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Table A5  Citation measures vs. scientific methods scale 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln Scopus 
citation 
adjusted 
for years 
since 
publication 
Ln Scopus 
citation 
adjusted 
for years 
since 
publication 
Ln Scopus 
citation 
adjusted 
for years 
since 
publication 
Ln SNIP 
score 
Ln SNIP 
score 
Ln SNIP 
score 
Scientific methods 
scale score 
0.160**  
(0.06) 
0.234  
(0.14) 
0.074  
(0.12) 
 
0.074***  
(0.03) 
0.020  
(0.04) 
0.024  
(0.04) 
Year – 2000   
 
 
 
0.048***  
(0.01) 
 
 
 
 
-0.001  
(0.01) 
Constant -0.292*  
(0.17) 
-0.456  
(0.31) 
-0.394  
(0.24) 
0.386***  
(0.06) 
0.507***  
(0.09) 
0.506***  
(0.09) 
Discipline effects - Yes Yes - Yes Yes 
r2 0.027 0.081 0.234 0.031 0.181 0.182 
N 258 258 258 228 228 228 
Note: Sample in columns (4-6) includes a subset of studies for which Scopus journal quality measures are available. 
Citation scores adjusted for years since publications are the study fixed effects recovered from regressions of 
study-year Google citation counts against years since publication (a spline function) and study fixed effects. A small 
number of observations is imputed using an auxiliary regression of the Google-based citation measure against a 
similarly constructed Scopus-based measure. Disciplines are defined based on outlets (journals and working paper 
series). SNIP is the 2011-2015 average over the Source Normalised Impact per Paper and SJR published by Scopus. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
In Figure A3, we compare adjusted citation scores to the SMS scores by discipline. The 
values plotted on the x-axis are the discipline fixed effects recovered from a regression 
of the Scopus citation count adjusted for years since publication effects against 
discipline effects and a publication year trend (the model from Table A5 , column 3). The 
values on the y-axis are the discipline fixed effects from similar regressions using our 
SMS scores as a dependent variable. The figure suggests significant heterogeneity in 
the methods used as well as in the citation probabilities across disciplines, but no 
significant correlation between the two.  
It is possible that differences in the average citation counts across disciplines reflect a 
tendency for researchers in some disciplines to cite relatively more frequently. This 
brings up the question of whether such differences should be controlled for in a 
citation-based quality measure. Controlling for discipline effects would impose the 
assumption that the average quality within disciplines is the same across disciplines. 
This is a strong assumption; especially given that we cover a potentially selective set of 
papers within each discipline. The high variation in the SMS score across disciplines is 
certainly not suggestive of a constant average quality. We, therefore, prefer not to 
control for cross-discipline differences in citation counts and, instead, assume that such 
differences are driven by differences in the quality of the papers.  
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Figure A3 Quality measures: Methods-based vs. citation-based by discipline 
 
Note: The values plotted on the x-axis are the discipline fixed effects recovered from regressions of the 
Google citation count adjusted for years since designation effects against discipline effects and a 
publication year trend (the model from TableA5, column 3). The values on the y-axis are the discipline fixed 
effects from similar regressions using our SMS scores as dependent variable. 
4.11 Density elasticity estimates in the literature 
4.11.1 Estimating the elasticity of density with respect to city size 
In Figure A4, we correlate city size proxied by population and density (population/area) 
across a sample of functional urban areas (FUA) as defined by the OECD. In keeping with 
theoretical predictions from standard models, there is a positive relationship between 
the two variables. The correlation is reasonably well defined and similar with the sub-
samples of US and non-US FUAs. 
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Figure A4 Population vs. population density 
 
Note: Dotted lines are the fitted lines from linear regressions. Non-US panel shows the partial correlation 
controlling for country effects. Afunctional urban area (FUA) is labelled if the population is among the ten 
largest or if it is an outlier. Outlies are below the 10th/5th or above the 90th/95th percentile in the US/Non-US 
residual distribution. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
We estimate the elasticity of density with respect to population using the following 
straightforward econometric specification.  
ln (
𝑃𝑖
𝐴𝑖
) = 𝛼 ln(𝑃𝑖) + 𝜇𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐  
, where 𝑃𝑖 is the population of city i, 𝐴𝑖  is the respective land area, and 𝜇𝑐  is a country 
fixed effect. While the data theoretically allows us to estimate the elasticity from within-
city variation over time, we are concerned about the very limited within-city variation in 
land area in the data. An imperfect measurement of changes in land area over time will 
lead to an upward bias in the elasticity estimate. In the extreme case, where land area 
does not change at all over time, the elasticity estimate would be mechanically one as 
the only variation on the left-hand side and the right-hand side originates from 
population. To mitigate this problem, we prefer to estimate the elasticity from cross-
sectional between-city variation. Yet, there is still a potential mechanical endogeneity 
as population (left-hand side) is also a component of density (right-hand side) so that 
any measurement error in population will upward bias the elasticity estimate. To 
address this problem, we exploit that, mechanically, there is a negative relationship 
between the population of a city and its rank in the population distribution within a city 
system. This negative relationship has been analysed in a vast literature on city size 
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distributions (Nitsch 2005). The rank of a city in the distribution of a country city-size 
distribution is naturally a strong instrument. It is also a valid instrument in this particular 
context because it effectively removes the population level from the right-hand side of 
the estimation equation.  
We note that it is straightforward to solve ln(𝑃𝑖/𝐴𝑖) = 𝛼 ln(𝑃𝑖) for ln(𝐴𝑖) =
(1 − 𝛼) ln(𝑃𝑖).  Thus, the elasticity estimate of density with respect to city size can also 
be estimated from a regression of the log of land area against the log of population, 
which avoids the mechanical endogeneity problem.  
Our estimates of the elasticity of density with respect to city size are reported in 
Table A6. The elasticity estimate increases significantly as the country fixed effects are 
added to the equation (from 1 to 2). As expected given the presumed absence of 
measurement error in population, using an IV for population hardly affects the results 
(3). The results from the alternative specification reported in the main paper, which uses 
the city log of area and log of population, are identical to the baseline, as expected (4 
and 5 vs. 1 and 2, resp. 3). Our preferred estimate of the elasticity of density with respect 
to city size is 0.43. The distribution of country-specific elasticities estimated by country 
using the same model as in Table A6 , column (3) (excluding country fixed effects), is 
illustrated in Figure A5and Table A7 .  
We note that our preferred estimate of the elasticity of density with respect to city size 
is within close range of Combes et al. (2018), who report an estimate of the elasticity of 
land area with respect to population of approximately 0.7 for French cities, implying an 
estimate of the elasticity of density with respect to city size of 0.3. Our results are also 
close to Rappaport (2008) who estimates an elasticity of 0.34 across US metropolitan 
areas. 
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Table A6  Estimates of the elasticity of density with respect to population 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Ln 
population 
density 
Ln 
population 
density 
Ln 
population 
density 
Ln 
geographic 
area 
Ln 
geographic 
area 
Ln population 0.304*** 
(0.07) 
0.427*** 
(0.05) 
0.431*** 
(0.04) 
0.696*** 
(0.07) 
0.573*** 
(0.05) 
Country effects - Yes Yes - Yes 
IV - - Yes - - 
Density 
elasticity 
0.3 0.43 0.43 0.3 0.43 
N 281 281 281 281 281 
r2 0.057 0.614  0.239 0.689 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Population density and population are averages over the 2000–2014. 
IV is rank of a city in the population distribution within a country. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Figure A5 Elasticity of density with respect to population: Distribution of 
estimates across countries 
 
Note: The vertical line represents the elasticity estimated in Table A6, column 2 model. The black 
curved line is the kernel density distribution across 19 countries with sufficient metropolitan areas 
estimated using Table A6, column 1 model by country. 
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Table A7  Estimates of the elasticity of density with respect to population by 
country 
Country code N 
Elasticity of density with respect to 
population Standard error 
AT 3 0.27 0.07 
AU 6 0.06 0.15 
BE 4 0.30 0.16 
CA 9 0.74 0.39 
CH 3 1.65 0.17 
CL 3 0.55 0.15 
CZ 3 -0.26 0.56 
DE 24 0.08 0.18 
ES 8 0.65 0.62 
FR 15 0.39 0.17 
IT 11 0.40 0.17 
JP 36 0.40 0.10 
KR 10 0.50 0.18 
ME 33 0.71 0.25 
NL 5 0.19 0.57 
PL 8 0.43 0.28 
SE 3 0.35 0.06 
UK 15 0.11 0.17 
US 70 0.43 0.13 
Note: Elasticity estimated for 19 countries with sufficient metropolitan areas estimated using Table A1, 
column 1 model by country. 
4.11.2 Estimating the elasticity of construction cost with respect to density 
We assume that density impacts on construction costs through two principle channels. 
On the one hand, constructing a dwelling unit with exactly the same specification is 
likely more expensive in denser places because such places are usually more congested 
(higher cost of moving materials, less space for construction), have higher construction 
worker wages, and are more regulated (a location effect). On the other hand, while 
density can be achieved by reducing housing consumption and increasing building 
density, it at least in the limit also requires taller buildings, which are more expensive to 
construct (a structure effect). We are interested in the gross effect of density on 
construction cost and, thus, in an estimate of the density elasticity of construction cost 
that captures both location and the structure effects. To our knowledge, such an 
estimate does not exist to date. However, Gyourko and Saiz (2006) provide estimates 
of the density elasticity of construction cost using a construction cost index for a same-
specification home, which reflects on the effects of location exclusively. Ellis (2004), in 
contrast, provides a construction cost index by dwelling type (various types of single-
family and multifamily structures) that holds all locational effects constant. In the 
remainder of this section we provide two novel approaches to estimating the density 
elasticity of construction cost.  
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Frist, we make use of a micro-data set to compare how observed construction costs 
(excluding costs for land acquisition) vary in density within and across cities. This 
approach directly yields an estimate of the combined location and structure effect. 
Second, we create a construction cost index that captures variation in the average 
construction cost across locations due to differences in the structure composition, i.e. 
the structure effect. We then combine the estimated density elasticity of this index with 
density elasticity estimates inferred from Gyourko and Saiz (2006), which capture the 
locational effect, to obtain an estimate of the overall effect of density on construction 
cost. 
4.11.2.1 Estimates using micro-data 
To our knowledge, no estimates of the effect of density on construction costs using 
actual construction cost data exist to date. To fill this gap, we make use of a commercial 
data set compiled by Emporis that has previously been used by Ahlfeldt & McMillen 
(2018). The data set contains information on the date of construction, the height, and 
the number of floors for a large number of buildings worldwide. Geo-information is 
provided in form of geographic coordinates so that the location can be merged with 
other spatial data in GIS. The data set contains additional building information, such as 
construction costs, use, or total floor space, however missing values are present for a 
substantial fraction of constructions. While the data set is a unique source of 
information on construction costs, its representativeness with respect to location and 
structure type is not guaranteed. The intuition is that taller buildings at denser places 
will be overrepresented in the data set as Emporis claims a nearly comprehensive 
coverage of tall buildings such as skyscrapers. Against this background, it is reassuring 
to see that within the US-sub-sample we use (containing information on construction 
cost and floor space, among other characteristics), a large share of observations refers 
to small structures which account for the majority of the building stock in US 
metropolitan areas (see also Figure A7). However, it is still notable from Figure A6 that 
low-density census tracts are underrepresented in the data set we analyse, suggesting 
that we obtain local elasticity estimates representative for above-average density areas. 
Within tracts with at least one Emporis observation, constructions are also more 
concentrated than population, as revealed by a more than twice as large Herfindahl 
index (0.0205% vs. 0.0097%).  
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Figure A6 Distribution of buildings in micro-data by number of floor 
 
Note: Data from Emporis. Sample restricted to observations in the US with information on 
location, construction year, construction cost, building area, building height and the number of 
floors. Constructions exceeding 20 floors excluded in the graph to improve the presentation.  
Census tract population density distribution: Emporis sample vs. all tracts 
Note: Population density computed using census tract population from the US 2010 Census and tract 
perimeter data from the US 2010 Census with areas calculated on ARCGIS (US Census Bureau 2010). 
“Emporis data” is a subsample of “all” US census tracts that contain construction observations in the 
Emporis data set (observation with complete information used in Figure A5. 
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In keeping with intuition, 0shows a positive correlation between average building 
height and population density across census tracts, i.e. density is achieved at least to 
some extent by building taller (the other margins of adjustment being building density 
and per-capital consumption of floor space). Given that taller buildings are generally 
more expensive to construct (Ahlfeldt & McMillen 2018) and that the same building is 
more difficult to construct where density is higher (Gyourko & Saiz 2006), it is no 
surprise that floor space construction costs are also higher at denser places.  
Figure A7 Height, construction cost, and density within metropolitan areas 
 
Note: Residuals are from regressions of each variable against MSA x year effects. Building data from 
Emporis. Population density computed using population data and area data from the US 2010 Census. 
In Table A8 , column (1), we estimate the density elasticity of construction cost using 
variation within and across metropolitan areas. Because density is measured at the 
census-tract level we cluster standard errors at the same level. We exclude any control 
except for year effects, which control for the time trend in nominal construction costs. 
Our estimate of the density elasticity of construction cost is 0.07. This estimate captures 
the effects of structure height due to expensive materials and engineering as well as 
locational effects originating from congestion (transport cost, space for construction), 
regulation (ease of obtaining planning permission), and labour market conditions 
(construction wages, unionisation) that vary within and across metropolitan areas. 
Besides the potential sample selection implying a local estimate that is likely valid for 
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denser-than-average places, the main concern with this estimate is that density is 
correlated with structure quality conditional on height. As an example, renters and 
buyers in markets with different densities may demand buildings of more sophisticated 
materials and designs due to differences in tastes and incomes.  
In column (2) we replace year effects with metro-year effects, which control for all such 
effects at the metropolitan level (core-based statistical areas) and also capture time 
trends that potentially vary across metropolitan areas. In column (3), in addition, we 
add a set of variables capturing non-height related features of the structure that are 
likely correlated with quality. Among these variables is the ratio of building height over 
the number of floors, which captures the effects of differences in ceiling height and 
decorative elements of the roof that primarily serve aesthetic purposes. The controls 
also include two sets of variables capturing the architectural design (e.g. modernism, 
postmodernism) and the structural material (e.g. wood, masonry). The density elasticity 
estimate is reduced to 0.43 conditional on these feature controls and metro-year 
effects. With respect to the gross-density effect we aim to estimate, there is a concern 
of over-controlling (bad control problem (Angrist & Pischke 2009)). For one thing, 
metro-year effects could absorb effects related to density that vary primarily across 
metropolitan areas, such as labour market conditions and regulation. For another, 
design and, in particular, materials (e.g. concrete and steel) to some extent are 
endogenous to building height as taller buildings require different approaches to 
structural engineering. In light of these concerns (omitted variable bias vs. over-
controlling) our preferred interpretation of the density elasticity estimates reported in 
(1) and (3) is that of a range between an upper-bound and a lower-bound estimate.  
The remaining columns in Table A8 are added to connect to the extant literature. In 
column (4), we estimate a (gross) height elasticity of construction cost of 0.25 for the 
US, which is close to the respective elasticity estimated by Ahlfeldt & McMillen (2018) 
from a global sample of small structures (up to five floors). In keeping with intuition, 
this elasticity estimate decreases considerably to approximately 0.14 when controlling 
for metro-year effects and the building features introduced in column (3).  
To our knowledge, Gyourko and Saiz (2006) provide the only explicit estimate of density 
effects on construction costs that exist thus far. The estimates of the specification they 
use, which is quadratic in density, imply a density elasticity of 0.02 at the mean of the 
density distribution across US metropolitan areas. As noted above, their estimate, by 
construction, excludes the structure effect as they use a construction cost index as 
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dependent variable that refers to a same-specification home. Their estimate also 
excludes various locational effects because they control for labour market conditions 
and the regulatory environment. The bounds of the density effect reported in Table A8, 
columns (1) and (3), thus, expectedly exceed their estimates. In column (6), we expand 
the baseline model from column (1) by the feature controls from column (3) and a large 
set of 310 indicator variables capturing various aspects of the building, such as the type 
and the use of a building (e.g. single-family detached housing, mid-rise apartment 
building). We also control for building height. With this specification, we aim to control 
for the structure effect as comprehensively as the Emporis data allows to obtain a 
density effect on construction cost that approximates the location effect. The resulting 
0.023 density elasticity estimates is slightly larger than the implied 0.02 elasticity at the 
mean from Gyourko and Saiz (2006). This is the expected result, because unlike Gyourko 
and Saiz (2006) we estimate the gross location effect without controlling for regulation 
and labour market conditions. In the last column, we further add metro-year effects, 
which controls for regulation and labour market conditions as these vary mostly 
between metropolitan areas. Of course, metro-year effects also control for any other 
density effect originating from variation between metropolitan areas. Even conditional 
on these demanding controls, we still estimate a density elasticity of approximately 
0.01, which is highly statistically significant. It is no surprise that this estimate which 
captures only a fraction of the location effect of density is smaller than the estimates by 
Gyourko and Saiz (2006). We thus conclude that our estimate of the density effect on 
construction cost is novel, but consistent with the existing literature.   
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Table A8  Estimates of the density elasticity of construction costs I 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Ln floor space construction cost 
Ln census tract 
population 
density 
0.070*** 
(0.003) 
0.053*** 
(0.004) 
0.043*** 
(0.004) 
 
 
 
 
0.023*** 
(0.002) 
0.009**
* 
(0.002) 
Ln Building height  
 
 
 
 
 
0.250*** 
(0.006) 
0.137*** 
(0.008) 
0.140*** 
(0.008) 
0.094**
* 
(0.008) 
Year effects Yes - - Yes - Yes - 
Metro-year 
effects 
- Yes Yes - Yes - Yes 
Feature controls - - Yes - Yes Yes Yes 
Building type 
controls 
- - - - - Yes Yes 
N 30,048 30,048 30,048 30,048 30,048 30,048 30,048 
r2 .202 .379 .435 .245 .438 .607 .699 
Note: Unit of analysis is construction. Construction data from Emporis. Census tract population density data 
from the US 2010 Census. Feature controls include the ratio of building height over the number of floors, a 
set of 18 dummy variables indicating architectural styles and a set of 19 dummy variables indicating 
structural materials. Building type controls are a set of 310 dummy variables indicating building types and 
uses. Standard errors clustered on census tracts. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust or clustered 
on metro-year effects where applicable. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Since the unit of observation in Table A8 is a construction, the models are implicitly 
weighted by the number of constructions per tracts. This weighting scheme attaches 
greater importance to census tracts for which we have more construction cost 
information. In Table A9 , we consider alternative weighting schemes. First, we re-
estimate the models from columns (1) and (3) in Table A8 , weighting each observation 
by the ratio of the population over the number of per-tract observations to instead 
obtain a density elasticity estimate that is more representative for an average 
household (columns 1-2). Then, we repeat the exercise using the inverse of the 
observation count (same weight to all tracts, columns 3-4) and the tract-population 
(lager weights to tracts with many constructions and large population) as weights. The 
density elasticity estimates reported in Table A8 , columns (1) and (3) are roughly at the 
centre of the range of estimates we find in this sensitivity analysis.  
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Table A9  Estimates of the density elasticity of construction costs II 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln floor space construction cost 
Ln census tract 
population 
density 
0.088*** 
(0.009) 
0.057*** 
(0.008) 
0.046*** 
(0.003) 
0.025*** 
(0.004) 
0.073*** 
(0.004) 
0.044*** 
(0.004) 
Year effects Yes - Yes - Yes - 
Metro year 
effects 
- Yes - Yes - Yes 
Feature controls - Yes - Yes - Yes 
Building type 
controls 
- - - - - - 
Weights Tract population  
/ Emporis count 
1 / Emporis count Tract population 
N 30,048 30,048 30,048 30,048 30,048 30,048 
r2 .211 .441 .172 .443 .179 .412 
Note: Unit of analysis is construction. Construction data from Emporis. Census tract population density data 
from the US 2010 Census. Feature controls include the ratio of building height over the number of floors, a 
set of 18 dummy variables indicating architectural styles and a set of 19 dummy variables indicating 
structural materials. Building type controls are a set of 310 dummy variables indicating building types and 
uses. Standard errors clustered on census tracts. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust or clustered 
on metro-year effects where applicable. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
4.11.2.2 Index-based estimates 
As noted, our primary concerns with the estimation of density effects using the Emporis 
data are the selectivity of the sample and an imperfect control for structural quality. 
These concerns motivate a complementary analysis in which we rely on engineering 
estimates of construction costs. This approach does not involve the arguably attractive 
use of actual micro data, but it largely avoids the aforementioned problems.  
In what follows, our aim is to estimate the cost of providing a mix of structures required 
to accommodate higher density (essentially greater average building height), holding 
non-height related structure features constant. While the use of an engineering cost 
index as dependent variable is analogical to Gyourko and Saiz (2006), the density effect 
we estimate is not. Gyourko and Saiz (2006) estimate the density effect on the cost of 
a same-specification home, i.e. they hold the structure effect constant and estimate a 
location effect. In contrast, we focus exclusively on the effect of having taller same-
quality structures at denser places, i.e. we hold the location effect constant and 
estimate the structure effect. We argue that combining both estimates yields a 
reasonable approximation of the gross density effect that can be compared to our 
micro-data estimates of the density elasticity. 
For this exercise, we require the composition of dwelling units by structure type at a 
geographically disaggregated level. To approximate the shares of various structure 
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types we make use of the American Community Survey (ACS). The data contains 
relatively rich information on the type structure a household lives in for a 1% sample of 
the total US population. To increase the number of observations we pool the 2010-2015 
survey waves, weighting each observation by the sample weight reported in the data.  
As expected, the left panel of Figure A8reveals that the great majority of households 
live in single-family homes (left panel). To explore the relationship between 
construction cost and density, we merge a structure-type specific per-unit construction 
cost index to the data. Ellis (2004) provides same-quality per-dwelling-unit engineering 
estimates of relative construction cost for eight structure types, which roughly 
correspond to the eight structure types in the ACS data. According to the Ellis (2004) 
index illustrated in the right panel of Figure A8, same-quality-same-size units in large 
multi-family structures are more than twice as expensive to build as single-family homes 
because they require more expensive materials (e.g. brick), more sophisticated 
structural engineering (e.g. concrete frames), and facilities (e.g. elevators).  
Having merged the Ellis index to the ACS data by structure type, it is straightforward to 
compute the weighted (by the household weight) mean structure replacement value 
within a public use microdata area (PUMA) – the smallest geographic identifier in the 
ACS data set – to which we refer to as construction cost for simplicity. To this PUMA 
level data set we merge population data from the ACS and the geographic area from 
the US Census to compute density (US Census Bureau 2010).  
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Figure A8 Household accommodation by structure 
 
Note: Left panel uses household-level data from American Community Survey (ACS), weighted by 
household weights. SF = single family house, MF = multi-family house (Ruggles et al. 2017). Right panel 
illustrates the construction cost index by Ellis (2004), mapping the closest of the eight categories in Ellis to 
each of the eight categories in IPUMS.  
Figure A9 Density, dwelling type, and the cost of construction 
 
Note: Unit of analysis is PUMA. Ln population density rescaled to have a zero mean. Area-based 
construction cost index and share of dwelling in multi-family structures is computed as the mean over the 
construction cost by dwelling type provided by Ellis (2004), weighted by the dwelling-type shares in the 
IPUMS data (incorporating sample weights). Population density computed using population data and area 
data from the American Community Survey (ACS). 
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In the left panel of Figure A9, we examine the relationship between structure 
composition and density. In keeping with intuition, higher densities are associated with 
larger shares of units in multi-family buildings, i.e. density is correlated with height as 
already evident from Figure A7. The relationship seems to be non-linear. One 
interpretation is that at low levels of density, increases in density can be achieved by 
building single-family homes more densely. Beyond a certain level, however, higher 
densities require the construction of tall multi-family buildings. Expectedly, the positive 
non-linear correlation also exists between density and the mean construction cost (right 
panel). 
In the table below, we provide estimates of the density elasticity of our construction 
cost index at the PUMA level. To account for the non-linearity suggested by Figure A9, 
we experiment with a quadratic specification. We also add metro effects in some 
specifications and weight observations by PUMA population in others. The elasticity 
estimates (at the mean) range from 0.043-0.056. As discussed above, these estimates 
capture the structure effect of density exclusively. Adding the 0.02 location effect 
estimated by Gyourko and Saiz (2006) (at the mean of the density distribution), we 
obtain a combined effect in the range of 0.06 to 0.75, which is close to the upper bound 
of the density elasticity estimated from the micro-data. The quadratic specification from 
column (2) implies a spread of the marginal density effect of 0.038-0.066 from the 5th 
to the 95th percentile in the density distribution across PUMAs.  
Table A10  Estimates of the density elasticity of construction costs (index-based 
models) III 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln construction cost index 
Ln population 
density 
0.043*** 
(0.003) 
0.055*** 
(0.004) 
0.043*** 
(0.005) 
0.056*** 
(0.006) 
0.043*** 
(0.003) 
0.056*** 
(0.005) 
Ln population 
density squared 
 
 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
 
 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
CBSA effects - - Yes Yes - Yes 
Weighted - - - - By pop. By pop. 
N 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 
r2 .259 .323 .357 .41 .263 .417 
Note: Unit of analysis is PUMA. Ln population density rescaled to have a zero mean. Area-based 
construction cost index is computed as the mean over the construction cost by dwelling type provided by 
Ellis (2004), weighted by the dwelling-type shares in the ACS data (incorporating sample weights). 
Population density computed using population data from ACS data and area data from US Census Bureau. 
Standard errors are robust or clustered on CBSAs where included. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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4.11.2.3 Summary 
The micro-data analysis presented in this section yields and estimate of the density 
elasticity of construction cost that is a composite of all structural effects (costs of 
building taller structures to achieve density) and locational effects (costs of building 
similar structures at denser locations). However, because of the potential selectivity of 
the Emporis data, the density estimate is potentially local and representative for above-
average density locations. The estimates may also confound the effects of non-height-
related structural characteristics (quality of design and materials) that are correlated 
with density. Our index-based estimates are likely robust to these problems because the 
composition of dwelling types in the ACS data is likely representative and the 
engineering cost index we use refers to constant-quality units. However, these 
estimates capture exclusively the structure effect of density, and not the location 
effect, for which we refer to Gyourko and Saiz (2006). 
The combined structural and locational effect that results from summing our 
engineering estimate and Gyourko and Saiz (2006)’s estimate of the density elasticity 
still differs conceptually from the elasticity estimate that results from the analysis of the 
micro-data. Gyourko and Saiz (2006) control for several locational attributes that are 
likely correlated with and potentially endogenous to density. If regulation was tighter 
in denser areas and had a positive effect on construction cost (Green et al. 2005; Saiz 
2010; Gyourko & Saiz 2006), one would expect the density elasticity estimated from the 
micro-data to exceed the index-based elasticity (our engineering estimate, plus Gyourko 
and Saiz (2006) estimate). However, the index-based estimate is close to the upper-
bound estimate from the micro-data, even though we suspect, if anything, an upward 
bias of the latter due to selection. This is consistent with a weakly negative correlation 
between the Wharton Regulatory Index and population density, which suggests that 
achieving density is not the primary motivation for more intense regulation in the US 
(Gyourko et al. 2007) 
Based on the evidence presented in this section, we conclude that 0.04-0.07 is a 
conservative estimated range for the density elasticity of construction cost. This 
estimate is a gross estimate that includes all structure effects and location effects that 
are associated with density (including differences in regulation, geology and labour 
market conditions may be cause or effects of density). 
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4.11.3 Converting estimated marginal effects into elasticity estimates 
Where possible, we convert reported marginal effects in levels or reported semi-
elasticities into density elasticity estimates (at the mean of a distribution) using 
descriptive statistics reported in the studies. Where necessary, we conduct auxiliary 
research into the institutional setting to facilitate such conversions (e.g. to infer mean 
density). For studies from disciplines that are remote to economics (e.g. engineering 
and medical research), additional steps are often required to infer density elasticity 
estimates because the results are reported not as marginal density effects but as 
predicted values by density category (e.g. energy consumption or adjusted premature 
mortality rates). In such instances, we extract the predicted values (if necessary, by the 
visual inspection of graphs) and approximate an implied density elasticity estimate by 
regressing the natural logarithm of an outcome value against the natural logarithm of 
the midpoint of the density interval. 
In this subsection we discuss how we adjust the density effects reported in the literature 
into a consistent format. Our aim is to express as many as possible estimates in terms 
of an elasticity of an outcome measure Y with respect to density P/A:  
 𝛽 =
𝑑𝑌
𝑌
𝑑(𝑃/𝐴)
(𝑃/𝐴)
 
, where P (population) and A (area) are defined as in the previous sub-section. Authors 
of the studies included in the evidence base frequently report marginal effects of the 
following forms:  
Marginal effects in levels:  
𝛾 =
𝑑𝑌
𝑑(𝑃/𝐴)
 
Log-lin semi-elasticities estimated using log-lin models:  
𝛿 =
𝑑𝑌
𝑌
𝑑(𝑃/𝐴)
 
Lin-log semi-elasticities estimated using lin-log models: 
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𝜗 =
𝑑𝑌
𝑑 (𝑃𝐴)
(𝑃/𝐴)
 
Hence, we can compute 𝛽 at the mean of the distributions of Y and P (denoted by bars) 
from reported estimates of 𝛾 or 𝛿 or 𝜗 as follows: 
𝛽 = 𝛿(𝑃/𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) 
 𝛽 = 𝛾
(𝑃/𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
?̅?
 
𝛽 = 𝜗
1
?̅?
 
We note that in some instances, a conversion into an elasticity estimate requires further 
auxiliary steps such as removing a standardisation (normalisation by standard 
deviations) or the auxiliary estimation of elasticities based on results reported for 
discrete categories. In some cases, we infer a marginal effect from graphical illustrations 
(in particular in the health category). 
4.11.4 Converting city size elasticities into density elasticities 
In several instances the authors of the considered analyses use city population as a 
proxy of density. The estimated elasticity of an outcome with respect to population (city 
size proxy) takes the following form (after the transformations described 2.2, if 
necessary): 
𝜃 =
𝑑𝑌
𝑌
𝑑(𝑃)
(𝑃)
 
As we have shown in 2.1, our estimated elasticity of density with respect to city size is 
not unity. It is therefore necessary to adjust the estimates in order to make them 
comparable to density elasticity estimates. Given that we have an estimate of the 
elasticity of density with respect to city size 
𝛼 =
𝑑(𝑃/𝐴)
(𝑃/𝐴)
𝑑𝑃
𝑃
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we can easily compute the elasticity of an outcome with respect to density as: 
𝛽 =
𝜃
𝛼
 
4.11.5 Converting density elasticities of land price into density elasticities of 
rent 
Density effects on the value of real estate are often reported in terms of house price 
capitalisation, which is linearly related to rent capitalisation (assuming a constant 
discount factor). Sometimes, authors report the effects in terms of land price 
capitalisation. Land price elasticity estimates are not directly comparable to house price 
elasticity estimates because house prices generally move less than land prices due to 
factor substitution (developers substitute away from land as land prices increase).  
To allow for a simple micro-founded translation of land price capitalisation effects into 
house price capitalisation effects, it is useful to assume a Cobb-Douglas housing 
production function and a competitive construction sector. Assume that housing 
services H are produced using the inputs capital K and land L as follows: 𝐻 = 𝐾ℶ𝐿1−ℶ. 
Housing space is rented out at bid-rent 𝜓 while land is acquired at land rent Ω. From the 
first-order condition 𝐾/𝐿 = ℶ/(1 − ℶ) Ω (the price of capital is the numeraire) and the 
non-profit condition 𝜓𝐻 = 𝐾 + Ω𝐿, it is immediate that log(𝜓) = (1 − ℶ) log(Ω) + 𝑐, 
where c is a constant that cancels out in differences, i.e., 𝑑 ln(𝜓) = (1 − ℶ)𝑑 ln(𝛺).  
It is, therefore, possible to translate an estimate of the density elasticity of land price 
with respect to density into an estimate of the density elasticity of rent (house price) 
with respect to density as follows:  
𝑑 ln 𝜓
𝑑ln (𝑃𝐴)
= (1 − ℶ)
𝑑 ln 𝛺
𝑑ln (𝑃𝐴)
 
, where we set (1 − ℶ) = 0.25, following Ahlfeldt et al. (2015). 
4.11.6 Density elasticity estimates: High-income vs. non-high-income 
In the table below, we compare citation-weighted median and mean elasticity estimates 
between high-income countries and non-high-income countries. The table 
complements Table 3 in the main paper. Evidently, the evidence base from non-high-
income countries is limited. Notably we observe that mean elasticity estimates differ 
between high-income and non-high-income countries in outcome categories where we 
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are able to observe this. For productivity, the unconditional citation-weighted mean in 
the evidence base is 0.08 for non-high-income countries, while 0.04 for high income 
countries. Within the quality of life category, we also observe that while density has an 
average positive effect on quality of life in high-income places, it has an average 
negative effect in non-high-income countries. Another relevant finding is that estimates 
of the density elasticity of non-car use are significantly lower for non-high-income 
countries.  
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Table A11  Average density elasticity estimates by high-income and non-high-
income 
  High-income a Non-High-income a 
ID 
Elasticity of outcome with respect 
to density N Median Mean S.D. N Median Mean S.D. 
1 Labour productivity 38 0.04 0.04 0.03 9 0.08 0.06 0.07 
1 Total factor productivity 13 0.05 0.05 0.03 2 0.10 0.06 0.06 
2 Patents p.c. 7 0.20 0.21 0.11 0 - - - 
3 Rent 13 0.16 0.15 0.13 0 - - - 
4 Commuting reduction 35 0.06 0.07 0.11 1 -0.21 -0.21 - 
4 Non-work trip reduction 7 -0.06 -0.20 0.44 0 - - - 
5 Metro rail density 3 0.00 0.01 0.02 0 - - - 
5 Quality of life 5 0.02 0.05 0.06 3 -0.05 -0.04 0.03 
5 Variety (consumption amenities) 1 0.19 0.19 - 0 - - - 
5 Variety price reduction 2 0.12 0.12 0.06 0 - - - 
6 Public spending reduction 20 0.11 0.17 0.25 0 - - - 
7 90th-10th pct. wage gap reduction 1 0.17 0.17 - 0 - - - 
7 Black-white wage   gap reduction 1 -0.00 0.00 - 0 - - - 
7 Diss. index reduction 3 0.33 0.66 0.94 0 - - - 
7 Gini coef. reduction 1 4.56 4.56 - 0 - - - 
7 High-low skill wage gap reduction 3 -0.12 -0.13 0.07 0 - - - 
8 Crime rate reduction 13 0.36 0.24 0.47 0 - - - 
9 Foliage projection cover 1 -0.06 -0.06 - 0 - - - 
10 Noise reduction 1 0.04 0.04 - 0 - - - 
10 Pollution reduction 10 -0.12 0.02 0.43 8 0.33 0.07 0.54 
11 Energy consumption reduction 19 0.07 0.07 0.10 2 0.04 0.08 0.13 
11 
Energy consumption reduction: 
Public transit 1 -0.37 -0.37 - 0 - - - 
12 Speed 2 -0.13 -0.12 0.01 0 - - - 
13 Car usage (incl. shared) reduction 22 0.04 0.05 0.07 0 - - - 
13 Non-car use 72 0.14 0.17 0.24 4 0.02 0.04 0.06 
14 
Cancer & other serious disease 
reduction 5 -0.30 -0.33 0.20 0 - - - 
14 KSI & casualty reduction 4 0.17 0.01 0.61 0 - - - 
14 Mental-health 1 0.01 0.01 - 0 - - - 
14 Mortality reduction 3 -0.29 -0.36 0.17 0 - - - 
15 Reported health 3 -0.32 -0.27 0.11 0 - - - 
15 Reported safety 1 0.07 0.07 - 0 - - - 
15 Reported social interaction 6 -0.04 -0.13 0.19 0 - - - 
15 Reported wellbeing 1 -0.00 0.00 - 0 - - - 
Note: a Weighted by the citation index introduced in section 3.2 and appendix section 1.2. Outcome 
categories correspond to ID as follows: 1: Productivity; 2: Innovation: 3: Value of space; 4: Job accessibility; 
5: Services access; 6: Efficiency of public services delivery; 7: Social equity; 8: Safety; 9: Open space 
preservation and biodiversity; 10: Pollution reduction; 11: Energy efficiency; 12: Traffic flow: 13: Sustainable 
mode choice; 14: Health; 15: Well-being. 
4.12 Original density elasticity estimates 
In this section we complement the existing literature on the effect of density using 
OECD.Stat functional economic areas or regional statistics data and the following 
regression model: 
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ln(𝑌𝑖) = 𝛽 ln (
𝑃𝑖
𝐴𝑖
) + 𝜏ln (
𝐺𝑖
𝑃𝑖
) + 𝜇𝑐 + 𝜖𝑖𝑐  
 
, where i indexes cities, 𝑌𝑖  is an outcome as defined in the table below, 𝑃𝑖, 𝐴𝑖, 𝜇𝑐  are 
population, geographic area, and country fixed effects, and 𝐺𝑖  is GDP per capita. The 
coefficient of interest is 𝛽, which gives the elasticity of an outcome with respect to 
population density controlling for local GDP p.c. and unobserved cross-country 
heterogeneity. Where either population or area forms part of the dependent variable 
we instrument population density using the rank within the national population density 
distribution as an instrument. In the following subsections, we present estimates of this 
model including and excluding the GDP control and fixed effects, as well as with and 
without using the instrumental variable. Because the interpretation of the parameter 
on population density as an elasticity is straightforward, we generally present the 
results without further discussion. The exception is our estimate of the elasticity of 
speed with respect to density, which follows a slightly different structure. 
4.12.1 Innovation 
Table A12  Elasticity estimates of patents per capita with respect to population 
density 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln patents 
per capita 
Ln patents 
per capita 
Ln patents 
per capita 
Ln patents 
per capita 
Ln patents 
per capita 
Ln patents 
per capita 
Ln population 
density 
0.170 
(0.11) 
0.349*** 
(0.06) 
0.122** 
(0.06) 
0.129* 
(0.07) 
0.164* 
(0.09) 
0.036 
(0.10) 
Ln GDP per capita  
 
2.953*** 
(0.11) 
1.426*** 
(0.21) 
1.425*** 
(0.39) 
2.028*** 
(0.34) 
1.053*** 
(0.35) 
Country effects - - Yes Yes - Yes 
Sample Non-US Non-US Non-US Non-US US Non-US 
IV - - - Yes Yes Yes 
N 218 218 218 218 70 148 
r2 0.010 0.723 0.894  0.408  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Unit of observation is functional economic area. All variables are 
averaged over 2000–2014. IV is rank of a city in the population density (and population where included) 
distribution within a country. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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4.12.2 Services access (broadband) 
Table A13  Elasticity estimates of broadband per capita with respect to population 
density 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln 
broadban
d per 
capita 
Ln 
broadban
d per 
capita 
Ln 
broadban
d per 
capita 
Ln 
broadban
d per 
capita 
Ln 
broadban
d per 
capita 
Ln 
broadban
d per 
capita 
Ln population 
density 
0.033*** 
(0.01) 
0.034*** 
(0.01) 
0.011 
(0.01) 
0.010 
(0.01) 
-0.000 
(0.00) 
0.013 
(0.01) 
Ln GDP per capita  
 
0.474*** 
(0.04) 
0.305*** 
(0.06) 
0.306*** 
(0.06) 
0.119 
(0.07) 
0.327*** 
(0.06) 
Country effects - - Yes Yes - Yes 
IV - - - Yes Yes Yes 
N 343 343 343 343 51 292 
Sample All All All All US Non-US 
r2 0.020 0.576 0.862  0.186  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Unit of observation is large regions (OECD definition). All variables 
are averaged over 2000–2014. IV is rank of a city in the population density distribution within a country. * p 
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
4.12.3 Social equity 
Table A14  Elasticity estimates of income quintile ratio with respect to population 
density 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Ln 
disposable 
income 
quintile 
ratio (pct. 
80 vs 20) 
Ln 
disposable 
income 
quintile 
ratio (pct. 
80 vs 20) 
Ln 
disposable 
income 
quintile 
ratio (pct. 
80 vs 20) 
Ln 
disposable 
income 
quintile 
ratio (pct. 
80 vs 20) 
Ln 
disposable 
income 
quintile 
ratio (pct. 
80 vs 20) 
Ln population 
density 
0.023 
(0.02) 
0.024 
(0.03) 
0.035** 
(0.01) 
0.057*** 
(0.02) 
0.032** 
(0.01) 
Ln GDP per capita  
 
-0.233*** 
(0.09) 
0.469 
(0.29) 
0.197* 
(0.11) 
0.503 
(0.32) 
Country effects - - Yes - Yes 
IV - - - - - 
N 275 269 269 51 218 
Sample All All All US Non-US 
r2 0.004 0.042 0.734 0.352 0.718 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Unit of observation is large regions (OECD definition). All variables 
are averaged over 2000–2014. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A15  Elasticity estimates of Gini coefficient with respect to population 
density 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Ln Gini 
coefficient 
Ln Gini 
coefficient 
Ln Gini 
coefficient 
Ln Gini 
coefficient 
Ln Gini 
coefficient 
Ln population 
density 
-0.007 
(0.01) 
-0.007 
(0.01) 
0.025*** 
(0.01) 
0.020*** 
(0.01) 
0.026*** 
(0.01) 
Ln GDP per capita  
 
-0.133*** 
(0.03) 
0.026 
(0.02) 
0.025 
(0.04) 
0.028 
(0.03) 
Country effects - - Yes - Yes 
IV - - - - - 
N 275 269 269 51 218. 
Sample All All All US Non-US 
r2 0.003 0.118 0.880 0.237 0.880 
Note: Unit of observation is large regions (OECD definition). Standard errors in parentheses. Unit of 
observation is large regions (OECD definition). All variables are averaged over 2000–2014. * p < 0.1, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A16  Elasticity estimates of poverty rate with respect to population density 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Ln poverty 
rate 
(poverty 
line 60%) 
Ln poverty 
rate 
(poverty 
line 60%) 
Ln poverty 
rate 
(poverty 
line 60%) 
Ln poverty 
rate 
(poverty 
line 60%) 
Ln poverty 
rate 
(poverty 
line 60%) 
Ln population 
density 
-0.014 
(0.01) 
-0.013 
(0.01) 
0.032 
(0.02) 
0.034** 
(0.02) 
0.027 
(0.03) 
Ln GDP per capita  
 
-0.280*** 
(0.05) 
-0.590*** 
(0.11) 
-0.396** 
(0.18) 
-0.617*** 
(0.13) 
Country effects - - Yes - Yes 
IV - - - - - 
N 275 269 269 51 218 
Sample All All All US Non-US 
r2 0.004 0.148 0.547 0.156 0.549 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Unit of observation is large regions (OECD definition). All variables 
are averaged over 2000–2014. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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4.12.4 Safety 
Table A17  Elasticity estimates of homicides p.c. with respect to population 
density 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln 
homicides 
p.c. 
Ln 
homicides 
p.c. 
Ln 
homicides 
p.c. 
Ln 
homicides 
p.c. 
Ln 
homicides 
p.c. 
Ln 
homicides 
p.c. 
Ln population 
density 
-0.204*** 
(0.03) 
-0.166*** 
(0.03) 
-0.033 
(0.04) 
-0.048 
(0.04) 
0.105** 
(0.05) 
-0.076** 
(0.04) 
Ln GDP per capita  
 
-0.918*** 
(0.07) 
0.086 
(0.06) 
0.086 
(0.07) 
0.312 
(0.48) 
0.058 
(0.07) 
Country effects - - Yes Yes - Yes 
IV - - - Yes Yes Yes 
N 481 474 474 474 51 423 
Sample All All All All US Non-US 
r2 0.088 0.393 0.879  0.139  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Unit of observation is large regions (OECD definition). All variables 
are averaged over 2000–2014. IV is rank of a city in the population density distribution within a country. * p 
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
4.12.5 Urban green 
Table A18  Elasticity estimates of vegetation density with respect to population 
density 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln 
vegetatio
n density 
Ln 
vegetatio
n density 
Ln 
vegetatio
n density 
Ln 
vegetatio
n density 
Ln 
vegetatio
n density 
Ln 
vegetatio
n density 
Ln population 
density 
-0.199*** 
(0.02) 
-0.267*** 
(0.02) 
-0.257*** 
(0.04) 
-0.245*** 
(0.05) 
0.034 
(0.10) 
-0.261*** 
(0.05) 
Ln GDP per capita  
 
0.388*** 
(0.06) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country effects - - Yes Yes - Yes 
IV - - - Yes Yes Yes 
N 583 410 583 583 45 538 
Sample All Non-US All All US Non-US 
r2 0.142 0.262 0.381    
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Unit of observation is small regions (urban and intermediate, OECD 
definition). US GDP data not available at this scale. All variables are averaged over 2000–2014. IV is rank of 
a city in the population density distribution within a country. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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Table A19  Elasticity estimates of green area density with respect to population 
density 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln green 
area 
density 
Ln green 
area 
density 
Ln green 
area 
density 
Ln green 
area 
density 
Ln green 
area 
density 
Ln green 
area 
density 
Ln population 
density 
  0.283** 
(0.14) 
0.683** 
(0.31) 
0.761* 
(0.40) 
1.446*** 
(0.38) 
0.197 
(0.43) 
Ln GDP per capita  
 
0.496** 
(0.23) 
0.035 
(0.94) 
0.022 
(0.86) 
1.178 
(0.96) 
-0.857 
(0.69) 
Country effects - - Yes Yes - Yes 
IV - - - Yes Yes Yes 
N 280 280 280 280 70 210 
Sample All All All All US Non-US 
r2 0.021 0.040 0.283  0.246  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Unit of observation is functional economic area. All variables are 
averaged over 2000–2014. IV is rank of a city in the population density (and population where included) 
distribution within a country. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A20  Elasticity estimates of green area per capita with respect to population 
density 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln green 
area per 
capita 
Ln green 
area per 
capita 
Ln green 
area per 
capita 
Ln green 
area per 
capita 
Ln green 
area per 
capita 
Ln green 
area per 
capita 
Ln population 
density 
-0.754*** 
(0.14) 
-0.717*** 
(0.14) 
-0.317 
(0.31) 
-0.239 
(0.40) 
0.446 
(0.38) 
-0.803* 
(0.43) 
Ln GDP per capita  
 
0.496** 
(0.23) 
0.035 
(0.94) 
0.022 
(0.86) 
1.178 
(0.96) 
-0.857 
(0.69) 
Country effects - - Yes Yes - Yes 
IV - - - Yes Yes Yes 
N 280 280 280 280 70 210 
Sample All All All All US Non-US 
r2 0.170 0.186 0.392  0.027  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Unit of observation is functional economic area. All variables are 
averaged over 2000–2014. IV is rank of a city in the population density (and population where included) 
distribution within a country. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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4.12.6 Pollution concentration 
Table A21  Elasticity estimates of air pollution concentration with respect to 
population density 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Ln air 
pollution 
(level 
PM2.5) 
Ln air 
pollution 
(level 
PM2.5) 
Ln air 
pollution 
(level 
PM2.5) 
Ln air 
pollution 
(level 
PM2.5) 
Ln air 
pollution 
(level 
PM2.5) 
Ln population 
density 
0.221*** 
(0.02) 
0.220*** 
(0.02) 
0.124*** 
(0.03) 
0.111*** 
(0.03) 
0.128*** 
(0.03) 
Ln GDP per capita  
 
-0.208*** 
(0.04) 
0.020 
(0.19) 
0.053 
(0.14) 
0.018 
(0.21) 
Country effects - - Yes - Yes 
IV - - - - - 
N 343 343 343 51 292 
Sample All All All US Non-US 
r2 0.407 0.456 0.708 0.247 0.720 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Unit of observation is large regions (OECD definition). All variables 
are averaged over 2000–2014. IV is rank of a city in the population density distribution within a country. * p 
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
4.12.7 Energy 
Table A22  Elasticity estimates of ln CO2 emissions p.c. with respect to 
population density 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln CO2 
emissions 
p.c. 
Ln CO2 
emissions 
p.c. 
Ln CO2 
emissions 
p.c. 
Ln CO2 
emissions 
p.c. 
Ln CO2 
emissions 
p.c. 
Ln CO2 
emissions 
p.c. 
Ln population 
density 
-0.225*** 
(0.02) 
-0.224*** 
(0.02) 
-0.189*** 
(0.04) 
-0.173*** 
(0.04) 
-0.190*** 
(0.05) 
-0.170*** 
(0.05) 
Ln GDP per capita  
 
0.503*** 
(0.04) 
0.283*** 
(0.08) 
0.282*** 
(0.07) 
0.354 
(0.27) 
0.280*** 
(0.07) 
Country effects - - Yes Yes - Yes 
IV - - - Yes Yes Yes 
N 570 562 562 562 51 511 
Sample All All All All US Non-US 
r2 0.176 0.358 0.597  0.300  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Unit of observation is large urban regions (OECD definition). All 
variables are averaged over 2000–2014. IV is rank of a city in the population density distribution within a 
country. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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4.12.8 Traffic flow 
In the figure below we compare the peak time (with congestion) speeds on freeways 
and arterial roads across metros that are above and below the median population 
density. Both distributions seem to suggest that metros with a higher population 
density have lower average speeds, which is in line with more congestion in denser 
cities. 
Figure A10 Distribution of peak time speeds by population density 
 
Note: Data from OECD (population density) and Lomax (2010).  
However, regressing the freeway speed against population density does not yield a 
significant relationship during peak time (with congestion) or off-peak time (free flow). 
There is also no population density effect on congestion, i.e., on peak time speeds 
controlling for free-flow speeds. There is, however, a significantly negative effect of 
population size on congestion, suggesting that freeway congestion is determined by 
the size of the city and not its density.  
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Table A23  Elasticity estimate of speed with respect to population density: 
Freeways 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln 
freeway 
speed 
(miles/h
): Peak 
time 
Ln 
freeway 
speed 
(miles/h
): Peak 
time 
Ln 
freeway 
speed 
(miles/h
): Free 
flow 
Ln 
freeway 
speed 
(miles/h
): Free 
flow 
Ln 
freeway 
speed 
(miles/h
): Peak 
time 
Ln 
freeway 
speed 
(miles/h
): Peak 
time 
Ln population 
density 
-0.008 
(0.01) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
0.003 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
0.011 
(0.01) 
Ln GDP p.c.  
 
-0.097*** 
(0.03) 
 
 
-0.015 
(0.02) 
-0.078** 
(0.03) 
-0.037 
(0.03) 
Ln freeway speed 
(miles/h): Free 
flow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.312*** 
(0.18) 
1.315*** 
(0.16) 
Ln population  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.042*** 
(0.01) 
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 
r2 0.012 0.113 0.001 0.013 0.420 0.630 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Data from OECD and Lomax (2010). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
For arterial streets, in contrast we estimate a significant elasticity of peak time speed 
with respect to population density of -0.063. Interestingly, we estimate an elasticity 
within the same range for free-flow speeds. This suggests that the lower speed is 
primarily a morphological density effect. Street layouts in denser cities result in a 
generally lower speed, but not higher congestion. This effect is confirmed by the model 
controlling for free-flow speeds, which yields no significant congestion effect (on peak 
time speeds). As with freeway speeds, there is a significant population size effect, 
although it is relatively smaller.  
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Table A24  Elasticity estimate of speed with respect to population density: 
Arterial streets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln 
arterial 
streets 
speed 
(miles/h): 
Peak 
time 
Ln 
arterial 
streets 
speed 
(miles/h): 
Peak 
time 
Ln 
arterial 
streets 
speed 
(miles/h): 
Free flow 
Ln 
arterial 
streets 
speed 
(miles/h): 
Free flow 
Ln 
arterial 
streets 
speed 
(miles/h): 
Peak 
time 
Ln 
arterial 
streets 
speed 
(miles/h): 
Peak 
time 
Ln population 
density 
-0.063*** 
(0.02) 
-0.041** 
(0.02) 
-0.050*** 
(0.02) 
-0.034** 
(0.02) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
0.003 
(0.00) 
Ln GDP p.c.  
 
-0.192*** 
(0.06) 
 
 
-0.139*** 
(0.05) 
-0.029 
(0.02) 
-0.018 
(0.02) 
Ln arterial streets 
speed (miles/h): 
Free flow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.182*** 
(0.03) 
1.142*** 
(0.03) 
Ln population  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.017*** 
(0.00) 
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 
r2 0.138 0.217 0.130 0.192 0.966 0.972 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Data from OECD and Lomax et al. (2010). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01 
4.12.9 Health 
Table A25  Elasticity estimate of standardised mortality rate with respect to 
population density 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln 
standardi
sed 
mortality 
rate 
Ln 
standardi
sed 
mortality 
rate 
Ln 
standardi
sed 
mortality 
rate 
Ln 
standardi
sed 
mortality 
rate 
Ln 
standardi
sed 
mortality 
rate 
Ln 
standardi
sed 
mortality 
rate 
Ln population 
density 
-
0.056*** 
(0.01) 
-
0.046*** 
(0.01) 
-0.015 
(0.01) 
-0.017 
(0.01) 
-0.005 
(0.01) 
-0.019 
(0.01) 
Ln GDP per 
capita 
 
 
-0.140*** 
(0.02) 
0.039 
(0.02) 
0.039* 
(0.02) 
-0.017 
(0.12) 
0.040 
(0.02) 
Country effects - - Yes Yes - Yes 
IV - - - Yes Yes Yes 
N 528 528 528 528 51 477 
Sample All All All All US Non-US 
r2 0.107 0.223 0.882  .  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Unit of observation is large regions (OECD definition). All variables 
are averaged over 2000–2014. IV is rank of a city in the population density distribution within a country. * p 
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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Table A26  Elasticity estimate of life expectancy at birth with respect to 
population density 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Ln life 
expectancy 
at birth 
Ln life 
expectancy 
at birth 
Ln life 
expectancy 
at birth 
Ln life 
expectancy 
at birth 
Ln life 
expectancy 
at birth 
Ln population 
density 
0.016*** 
(0.00) 
0.013*** 
(0.00) 
0.007** 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
0.008*** 
(0.00) 
Ln GDP per capita  
 
0.055*** 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
0.023 
(0.02) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
Country effects - - Yes - Yes 
IV - - - - - 
N 496 496 496 51 445 
Sample All All All US Non-US 
r2 0.157 0.496 0.922 0.065 0.931 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Unit of observation is large regions (OECD definition). All variables 
are averaged over 2000–2014. IV is rank of a city in the population density distribution within a country. * p 
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A27  Elasticity estimate of mortality in transport p.c. with respect to 
population density 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln 
mortality 
in 
transport 
p.c. 
Ln 
mortality 
in 
transport 
p.c. 
Ln 
mortality 
in 
transport 
p.c. 
Ln 
mortality 
in 
transport 
p.c. 
Ln 
mortality 
in 
transport 
p.c. 
Ln 
mortality 
in 
transport 
p.c. 
Ln population 
density 
-0.162*** 
(0.02) 
-0.150*** 
(0.01) 
-0.103*** 
(0.03) 
-
0.099*** 
(0.03) 
-0.119*** 
(0.02) 
-
0.093*** 
(0.03) 
Ln GDP per 
capita 
 
 
-0.278*** 
(0.04) 
-0.111** 
(0.04) 
-0.110*** 
(0.04) 
-0.484* 
(0.25) 
-0.087** 
(0.04) 
Country effects - - Yes Yes - Yes 
IV - - - Yes Yes Yes 
N 420 414 414 414 51 363 
Sample All All All All US Non-US 
r2 0.260 0.375 0.819  0.534  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Unit of observation is large regions (OECD definition). All variables 
are averaged over 2000–2014. IV is rank of a city in the population density distribution within a country. * p 
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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4.12.10  Well-being 
Table A28  Elasticity estimate of subjective well-being with respect to population 
density 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Ln 
subjective 
life 
satisfaction 
Ln 
subjective 
life 
satisfactio
n 
Ln 
subjective 
life 
satisfactio
n 
Ln 
subjective 
life 
satisfactio
n 
Ln 
subjective 
life 
satisfactio
n 
Ln population 
density 
-0.021*** 
(0.00) 
-0.023*** 
(0.00) 
-0.007** 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.008** 
(0.00) 
Ln GDP per capita  
 
0.114*** 
(0.01) 
0.069*** 
(0.01) 
0.012 
(0.04) 
0.074*** 
(0.01) 
Country effects - - Yes - Yes 
IV - - - - - 
N 339 339 339 51 288 
Sample All All All US Non-US 
r2 0.073 0.410 0.850 0.003 0.859 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All variables are averaged over 2000–2014. IV is rank of a city in the 
population density distribution within a country. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
4.13 Recommended elasticity estimates 
This section provides a justification of the recommended elasticity estimates reported 
in Table 5 in the main paper alongside a critical discussion of the quality and the quantity 
of the evidence base. We strongly advise consulting the relevant subsections below 
before applying one of the recommended elasticity estimates in further research.  
Before we proceed to the discussion of the category-specific density elasticity 
estimates, we wish to remind the reader, that, as discussed in Section 2.1 in the main 
paper, there is fundamental problem in identifying density effects because density is 
endogenous and potentially determined by unobserved location fundamental factors 
(e.g. a favourable geography). Studies that estimate density effects from plausibly 
exogenous variation (e.g. by making use of natural experiments or instrumental 
variables) are the minority. For most estimates, the causal interpretation rests on the 
assumption that the variation in density within and between cities is largely historically 
determined by factors that have limited contemporaneous effects on outcomes. For 
individual-, firm-, and unit-based outcomes (e.g. wages, innovation, rent, wellbeing), the 
collected density elasticity estimates often capture composition effects. In this case, a 
density elasticity estimate does not give the effect of an exogenous change in density 
on an outcome such as the productivity of individuals, the innovative activity of firms, 
or the value of housing units. For individual- and firm- based outcomes, the density 
elasticity estimate, in addition, captures the composition effect that usually arises 
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because more productive individuals and firms self-select into more productive areas. 
The density elasticity of rent captures the effect of a change in the quality of housing 
stock if developers make choices that depend on rents and incomes, which in turn 
depend on density.  
4.13.1 Wage elasticity 
The literature reports both wage and TFP elasticities with respect to density, the former 
being by far the most frequently reported parameter. While we find a significant 
difference between the wage and the TFP elasticity in our review, it is notable that high 
quality papers analysing both wage and TFP within a consistent framework do not 
report the existence of such a difference (Combes et al. 2010). We choose the citation-
weighted average value of the wage elasticities in our sample of 0.04, which is close to 
the results from recent high-quality work (Combes et al. 2012) and meta-analysis (Melo 
et al. 2009). The citation-index-weighted mean elasticity is almost identical if we restrict 
the sample to 19 analyses that disentangle density effects from unobserved location 
fundamentals using instrumental variables or natural experiments. Therefore, a causal 
interpretation of our recommended elasticity seems justifiable. While there is some 
variation in the estimated density elasticities of wage and TFP, the estimates in the 
literature do not appear to be systematically related to the average density level in the 
considered study areas. However, it is noteworthy that, within the admittedly smaller 
sample of studies from non-high-income countries, the citation-weighted average of the 
density elasticity of wages, at 0.08, is about twice as large. We also note that there is a 
tendency for within-city analyses (Ahlfeldt et al. 2015) and TFP analyses to yield larger 
estimated elasticities, but we recommend further work to substantiate this impression. 
An important qualification is that the recommended 0.04 elasticity is best interpreted 
as an area-based effect that partially captures a productivity effect on identical workers 
and partially captures a shift in composition towards more productive workers (a 
sorting effect). Studies that control for unobserved heterogeneity of workers by 
identifying from movers across agglomerations tend to find elasticities that are about 
50% lower (Combes & Gobillon, 2015). We recommend the 0.04 elasticity as an area-
based effect that is consistent with the area-based estimates recommended for the 
other categories, for which estimates controlling for unobserved micro-level 
heterogeneity are typically not available. 
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4.13.2 Patents 
While there is a sizeable literature engaged with the effects of urban form on 
innovation, we only found seven studies that provided estimates that either directly 
corresponded to or could be converted into estimates of the density elasticity of 
patents. Some studies report marginal effects that cannot be converted into elasticity 
estimates due to missing descriptive statistics. We recommend the citation-weighted 
mean in the evidence base of 0.21, which is in line with Carlino et al. (2007) and Sedgley 
& Elmslie (2004) who use instruments for density.  The recommended elasticity 
estimate is also in line with our original analysis of US FUAs. While this consistency is 
reassuring, we are somewhat hesitant to recommending a causal interpretation. In 
general, we find the evidence provided by Carlino et al. (2007) quite convincing. 
Actually, we consider it the most credible study on the effects of density on innovation 
in our evidence base. However, it can be argued that the instruments may not be 
excludable. As an example, favourable climate may attract high-skilled workers. Lagged 
density may be endogenous to the same fundamentals as current density, and 
consumption amenities are likely endogenous to density itself and, thus, the 
fundamentals that determine density. We acknowledge that the comprehensive set of 
control variables makes the instruments more likely excludable. Yet, compared to the 
other categories for which we recommend a causal interpretation, the identifying 
variation in our view is less plausibly exogenous.  
More generally, the evidence base in this category is relatively thin and our original 
elasticity estimates for the world-wide sample, at 0.13, are somewhat smaller than the 
recommended elasticity. More work aiming at comparable elasticity estimates from 
different geographic contexts would be desirable. 
4.13.3 Rents 
We recommend the citation-weighted mean elasticity from the evidence base of 0.15. 
This estimate is almost identical to the density elasticity of rent in the data set used by 
Albouy & Lue, (2015), which was kindly provided by the authors. This estimate is also 
within the range of other good quality and relevant papers. In particular, the citation-
index-weighted mean elasticity, at 0.13, is very close if we restrict the sample to six 
analyses that disentangle density effects from unobserved location fundamentals using 
instrumental variables or natural experiments (SMS = 4). Therefore, a causal 
interpretation of our recommended elasticity seems justifiable and we are thus 
reasonably confident in recommending the mean elasticity of 0.15 as an average even 
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though the evidence base is not as well developed as it is, for example, for wages. It is 
important to note, however, that the density elasticity of rent appears to vary in density. 
Our meta-analysis of the reviewed elasticities suggests that elasticity increases by 0.06 
if the population density in the considered study area increases by 1000 inhabitants per 
square kilometre. This effect is qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with the 
positive effect of city size on the density elasticity of rent documented by Combes et al 
(2018) for French cities. The non-log-linearity in the effect of density on rent also 
explains why Combes et al (2018) find a larger elasticity for French cities than Albouy 
and Lue (2015) find for US cities. The 0.06 difference in the density elasticity (0.21 for 
French cities vs. 0.15 for US cities) corresponds to a difference in density of about 1000 
inhabitants per square kilometre, almost exactly the difference reported in the 
Demographia World Urban Areas (2018). So, as a rule of thumb we can recommend the 
following approximation of a context-specific density elasticity of rent: 
𝛽𝑐 = 0.15 + 0.63 × (
𝐷𝑐 − 1200
1000
), 
where 0.15 is the average density elasticity applicable to the US average, 0.63 is the 
marginal effect of an increase in density by 1000 residents per square kilometre, 1200 is 
the average density of US cities measured in population per square kilometre reported 
in the Demographia World Urban Areas (2018), and 𝐷𝑐 is the density measured in 
population per square kilometre in a specific context. 
4.13.4 Vehicle miles travelled 
We recommend the citation-weighted mean elasticity from the evidence base of 0.06. 
The evidence base, including 36 analyses, is relatively large. There is sizeable variation 
in the estimated density elasticity across analyses (standard deviation of 0.12). Our 
recommended elasticity, however, is relatively close to Duranton & Turner (2018), a 
dedicated high-quality paper, and to the mean elasticity recommended in the meta-
analysis (0.04) by Ewing & Cervero (2010). Moreover, the citation-index-weighted mean 
elasticity is almost identical if we restrict the sample to four analyses from two papers 
that disentangle density effects from unobserved location fundamentals using 
instrumental variables or natural experiments (SMS = 4). Therefore, a causal 
interpretation of our recommended elasticity seems justifiable and we are reasonably 
confident in recommending this elasticity, even though there is significant 
heterogeneity that remains to be explored. 
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4.13.5 Variety benefits 
The literature on consumption benefits arising from agglomeration is underdeveloped 
relative to the production side. However, there are some good papers which suggest a 
sizeable effect. Victor Couture kindly provided estimates of the elasticity of restaurant 
price indices with respect to population density not reported in his paper (Couture 
2016). Expressed in terms of price reductions (gains from variety) the elasticity 
estimates take the values of 0.08 for driving and 0.16 for walking. These elasticities 
roughly generalise when estimated exploiting between-city variation (0.05–0.11 and 
0.1–0.22). We recommend the naïve average of two elasticity estimates (0.12), stressing 
that the exact elasticity will depend on the relative importance of the two modes in a 
setting. In support of the recommended elasticity we highlight that other good work 
has pointed to a positive and causal impact of density on consumption variety (Schiff 
2015) and that Couture’s result is close to the elasticity of urban amenity value with 
respect to density provided by Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), which is identified from quasi-
experimental variation. The recommended elasticity is based on a small sample of high-
quality evidence. More research is required to substantiate the findings and to allow for 
a causal interpretation.  
4.13.6 Local public spending 
We recommend the citation-weighted mean elasticity estimate from the evidence base 
of 0.17. This elasticity is within reasonable close range of Carruthers & Ulfarsson (2003) 
who find an 0.144 elasticity of total spending.  Overall, the evidence base is relatively 
thin as most estimates come from a hand full of studies providing multiple estimates of 
density elasticities for distinct spending categories. More research is required in this 
area. There is significant heterogeneity that remains to be explored. Disentangling the 
effects of density from correlated unobserved fundamental effects to establish 
causality remains a challenge in this category.  
4.13.7 Income inequality 
The literature on the effects of density on inequality is relatively inconsistent in the 
sense that a small number of studies use different inequality measures (e.g., 
dissimilarity index, wage gaps, Gini coefficient), different geographic scales (within-city, 
between-city) and different density measures (e.g., population density, relative 
centralisation, clustering). The results are, therefore hard to compare and are also 
qualitatively inconsistent. Our analysis of OECD regional data suggests that inequality 
increases in density, irrespective of the inequality measure we use (Gini, poverty ratio, 
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interquartile wage gap). This finding is consistent with broader evidence in urban 
economics suggesting that the highly skilled (high-wage earners) benefit relatively 
more from agglomeration (Baum-Snow et al. 2017). We acknowledge that we may be 
capturing different phenomena than studies that find a negative association between 
density and inequality at a within-city scale (Galster & Cutsinger 2007). We believe, 
however, that our original estimates are closer to the thought experiment conducted 
here, which refers to an increase in overall urban density. Our original analysis of OECD 
data suggests a -0.035 elasticity estimate of the income quintile wage gap reduction 
with respect to density (Table 5 in the main paper).  Reassuringly, our -0.057 elasticity 
estimate for the US is within close range of Baum-Snow et al (2017). However, a sizeable 
evidence base with comparable results has yet to be developed. Disentangling the 
effects of density from correlated unobserved fundamentals to establish causality 
remains a challenge in this category. 
4.13.8 Crime rate reduction 
The literature of the effects of urban form on crime rates is small, but mostly points to 
a normatively positive effect of density on crime rates (crimes, p.c. as opposed to crimes 
per area) of sizeable magnitudes. The interpretation of the results is somewhat 
complicated as authors typically consider various dimensions of compact urban forms 
at the same time. While separating the effects of different shades of compactness is 
interesting, it also complicates the evaluation of an overall density effect as any 
dimension can only be varied under the ceteris paribus condition (while most measures 
effectively change at the same time). Our recommended elasticity estimate, therefore, 
is from Cheng Keat Tang, who kindly provided estimates of the elasticity of crime rates 
with respect to population density (without controlling for other dimensions of urban 
form) not reported in his paper (Tang 2015). Reassuringly, his estimates (level-level 
model) are almost identical for crimes against persons and property. Moreover, Tang’s 
estimate is close to our original estimate of the density elasticity of crime rate reduction 
for non-US cities (setion 3.4 of this appendix). Importantly, however, we stress, that our 
original analysis reveals that the elasticity is negative for US cities, i.e. higher densities 
tend to be associated with higher crime levels in the US. This is in line with Glaeser & 
Sacerdote (1999). Therefore, we consider the recommended elasticity estimate to be 
suitable for non-US countries exclusively. More comparable evidence is required to 
substantiate our recommended elasticity for non-US countries and to allow for a more 
comprehensive analysis of heterogeneity. Disentangling the effects of density from 
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correlated unobserved fundamentals to establish causality remains a challenge in this 
category. 
4.13.9 Urban green 
As discussed in the context of the presentation of our original results in the main paper 
quantitative evidence suitable for our purposes is essentially non-existent. We are thus 
left with no choice but to recommend our original elasticity estimate of green space 
density with respect to population density of 0.0283. Of course, we must stress that this 
estimate should be considered preliminary as a sizeable evidence base with comparable 
results has yet to be developed. Disentangling the effects of density from correlated 
unobserved fundamentals to establish causality remains a challenge in this category. 
4.13.10  Pollution reduction 
The literature on the effects of density on pollution concentrations is relatively small. 
Moreover, the quantitative results prevailing in the literature are highly inconsistent as 
reflected by a standard deviation of 0.47 relative to a weighted mean elasticity of 
pollution reduction with respect to a density of 0.04. Our original cross-sectional 
estimate of approximately -0.12 (using OECD data) is close to the elasticity reported by 
Albouy & Stuart (2014). Moreover, this elasticity has been substantiated by a recent 
working paper by Carozzi and Roth (2018) who provide an elasticity estimate of -0.13 
and shortly after, by Borck & Schraut (2018), who provide very similar estimates. In our 
view, Carozzi & Roth (2018) and Borck & Schraut (2018) are the most credible estimates 
in the evidence base. Given the consistency of their independent estimates for the US 
(Carozzi & Roth) and Germany (Borck & Schraut) as well as the consistency with our 
original estimates from a sample of OECD cities, we are confident in recommending the 
-0.13 elasticity from Carozzi and Roth (2018). Given that both Carozzi & Roth (2018) and 
Borck & Schraut (2018) use instrumental variable strategies to disentangle density 
effects from correlated fundamental effects, a causal interpretation seems justifiable. 
A larger evidence base, however, would be desirable to substantiate findings.  
4.13.11  Energy consumption 
We interpret CO2 emissions as reflecting energy usage, assuming that the elasticity of 
energy mix with respect to density is zero. CO2’s social cost is primarily incurred through 
global warming. This is different from the pollutants considered in category 10, which 
have much more localised effects. The literature on the effects of density on energy 
consumption is relatively well developed and reasonably consistent, both qualitatively 
and quantitatively. We therefore choose the weighted mean elasticity estimate of 
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energy use reduction with respect to density across the reviewed analyses of 0.07 as a 
recommended elasticity estimate. We note that the respective elasticity of public 
transport seems to be negative (meaning more energy is consumed) and large (-0.37), 
which is consistent with higher transit usage in denser cities (see category 13). Given the 
relatively small proportion of overall energy consumption, the effects on aggregate 
outcomes are limited. Since few studies seek to disentangle the effects of density from 
correlated unobserved fundamentals, establishing causality remains a challenge in this 
category. 
4.13.12  Traffic flow 
The quantitative literature on the effects of density on average speed is surprisingly 
small. Most related analyses focus on the effects of road usage on speed on individual 
road segments. We found only two studies providing estimates of the elasticity of speed 
with respect to density, both of which, however, are of high quality (Couture et al. 2018; 
Duranton & Turner 2018). They yield very similar elasticities with a mean of -0.12. 
Because the evidence base is quantitatively thin we contribute an original analysis using 
OECD functional urban area (density) and speed data from Lomax et al. (2010). We find 
no effect of urban density on speeds on highways where the metropolitan population 
is the more important predictor. This is intuitive because highways represent a 
transport system which is used to overcome relatively large distances, and which is 
separate from the local street network. As long as the length of the highway network 
grows with the population in the metro area, flows on highways are not necessarily 
determined by population density. In contrast, for the arterial road network, density is 
predicted to be a more explicit determinant of flow as more people per area are 
expected to congest local roads as it is more difficult to increase the overall road density 
proportionately in population density. In line with these expectations, we find an 
elasticity of speed with respect to population density of -0.63%, which is at least roughly 
in line with Couture et al. (2016). Given the consistency of the estimates, we are 
reasonably confident in recommending the -0.12 elasticity from the small literature. 
Since both studies (Couture et al. 2018; Duranton & Turner 2018) use plausible 
instrumental variables to disentangle density effects from correlated unobserved 
fundamental effects, a causal interpretation seems justifiable. More research, however, 
is required to substantiate the evidence and to allow for us to differentiate by road 
types and geographies. In particular, evidence from outside the US is desirable. 
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4.13.13  Mode choice 
The literature on the effects of urban form on mode choice is quantitatively well 
developed, although there is significant variability in the methodological approaches, 
which complicates the comparability of results across studies. Our recommended 
estimate of the density elasticity of car use reduction of 0.05 is the quality-weighted 
average from the evidence base. Ewing & Cervero (2010), in a dedicated meta-analysis, 
report estimates of the density elasticity of walking and public transit use of 0.07. We 
note that this elasticity of non-car usage with respect to density is consistent with the 
recommended elasticity of car usage reduction of 0.05 since car trips typically account 
for roughly 50% of overall trips. We note that the estimated elasticity of non-car use with 
respect to density of 0.16 in our evidence base is driven by outliers since the median 
value is 0.1. We further note that Ewing & Cervero (2010) discuss a range of elasticities 
with respect to other dimensions of compact urban form such as diversity or design, 
which may well be more appropriate in particular contexts and are worth considering. 
Since few studies seek to disentangle the effects of density from correlated unobserved 
fundamentals, establishing causality, despite a large evidence base, remains a challenge 
in this category. 
4.13.14  Health 
The evidence base on the effects of density on health is small and difficult to interpret. 
The results are mostly published in the field of medicine with a presentation that differs 
significantly from social sciences. None of the considered studies estimates marginal 
effects with respect to density. Instead, adjusted (by individual characteristics) rates 
(e.g., pre-mature mortality or mortality by disease) are reported by density categories. 
In some instances, such categories refer to density terciles or quintiles, which are not 
specified further so that admittedly heroic assumptions have to be made regarding 
density distributions in a study setting. In other instances, rates are only reported 
graphically, and numeric values must be entered after a visual inspection. We conduct 
ambitious back-of-the-envelope calculations to compute marginal effects, which can be 
converted into density elasticity estimates as otherwise we would virtually be left 
without any evidence base. The nature of this evidence base needs to be critically 
acknowledged when working with the results. In particular, because the relatively large 
negative effects of density on health are not confirmed by our original analysis of OECD 
regional data. In our preferred specification, we do not find a significant effect of 
density on overall mortality rates. If anything, the effect is negative (meaning, positive 
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health effects) as we find significantly negative effects in simpler specifications that do 
not control for cross-country heterogeneity. Moreover, there is a robust negative effect 
of density on mortality in transport rates and a robust positive association between 
density and life expectancy at birth. Following our rule, that we generally prefer 
evidence from the literature over our original estimates – unless the evidence is highly 
inconsistent or inconclusive – we use an estimated of the elasticity of mortality rate 
reduction with respect to density, derived from Reijneveld et al.'s (1999) in the further 
calculations: their research focuses specifically on density and the overall mortality rate 
is particularly amenable to back-of-the-envelope calculations using the statistical value 
of life (see next section). We note however, that the evidence base is not sufficiently 
developed to allow for a confident recommendation of a consensus estimate. More 
research is required, ideally research using methods that are closer to the conventions 
in economics to allow for a more immediate cross-category comparison. Since few 
studies seek to disentangle the effects of density from correlated unobserved 
fundamentals, establishing causality remains a challenge in this category. 
4.13.15 Well-being 
Except for reported safety (in line with the evidence reviewed in category 8), the 
literature finds a negative association between reported satisfaction indicators and 
density, including reported satisfaction with social contacts, health (consistent with 14) 
and healthy environment (inconsistent with 9, but consistent with 10). Our evidence 
base contains surprisingly few analyses of the relationship between life satisfaction 
(subjective well-being or happiness) and density. For one of the few analyses in the 
evidence base, we were not able to convert the presented results into an estimate of 
the elasticity of well-being with respect to happiness (Brown et al. 2015). We found one 
estimate which we were able to convert (from a lin-log semi-elasticity) in Glaeser et al. 
(2016). This estimate referred to city size instead of density and we converted it using 
the estimate of the elasticity of density with respect to city size presented in section 2.1. 
The resulting elasticity estimate of reported life satisfaction with respect to density is -
0.0037, which is roughly within the range of our original analysis of OECD data (-0.007). 
While we proceed using the -0.0037 elasticity estimate implied by Glaeser et al.'s (2016) 
analysis, we caution against uncritical application of this elasticity unless further 
research substantiates our quantitative interpretation. Since few studies seek to 
disentangle the effects of density from correlated unobserved fundamentals, 
establishing causality remains a challenge in this category. 
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4.14 Monetary equivalents 
This section lays out the assumptions on quantities and unit values on which we base 
the calculation of monetary equivalents of density increases reported in Table 7 in the 
main paper. We strongly advise to consider the relevant subsection before applying the 
monetary equivalents to specific contexts as the assumptions may not be transferrable. 
All monetary equivalents are expressed in per capita and year Dollar terms. Some of the 
quantities and unit values borrowed from the literature are in other currencies. To 
convert Pound and Euro values into Dollar values we apply the average exchange rates 
over the 2000–2016 (October) period (1.64 and 1.22). 
4.14.1 Productivity 
A value of $35,000 is set as the worker wage, which is slightly below the US real 
disposable household income during 2010 (US Bureau of Economic Analysis 2016), but 
above the level of most high-income countries. 
4.14.2 Innovation 
We use the mean number of patents per year and 10,000 of population over 1990–1999 
(2.057) as reported by Carlino et al. (2007). Valuing patents is difficult because prices are 
not usually directly observed. To analyse the distribution of patent values, the literature 
uses patent renewal data (Pakes 1986), event studies (Austin 1993), inventor surveys 
(Giuri et al. 2007), and census data (Balasubramanian & Sivadasan 2010), typically facing 
a trade-off between representativeness and identification. Recent estimates of an 
average patent value range from a simple average of transaction prices of patents of 
$288K ($233K median) to well-identified but much more specific estimates of $20M–
30M inferred from the economic success of start-ups (Gaulé 2016). A common theme 
emerging from the literature is that the distribution of patent values is skewed, i.e., the 
majority of patents have low values, while a small number of patents achieve extremely 
high values. Given these challenges, our preferred approximation of the value of a 
representative patent is a reservation price (the price at which inventors report being 
willing to sell their patent) of $793,000 (€650,000) from Giuri et al. (2007). This value is 
in the middle of the median category (300K–1M) of reported patent reservation prices 
and the broader distribution of patent value estimates in the literature. We prefer self-
reported reservation prices to observed transaction prices because the latter 
subsample is likely prone to adverse selection due to severe information asymmetries.  
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4.14.3 Value of space 
We assume that the expenditure share on housing is one-third, which is in line with 
empirical evidence (Combes et al. 2018) and conventional assumptions made in urban 
economics (Chauvin et al. 2016; Albouy & Lue 2015). The total rent paid per year thus 
corresponds to one-fourth of the disposable income. This expenditure share is an 
average and seems to increase in city size (Combes et al. 2018). 
4.14.4 Job accessibility 
Total vehicle miles p.c. are taken from the American Driving Survey (Triplett et al. 2015). 
The total (private) per mile driving costs are from the American Automobile Association 
(2015). 
4.14.5 Amenity access 
Assuming that similar gains from variety arise in the consumption of other non-
tradeables, we apply the estimate of the density elasticity of the restaurant variety price 
index to household expenditures (see 5.5 for a discussion) in food away from home, 
entertainment, and apparel and services (based on shares reported in the 2015 
Consumer Expenditure Survey) (Bureau of Labour Statistics 2015). In Table 6 in the main 
paper we use an adjusted elasticity estimate to avoid a double counting of reduced 
costs of road trips that are already itemised in category 4. Couture reports that 
approximately 56% from the gains are pure gains from variety, with the remaining share 
result from travel cost reductions. Since the overall reduction in vehicle miles travelled 
is already accounted for in 4, we multiply the car elasticity by 0.56 to capture purely the 
gains from variety, resulting in an elasticity of 0.045. Assuming that each of the modes 
accounts for half of the restaurant trips made, we use the naïve average over the 
adjusted car and the walking elasticity estimates in our calculations.  
4.14.6 Efficiency of public services 
The per capita expenditures on local public services are from Carruthers & Ulfarsson 
(2003).  
4.14.7 Social equity 
Valuing income inequality is even more challenging than measuring income inequality. 
To value income equality as it arises from density we compute the premium an individual 
would be willing to pay to insure themselves against uncertain realisations of incomes. 
In doing so we assume a concave relationship between utility and income that implies 
certain outcomes are preferred over uncertain outcomes, which is in line with risk-
aversion. We compute the difference between the expected income E and the certainty 
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equivalent (which a risk-averse individual would accept to avoid uncertainty) across the 
20th (𝐼20𝑝𝑐𝑡) vs. the 80th (𝐼80𝑝𝑐𝑡) percentiles in the income distribution after taxes. The 
expected income is simply the mean across the two potential outcomes. 
𝐸 =
1
2
𝐼20𝑝𝑐𝑡 +
1
2
𝐼80𝑝𝑐𝑡 
The certainty equivalent is computed as,  
𝐶𝐸 = 𝑈−1 [
1
2
𝑈(𝐼20𝑝𝑐𝑡) +
1
2
𝑈(𝐼20𝑝𝑐𝑡)] 
where 𝑈(𝐼) = 𝐼ℵ is the utility function in which ℵ determines the degree of concavity. 
We set ℵ = 0.5, which is in the middle of the range of the elasticity estimates of 
happiness (viewed as a proxy for utility) with respect to income estimates reported by 
Layard, Mayraz, & Nickell (2008). We use the distribution of incomes after taxes of the 
UK, a country that is arguably neither among the most equal nor unequal countries in 
the world (HM Revenue & Customs 2016). In dollar terms, the resulting inequality 
premium corresponds to 𝐶𝐸 − 𝐸 = $1,793 or (𝐸 − 𝐶𝐸)/𝐶𝐸 = 4.8%. To analyse the 
effects of density on inequality we apply the estimate of the elasticity of the 
interquartile wage gap with respect to density to the product of the percentage 
uncertainty premium and the disposable income in our scenario. 
4.14.8 Safety 
The average crime rate (p.c.) as well as the estimated cost of crime are from Brand & 
Price (2000). 
4.14.9 Urban green 
The green area p.c. of 540 m² we use is the mean across functional economic areas in 
the OECD.Stat data. The value of a m² green area per year is based the meta-analysis of 
contingent valuation estimates by Brander & Koetse (2011). Based on the reported 
meta-analysis coefficients we compute the average per m² and year value of a park in a 
functional economic area with a population density and a per capita GDP that 
corresponds to the mean in the OECD.Stat data.  
4.14.10 Pollution concentration 
We use an elasticity of rent with respect to density of 0.25, which is in the middle of the 
range of estimates reported by Chay & Greenstone (2005) with respect to the total 
suspended particles (TSPs). We note that with this approach we presumably capture 
dis-amenity effects and health effects, both of which should be associated with a 
negative willingness to pay. Carozzi & Roth (2018) compute the pure health effect using 
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estimates of the pollution effect on death risk and the statistical value of live. 
Accordingly, a log-point increase in density leads to an annualised per capita effect of -
$370. It follows that a percentage point increase in density is associated with -$.215 
which, at a 5% discount rate over an infinite horizon, gives a per capita present value of 
-$43. This is about half of the -$90 per capita present value gross effect we compute. To 
avoid double counting with the health effect discussed in 5.14, we subtract the -$43 
health effect from the -$90 gross effect in the accounting reported in Table 8 in the main 
paper.  
4.14.11 Energy reduction 
The total energy consumption per year is from the US Energy Information 
Administration (2012). We consider residential and transport energy consumption, 
which corresponds to 40% of all energy consumed according to Glaeser & Kahn (2010). 
To compute the p.c., annual consumption, we normalise by the total US population 
(320M). This results in a p.c. energy consumption of 121M BTU. We use an average over 
the price of all individual energy sources of $18.7 per 1M BTU from the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (2012). To compute the corresponding CO2 emissions, we 
first convert p.c. energy consumption into KWH, to which we apply a factor of 25T/KWH 
and a social cost of $43/T (Glaeser & Kahn 2010). 
4.14.12 Traffic flow 
We obtain the total travel time p.c. per year by multiplying the average daily car trip 
length of 45 minutes (Triplett et al. 2015) by 365. The value of time is set to 50% of the 
average hourly wage of $21.5 as in Anderson (2014).  
4.14.13 Sustainable mode choice 
In computing the economic benefits of changes in mode we operate under the 
assumption that the marginal user is indifferent between modes, thus, there are no 
private costs and benefits to be considered above and beyond those already considered 
in categories 4, 5, and 12. However, a switch in mode may be associated with external 
benefits. Since the effects on congestion are already captured by the outcome category 
12, we focus exclusively on the emission externalities. To compute the average 
emissions economised by switches away from car trips we proceed as follows. First, we 
compute the average energy consumed per passenger km by mode across the US, EU, 
high-income Asian, and Latin American countries. Weighted by the average modal split 
the average energy consumed per passenger km corresponds 0.49 MJ/km for non-car 
trips and 3.73 MJ/km for a car trip (Bohler-Baedeker & Huging 2012). These figures can 
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be converted into KWH/mile, CO2/mile, and eventually $/mile using the same 
conversation rates as in 11. 
4.14.14 Health 
The premature mortality risk refers to OECD countries and is taken from OECD (2011). 
The statistical value of life is to $7,000,000 according to Viscusi & Aldy (2003) and 
confirmed in later studies (Hammitt & Haninger 2010; Viscusi 2010). We note that the 
per capita present monetised pollution effect on health we infer from Carozzi & Roth 
(2018) of -$43 (see 5.10) corresponds to about two-thirds of the health effect of -$64 we 
compute with our approach.  
4.14.15  Wellbeing  
We use an estimate of the elasticity of self-reported well-being with respect to income 
of 0.5, which is in the middle of the range reported by Layard et al. (2008) who estimate 
this elasticity through survey data on both happiness and life satisfaction from a wide 
range of geographical locations (US, Europe, and worldwide). Due to the concavity of 
the happiness function in income a 2% change in income is required to trigger a 1% 
change in happiness.  
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ID Author Year Cause Cat. Outcome  Density  Country Model SMS CI Elasticity P1 Abel et al.  2012 a 1 Labour productivity PD US OLS IV 4 2.10 0.0300 P2 Aberg  1973 a 1 Productivity PD Sweden OLS 2 0.10 0.0170 P3 Ahlfeldt & Feddersen  2015 a 1 Labour productivity ED Germany DID IV 4 4.92 0.0380 P4 Ahlfeldt & Wendland  2013 a 1 Total factor productivity SPP Germany Panel FE 3 1.01 0.0590 P5 Ahlfeldt, Redding, et al.  2015 a 1 Total factor productivity ED Germany DID, GMM 4 2.01 0.0620 P6 Albouy & Lue  2015 a 1 Wages PD US OLS CONTR 2 1.07 0.0680 P8 Andersson et al.  2014 a 1 Wages ED Sweden Panel FE 3 1.18 0.0100 P9 Andersson et al. 2016 a 1 Wages ED Sweden Panel 3 1.83 0.0300 P10 Au & Henderson 2006 a 1 Productivity ED China OLS IV 4 2.40 0.0130 P11 Baldwin et al.  2010 a 1 Labour productivity ED Canada FD, GMM, IV 3 1.32 0.0200 P12 Baldwin et al.  2007 a 1 Labour productivity PD Canada CrossSec FE 2 0.23 0.0674 P13 Barde 2010 a 1 Wages ED France CrossSec, IV 4 0.58 0.0350 P14 Barufi et al.  2016 a 1 Wages ED Brazil Panel IV 3 0.61 0.0730 P16 Baum-Snow & Pavan  2012 a 1 Log hourly wage PD US Panel, IV 4 2.94 0.0870 P17 Brülhart & Mathys 2008 a 1 Labour productivity ED Europe Panel GMM 3 2.00 -0.0800 P18 Chauvin et al.  2016 a 1 Wages PD China Panel IV 3 0.61 0.2000 P19 Chauvin et al. 2016 a 1 Wages PD India Panel IV 3 0.61 0.0750 P20 Chauvin et al. 2016 a 1 Wages PD US Panel IV 3   0.61 0.0500 P21 Chauvin et al. 2016 a 1 Wages PD Brazil Panel IV 3   0.61 0.0260 
                255 
 
ID Author Year Cause Cat. Outcome  Density  Country Model SMS CI Elasticity P23 Ciccone  2002 a 1 Labour productivity ED Europe FE, IV 4 3.79 0.0450 P24 Ciccone & Hall  1996 a 1 Total factor productivity ED US OLS IV 3 5.58 0.0530 P25 Cingano & Schivardi  2004 a 1 Total factor productivity PD Italy CrossSec 2 1.82 0.0540 P26 Combes et al.  2012 a 1 Total factor productivity ED France Panel IV 4 4.88 0.0320 P27 Combes et al.  2008 a 1 Wages ED France Panel IV 4 9.07 0.0300 P28 Combes et al.  2017 a 1 Total earning ED China Panel OLS 3 1.72 0.0970 P29 Combes et al.  2015 a 1 Total earnings ED China OLS IV 4 0.93 0.1100 P30 Combes et al. 2008 a 1 Total factor productivity ED France Panel IV 4 2.29 0.0400 P31 Combes et al. 2008 a 1 Wages ED France Panel IV 4 2.29 0.0500 P32 Combes & Li  2018 a 1 Earnings per hour ED China OLS IV 4 1.06 0.1000 P33 Davis & Weinstein  2001 a 1 Productivity ED Japan OLS 2 0.52 0.0628 P34 Dekle & Eaton  1999 a 1 Wages ED Japan Panel FE 3 0.74 0.0100 P35 Dericks & Koster 2018 a 1 Total factor productivity ED UK Panel, IV 4 1.06 0.0720 P37 Echeverri-Carroll & Ayala  2011 a 1 Wages PD US OLS IV 4 0.43 0.0305 P38 Faberman & Freedman  2016 a 1 Wages PD US Panel IV 3 0.61 0.0698 P39 Fingleton  2003 a 1 Wages ED UK OLS 2 1.12 0.0170 P40 Fingleton  2006 a 1 Wages ED UK OLS 2 1.67 0.0250 P41 Fu  2007 a 1 Wages ED US CrossSec FE 2 2.07 0.0370 P44 Graham 2007 a 1 Labour productivity ED UK GLS CONTR 2 2.44 0.0402 P45 Graham  2000 a 1 Labour productivity ED UK OLS 2 0.18 0.0080 P46 Graham 2007 a 1 Labour productivity ED UK Panel OLS 3 0.83 0.0200 P47 Graham  2005 a 1 Labour productivity ED UK Panel OLS 3 0.29 0.1290 
                256 
 
ID Author Year Cause Cat. Outcome  Density  Country Model SMS CI Elasticity P48 Graham & Kim 2008 a 1 Labour productivity ED UK Panel OLS 3 0.91 0.0790 P49 Graham et al.  2010 a 1 Labour productivity ED UK Panel GMM 3 1.33 0.0905 P50 Henderson  2003 a 1 Labour productivity ED US Panel IV 3 6.58 0.0240 P52 Henderson  1986 a 1 Total factor productivity ED Brazil CrossSec, IV 4 1.31 0.1000 P53 Kanemoto et al.  1996 a 1 Total factor productivity PD Japan CrossSec 2 0.24 0.0890 P54 Lall et al.   2004 a 1 Industry productivity ED India OLS 2 1.22 0.0170 P55 Larsson  2014 a 1 Wages ED Sweden Panel IV 3 1.41 0.0100 P56 Mion & Naticchioni 2005 a 1 Wages ED Italy Panel OLS 3 0.83 0.0340 P57 Monkkonen et al.  2018 a 1 Labour productivity ED Mexico Panel 3 1.06 -0.0800 P58 Moomaw  1985 a 1 Labour productivity PD US OLS 2 0.39 0.0930 P59 Moomaw  1983 a 1 Total factor productivity PD US CrossSec  2 0.16 0.0884 P60 Morikawa 2011 a 1 Total factor productivity PD Japan Panel  2 0.92 0.1100 P61 Nakamura  1985 a 1 Labour productivity PD Japan CrossSec  2 0.64 0.0781 P62 Rappaport  2008 a 1 Total factor productivity PD US CGEM 1 0.78 0.1500 P63 Rice et al.  2006 a 1 Labour productivity PD UK OLS IV 4 2.37 0.0350 P64 Rosenthal & Strange  2008 a 1 Wages ED US OLS, GMM, IV 4 5.69 0.0450 P65 Sveikauskas 1975 a 1 Labour productivity PD US CrossSec  2 1.07 0.1391 P66 Sveikauskas et al.  1988 a 1 Labour productivity PD US CrossSec  2 0.41 0.0130 P67 Tabuchi  1986 a 1 Labour productivity PD Japan CrossSec IV 4 0.21 0.0615 P68 Wheeler  2001 a 1 Total factor productivity ED US CrossSec  2 1.21 0.0170 P69 Eckert et al.  2018 a 1 Wages PD Denmark OLS FE 3 0.35 0.0539 I1 Andersson et al.  2005 a 2 Patents/capita ED Sweden Poisson 2 0.82 0.0190 
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ID Author Year Cause Cat. Outcome  Density  Country Model SMS CI Elasticity I3 Bettencourt et al.  2007 a 2 Patents/capita PD US FGLS  2 2.99 0.2900 I4 Carlino et al.  2007 a 2 Patents/capita ED US OLS IV 4 4.45 0.2000 I5 Echeverri-Carroll & Ayala  2011 a 2 Patents/capita PD US OLS IV 1 0.43 0.0504 I8 Knudsen et al.  2008 a 2 Patents per 100,000 pop PD US OLS 2 1.54 0.3000 I11 Ó hUallacháin  1999 a 2 Patents/capita PD US OLS 2 0.71 0.3100 I13 Sedgley & Elmslie  2004 a 2 Average patents  PD US GMM IV 4 0.82 0.0020 VS2 Ahlfeldt, Redding, et al.  2015 a 3 House prices PD Germany SPVAR IV 4 1.07 0.0465 VS3 Albouy & Lue  2015 a 3 House prices PD US OLS CONTR 2 1.07 0.1560 VS9 Combes et al.  2018 a 3 House prices PD France OLS IV 4 1.06 0.2080 VS10 Dericks & Koster  2018 a 3 Rent ED UK Panel, IV 4 1.06 0.2873 VS13 Kholodilin & Ulbricht  2015 a 3 House prices PD Europe OLS QR 2 0.62 0.2500 VS15 Koster et al.  2014 a 3 Rent ED Netherlands Panel, IV 4 0.82 0.0820 VS16 Liu et al.  2016 a 3 Rent ED US OLS FE 2 0.71 0.1000 VS17 Lynch & Rasmussen 2004 a 3 House prices PD US OLS CONTR 2 0.48 -0.0179 VS21 Palm et al.  2014 a 3 Rent PD US OLS FE 2 0.54 0.0450 VS23 Song & Knaap 2004 a 3 House prices PD US OLS IV 4 1.07 -0.0170 VS26 Cheshire & Dericks  2018 a 3 Rent ED UK QUASI-EXP 4 1.06 0.1840 VS21 Palm et al.  2014 a 3 Rent PD US OLS FE 2 0.54 0.0450 JA1 Albouy & Lue 2015 a 4 Commuting cost red. PD US LPROB 2 1.07 -0.0230 JA3 Bento et al.  2005 c 4 VMT per household EPD US LOGIT 2 2.41 0.0600 JA5 Bhat et al.  2009 b 4 VMT per household BS US LOGIT  2 4.85 0.0100 JA8 Brownstone & Thomas  2013 a 4 Red. total vehicle mileage/year HD US OLS 2 1.16 0.1222 
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ID Author Year Cause Cat. Outcome  Density  Country Model SMS CI Elasticity JA9 Cervero & Kockelman 1997 a 4 VMT per household ED US LOGIT 2 3.43 0.2470 JA10 Cervero & Kockelman 1997 a 4 VMT per household LU US LOGIT 2 3.43 0.0000 JA11 Cervero & Kockelman 1997 b 4 VMT per household SC US LOGIT 2 3.43 0.0000 JA12 Cervero & Kockelman 1997 b 4 VMT per household BS US LOGIT 2 3.43 0.1900 JA13 Champman et al.  2004 b 4 VMT per person SC US LOGIT 2 0.13 0.0800 JA14 Chapman & Frank 2004 c 4 VMT per person LU US LOGIT 2 0.13 0.0400 JA15 Chatman  2003 a 4 Commercial trip length red. ED US LOGIT, TOBIT  2 0.45 0.2327 JA16 Chatman 2003 a 4 VMT commercial trips  PD US LOGIT, TOBIT  2 0.45 -0.5800 JA19 Duranton & Turner  2015 a 4 VKT per person  PD US Panel IV 4 1.30 0.0850 JA21 Fan 2007 b 4 Miles travelled per person PCD US OLS 2 1.06 0.0700 JA22 Fan 2007 b 4 Miles travelled per person SC US OLS 2 1.06 0.1100 JA23 Frank & Bradley  2009 b 4 VMT per household SC US OLS  2 0.33 0.1100 JA24 Frank 2009 c 4 VMT per household LU US OLS 2 0.33 0.0400 JA27 Holtzclaw et al.  2002 a 4 VMT per household  HD US OLS 2 1.94 0.1400 JA28 Cervero & Kockelman 1997 c 4 VKT per household  LU US OLS 2 0.87 0.1000 JA29 Cervero & Kockelman 1997 a 4 VMT per household ED US OLS 2 0.87 0.0000 JA30 Cervero & Kockelman 1997 a 4 VMT per household PD US OLS 2 0.87 0.0000 JA31 Kuzmyak et al 2006 c 4 VMT per household LU US OLS 2 0.43 0.0900 JA34 Mashall 2008 a 4 Vehicle Km travelled PD US COR 0 1.43 0.3000 JA36 Pouyanne  2004 a 4 Commuting length reduction ED France OLS, LOGIT 2 0.34 0.1104 JA37 Pouyanne 2004 a 4 Commuting length reduction PD France OLS, LOGIT 2 0.34 0.2065 JA38 Pickrell & Schimek  1996 a  4 VMT per household PD US OLS 2 0.69 0.0700 
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ID Author Year Cause Cat. Outcome  Density  Country Model SMS CI Elasticity JA40 Sun et al 1998 a 4 VMT per household ED US OLS - ANOVA 2 0.45 0.0000 JA41 Sun et al 1998 c 4 VMT per household LU US OLS - ANOVA 2 0.45 0.1000 JA43 Vance & Hedel  2007 a 4 VKT per person  ED Germany PROBIT IV 4 1.51 0.0100 JA44 Vance & Hedel 2007 b 4 VKT per person  SDI Germany PROBIT IV 4 1.51 0.0400 JA45 Vance & Hedel 2007 c 4 VKT per person  LU Germany PROBIT IV 4 1.51 0.0600 JA46 Veneri  2010 a 4 Av. Commuting time PD Italy OLS, ML  2 1.02 -0.0212 JA47 Fan 2007 b 4 Daily transit travel time  PCD US OLS 2 1.06 0.0000 JA48 Frank et al.  2008 b 4 transit trips per household SC US LOGIT 2 1.06 0.1200 JA49 Zhou & Kockelman 2008 a 4 VMT per household ED US OLS -PROBIT 2 1.44 0.0200 JA50 Zhou & Kockelman 2008 a 4 VMT per household PD US OLS -PROBIT 2 1.44 0.1200 JA51 Yang et al.  2012 a 4 Commuting time reduction PD China OLS CONTR 2 2.25 -0.2085 JA52 Boarnet et al.  2004 a 4 Non-work VMT per person ED US OLS 2 0.28 0.0300 JA53 Boarnet et al 2004 a 4 Non-work VMT per person PD US OLS 2 0.28 -0.0400 JA54 Chatman  2008 a 4 Non Work VMT per person ED US LOGIT 2 1.74 -0.1900 JA55 Chatman 2008 a 4 Non Work VMT per person PD US LOGIT 2 1.74 -1.0500 JA56 Chatman 2008 b 4 Non Work VMT per person SC US LOGIT 2 1.74 -0.0600 JA58 Cervero & Kockelman 1997 a 4 VMT  ED US LOGIT 2 3.43 0.0630 SA1 Ahlfeldt & Maennig 2015 a 5 Quality of life ED Germany DID, GMM 4 2.01 0.1500 SA2 Ahlfeldt, Moeller, et al.  2015 a 5 Underground station density  PD Germany SPVAR IV 4 1.07 0.0350 SA3 Albouy  2008 a 5 Quality of life PD US OLS FE 2 2.15 0.0200 SA4 Albouy & Lue 2015 a 5 Quality of life PD US OLS CONTR 2 1.07 0.0150 SA8 Chauvin et al.  2016 a 5 Real wages PD China Panel IV 3 0.61 -0.0520 
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ID Author Year Cause Cat. Outcome  Density  Country Model SMS CI Elasticity SA9 Chauvin et al. 2016 a 5 Real wages PD India Panel IV 3 0.61 -0.0690 SA10 Chauvin et al. 2016 a 5 Real wages PD US Panel IV 3 0.61 -0.0200 SA11 Chauvin et al. 2016 a 5 Real wages PD Brazil Panel IV 3 0.61 -0.0100 SA12 Couture  2016 a 5 Restaurant prices  PD US OLS LOGIT IV 4 3.61 0.0800 SA13 Couture 2016 a 5 Restaurant prices  PD US OLS LOGIT IV 4 3.61 0.1600 SA14 Levinson  2008 a 5 Rail station density  PD UK Panel 3 1.28 0.0023 SA15 Levinson 2008 a 5 Underground station density  PD UK Panel 3 1.28 0.0027 SA17 Schiff 2015 a 5 Cuisine variety PD US OLS IV 4 0.92 0.1850 SA18 Baum-Snow & Pavan  2012 a 5 Real wages PD US Panel, IV 4 2.94 0.0160 PS2 Carruthers & Ulfarsson  2003 a 6 Red. spending capital  PD US CrossSec FE 2 0.98 0.1440 PS3 Carruthers & Ulfarsson 2003 a 6 Red. spending education PD US CrossSec FE 2 0.98 0.1920 PS4 Carruthers & Ulfarsson 2003 a 6 Red. spending police  PD US CrossSec FE 2 0.98 0.0960 PS5 Carruthers & Ulfarsson 2003 a 6 Red. spending roadways PD US CrossSec FE 2 0.98 0.2880 PS6 Carruthers & Ulfarsson 2003 a 6 Red. spending sewerage PD US CrossSec FE 2 0.98 -0.1440 PS7 Carruthers & Ulfarsson 2003 a 6 Red. total spending  PD US CrossSec FE 2 0.98 0.1440 PS8 Carruthers & Ulfarsson 2003 b 6 Red. total spending  GAR US CrossSec FE 2 0.98 0.0195 PS9 Carruthers & Ulfarsson 2003 a 6 Red. spending transport  PD US CrossSec FE 2 0.98 -0.4800 PS10 Carruthers & Ulfarsson 2003 a 6 Red. spending trash PD US CrossSec FE 2 0.98 0.0960 PS11 Hortas-Rico & Sole-Olle  2010 a 6 Admin spending per capita UL Spain  OLS CONTR 2 1.39 0.1075 PS12 Hortas-Rico & Sole-Olle 2010 a 6 Red. community facilities  UL Spain  OLS CONTR 2 1.39 0.1069 PS13 Hortas-Rico & Sole-Olle 2010 a 6 Red. culture and sports  UL Spain  OLS CONTR 2 1.39 0.1509 
PS14 Hortas-Rico & Sole-Olle 2010 a 6 Red. housing and community development per capita UL Spain  OLS CONTR 2 1.39 0.0753 
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ID Author Year Cause Cat. Outcome  Density  Country Model SMS CI Elasticity PS15 Hortas-Rico & Sole-Olle 2010 a 6 Red. spending police  UL Spain  OLS CONTR 2 1.39 0.0920 PS16 Hortas-Rico & Sole-Olle 2010 a 6 Red. total spending  UL Spain  OLS CONTR 2 1.39 0.1058 PS17 Hortas-Rico & Sole-Olle 2010 a 6 Red. spending trash UL Spain  OLS CONTR 2 1.39 0.3058 PS19 Ladd  1994 a 6 Change per capita spending PD US CrossSec FE 2 0.19 -0.0302 PS20 Prieto et al.  2015 a 6 Paving cost per capita PD Spain  LOGIT 2 1.23 0.8120 PS21 Prieto et al. 2015 a 6 Sewage cost per capita PD Spain  LOGIT 2 1.23 0.5070 PS22 Prieto et al. 2015 a 6 Water supply cost per capita PD Spain  LOGIT 2 1.23 0.3970 SE1 Ananat et al.  2013 a 7 Red. in black-white wage gap ED US OLS FE 2 0.92 -0.0033 SE2 Baum-Snow et al.  2016 a 7 High-low skill wage gap red. PD US Panel IV 4 2.69 -0.0674 SE5 Galster & Cutsinger  2007 a 7 Dissimilarity index  PD US OLS CONTR 2 0.51 2.5675 SE8 Rothwell  2011 a 7 Dissimilarity index  PD US CrossSec IV 4 1.25 0.3920 SE9 Rothwell & Massey  2009 a 7 Dissimilarity index  PD US CrossSec IV 4 1.88 0.3261 SE10 Rothwell & Massey  2010 a 7 Red. Gini coefficient  PD US CrossSec IV 4 1.33 4.5635 SE11 Wheeler  2004 a 7 Red. 90th vs. 10th decile PD US GLS IV 4 0.35 0.1700 SE12 Baum-Snow & Pavan  2012 a 7 Skill wage gap PD US Panel, IV 4 2.94 -0.2093 SE13 Baum-Snow & Pavan 2012 a 7 Skill wage gap PD US Panel, IV 4 2.94 -0.1163 SF6 Glaeser & Sacerdote  1999 a 8 Crime per capita PD US OLS IV 3 2.04 -0.5581 SF10 Raleigh & Galster  2015 a 8 Red. assault  PD US OLS CONTR 2 0.66 0.3562 SF11 Raleigh & Galster 2015 a 8 Red. burglary PD US OLS CONTR 2 0.66 0.3417 SF13 Raleigh & Galster 2015 a 8 Red. narcotics PD US OLS CONTR 2 0.66 0.8142 SF14 Raleigh & Galster 2015 a 8 Property theft PD US OLS CONTR 2 0.66 0.4580 SF15 Raleigh & Galster 2015 a 8 Red. robbery PD US OLS CONTR 2 0.66 0.8288 
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ID Author Year Cause Cat. Outcome  Density  Country Model SMS CI Elasticity SF16 Raleigh & Galster 2015 a 8 Red. vandalism PD US OLS CONTR 2 0.66 0.3562 SF17 Raleigh & Galster 2015 a 8 Vehicle theft PD US OLS CONTR 2 0.66 0.2763 SF18 Raleigh & Galster 2015 a 8 Red. violence PD US OLS CONTR 2 0.66 0.5234 SF20 Tang  2015 a 8 Red. assault  PD UK Panel 3 0.45 0.0845 SF21 Tang 2015 a 8 Property theft PD UK Panel 3 0.45 0.0902 SF22 Twinam  2016 a 8 Red. assault  PD US Panel IV 4 0.78 0.5314 SF23 Twinam 2016 a 8 Red. robbery PD US Panel IV 4 0.78 0.4679 OG4 Lin et al.  2015 b 9 Foliage Projection Cover  HD Australia OLS 1 0.87 -0.0600 PO1 Albouy & Stuart 2014 a 10 Red. Pollution  PD US NLLS CONTR 2 1.68 -0.1500 PO3 Hilber & Palmer  2014 a 10 Red. NOx μg/m3 PD non-OECD Panel FE 3 0.36 -0.7816 PO4 Hilber & Palmer 2014 a 10 Red. PM10 μg/m3 PD non-OECD Panel FE 3 0.36 0.3482 PO5 Hilber & Palmer 2014 a 10 Red. SOx μg/m3 PD non-OECD Panel FE 3 0.36 -1.8367 PO6 Hilber & Palmer 2014 a 10 Red. NOx μg/m3 PD OECD Panel FE 3 0.36 0.2382 PO7 Hilber & Palmer 2014 a 10 Red. PM10 μg/m3 PD OECD Panel FE 3 0.36 -0.4740 PO8 Hilber & Palmer 2014 a 10 Red. SOx μg/m3 PD OECD Panel FE 3 0.36 2.0080 PO9 Salomons & Berghauser  2012 a 10 Red. Noise PD Netherlands CORR 1 2.31 0.0400 PO10 Sarzynski  2012 a 10 Red. CO m. metric tons PD World CrossSec  2 1.37 0.2280 PO11 Sarzynski 2012 a 10 Red. Nox m. metric tons PD World CrossSec  2 1.37 0.4380 PO12 Borck & Schrauth 2018 a 10 NO2 PD Germany Panel IV 4 1.06 -0.1610 PO13 Sarzynski 2012 a 10 Red. SO2 m. metric tons PD World CrossSec  2 1.37 0.3760 PO14 Sarzynski 2012 a 10 Red. VOCs m. metric tons PD World CrossSec  2 1.37 0.3300 PO15 Stone 2008 a 10 Red. NOx μg/m3 PD US Panel 2 2.33 0.1900 
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ID Author Year Cause Cat. Outcome  Density  Country Model SMS CI Elasticity PO16 Tang & Wang  2007 b 10 Red. CO2 concentration  HD China CORR 1 2.18 -0.2300 PO17 Borck & Schrauth  2018 a 10 CO PD Germany Panel IV 4 1.06 -0.1200 PO18 Borck & Schrauth 2018 a 10 PM10 PD Germany Panel IV 4 1.06 -0.1140 PO19 Borck & Schrauth 2018 a 10 O3 PD Germany Panel IV 4 1.06 -0.0600 PO20 Carozzi & Roth  2018 a 10 Average residential PM2.5 PD US Panel IV 4 1.06 -0.1300 EN3 Barter  2000 a 11 Red. Emission/capita  PD Eastern Asia DESC 0 0.46 0.2940 EN5 Brownstone & Thomas  2013 a 11 Red. gasoline consumption HD US OLS 2 1.16 0.1440 EN7 Cirilli & Veneri  2014 a 11 CO2 emissions commutes PD Italy OLS IV 4 1.32 0.2346 EN8 Glaeser & Kahn  2010 a 11 CO2 private driving PD US CORR 1 7.41 0.0821 EN9 Glaeser & Kahn 2010 a 11 CO2 electricity PD US CORR 1 7.41 0.0682 EN10 Glaeser & Kahn 2010 a 11 CO2 heating PD US CORR 1 7.41 -0.0339 EN11 Glaeser & Kahn 2010 a 11 CO2 Total PD US CORR 1 7.41 0.0527 EN12 Glaeser & Kahn 2010 a 11 CO2 public transport PD US CORR 1 7.41 -0.3685 EN13 Glaeser & Kahn 2010 a 11 Red. gasoline consumption PD US CORR 1 7.41 0.0320 EN14 Glaeser & Kahn 2010 a 11 Red. gasoline consumption PD US CORR 1 7.41 0.0974 EN15 Holden & Norland  2005 a 11 Red. domestic energy  HD Norway OLS 2 2.28 0.1100 EN16 Hong & Shen  2013 a 11 Red. CO2 transport PD US OLS IV  4 1.79 0.3100 EN19 Larson et al.  2012 b 11 Red. residential energy   FACAP US OLS 2 1.16 0.0338 EN20 Larson et al. 2012 b 11 Red. residential energy   FACAP US OLS 2 1.16 0.0467 EN23 Muñiz & Galindo  2005 a 11 Red. ecological footprint  PD Spain  OLS 2 2.38 0.3648 EN25 Norman et al.  2006 b 11 Red. CO2 emissions HD Canada CORR 1 3.92 0.0890 EN26 Osman et al.  2016 a 11 Red. gasoline consumption PD Egypt OLS  1 2.44 0.0354 
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ID Author Year Cause Cat. Outcome  Density  Country Model SMS CI Elasticity EN30 Su  2011 a 11 Gasoline consumption PD US OLS CONTR 2 1.41 0.0680 EN31 Su 2011 b 11 Gasoline consumption FSDI US OLS CONTR 2 1.41 -0.0920 EN32 Travisi et al.  2010 b 11 Env. impact reduction  PD Italy Pooled WLS 3 2.63 0.0092 EN34 Borck & Tabuchi  2016 a 11 CO2 Reduction PD US Panel 3 0.79 0.4651 EN35 Fragkias et al.  2013 a 11 Red. CO2 PD US Panel 2 4.96 0.0017 C2 Couture et al.  2018 a 12 Travel speed PD US OLS IV 4 2.82 -0.1300 C3 Duranton & Turner  2018 a 12 Travel speed PD US Panel IV 4 1.30 -0.1100 MC6 Boarnet et al 2008 a 13 Miles walked per person ED US LOGIT 2 1.57 0.0000 MC7 Boarnet et al 2011 a 13 Walking trips per person ED US LOGIT 2 2.72 0.1400 MC8 Boarnet et al 2011 a 13 Walking trips per person PD US LOGIT 2 2.72 0.5000 MC9 Boarnet et al.  2008 a 13 Miles walked per person PD US LOGIT 2 1.57 0.1300 MC10 Boarnet et al.  2011 b 13 Walking trips per person SC US LOGIT 2 2.72 -0.0900 MC11 Boarnet et al 2011 b 13 Walking trips per person BS US LOGIT 2 2.72 -0.3500 MC12 Boarnet et al 2008 b 13 Miles walked per person SC US LOGIT 2 1.57 0.4500 MC15 Boer et al.  2007 a 13 Miles walked per person PD US  LOGIT 2 1.58 0.2100 MC16 Boer et al. 2007 b 13 Miles walked per person PD US  LOGIT 2 1.58 0.3900 MC20 Cervero  2002 c 13 Transit mode choice LU US LOGIT 2 2.98 0.5300 MC21 Cervero 2002 c 13 Transit mode choice PD US LOGIT 2 2.98 0.3900 MC24 Cervero & Kockelman 1997 a 13 Non-personal vehicle ED US LOGIT 2 3.43 0.0980 MC25 Cervero & Kockelman 1997 a 13 Non-pers. vehicle  ED US LOGIT 2 3.43 0.0840 MC28 Cervero & Kockelman 1997 a 13 Alternative to car (ACU) LU US LOGIT 2 3.43 0.0000 MC29 Cervero & Kockelman 1997 b 13 Alternative to car (ACU) SC US LOGIT 2 3.43 0.0000 
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ID Author Year Cause Cat. Outcome  Density  Country Model SMS CI Elasticity MC30 Cervero & Kockelman 1997 b 13 Alternative to car (ACU) SC US LOGIT 2 3.43 0.0000 MC31 Cervero & Kockelman 1997 c 13 Non-person vehicle choice  LU US LOGIT 2 3.43 0.0000 MC34 Chao & Qing  2011 a 13 Walking choice PD US OLS CONTR 2 2.14 0.1573 MC35 Chatman  2003 c 13 Driving choice ED US LOGIT TOBIT  2 0.44 0.4373 MC36 Chatman 2009 a 13 Walk/bike trips per person PD US BINOMIAL 2 3.13 0.1600 MC37 Chatman 2009 b 13 Walk/bike trips per person SC US BINOMIAL 2 3.13 0.3000 MC41 de Sa & Ardern  2014 a 13 Walking/cycling choice PD Canada LOGIT 2 0.36 0.1093 MC43 Fan  2007 b 13 Daily walking time per person PCD US OLS 2 1.06 0.0800 MC44 Frank & Bradley  2009 b 13 Walk trips per household FAR US OLS  2 0.33 0.2000 MC45 Frank 2009 c 13 Walk trips per household LU US OLS  2 0.33 0.0800 MC46 Frank et al.  2008 a 13 Cycle choice  PD US LOGIT 2 3.03 -0.0800 MC47 Frank et al. 2008 a 13 Cycle choice  PD US LOGIT 2 3.03 0.8400 MC48 Frank et al. 2008 a 13 Transit mode choice  PD US LOGIT 2 3.03 0.2400 MC49 Frank et al. 2008 a 13 Transit mode choice  PD US LOGIT 2 3.03 0.2600 MC50 Frank et al. 2008 b 13 Walk choice  PD US LOGIT 2 3.03 0.2800 MC51 Frank et al. 2008 a 13 Walk choice  PD US LOGIT 2 3.03 0.4300 MC52 Frank et al. 2008 b 13 Transit mode choice  FAR US LOGIT 2 3.03 0.1700 MC53 Frank et al. 2008 b 13 Transit mode choice SC US LOGIT 2 3.03 0.2400 MC54 Frank et al. 2008 c 13 Transit mode choice LU US LOGIT 2 3.03 0.1900 MC56 Frank et al. 2008 b 13 Transit mode choice FAR US LOGIT 2 3.03 0.2100 MC57 Frank et al. 2008 b 13 Transit mode choice SC US LOGIT 2 3.03 0.2000 MC58 Frank et al. 2008 c 13 Transit mode choice LU US LOGIT 2 3.03 0.0900 
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ID Author Year Cause Cat. Outcome  Density  Country Model SMS CI Elasticity MC59 Frank et al. 2008 b 13 Walk mode choice  SC US LOGIT 2 3.03 0.2800 MC60 Frank et al. 2008 b 13 Walk trips per household SC US LOGIT 2 3.03 0.5500 MC61 Frank et al. 2008 b 13 Walk mode choice  SC US LOGIT 2 3.03 0.2100 MC63 Greenwald & Boarnet  2001 a 13 Walk trips per person  PD US PROBIT  2 0.07 0.3400 MC64 Joh et al.  2009 a 13 Walk trips per person  ED US OLS 2 0.34 0.1900 MC65 Joh et al 2009 b 13 Walk trips per person  SC US OLS 2 0.34 -0.2700 MC66 Joh et al 2009 b 13 Walk trips per person  BS US OLS 2 0.34 0.0100 MC68 Cervero & Kockelman 1997 a 13 Walk/bike mode choice ED US OLS 2 0.87 0.0000 MC69 Cervero & Kockelman 1997 a 13 Walk/bike mode choice PD US OLS 2 0.87 0.0000 MC70 Cervero & Kockelman 1997 c 13 Walk/bike mode choice LU US OLS 2 0.87 0.2300 MC73 Lund et al.  2004 b 13 Transit mode choice SC US LOGIT 2 1.14 1.0800 MC79 Nielsen et al.  2013 a 13 Cycle distance PD Denmark Heckman 2 1.86 0.0870 MC81 Pouyanne  2004 a 13 Car share rate  PD France OLS, LOGIT 2 0.34 -0.0210 MC82 Pouyanne 2004 a 13 Cycling choice  PD France OLS, LOGIT 2 0.34 2.0143 MC83 Pouyanne 2004 a 13 Public transport choice PD France OLS, LOGIT 2 0.34 0.4203 MC84 Pouyanne 2004 a 13 Walking choice PD France OLS, LOGIT 2 0.34 0.4390 MC85 Rajamani & Handy 2003 c 13 Transit mode choice LU US LOGIT 2 1.04 -0.0400 MC86 Rajamani et al 2003 a 13 Walk mode choice  PD US LOGIT 2 1.04 0.0100 MC87 Rajamani et al 2003 c 13 Walk mode choice  LU US LOGIT 2 1.04 0.3600 MC88 Reilly & Landis 2002 a 13 Transit mode choice  PD US LOGIT 2 0.36 0.2000 MC89 Reilly 2002 a 13 Walk mode choice  PD US LOGIT 2 0.36 0.1600 MC90 Rodríguez & Joo 2004 a 13 Transit mode choice  PD US LOGIT 2 2.80 -0.2000 
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ID Author Year Cause Cat. Outcome  Density  Country Model SMS CI Elasticity MC93 Targa et al.  2005 a 13 Walk trips per person PD US Poisson 2 0.35 0.0300 MC94 Targa & Clifton 2005 b 13 Walk trips per person BS US Poisson 2 0.35 0.3200 MC95 Targa & Clifton 2005 c 13 Walk trips per person LU US Poisson 2 0.35 0.0800 MC98 Zegras 2007 b 13 Daily automobile use  BD Chile OLS -LOGIT 2 0.89 -0.0400 MC99 Zegras 2007 b 13 Automobile use per household SC Chile OLS -LOGIT 2 0.89 -0.1500 MC100 Zegras 2007 c 13 Automobile use per household LU Chile OLS -LOGIT 2 0.89 -0.0100 MC101 Zhang  2004 a 13 Driving choice red. ED Hong Kong LOGIT 2 1.63 0.0700 MC102 Zhang 2004 a 13 Driving choice red. PD Hong Kong LOGIT 2 1.63 0.1100 MC103 Zhang 2004 a 13 Driving choice  ED Hong Kong LOGIT 2 1.63 0.0770 MC104 Zhang 2004 a 13 Driving choice  PD Hong Kong LOGIT 2 1.63 0.0390 MC105 Zhang 2004 a 13 Taxi red.  ED Hong Kong LOGIT 2 1.63 0.0240 MC106 Zhang 2004 a 13 Taxi red.  PD Hong Kong LOGIT 2 1.63 0.1280 MC107 Zhang 2004 a 13 Taxi red.  ED Hong Kong LOGIT 2 1.63 0.1180 MC108 Zhang 2004 a 13 Taxi red.  PD Hong Kong LOGIT 2 1.63 0.0260 MC109 Zhang 2004 a 13 Public transport choice ED Hong Kong LOGIT 2 1.63 0.0060 MC110 Zhang 2004 a 13 Public transport choice PD Hong Kong LOGIT 2 1.63 0.0140 MC111 Zhang 2004 a 13 Transit choice  ED Hong Kong LOGIT 2 1.63 0.0110 MC112 Zhang 2004 a 13 Transit choice  PD Hong Kong LOGIT 2 1.63 0.0050 MC113 Zhang 2004 a 13 Driving choice red. ED US LOGIT 2 1.63 0.0010 MC114 Zhang 2004 a 13 Driving choice red. PD US LOGIT 2 1.63 0.0400 MC115 Zhang 2004 a 13 Car share red.  ED US LOGIT 2 1.63 0.0030 MC116 Zhang 2004 a 13 Car share red.  PD US LOGIT 2 1.63 0.0330 
                268 
 
ID Author Year Cause Cat. Outcome  Density  Country Model SMS CI Elasticity MC117 Zhang 2004 a 13 Car share red.  ED US LOGIT 2 1.63 0.0440 MC118 Zhang 2004 a 13 Car share  PD US LOGIT 2 1.63 0.0710 MC119 Zhang 2004 a 13 Driving choice  ED US LOGIT 2 1.63 0.0310 MC120 Zhang 2004 a 13 Driving choice  PD US LOGIT 2 1.63 0.0440 MC121 Zhang 2004 a 13 Public transport choice ED US LOGIT 2 1.63 0.0040 MC122 Zhang 2004 a 13 Public transport choice PD US LOGIT 2 1.63 0.1260 MC123 Zhang 2004 a 13 Transit choice  ED US LOGIT 2 1.63 0.0900 MC124 Zhang 2004 a 13 Transit choice  PD US LOGIT 2 1.63 0.1180 MC125 Zhang 2004 a 13 Walking/cycling choice ED US LOGIT 2 1.63 0.0040 MC126 Zhang 2004 a 13 Walking/cycling choice PD US LOGIT 2 1.63 0.0600 MC127 Zhang 2004 a 13 Walking/cycling  ED US LOGIT 2 1.63 0.0260 MC128 Zhang 2004 a 13 Walk choice  PD US LOGIT 2 1.63 0.1050 MC129 Zhao  2014 a 13 Cycling choice  ED China LOGIT 2 2.78 0.1265 MC130 Zhao 2014 a 13 Cycling choice  PD China LOGIT 2 2.78 0.0034 MC133 Zhao 2014 a 13 Walking choice ED China LOGIT 2 2.78 0.0418 MC134 Zhao 2014 a 13 Walking choice PD China LOGIT 2 2.78 0.0013 MC135 Cervero & Kockelman  1997 a 13 Non-pers. vehicle  ED US LOGIT 2 3.43 0.1130 H1 Chaix et al.  2006 a 14 IHD risk red. PD Sweden Panel LOGIT 3 2.40 -0.2986 H2 Chaix et al. 2006 a 14 Lung cancer risk red. PD Sweden Panel LOGIT 3 2.40 -0.1949 H3 Chaix et al. 2006 a 14 Pulmonary disease red. PD Sweden Panel LOGIT 3 2.40 -0.5779 H4 Fecht et al. 2016 a 14 Premature mortalities  PD UK CrossSec 2 2.40 -0.2900 H5 Fecht et al. 2016 b 14 Premature mortalities  SDI UK CrossSec 2 1.22 -0.5000 
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ID Author Year Cause Cat. Outcome  Density  Country Model SMS CI Elasticity H6 Graham & Glaister 2003 a 14 KSI reduction  ED UK LOGLIN 2 0.88 -0.0510 H7 Graham & Glaister 2003 a 14 KSI reduction  PD UK LOGLIN 2 0.88 0.3990 H9 Graham & Glaister 2003 a 14 Pedestrian casualty red. ED UK LOGLIN 2 0.88 -0.8260 H10 Graham & Glaister 2003 a 14 Pedestrian casualty red. PD UK LOGLIN 2 0.88 0.5290 H12 Howe et al.  1993 a 14 Red. all cancer rate PD US COR 1 0.51 -0.0550 H14 Mahoney et al.  1990 a 14 Mortality red. (all cancers)  PD US LOGIT 2 2.55 -0.0380 H15 Melis et al.  2015 a 14 Red. metal health prescript. PD Italy OLS, panel 2 1.54 0.0127 H16 Reijneveld et al.  1999 a 14 Mortality red. PD Netherlands LOGLIN 2 0.29 -0.0906 WB3 Brueckner & Largey  2006 a 15 # times attends club meeting PD US PROBIT IV 4 1.10 -0.0796 WB4 Brueckner & Largey 2006 a 15 # people can confide in  PD US PROBIT IV 4 1.10 -0.0056 WB5 Brueckner & Largey 2006 a 15 # close friends PD US PROBIT IV 4 1.10 -0.0081 WB6 Brueckner & Largey 2006 a 15 Social contacts  PD US PROBIT IV 4 1.10 -0.0159 WB7 Brueckner & Largey 2006 a 15 Visit neighbour/week PD US PROBIT IV 4 1.10 -0.0446 WB8 Fassio et al.  2013 a 15 Self-rep. env. health  PD Italy COR 1 1.97 -0.3384 WB9 Fassio et al. 2013 a 15 Self-rep. social satisfaction PD Italy COR 1 1.97 -0.4232 WB10 Fassio et al. 2013 a 15 Self-rep. physical health  PD Italy COR 1 1.97 -0.1380 WB11 Fassio et al. 2013 a 15 Self-rep. psychological status  PD Italy COR 1 1.97 -0.3189 WB12 Glaeser et al.  2016 a 15 Self-rep. well-being PD US Panel 3 1.30 -0.0037 WB13 Harvey et al.  2015 b 15 Perceived safety  FAR US OLS, LOGIT 2 1.07 0.0690 WB10 Fassio et al.  2013 a 15 Self-rep. physical health  PD Italy COR 1 1.96 -0.1380 
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Paper IV 
 
5 A permanent (re)construction site? 
Changing Urban Form and Resident Value of 
Urban Amenities 
 
“There is no logic that can be superimposed on the city; people make it, and it is to them, not 
buildings, that we must fit our plans.”  
― Jane Jacobs 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Rapid urban development is a major feature of many less-developed countries.44 While 
we generally think of rapid urbanization taking the form of ‘informal’ or ‘illegal’ 
settlements in low- and middle-income countries, notably ‘peripheries’ (Roy 2005; Roy 
2009b) that develop as urban slums, motives for urban illegality often go beyond the 
production of housing for low-income city dwellers (Fawaz 2009; Heyman 1999; 
Nientied & van der Linden 1990). The state and planning agencies have been 
deliberately involved in the production of illegality in various Global South contexts 
(Fawaz 2017), contributing to deregulated and unplanned urban development which 
often leads to blatant transformations of urban form.  
Beirut is no exception. Through the urban renewal process driven by a well-resourced 
Lebanese diaspora and foreign investment since the early 2000s, Beirut has become a 
permanent (re)construction site. Urban planning is characterized by neoliberal 
tendencies and a public–private overlap which has allowed discourses of real-estate 
profit to hijack notions of urban amenities (Ashkar 2018). This has been paired with 
demolition-based urban restructuring for maximum profit. Fawaz (2017, p.94) highlights 
the prevalence of the practice of issuing ‘exceptions’ or temporary suspensions of the 
law in the daily practices of public planning agencies as they manage the production of 
the built environment in Beirut. 
Over the past few decades, most neighbourhoods in municipal Beirut have thus 
undergone conspicuous alterations, resulting in dramatic changes to the city’s 
                                                             
44 By 2025, more than 90% of new urbanities will locate in low-income countries (United Nations 
Population Fund 2007), which are already characterized by explosive growth of population, low 
stages of economic development and poor state of the urban environment (Pugh 2013).  
  
271 
landscape, housing stock and people–space relations (Gebara et al. 2016). The 
deregulated planning framework has in many cases led to the deterioration of urban 
environments and to social-cultural instabilities, in many ways opposing the wide-
ranging consensus among planners and policymakers of the importance of sustainable 
urban growth (World Economic Forum 2019; UNDP 2017; Pugh 2013; Knox 1993). 
Although recent work has considerably furthered our understanding of deregulated 
planning in Beirut (Krijnen & Fawaz 2010; Fawaz 2017; Bou Akar 2018; Krijnen 2010), little 
is known of the preferences and responses of local residents in relation to the urban 
development process. 
In order for policy or urban interventions to attempt to enforce collectively rational 
behaviour and adherence to local values, the latter should be uncovered and analysed. 
This paper contributes to such an exploration and analysis, building on ongoing research 
into strategies to protect and enhance Beirut’s social and architectural diversity by 
exposing, as far as that is possible,  residents’  complex and multiple values in this 
regard. Specifically, this paper investigates how changing urban form affects how 
residents value both physical environments and intangible urban amenities, specifically 
architectural amenities45, open space (specifically sidewalks) and neighbourhood 
belonging. The study first explores satisfaction with and preferences attached to these 
amenities and investigates whether they vary across socio-economic characteristics. 
The paper then uses stated preference to assess indicative monetary values, and asks: 
in a context of continual construction with no public consultation, are residents still 
willing to pay (WTP) to preserve architectural amenities and public space? And given the 
climate of ‘exceptions’ present in urban planning in Beirut, does mistrust in local 
government affect WTP? 
This study uses a novel data set and two case-study neighbourhoods as entry points to 
examine the relationship between construction rates as indicators of building change 
(BC) and resident value of neighbourhood amenities. The two middle-income 
neighbourhoods, Ras Beirut and Mar Mikhael, were selected as case studies because 
the former has undergone substantial change in urban form over the last few decades 
whereas the latter has only recently seen changes to its urban fabric. These 
                                                             
45 Architectural amenities in this paper refer to locally valued heritage and modern heritage 
buildings. I have preferred not to identify them as heritage buildings within the discourse of this 
paper as most such buildings are not legislatively recognized as heritage in light of the limitations 
of Lebanese conservation policy system but are instead recognized by local actors and 
communities. 
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neighbourhoods were also chosen as both areas present multiple cases of urban 
illegality linked to the production of housing for profit (Fawaz et al. 2018; Khechen 2018). 
This study uses a mixed methods strategy of qualitative and quantitative research 
techniques in order to provide triangulation of the results (Greene et al. 1989; Greene 
2007; Johnson et al. 2007) and to obtain a comprehensive appreciation of the complex 
relationship between changing urban form and the value residents attach to their urban 
environments in Beirut. Three principal modes of analysis were used: descriptive 
statistics, survey-based stated preferences techniques, and textual analysis of 
discursive survey and interview elements. Survey-based stated preference techniques 
ask individuals to choose between a number of response options or place a monetary 
value on a good presented in a hypothetical scenario (see Alberini & Kahn, 2006; 
Bateman et al., 2002 for comprehensive reviews). While descriptive statistics and 
contingent valuation (CV) are used to identify underlining patterns of resident 
preferences according to the BC rates of their location of residence, analysis of open-
ended survey responses and interviews allows for a better understanding of the 
reasons behind resident preferences. 
CV has been widely used to elicit citizens' preferences and their WTP for the 
preservation of architectural amenities or open or green spaces (Provins et al. 2008; 
Alberini et al. 2003), including in less-developed countries where the quality of the urban 
environment has been increasingly recognized as a key determinant of quality of life 
(Whittington 2010). A common aspect of CV studies in these contexts, however, is the 
occurrence of protest responses, which has attracted growing attention from scholars 
and practitioners. These are defined as responses in which respondents reject some 
aspect of the contingent market rather than reveal their true preferences, thus 
jeopardizing the validity of the WTP estimates (Calia & Strazzera 2000; Szabó 2011). One 
possible reason associated with protest responses is respondents’ distrust of 
authorities, or in this case, of planning agencies in conjunction with developers 
responsible for changes in urban environment (Oh & Hong 2012). This paper accounts 
for this possibility in the Lebanese context by analysing motives for lack of WTP through 
textual analysis and attempts to account for mistrust in governance through the 
inclusion of a confidence in government indicator (CGOV) in the WTP regressions. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 first discusses neoliberal planning in the 
Lebanese context and ‘exceptions’ as one of Beirut’s principal planning strategies, and 
then explores how changes in urban form can affect the values residents attach to 
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architectural amenities, open spaces and neighbourhood belonging. Section 3 
introduces the construction rate and survey data, defines the main variables used and 
discusses the mixed-methods approach. Section 4 presents findings on overall 
perceptions of BC, while section 5 presents the different relationships between 
construction rates and the value residents attach, respectively, to architectural 
amenities, open space and neighbourhood belonging. In section 6 I discuss the WTP 
results, revealing a stable negative relationship between WTP to stop new building and 
rate of BC, and a similar negative relationship between WTP and confidence in local 
governance. Section 7 sets out the conclusions of the study. 
5.2 A permanent construction site 
5.2.1 Planning as a political decision versus planning as a technical activity  
Heavy construction is widespread across municipal Beirut. It is worth noting, as argued 
by Ashkar (2018), that unlike most other Middle Eastern countries, Lebanon never 
developed a social welfare state system, and in many ways Lebanon moved directly 
from economic liberalism to neoliberalism (Harvey 2005). Neoliberal tendencies 
facilitate the circulation of capital to the real-estate sector and foster intensive 
construction practices (Fawaz 2017; Krijnen 2018; Krijnen & Fawaz 2010). 
The Lebanese Law of Construction sets out the conditions required to obtain 
a construction permit. This Law is applied across the Lebanese territory but is restricted 
by the relevant Master Plan at the local level (Ashkar 2018). Beirut’s Master Plan has not 
been updated since 1954, and most efforts to amend it have been hindered by political 
pressure. The Master Plan is basic and lacks meaningful restrictions on development or 
height limits. The Law of Construction is, on the other hand, periodically amended. 
Article 16 of the Lebanese Construction Law and its 2004 revision (followed by two 
Enforcement Decrees in 2005 and 2007) enlarged the permissible building envelope and 
stipulated that land developers could benefit from exemptions to the Total Coefficient 
of Exploitation (TCE) (Ashkar 2011). This allowed further height exploitation, best 
viewed in terms of financial profit, as higher floor generate more income than lower 
ones, with the price of apartments in Beirut typically increases by at least US$100 per 
square metre per floor (Ashkar 2011). Such projects are transforming both the skyline 
and the social make-up of Beirut as they are clearly not targeted at the majority of the 
city’s long-term dwellers, but mostly cater to the wealthy or Lebanese expatriates and 
other nationals investing in multi-million-dollar apartments. 
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Despite the loose development regulation, the prevalence of the issuance of 
‘exceptions’ or temporary suspensions of the law to bolster profitable development 
even further is common practice. This is an example of the rise of state-led informal 
planning practices happening in many Global South cities (Roy 2005; Roy 2009a). Fawaz 
(2017) argues that ‘exceptions’ constitute one of Beirut’s principal planning strategies, 
originating in clear continuities between the realms of the legal and the illegal, given the 
entanglement of the political elite and the real-estate industry. This argument inscribes 
itself in a body of work that traces the relationship between political gain and tolerance 
of forms of informality, where legality rests on the power of state actors who determine 
what is and is not legal to their own advantage (Smart 2001; Roy 2009a). Decisions 
frequently disguise political motives and rarely reflect the technical planning 
imperatives in place (Portes et al. 1989; Braverman 2007). 
Planning as a government decision and planning as a technical activity are clearly at 
odds here (Alexander et al. 2012). In this case, it is not ‘society collectively deciding what 
urban change should look like’, as Rydin (2013, p.12) asserts, but is quite the opposite. 
The climate of ‘exceptions’ reveals a struggle over the right to the city, where low-
income dwellers are mostly subject to insecure housing or need to relocate to the city’s 
peripheries and partake in long commutes, while incentives are extended to wealthy 
developers to enable high-end buildings. It can therefore be assumed that patterns of 
urban and neighbourhood change are reshaping communities and altering the cohesion 
of societies. 
It comes as no surprise that these dynamics have led to significant morphological 
densification in the city. Morphological density refers to the density of the built 
environment and captures aspects such as compact urban land cover, street 
connectivity, and a high building footprint to parcel size ratio (Neuman 2005; 
Churchman 1999).46 Beirut’s case is characterized by parcel aggregation and 
exploitation of building height (Khechen 2018; Verdeil 2002). Unsurprisingly, 
morphological densification has been paralleled by changes in population.47 Notably, 
there have been changes in the demographics and socioeconomic backgrounds of local 
                                                             
46 This can also be referred to as the densification of built form: a measure of the intensity of 
development in relation to available ground-level open space. 
47 The population of Lebanon is unevenly distributed among regions: one third of the population 
resides in the Greater Beirut Area (GBA), occupying only 233 km2 (2% of Lebanon’s total area). 
The Greater Beirut Area is subject to pressures arising from population growth and economic 
expansion (Faour & Mhawej 2014). 
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populations, not only as a result of internal displacement trends but also of the influx of 
displaced individuals and families following the Syrian crisis (UNHCR & UNHabitat 2014). 
Many displaced people reside in costly middle-income neighbourhoods – such as this 
paper’s case studies Ras Beirut and Mar Mikhael – because of close access to services 
and jobs, inserting themselves as best they can, often in informal or unserviced housing 
units within these areas (Pietrostefani 2019). Although this paper will not be focusing 
on the effects of population change on local neighbourhoods, it will be accounting for 
it in its analysis, given its important impact on this context. 
5.2.2 Resident value of urban environments 
In considering whether morphological change affects how residents value their urban 
environments, this paper focuses on three aspects: the value residents attach to 
architectural amenities, open space (principally sidewalks) and neighbourhood 
belonging. These three aspects were selected because of their relevance to the 
Lebanese context. The paper focuses on both physical and immaterial amenities, as 
morphological change may influence both objective (visual, aesthetic) and subjective 
(social or symbolic) dimensions of neighbourhood satisfaction (Young et al. 2004). This 
section gives an overview of the relevant literature, linking it to the central concerns in 
the chosen context.  
Although I am not aware of any studies exploring the relationship between changing 
urban form and values attached to either physical or intangible urban amenities, there 
is a large body of work on the effects of changing urban form on various subjective 
outcomes. Improved access due to morphological density can increase social well-
being, as can agreeable dense urban environments (Vorontsova et al. 2016; Churchman 
1999). Morphological density can, however, have negative effects on well-being, due to 
a lower overall sense of community (Wilson & Baldassare 1996), anxiety, stress, social 
withdrawal, and a feeling of loss of control (Chu et al. 2004; Churchman 1999). It can 
also negatively affect perceptions of space, and tall, dense structures obstruct views, 
cause shadowing, reduce open space, and give a visual sense of lack of proportion 
(Hitchcock 1994).  
5.2.2.1 Architectural amenities and open space  
Height of buildings and amount and quality of open space have been recognized as 
being among the most important attributes of urban space in environmental 
psychology (Stamps & Nasar 1997; Alberini et al. 2003). Both buildings of architectural 
value and open space (as opposed to built space) have also been recognized as land-
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based public goods in both urban planning and urban economic discourses (Ahlfeldt & 
Holman 2018; Brander & Koetse 2011; Ward 2004). Studies thus confirm a demand for 
well-designed buildings, heritage buildings and new architectural designs, and open 
space in contemporary urban environments. 
The value attached to buildings is particularly relevant in Beirut, given both the urban 
landscape’s extensive transformations and the associations attached to architectural 
styles and types of building. Connotations of wealth attached to high-rise buildings are 
easily understood, following the discussion in section 2.1. Urban heritage buildings and 
older building stock, although valued by practitioners, academics and non-
governmental agencies (Hilton 2017; Davie 2004; Saliba 2013), are ‘often disregarded or 
devalued’ by much of the Lebanese population, as illustrated by various interviewees, 
even though these buildings largely represent the remaining part of the city’s affordable 
housing stock (Fawaz et al. 2018). 
Urban open space provides a number of valuable services to urban populations, 
including recreational opportunities, aesthetic enjoyment and environmental functions 
(Brander & Koetse 2011). Considerable advances have been made in urban open-space 
research, influenced by a growing concern for the quality of urban environments and 
the importance of the role of open space in achieving sustainable neighbourhoods 
(Francis 1987; Al-Hagla 2008). Traditionally, open spaces are identified as parks, green 
spaces, playgrounds and squares as well as undeveloped land. In Beirut, however, the 
widespread privatization of public spaces, often associated with the construction of 
new buildings or private leisure facilities (Fawaz 2014; Saksouk-Sasso 2019), has resulted 
in sidewalks often performing the role of open spaces. Sidewalks are spaces often 
appropriated by residents because of a lack of other public spaces (Ghandour & Fawaz 
2010; Seidman 2009). As illustrated in Figure A1 of the appendix, most open space in Ras 
Beirut are private, and numerous gatherings in public spaces are on sidewalks or edges 
of buildings. Given the different nature of sidewalks from that of parks or squares, 
residents may also attach a different value to these amenities than to more traditional 
forms of open space. Brander & Koetse (2011) also underline the important regional 
differences in preferences for open space, which may constrain the potential for 
transferring estimated values between places.  
5.2.2.2 Neighbourhood Belonging  
Understanding the meaningful relationships that people have with place(s) has been of 
academic interest for several decades. Patterns of urban and neighbourhood change 
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are reshaping communities and altering the cohesion of societies. Neighbourhood is a 
central element within both social geography and environmental psychology in 
understanding and explaining people’s sense of attachment to places, defined as 
meaningful locations (Lewicka 2011; Lewicka 2010). Neighbourhood belonging can 
represent an emotional bond to a place and is usually seen as positive as it can result in 
local social networks and engagements associated with well-being and building of 
community identity (Finney & Jivraj 2013). It is important to note, however, that 
neighbourhood relationships and senses of belonging are not universal, and some 
residents will always be excluded. 
Neighbourhoods have both concrete and symbolic definitions (Blokland-Potters 2003, 
p.213). As presented by Watt & Smets (2014, p.8), the neighbourhood is characterized 
by the ‘spatial’ – it is a locally bounded place; the ‘social’ – it involves sets of social 
relations between neighbours; and the ‘symbolic’ – it has an imaginative, symbolic 
component. The social and symbolic are meaningful to a neighbourhood’s residents, 
even though there can be a lack of congruence over what that meaning is. Indeed, social 
and symbolic aspects are frequently linked to the concept of community (Watt & Smets 
2014, p.6), where locals, longstanding residents, new comers and ex-residents 
experience living in places differently, and are often part of separate communities, 
often resulting in multiple senses of belonging (Bailey et al. 2012). Neighbourhood 
relationships are an important feature of the Lebanese value system, and this paper 
aims to explore, in the second instance, whether morphological change affects these 
sociospatial relationships or whether they are driven by socio-economic characteristics.  
Recent studies have assessed relationships between population change and 
neighbourhood belonging, producing somewhat different results (Finney & Jivraj 2013; 
Clark & Coulter 2015; Bailey et al. 2012). The contrasting results suggest that type48 of 
local population change matters in relation to feelings of neighbourhood belonging. In 
addition, the impact of population change on belonging may be experienced differently 
by different ethnic groups (Finney & Jivraj 2013). To this author’s knowledge, however, 
beyond sociological commentaries (Watt & Smets 2014), there is no available literature 
on the relationship between change in physical urban form and neighbourhood 
                                                             
48 The arrival of racialised ‘others’ in a given neighbourhood can be perceive ‘to disrupt the 
cultural familiarity of place’ (Watt 2010, p.154), but the arrival of individuals more similar to 
longstanding populations may not be seen as disrupting (Laurence & Heath 2008). 
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belonging. This paper contributes to filling this gap, while accounting for population 
change given its prevalence to the context. 
5.3 Data and Methodology 
5.3.1 Measuring building change 
Until recently, only a limited number of visual and quantitative records were available 
documenting the conspicuous construction activities that have taken place in Beirut in 
the last 20 years. To investigate the relationship between changing urban form and the 
value residents attach to their urban environments I exploit a recently assembled data 
set on construction permits between 2000 and 2013 (Gebara et al. 2016). Building 
permits reflect the intentions of financiers to invest and of builders to launch projects, 
according to their anticipation of real-estate activity. The data was verified and updated 
until 2017 for the neighbourhoods of Ras Beirut and Mar Mikhael. Site visits were 
conducted and only data relating to projects that were actually built was retained.49 
Other limitations linked to the data set are discussed in section 2.2 of the appendix or 
more thoroughly in Gebara et al. (2016). Construction permits are thus adopted as a key 
indicator of changing urban form and morphological densification. Other changes in 
urban form are of course present but difficult to measure. The data was instrumental in 
the site-selection of this study as it allowed the identification of areas which have 
experienced different rates of construction (Figures A2 and A3 in the appendix) and it 
confirmed two main trends in construction patterns throughout the city: the 
concentration of developments in prime city locations and the domination of a 
demolition-based form of urban restructuring.  
In order to identify whether and how changing urban form affects the value residents 
attach to urban amenities, areas that had undergone different rates of construction 
were identified. The selection process was carried out as follows. The city of Beirut was 
divided in a fishnet grid of 200 metre by 200 metre square cells, as illustrated in Figure 
1. The cells were then limited to the squares overlapping the areas of Ras Beirut and Mar 
Mikhael. Given the great limitation of geolocalized micro-data in Lebanon, these areas 
were selected for their data availability, as previous geolocalized surveys were run in 
2009 (Ras Beirut) (Kaddour et al. 2014) and 2011 (Mar Mikhael) (Buccianti-Barakat et al. 
2015) giving me access to indicative measures of population change for both areas. The 
                                                             
49 It is possible that some building permits have been cancelled or that construction activities 
have been postponed as construction permits have a six-to-eight-year period of validity. 
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definition of these areas as cohesive neighbourhoods is presented in section 3.1 of the 
appendix.  
The building permit data was used to construct a simple index of building change 𝐵𝐶𝑐 
as follows: 
𝐵𝐶𝑐 =
∑ 𝐵𝑈𝑃𝑐𝑏𝑛𝑏=1
𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐
 
where 𝐵𝑈𝑃𝑏 is the sum of the super built-up areas50 b of all new developments within 
each square c and 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐 is simply the area of each square c, in this case 0.04 square 
kilometres. Once the building change ratio had been calculated, the squares were 
divided into quartiles, from areas of high BC to areas of low BC, as distinct treatment 
and control areas would have been contextually inappropriate.51 In Figure 1, red areas 
display high rates of BC (more than 13% of the area of a given square), yellow areas 
display medium rates of BC (7-13%), light green areas display low rates (5-7%) while dark 
green areas display almost no change to the urban fabric (<5%). For closer-up 
illustrations of the classification grid and more details on the BC index please see section 
4.1 of the appendix. 
 Ras Beirut and Mar Mikhael are currently both prime locations, both being middle-
income neighbourhoods with main roads, presenting comparable access to and quality 
of commercial amenities, and with very similar house price trends in the last five years 
(RAMCO 2015). Moreover, despite the wealth of these neighbourhoods, recent research 
(Public Works Studio 2016; Public Works Studio 2018; Pietrostefani 2019) has confirmed 
the presence of a significant number of low-income families in both areas, using 
abandoned buildings, ad-hoc structures on roofs and in courtyards or renting very small 
spaces for close access to services and jobs.  
Despite their similarities, Figure 1 indicates that Ras Beirut presents higher building 
change rates than Mar Mikhael. The main reason is that Mar Mikhael only became a 
prime location in 2010 (Fawaz et al. 2018) whereas Ras Beirut has been one of Beirut’s 
most diverse and cosmopolitan neighbourhoods for many years (Khechen 2018; 
Kaddour et al. 2014), thus enticing market-led development. The better the location in 
                                                             
50 In urban planning, ‘super built-up area’ refers to the carpet area + wall area + common area. 
51 Quartile classification slightly varies according to whether it is calculated over the whole 
sampling area or only considering sampled squares. This paper uses the classification as 
calculated over the whole sampling area; however, the analysis was also run with the alternative 
and results did not significantly differ. 
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terms of prestige, historical reputation and open views (including sites with high 
elevation), the higher the built-up area of new projects is likely to be (Gebara et al. 2016).  
Figure 1 Sampling grid 
 
Given its different history, Mar Mikhael has managed to retain a significant proportion 
of buildings from the 1950s despite recent constructions, while Ras Beirut’s buildings 
date principally from the 1975 onwards. To date, a significant number of new projects in 
both these prime locations have been given exceptional building permits, allowing their 
developers to bypass zoning regulations and exceed permissible TCE (Krijnen & Fawaz 
2010).52 Despite the differences in construction rate, both neighbourhoods have been 
subject to demolition-based construction. Eighty-three percent of authorized 
construction projects were planned on constructed parcels of land as of the 2004 
occupation status in Ras Beirut and eighty-seven percent in Mar Mikhael (Gebara et al. 
2016). 
5.3.2 Mixed methods : survey and interview data  
This study uses a mixed methods strategy of qualitative and quantitative research 
techniques in order to provide triangulation of the results (Greene et al. 1989; Greene 
2007; Johnson et al. 2007). It draws on regression analysis of a household survey to 
identify patterns and detect the relative magnitudes of resident preferences for the 
                                                             
52 Total Exploitation Coefficient is 5 in Ras Beirut and 2.5 in most of Mar Mikhael. 
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urban amenities considered. In the absence of panel or other cross-section comparisons 
with variables of interest to control for endogeneity, qualitative data is used to 
complement, validate and develop the results obtained from that analysis (Lieberman 
2005; Greene 2007). Primary data collection was the only possible means of obtaining 
quantitative data on values residents attach to their urban environments at a detailed 
level. A household survey was consequently designed, and over one thousand 
households were surveyed in the two selected neighbourhoods. The geo-localized 
survey observations were then mapped through Geographical Information Systems 
(GIS), and matched to the new constructions data.53 Analysis of open-ended survey 
responses and interviews then allowed for a better understanding of the reasons 
behind resident preferences. More information on survey design and sampling is 
detailed in section 3.1 of the appendix.  
In the first instance, this paper aims to understand whether the value residents attach 
to architectural amenities and sidewalks as open spaces is related to the rates of 
morphological change undergone in the areas they live in. To evaluate these 
relationships, I use a series of variables evaluating the value residents attach to urban 
heritage and well-designed modern building and a series of variables on resident 
satisfaction with open areas and use of sidewalks. I also consider variables assessing 
resident confidence in legislative or action-led mechanisms to protect the integrity of 
the urban environment. A wide range of socioeconomic characteristics were also 
collected, including age, sex, nationality, education, income, housing tenure and 
religion. Two main sets of CV questions were also presented to respondents to evaluate 
relationships between rates of BC and WTP a) to stop excessive building and b) to 
improve sidewalk conditions. 
To evaluate the relationship between neighbourhood belonging and rates of 
morphological densification a series of questions measuring neighbourhood 
experience, identity, belonging, friendships and relationships and civic participation are 
compiled to create a Neighbourhood Belonging indicator. An assortment of questions is 
typically used to measure neighbourhood attachment for clarity and simplicity, and to 
                                                             
53 The final sample covers 7.7% of the estimated population and 21.5% of total households in the 
randomly selected 27 squares. Surveys were conducted face-to-face and the sample was drawn 
so as to cover the principal nationalities resident in these neighbourhoods, with a 95% confidence 
level and 5% margin of error. The squares selected also ensured that the sample geographically 
overlapped by 70% with data previously collected in these neighbourhoods so as to be able to 
control for population change. 
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directly access perceptions of belonging, without normative assumptions about 
whether this is positively or negatively experienced (Finney & Jivraj 2013).54 The overall 
indicator used in this paper measures the degree to which residents feel attached to 
their neighbourhood with respect to ties they have with individuals located in their area. 
It also integrates the likelihood of residents of a certain neighbourhood to stay in their 
area. The full list of variable descriptions is presented in  Table A3 of section 3.4 of the 
appendix, summary statistics of main variables are presented in Table 1 and 
complementary variables are itemised in Table A4 section 4.1 of the appendix.  
The impact of changing urban form on value of architectural amenities and 
neighbourhood belonging are analysed using simple logistic models. These models 
illustrate the relationships between BC rates and our different variables of interest (Y), 
notably value of architectural amenities, signing a petition objecting a major change in 
your neighbourhood  and neighbourhood belonging, controlling for demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics (age, nationality, gender, education, income, etc.), and 
other relevant variables (housing tenure, length of residence in the neighbourhood)55 
(Lewicka 2011). Both ordinal logistic regression and binary logistic models are used. 
Weights compensated for unequal sampling rates and for the possibility that certain 
population elements may not have been included in the frame used for sampling. This 
was done in an attempt to reduce bias in the survey (Brick & Kalton 1996). The model is 
then replicated using WTP as the dependant variable to evaluate the effect of BC rates 
on the expected probability of WTP to stop excessive building and to improve sidewalk 
conditions. Given the climate of deregulated planning and public-private overlap 
discussed in section 2.1, in the WTP regressions, I also attempt to account for a possible 
bias in stated WTP in light of mistrust with developers and governmental institutions by 
controlling for a confidence in local government.  
Although overall questions were multiple choice in the survey, I included selected 
questions allowing for longer discursive elements to disentangle resident opinions 
about their neighbourhood environments and allowing for a mixed-methods approach. 
                                                             
54 The set of questions selected was adapted from the Understanding Society survey (Knies 2014) 
and resulted in eight questions (Table A1 in appendix) on a 5-point scale from Strongly agree to 
Strongly disagree and one asking for the number of neighbours known by name. 
55 This cross-section data allows me to regress controlling for a number of variables (socio-econ 
and neighbourhood characteristics). These variables control for the potential correlation of 
place and individual-specific variables on the outcome of interest. As in any cross-sectional paper, 
I cannot rule out the possibility that other omitted variables may be correlated with the outcome 
of interest, and therefore I do not claim a causal effect.  
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For instance, after the WTP questions, debriefing questions were asked with the aim of 
understanding reasons for non-WTP, followed by attitudinal questions pertaining to 
potential protest attitudes. In many empirical studies, non-WTP respondents are 
required to state the reasons for their choices, in order to distinguish protesters from 
genuine zero responses (Calia & Strazzera 2000). My aim is to detect which percentage 
of respondents were not WTP because they believed developers ‘would build anyway’ 
or because ‘there is no way of stopping them’. Public trust in governments has declined 
significantly over the past decades, and such a declining trend is often more apparent 
in countries with well-known political unrest like Lebanon (Bou Akar 2018). Qualitative 
interviews were also conducted with six local community-based organizations, three in 
each neighbourhood, and with one administrative official in each neighbourhood to 
unpick some of the subtleties that emerged in the quantitative analysis. At all stages, 
anonymity was assured, and informed consent gained. More details on the data 
collection can be found in section 3.3 of the appendix. 
Table 1 Summary Statistics 
 mean sd min max 
Urban Change Ratio 
Urban Change Ratio 7.24861 4.901557 0 19.39 
Urban Change Ratio (quartile) 2.441706 1.092568 1 4 
Willingness to Pay 
WTP to stop development (image) 2.969668 2.352485 1 9 
WTA development (image) 2.548134 2.476267 1 9 
WTP to improve sidewalk 2.972947 1.609703 1 8 
Control variables 
Age a 3.280569 1.246228 1 5 
Nationality b 1.312796 .6026328 1 3 
Gender c 1.504265 .5002189 1 2 
Education d 3.290995 .8786226 1 4 
Years lived in N* 21.21048 20.00683 0 78 
Income e 3.763657 1.94394 1 8 
Ownership or Rent f 2.136008 .9995567 1 5 
Religion g 3.745972 3.964013 1 11 
Other variables 
Neighbourhood Belonging h 3.492987 .9108901 1 5.125 
Confidence in Government i 2.76412 .7744556 1 5 
Sample Size N = 1055     
 
Note: a Age brackets: 1. <21, 2. 22-34, 3. 35-49, 4. 50-64, 5. >65; b Nationalities: 1. Lebanese, 2. Syrian or 
Palestinian, 3. Other; c Gender: 1 Man, 2 Woman; d Education brackets: 1 None, 2, Elementary, 3 Secondary, 
4 University; e Income brackets: 1. $450 (minimum wage), 2. $450 – 1,600, 3. $1,601 – 3,000, 4. $3,001 – 5,000, 
5. $5,001 – 8,000, 6. $8,001 – 12,000, 7. $12,001 – 16,000, 8. <$16,001; f House Tenure: 1. Old Ownership, 2. Old 
Rent, 3. New Rent, 4. No Rent; g Religion brackets: 1. Muslim, 2. Christian, 3. Druze, 4. Atheist, 5. Refused; h 
Average of Neighbourhood Belonging variables (belonging, friendship and associations, advice, borrowing, 
remaining a resident, talking to people, helping neighbours, trust in neighbours, knowing neighbours by 
name). I Average of Confidence in Government variables (Confidence in Muhtar, Municipality, Political 
Parties, Parliament, Religious bodies, Media, NGOs, Police). 
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5.4 Has my neighbourhood changed? 
5.4.1 Overall neighbourhood perception 
The survey started by asking questions about residents’ overall neighbourhood 
perceptions. It first asked respondents to briefly describe the physical environment of 
their street, without being biased by detailed questions. While Mar Mikhael was valued 
for the quality of its environment as a ‘village-like’ ‘old neighbourhood with heritage 
buildings’, but it was also described as ‘dirty’, ‘unkempt’ and ‘needing renovation’. Ras 
Beirut was considered as a ‘mixed’ neighbourhood, which had become ‘cleaner after 
renovations’ despite its lack of ‘open spaces’.  
This snapshot of resident quotes immediately underlined the complex nature of the 
connotations associated with changes in urban form, where, because of their neglected 
state, areas with historical or well-designed urban fabric are not necessarily valued more 
highly than areas reconstructed with large numbers of high-rise structures. When 
respondents were asked what they most valued about their neighbourhood, the core 
element that emerged across all of the surveyed areas was location in terms of access 
to services and retail amenities, confirming the similarity in these neighbourhoods in 
this respect. Community cohesion (or neighbourliness) was also highlighted as a key 
aspect valued by respondents in both neighbourhoods.  
Respondents were then asked to rate the attractiveness of their neighbourhoods on a 
five-point scale where 1 was not at all attractive and 5 was very attractive. They were 
also asked to rate how safe, stressed, happy and satisfied they felt with their 
neighbourhoods to evaluate residents’ overall satisfaction. Similarly to Navarrete-
Hernandez and Laffan (2019), these variables were used to construct an overall 
perception of the neighbourhood measure shown in the bottom-right panel of Figure 2. 
Finally, respondents were asked how much they perceived their local neighbourhood 
to have changed and to discursively explain why.  
Only 20% of Mar Mikhael residents considered their neighbourhood to be very 
attractive, in contrast to 40% of Ras Beirut residents. Figure 2 suggests a positive 
correlation between finding your local neighbourhood attractive and BC rates and a 
small, but also positive correlation between having positive neighbourhood 
perceptions and BC rates. This suggests not only that areas that have undergone more 
morphological transformations are seen as more attractive by residents, but they are 
also perceived as safer and less stressful. Areas that are still composed of older urban 
fabric, and effectively more open and green spaces, are not necessarily better perceived 
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by their residents, given the ‘degradation’, ‘continual new construction’ and 
‘demolishing of old buildings’. They are also considered as being more ‘popular’ which 
has been show to increase the perception of crime (Burton 2000) (Figure 2).  
Moreover, as shown in Figure 2, areas with the lowest rates of building change are 
actually rated as having changed more in recent years (50% of residents considered 
areas with low BC rates as ‘very’ or ‘extremely’ changed). This negative correlation is 
explained by the residents’ comments when asked what had changed: ‘new 
constructions’ and ‘new developments’ were much more recurrent reasons for 
residents in areas with low BC rates, suggesting that, although there had actually been 
less morphological change in these areas in the past decades, residents were currently 
focusing more on the evolving urban form of their environments. ‘It is no wonder Mar 
Mikhael residents are more concerned with building change than people in other 
neighbourhoods,’ commented one interviewee, ‘many parts of this once quiet 
neighbourhood are now construction sites.’ ‘Newcomers’, ‘Syrians’, ‘new people’ and 
‘new neighbours’ were other principal markers of change, underlining the change in 
populations driven by the refugee crisis across all areas. For an overview of the 
geographical patterns of new constructions by year see Figure A4 in section 2.2 of the 
appendix. 
Figure 2 Neighbourhood Perception 
 
Note: 1-4 indicate the quartiles of building change, 1 being the least change and 4 being the most change. 
N stands for Neighbourhood. Overall Perception of Neighbourhood is the average of variables: satisfied, 
safe, stressed and happy. 
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5.4.2 Contradictions of morphological change 
Respondents were then asked more specifically about their satisfaction with the 
physical aspects of their urban environments. Figure 3 shows how residents in areas 
with high rates of BC were on average more satisfied with the physical transformations 
of their neighbourhoods. Moreover, more residents in high BC rate areas considered 
the overall condition of the buildings in their neighbourhood ‘excellent’ and even found 
the condition of some older buildings ‘excellent’.56 Higher BC rates are therefore 
paralleled with overall higher satisfaction of local urban environments. And yet, finding 
newly redeveloped places more attractive does not necessarily imply a lack of resident 
interest in preserving more traditional urban environments or stopping excessive 
building. 
 In fact, contradictions in the survey responses, in many ways reflecting the 
contradictions of Beiruti (re)construction patterns (Verdeil 2002; Huybrechts & Verdeil 
2005), became apparent while plotting different variable relationships, underlining the 
importance of a mixed-methods approach. For example, while 60% of residents 
considered new constructions to be ‘attractive’ or ‘very attractive’ (0), when asked 
directly if they preferred Beirut’s traditional urban stock or new high-rise buildings, 75% 
preferred traditional building stock. Other aspects influencing these preferences are 
not only education and income but also number of years lived in a given location, and 
type of building lived in as a child, but are not reported here for brevity. 
 The morphological evolution of a city is problematic because buildings are almost 
necessarily related to socioeconomic status (Ragette 1980). This is especially relevant in 
contexts where state policies and market forces converge to make profit-driven real 
estate a pillar of the neoliberal economy, while offering no housing, social or economic 
policies to redress its gentrifying effects. Residents therefore associate building change 
not only with the evolution of urban physical form, but also with changes in local 
socioeconomic make-up. As interviewees confirmed, socioeconomic status of buildings 
is typically well-understood by urban citizens, given that the building of new 
constructions is usually preceded by evictions and pressured displacement (Bekdache 
2015; Fawaz et al. 2018). Respondents in Mar Mikhael living in pre-1990 building stock 
                                                             
56 Interviews with local NGOs suggested that more cases of heritage building restoration had 
recently taken place in Ras Beirut, both for commercial uses and less lucrative purposes with 
community participation, most probably accounting for the more positive resident accounts in 
regard to older building stock. 
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commented that, if a tall building was being built next to them, it would probably result 
in their forced displacement next. 
These relationships are important in explaining the background to the willingness to 
pay analysis. On the one hand, the responses suggest that the deregulated planning 
practices ‘making Beirut for its buildings’ are in many ways accepted by society, in 
contradiction to one of Jane Jacob’s (1961) famous arguments that plans for a city 
should be made not for its buildings but for its people. In some ways, preferences can 
therefore be seen to be in opposition to arguments made by widespread discourses in 
sustainable urban growth (Williams et al. 2000). On the other hand, residents in areas 
with low BC rates are dissatisfied with the changes occurring in their neighbourhoods. 
Figure 3 Building Conditions 
 
Note:  1-4 indicate the quartiles of building change, 1 being the least change and 4 being the most change. 
N stand for Neighbourhood. 
 
5.5 Values in a changing urban environment  
The aspect of ‘neighbourliness’ highlighted in the initial open answers of the survey 
confirmed the importance of addressing both physical and subjective neighbourhood 
values, in considering the possible effects of morphological change (Young et al. 2004). 
This section will now consider more specifically the values residents attach to 
architectural amenities, open space (principally sidewalks) and neighbourhood 
belonging and analyse whether these values differ according to building change rates. 
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5.5.1 Architectural amenities and open spaces 
Architectural amenities, referring to both urban heritage and well-designed modern 
buildings, were generally valued by respondents, with 85% of respondents strongly 
agreeing with the importance of preserving both such areas as illustrated in the top-left 
panel of Figure 4. Residents were more likely to sign a petition opposing a major change 
in their neighbourhood if they lived in areas with lower BC rates (bottom-left panel of 
Figure 4). Of the 10% of respondents who had signed a petition in the last year, 65% lived 
in areas that had undergone low or almost no change to their urban fabric. Findings also 
show that the probability of signing a petition increases with age and that Lebanese are 
more likely to sign a petition than Syrians or other nationalities. Higher levels of 
education also increase the probability of signing a petition. An overview of findings is 
presented in Table A5 of the appendix. 
Interviews with local community-based organizations in Mar Mikhael confirmed that 
they had received some support from residents publicly opposing recently confirmed 
construction projects, even though ‘most residents have lost hope that sociopolitical 
activism will make any difference’. I can therefore confirm a discordance between 
values residents attach to architectural amenities and actual action towards their 
preservation. Indeed, it is not surprising that these same residents, living in areas with 
low BC rates, do not believe legislation is the best mechanism with which to protect the 
integrity of urban environments (Figure 4). Interviewees explained that academics, 
NGOs and other activists have pushed towards legislative solutions to demolition-based 
construction with few successes. The Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) Law 
(12/10/2017) was a small achievement, intended to allow owners to retain their low-rise 
buildings while letting them benefit from the development value of their land by 
enabling them to sell their ‘air space’, thereby gaining revenue to renovate their 
building. Although this law has passed through parliament, the government has yet to 
ratify it. 
Respondents were generally unsatisfied with the open spaces available in their 
neighbourhoods and in many cases were not sure what to respond, simply saying that 
there were no open spaces in their neighbourhoods. There was a clear higher resident 
satisfaction in open spaces at a 200m radius from Sanayeh park in Ras Beirut and from 
the Jesuit garden in Mar Mikhael – two of the very few green spaces in Beirut. There 
was also a higher satisfaction with open spaces in areas with higher BC rates, and clearly 
higher satisfaction in Ras Beirut than in Mar Mikhael, although the surface area of open 
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spaces is lower in the former than the latter area. Higher satisfaction in Ras Beirut may 
be connected to the recent public space interventions carried out by the 
Neighbourhood Initiative and to the existence of some resident access to the American 
University of Beirut which has many green areas, although they are semi-public at best. 
Figure 4 Architectural amenities and sidewalk descriptive analysis  
 
Seventeen percent of respondents affirmed they sat on sidewalks, whether by 
themselves, with family or friends. The data thus validates the use of sidewalks as an 
alternative form of open space, although it is not as widespread as initially hypothesized 
(also refer to Figure A1 in the appendix). Surprisingly, 20% of respondents used 
sidewalks in this manner in Ras Beirut while only 10% did so in Mar Mikhael, which was 
hypothesized as the opposite before data collection (lower-right panel 0). This finding 
parallels other recent research on Street Invitation Quality which was recorded as 
higher in Ras Beirut areas than in Mar Mikhael areas (Madani, 2018). In fact, respondents 
noted that neighbours used to sit on sidewalks in Mar Mikhael much more in past years 
but that the recent construction sites, as well as the opening of more commercial 
facilities which often use sidewalks for outdoor seating, obstruct these spaces, and 
have led residents to use sidewalks less for walking, let alone for sitting. It must also be 
noted that this rate is also influenced by a discrepancy of sidewalks in areas with low BC 
rates, marking a lack of basic infrastructure in less redeveloped areas. While only 9% of 
residents living in high BC rate areas confirmed not having a sidewalk at the entrance to 
their building, 19% stated the same in low BC rate areas.  
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Greater deficiency in local infrastructure, together with the short-term effects of 
construction, is thus affecting the use of sidewalks as public spaces in areas that have 
undergone less morphological change. Other findings include men and less educated 
residents being far more likely to use sidewalks as open spaces. As observed in other 
contexts, as housing forms change the practice of sitting on the sidewalk or similar ad-
hoc spaces moves from a collective practice to an activity of poorer populations, where 
highly-educated residents prefer their homes of more formalised forms of public space 
(Kim 2012; Gehl 2011). The relationship between morphological change and use of 
sidewalks as open spaces is thus ambiguous. Although we ascertain some value 
attached to these spaces in Beirut, it is much lower, as expected, than values attached 
to spaces such as parks which were immediately acknowledged as highly valuable. 
5.5.2 Neighbourhood Belonging 
Figure 5 suggests that average neighbourhood belonging is slightly higher in Mar 
Mikhael than in Ras Beirut. This figure represents the average of the set of 
neighbourhood belonging variables  depicting ties and actions of the respondent in her 
local neighbourhood. They include belonging, friendships and associations, seeking 
advice, borrowing things, planning to remain a resident, regularly stopping and talking 
to people, willingness to help neighbours, trust in neighbours, and knowing neighbours 
by name. The complete tabulations of all neighbourhood belonging variables can be 
found in Figure A1 in section 4.2 of the appendix. The data is presented by 
neighbourhood as it does not reveal specific tendencies by BC rates. This is not 
surprising given that respondents are being asked about neighbourhoods as a whole, 
and resident conception of neighbourhood as discussed in section 3.1 of the paper is 
usually much larger than the 200m by 200m areas plotted to distinguish between rates 
of building change. 
Although Figure 5 suggests more pronounced neighbourhood belonging in Mar 
Mikhael, the baseline regression presented in Table 2 reveals that location, at least in 
the case of these two neighbourhoods, becomes insignificant as other relevant 
confounders are added to the analysis (Wald test = 1.70; P>.05). Age is a main 
determinant of neighbourhood belonging and statistically significant (Wald test = 5.24; 
P<.01), where the older the resident the more likely the feeling of neighbourhood 
belonging. Nationality can also influence neighbourhood belonging, as shown in the 
right panel of Figure 5 – Syrian nationals are less likely to form attachments to their 
neighbourhoods, as they often described holding stronger attachments to their cities 
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of origin (Wald test = 3.01; P>.05). As we can see in Table 2, however, this tendency is 
actually driven not by nationality but by the number of years lived in a place (Wald test 
= 33.91; P<.001). Perceived good quality of building conditions also increases likelihood 
of strong neighbourhood belonging, indicating a key role for the built environment and 
a city’s physical structure (Wald test = 10.82; P<.001) (Balducci & Checchi 2009).  
Unlike in other case studies, there is no evidence that neighbourhood-based social 
relations are influenced by residents’ reactions to changing forms of urban governance 
and policy (Johnstone & Whitehead 2004). The likelihood of having signed a petition 
either generally or specifically to oppose a major change to the local urban environment 
does not significantly affect neighbourhood belonging. This might be a result of the 
small degree of success that sociopolitical activism has had in these contexts, which 
often leads residents to ‘let go’. Although the ‘concept of neighbourhood has salience 
when acted upon … for political or social purposes’ (Martin 2003, p.380), this is usually 
reinforced with obtaining desired outcomes, which has not been the case in our case 
studies. The change in percentage of non-Lebanese population (2009-2018)  mainly as a 
result of the influx of displaced Syrians, highlighted by many respondents as one of the 
main sources of change in both neighbourhoods, negatively influences neighbourhood 
belonging but is not significant. This suggests that despite Lebanese discontent with 
Syrians living in their neighbourhoods, as noted by 65% of Lebanese respondents, the 
‘hidden’ quality of the Syrian neighbours (Pietrostefani 2019) does not significantly 
lower the odds of feeling strong neighbourhood belonging. Qualitative commentaries 
suggested that this lack of significance may be driven by Ras Beirut, whose long-term 
residents although often wary of newcomers live in a historically demographically 
mixed area. Indeed an analysis of the Mar Mikhael subset suggests a negative and 
significant relationship in this neighbourhood, in line with research that finds that the 
arrival of ‘racialised others’ can be perceives as a disruption.  
It is difficult to assess the ‘symbolic’ elements influencing neighbourhood belonging in 
the quantitative analysis, though there were clear references to them in the responses 
to the open-ended questions and interviews. In most cases, this surfaced when 
residents mentioned landmarks that no longer existed, but that people still referred to 
when giving directions or simply when discussing their neighbourhood. Multiple 
references were made to the old brewery (Grande Brasserie du Levant) in Mar Mikhael, 
and to the old cinema in Hamra Ras Beirut, even though neither location still exists. This 
presents a distinction between the lived and symbolic aspects of neighbourhood, 
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highlighting how these two aspects need not necessarily empirically overlap. Could 
neighbourhood belonging be more closely related to these memories than to the 
change in population trends? Indeed, neighbourhood belonging studies have 
underlined the contradictions between residents’ appreciation of their ongoing 
convivial neighbourly relations and their lament over different forms of change (Watt, 
2006). 
Figure 5 Average Neighbourhood Belonging  
 
 
Note: Left Panel: Average of all neighbourhood belonging variables. MM: Mar Mikhael. RB: Ras Beirut. 
Right Panel: y-axis is percentage of residents in top two quintiles of neighbourhood belonging average. 1: 
Mar Mikhael. 2: Ras Beirut 
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Table 2 Results of Neighbourhood Belonging logit analysis 
 
 Model I: Ordinal Logistic Regression, OR a Model II: Binary Logistic Regression, OR b 
N. Belonging (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
RB c 0.670*** 0.795* 0.794* 0.893 0.860 0.855 0.866 0.643*** 0.774* 0.771* 0.863 0.821 0.802 0.811 
 (0.0793) (0.0968) (0.0968) (0.111) (0.108) (0.109) (0.110) (0.0870) (0.112) (0.111) (0.128) (0.124) (0.123) (0.124) 
Age d  1.436*** 1.433*** 1.129** 1.132** 1.133** 1.134**  1.475*** 1.479*** 1.172** 1.164** 1.167** 1.163** 
  (0.0728) (0.0726) (0.0683) (0.0687) (0.0687) (0.0689)  (0.0908) (0.0914) (0.0863) (0.0861) (0.0863) (0.0860) 
2. Syrian e  0.849 0.880 1.205 1.134 1.132 1.140  0.927 0.955 1.301 1.227 1.225 1.221 
  (0.151) (0.158) (0.225) (0.214) (0.214) (0.216)  (0.198) (0.206) (0.296) (0.283) (0.283) (0.282) 
3. Other  0.416*** 0.415*** 0.602** 0.571** 0.570** 0.574**  0.472** 0.471** 0.681 0.660 0.655 0.656 
  (0.0941) (0.0944) (0.141) (0.135) (0.134) (0.135)  (0.148) (0.148) (0.222) (0.216) (0.214) (0.215) 
2. Female f  0.775** 0.784** 0.793** 0.784** 0.784** 0.782**  0.850 0.855 0.895 0.896 0.896 0.897 
  (0.0902) (0.0915) (0.0933) (0.0926) (0.0926) (0.0925)  (0.119) (0.119) (0.128) (0.129) (0.130) (0.130) 
Education g  0.810*** 0.777*** 0.802*** 0.835** 0.835** 0.833**  0.754*** 0.728*** 0.735*** 0.758*** 0.760*** 0.761*** 
  (0.0592) (0.0598) (0.0631) (0.0665) (0.0665) (0.0665)  (0.0634) (0.0647) (0.0671) (0.0702) (0.0704) (0.0706) 
Income h   1.056* 1.064** 1.059* 1.060* 1.058*   1.048 1.062 1.060 1.064 1.062 
   (0.0325) (0.0330) (0.0331) (0.0333) (0.0331)   (0.0398) (0.0415) (0.0420) (0.0423) (0.0422) 
N° Years Lived     1.030*** 1.029*** 1.030*** 1.029***    1.027*** 1.028*** 1.028*** 1.028*** 
    (0.00417) (0.00418) (0.00419) (0.00418)    (0.00477) (0.00481) (0.00483) (0.00482) 
Build. Condition i     1.259*** 1.259*** 1.261***     1.313*** 1.312*** 1.310*** 
     (0.0855) (0.0855) (0.0857)     (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) 
Petition j      0.946       0.806  
      (0.186)       (0.191)  
Δ % non-Leb. k 
 
      0.618       0.636 
       (0.237)       (0.215) 
Observations 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,050 1,043 1,043 1,043 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,050 1,043 1,043  
Log likelihood -1425 -1373 -1372 -1337 -1322 -1322 -1312 -699 -627 -626 -606 -595 -595 -595 
LR chi2 11.49 114.74 124.88 161.93 170.50 197.27 234.67 10.56 124.08 124.88 161.93 170.50 197.27 198.43 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.20 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.18 
Notes: Logistic models fitted and interpreted in terms of their coefficients interpreted as odds ratios. If the OR > 1 then the odds of Y=1 increases and if the OR < 1 then the odds 
of Y=1 decreases (Stock & Watson 2011) a Ordinal Neighbourhood Belonging (NB) : 1 Low average rate of NB to 5 High average rate of NB. b Top quintile of NB: 1 = top quintile; 0 = 
all else. c 1. Mar Mikhael. 2. Ras Beirut. d Age brackets: 1. <21, 2. 22-34, 3. 35-49, 4. 50-64, 5. >6. e Nationalities: 1. Lebanese, 2. Syrian or Palestinian, 3. Other. f Gender: 1 Man, 2 
Woman. d Education brackets: 1 None, 2, Elementary, 3 Secondary, 4 University. e Income brackets: 1. $450 (minimum wage), 2. $450 – 1,600, 3. $1,601 – 3,000, 4. $3,001 – 5,000, 5. 
$5,001 – 8,000, 6. $8,001 – 12,000, 7. $12,001 – 16,000, 8. <$16,001. I Building Conditions: 1. Very Poor, 2. Below Average, 3. Above Average, 4.Excellent. j Signed a Petition to 
oppose major change dummy. k  Δ % non-Lebanese residents per neighbourhood block. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
 
 294 
5.6 Who is Willing to Pay more?  
The willingness to pay section in the survey was introduced with a hypothetical 
scenario. Respondents were asked to imagine they could decide whether a building 
would be demolished, and a new tall building constructed to replace it next to their 
building. They were then asked if they would be willing to pay the developer to prevent 
this change and how much they would be willing to pay every month for a year. The 
specific time frame and monthly instalment scenario were chosen to simplify the 
conception of the payment method and to give assurance that this payment would not 
be indefinite. A very similar approach was taken for the sidewalk-open space questions 
detailed in Table A3 of the appendix. 
I focus on these two simple attributes for the WTP question – new buildings and 
sidewalks – as the urban reality of Beirut with its multi-faceted changes makes it difficult 
to present more complex situations.57 Although contingent valuation and choice 
experiments have gained increasing acceptance in academic and policy-making circles 
(Carson et al. 2001), WTP has been shown to be particularly low in less-developed 
countries both in absolute terms and as a percentage of income (Whittington 2010; 
Alam 2005). In the case of Beirut, given the very low trust in institutions and third-party 
non-sectarian ties (Bou Akar 2018), the concept of willingness to pay in a hypothetical 
scenario was understood with difficulty, and the final version of the survey therefore 
opted for the simplest set-up. Although the construction of a building close to their 
residence was a very realistic scenario, with 24% of respondents commenting that this 
had happened to them at some point in their life, giving residents decision power was 
almost unheard of to most respondents. I am, however, not overly concerned with 
hypothetical bias – when people’s stated WTP exceeds their true WTP – as the lowering 
effect of mistrust in governance on WTP outweighs potential effect of hypothetical bias 
(Murphy et al. 2005). 
Prior to being asked the WTP questions, respondents were first asked how much the 
presented tall building scenario would bother or stress them. A new skyscraper being 
built bothered and stressed residents considerably less in areas with high BC rates, as 
illustrated in Figure A15 of section 4.2 of the appendix. Reasons behind this are 
illustrated in the respondents’ comments: ‘this has already happened in my area, I have 
                                                             
57 The scenarios initially combined a set of choices as well as a range in prices (choice 
experiments) (Strazzera et al. 2012), but the exercise was simplified after the pilot survey 
because of the difficulties experienced in obtaining reliable responses. 
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no way of stopping this’ and ‘there are already tall buildings blocking my views around 
me’. One respondent even insisted on showing the interviewer how their terrace, which 
once had a view, is now simply a space between two concrete walls, as the side of a 
new building had been erected immediately next to the edge of the terrace.  
Figure 6 WTP by neighbourhood and BC rate 
 
Note: WTP – What would you be willing to pay in order for change from picture A to picture B not to 
happen? (every month for a year) $0 a month for a year, $1-4 a month for a year, $5-10 a month for a year, $11-
20 a month for a year, $21-50 a month for a year, If, $51 or more, how much? MM: Mar Mikhael. RB: Ras Beirut. 
1-4 indicate the quartiles of building change, 1 being the least change and 4 being the most change. 
Forty-nine percent of residents were willing to pay the developer to prevent a new 
building from rising next to their current residence when asked without a picture 
illustrating the change, while fifty-one percent were WTP when asked with a picture. 
Although these percentages do not substantially differ, the amount residents were 
willing to pay every month for a year did slightly increase when the before and after 
pictures were shown, signalling the significance of visual aids when asking questions 
related to physical changes in the urban environment. Findings suggest a negative 
relationship between WTP and rate of BC, as illustrated in Figure 6. I observe a higher 
WTP in Mar Mikhael than in Ras Beirut and generally a higher WTP in areas having 
undergone less building change. The left-hand side of zero in the graphs shows 
percentages of residents not WTP, while the right-hand side of zero shows residents 
WTP. Figure 6 suggests that, despite residents’ general satisfaction with heavily 
transformed urban environments, there is still a desire to stop excessive building 
practices especially in areas that maintain low rates of building change, implying that 
the renovation desired by residents in these areas does not involve substantial 
transformation of building design and heights but, as suggested by residents’ 
comments, is centred around infrastructure renovation and modernization of existing 
buildings rather than complete substitution. This is supported by greater percentages 
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of residents having petitioned to object to a major change in their urban environments 
in areas with low rates of BC.  
Estimates presented in Table 4 confirm the negative relationship between WTP and BC 
rates. This is especially pronounced for the last quartile of the BC variable. Residents 
living in areas with high BC rates have almost 50% lower odds of being WTP to stop new 
construction near their location of residence. Age is a main determinant and statistically 
significant, older residents are less willing to pay to stop excessive construction. Non-
Lebanese residents are also less WTP to stop new constructions, but this is only weakly 
significant. Residents with higher education present higher WTP but education 
becomes insignificant with the inclusion of income, stressing, as noted in the literature 
(Alberini et al. 2003) the role of resident disposable income in the economic valuation 
of public goods. While valuing protection of urban heritage and well-designed 
architecture has strong positive relationship with WTP, having signed a petition has a 
significantly negative relationship with WTP, possibly marking the ‘lost hope’ of resident 
who have been active in safeguarding their urban environments. Residents having 
strong feelings of neighbourhood belonging have close to 50% higher odd of being WTP 
to stop new construction and, as predicted, confidence in local government has a 
negative and significant relationship with WTP, underling resident mistrust of local 
institutions.  
An open-ended question was asked to residents who were not willing to pay to stop a 
new building from rising next to their current residence to enquire further about the 
reasons behind their decision. This questions helped respondents avoid being 
misleading, revealed rates of genuine zero responses and protest beliefs 
comprehensively (Brander & Koetse 2011; Calia & Strazzera 2000). In line with other 
literature (Chen & Hua 2015), 32% of respondents said they could not afford to pay due 
to budget constraints and a notable 38% of respondents said they ‘did not trust 
developers’ and that there was ‘no point in paying as the building would be built 
anyway’ (Table 3). The respondent distrust with developers and planning agencies 
responsible for changes in their urban environments is clear, marking the number of 
responses which rejected the contingent market in light of their lack of trust with the 
planning system (Oh & Hong 2012). Nineteen percent of respondents remarked that the 
municipality should be responsible for moderating morphological changes, and the 
monetary responsibility should not fall with residents. Many of these same respondents 
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also remarked that they did not believe the municipality would actually take action and 
this is why they would pay.  
Table 3 Respondent’s reasons for not making WTP bids 
 
Reasons why respondents were not WTP % of respondents 
Don't trust Developers/ No point 38% 
Cannot afford 32% 
Municipality’s responsibility/Regulation 19% 
Pro development 17% 
Short term resident 4% 
Don’t care 9% 
 
Figure 7 shows the predicted probabilities of model in column 7 of Table 4. It clearly 
identifies how WTP=0 increases with BC rates, while WTP decreases with BC rates. The 
estimates also suggest that while small amounts of WTP ($1-50 a month for a year) 
decrease at a steady rate, larger monetary amounts ($50-100 and over $100 a month for 
a year) decrease with a flatter curve, suggesting that BC rates do not significantly 
influence resident WTP at these larger values. This suggests that people able to pay 
these higher amounts as a percentage of income are present in all areas within the 
study.  
Figure 8 shows us that WTP for sidewalk improvement does not present a clear 
correlation with BC rates. However, Mar Mikhael residents are generally more WTP, 
referring back to comments underlining the need for improved local infrastructure. 
More generally WTP for sidewalk improvement is much higher, seventy-four percent of 
respondents were WTP to improve local sidewalks remarking that usable, un-
obstructed sidewalks were essential to their daily lives, while continual construction 
was ‘something [they] were used to’. This suggests that spaces with both 
infrastructural and social uses present a higher local value. NGO interviewees in both 
neighbourhoods commented that people’s awareness of a climate of building 
exceptions in many respects probably made their thinking incredibly practical with 
respect to the presented scenarios. ‘Well-designed architecture and a balanced skyline 
are unrealistic in Beirut’, but ‘walkable sidewalks are still something Beirut residents can 
expect’.   
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Figure 7 WTP Predicted Probabilities 
 
Note: Left panel: Uses quartiles of BC index, 1 being the least change and 4 being the most change. Right 
panel: Continuous values of BC index. 
 
Figure 8 WTP to improve sidewalks 
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Table 4 Results of WTP logit analysis  
 Model I: Ordinal Logistic Regression, OR a 
Model II: Binary Logistic Regression, OR 
Model I: Ordinal Logistic Regression, OR 
Model II: Binary Logistic Regression, OR 
Model I: Ordinal Logistic Regression, OR 
Model II: Binary Logistic Regression, OR 
  Model II: Binary Logistic Regression, OR b 
Model II: Binary Logistic Regression, OR 
Model I: Ordinal Logistic Regression, OR 
Model II: Binary Logistic Regression, OR 
Model I: Ordinal Logistic Regression, OR 
Model II: Binary Logistic Regression, OR 
WTP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
2. BC light green 0.746* 0.714** 0.747* 0.754* 0.760 0.806 0.785 0.839 0.795 0.826 0.829 0.833 0.865 0.840 
 (0.120) (0.116) (0.124) (0.126) (0.127) (0.135) (0.132) (0.145) (0.140) (0.149) (0.151) (0.152) (0.159) (0.155) 
3. BC yellow 0.737** 0.673** 0.688** 0.718** 0.713** 0.750* 0.704** 0.911 0.836 0.873 0.889 0.874 0.924 0.851 
 (0.114) (0.106) (0.111) (0.117) (0.116) (0.122) (0.116) (0.154) (0.144) (0.155) (0.159) (0.157) (0.168) (0.157) 
4. BC red 0.589*** 0.570*** 0.575*** 0.582*** 0.569*** 0.530*** 0.534*** 0.624*** 0.590*** 0.612** 0.614** 0.593*** 0.556*** 0.562*** 
 (0.101) (0.0991) (0.105) (0.107) (0.105) (0.0991) (0.100) (0.113) (0.109) (0.120) (0.121) (0.117) (0.112) (0.114) 
Age c  0.888** 0.886** 0.877** 0.873** 0.858** 0.867**  0.820*** 0.825*** 0.821*** 0.817*** 0.801*** 0.813*** 
  (0.0430) (0.0544) (0.0544) (0.0543) (0.0538) (0.0543)  (0.0442) (0.0558) (0.0558) (0.0556) (0.0552) (0.0564) 
Nationality d  0.818* 0.830 0.842 0.824* 0.830 0.862  0.815* 0.802* 0.809* 0.788* 0.794* 0.832 
  (0.0858) (0.0952) (0.0969) (0.0953) (0.0970) (0.101)  (0.0908) (0.0987) (0.0999) (0.0983) (0.100) (0.106) 
2. Female e  0.990 0.934 0.921 0.926 0.959 0.949  0.997 0.957 0.949 0.954 0.992 0.975 
  (0.116) (0.113) (0.112) (0.113) (0.118) (0.116)  (0.127) (0.126) (0.125) (0.126) (0.133) (0.131) 
Education f  1.130* 1.042 1.022 1.039 1.077 1.048  1.124 1.064 1.049 1.074 1.107 1.077 
  (0.0801) (0.0806) (0.0797) (0.0816) (0.0855) (0.0841)  (0.0841) (0.0881) (0.0875) (0.0904) (0.0947) (0.0930) 
Income g   1.101*** 1.097*** 1.099*** 1.092*** 1.086**   1.057 1.056 1.058 1.052 1.043 
   (0.0356) (0.0356) (0.0358) (0.0357) (0.0356)   (0.0377) (0.0379) (0.0381) (0.0381) (0.0381) 
Housing tenure h   0.991 1.002 1.004 1.050 1.023   1.071 1.075 1.079 1.127 1.087 
   (0.0848) (0.0862) (0.0865) (0.0915) (0.0896)   (0.0995) (0.100) (0.101) (0.107) (0.104) 
N° Years Lived   0.999 1.000 0.999 0.995 0.994   1.000 1.000 0.999 0.995 0.994 
   (0.00437) (0.00442) (0.00443) (0.00453) (0.00455)   (0.00465) (0.00468) (0.00470) (0.00483) (0.00487) 
Protect UH i    1.374*** 1.381*** 1.353*** 1.369***    1.219* 1.232** 1.207* 1.232** 
    (0.139) (0.141) (0.139) (0.139)    (0.126) (0.128) (0.126) (0.129) 
Petition j    0.686* 0.685* 0.675* 0.695*    0.829 0.831 0.831 0.864 
    (0.140) (0.140) (0.138) (0.142)    (0.182) (0.183) (0.185) (0.193) 
Open space k     1.115** 1.118** 1.118**     1.151** 1.150** 1.154** 
     (0.0592) (0.0594) (0.0594)     (0.0672) (0.0678) (0.0685) 
NB l      1.399*** 1.477***      1.377*** 1.483*** 
      (0.103) (0.114)      (0.111) (0.125) 
Conf. Gov m       0.825**       0.768*** 
       (0.0631)       (0.0644) 
Observations 1,055 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,055 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 
Log likelihood -1734 -1726 -1455 -1448 -1447 -1437 -1371 -727 -716 -597 -595 -593 -585 -553 
LR chi2 9.89 25.32 34.20 47.49 50.40 69.12 65.26 7.25 29.51 30.11 34.66 38.36 54.27 54.56 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.05 0.20 0.24 0.28 0.31 0.44 0.46 
Note: Logistic models fitted and interpreted in terms of their coefficients interpreted as odds ratios. If the OR > 1 then the odds of Y=1 increases and if the OR < 1 then the odds of Y=1 
decreases (Stock & Watson 2011) a Ordinal WTP : 1. $0 2. $1-50 3. $51-100 4. >$101. b Binary WTP: 1 = yes; 0 = no. c Age brackets: 1. <21, 2. 22-34, 3. 35-49, 4. 50-64, 5. >6. d Nationalities: 1. 
Lebanese, 2. Syrian or Palestinian, 3. Other. e Gender: 1 Man, 2 Woman. f Education brackets: 1 None, 2, Elementary, 3 Secondary, 4 University. g Income brackets: 1. $450 (minimum 
wage), 2. $450 – 1,600, 3. $1,601 – 3,000, 4. $3,001 – 5,000, 5. $5,001 – 8,000, 6. $8,001 – 12,000, 7. $12,001 – 16,000, 8. <$16,001. h Housing Tenure: 1. Old ownership 2. Old rent 3. New rent. 
i Believes in importance of Urban Heritage j Signed a Petition to oppose major change dummy. k Satisfaction with open spaces in local neighbourhood . l Overall Neighbourhood 
Belonging: 1 Low average rate of NB to 5 High average rate of NB. m Confidence in Government *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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5.7 Conclusion 
The quality of the urban environment in less-developed countries has been increasingly 
recognized as a key determinant of quality of life (Whittington 2010). This study sheds 
light on how morphological densification affects the complex values attached by 
residents to their urban environments in a quantitively understudied context in the 
Global South. It also contributes to uncovering some of the darker realities of planning 
practices (Alexander et al. 2012). The intention of this paper is to extend recent 
arguments on the effects of actually existing planning practices (Fawaz 2017), in this 
case by examining how living in continual construction, an everyday reality of many 
deregulated cities in less-developed countries, affects local resident attitudes and 
values. Specifically, by exploring how dramatic urban restructuring affects resident 
values of architectural amenities, open space (sidewalks), and neighbourhood 
belonging.  
Although living in areas with different rates of building change does not affect 
preferences for architectural amenities, it affects resident socio-political activism 
towards the preservation of their built environment, and it affects their use of ad-hoc 
open spaces such as sidewalks. The data further validates the use of sidewalks as an 
alternative form of open space, although it is not as widespread as initially 
hypothesized. Neighbourhood belonging is not significantly affected by construction 
rates, but significantly increases both with the number of years lived in a given 
neighbourhood and in locations boasting better building conditions, confirming a role 
for the built environment with regards to intangible urban amenities. Moreover, despite 
Lebanese discontent with the Syrian influx in urban areas, higher numbers of Syrian 
neighbours do not significantly lower the odds of feeling strong neighbourhood 
belonging mostly likely linked to the ‘hidden’ realities of many Syrian residents in the 
two neighbourhoods considered. 
In assessing indicative monetary values, this paper also finds that while approximately 
fifty percent of respondents were WTP to stop disruptive building near their location of 
residence, seventy-four percent were willing to pay to improve local sidewalks. Many 
remarked that it was a matter of prioritising, un-obstructed sidewalks were essential to 
their daily lives, while continual construction although bothersome was hard to change 
given the well-known influence of politicians on developers. Indeed, residents living in 
areas with high BC rates had almost 50% lower odds of being WTP to stop new 
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construction near their location of residence both because of their ‘lost hope’ and their 
lack of confidence that paying would stop developers from building.  
This paper hopes to incite researchers to collect quantitative data in Global South cities 
despite the difficulties involved. Collecting such data not only allows for the better 
understanding of local residents’ reactions to urban development processes but can 
also facilitate adapted localised urban interventions by exploiting the geolocalized 
nature of such data. Moreover, although it is certainly challenging to overcome forms 
of illegality in a context where the market has largely taken over public roles, by 
performing a type of public consultation, such data should also motivate a critical 
analysis of legal texts and a review of the processes through which they are 
operationalized, aiming to make these processes more responsive and democratic 
(Friedmann 1992; Albrechts & Balducci 2017).  
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5.9 Appendix : A permanent (re)construction site?  
5.9.1 Introduction 
This appendix complements the main paper by providing additional detail not included 
in the main paper for brevity. To facilitate comprehension, it partially duplicates parts 
of the prose in the main text. Section 2 includes some additional material on the data 
used and presents further insights on what the data tells us about the institutional 
setting. Section 3 presents further detail on the survey data collection, including the 
sampling strategy, survey implementation and design. Section 4 presents 
complementary results that are not essential for the message of the main paper but 
may be of interest to some readers. The appendix is designed to complement 
arguments and specification in the main paper, it is not designed to stand alone or 
replace the reading of the main paper. 
5.10 Urban Data 
5.10.1 Open Spaces 
Figure A1 illustrates the nature of public spaces in Beirut but taking the area of Hamra, 
part of Ras Beirut, as an example. The data illustrated in this map was collected by the 
author during complementary fieldwork in Beirut.  The map clearly shows that most 
open space in the area are actually private, and therefore not necessarily accessible to 
local residents, but only to individuals having access to the relevant private institutions. 
Figure A1 illustrates that numerous gatherings happening in public spaces are on 
sidewalks or edges of buildings, supporting the claim that sidewalks are often 
appropriated as public open spaces given the scarcity of formalised public spaces such 
as public garden or plazas. 
Figure A1 Open Spaces in Hamra (Ras Beirut) 
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5.10.2 Construction Data 
Until recently, only a limited number of visual and quantitative records were available 
documenting the conspicuous construction activities that have taken place in Beirut in 
the last 20 years. To investigate the relationship between changing urban form and the 
value residents attach to their urban environments I exploit a recently assembled data 
set on construction permits (Gebara, Khechen, & Marot, 2016). This data set was 
collected through a collaboration between AUB Neighbourhood Initiative and the Cities 
Programme at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and was 
made available by the Neighbourhood Initiative. The data was obtained from 
photocopies of the permit records issued for all plots that received a building permit in 
municipal Beirut between 2000 and 2013. This included information on the permit itself 
(registration number, issuance date and status), the proposed new project (building 
use, construction quality, total built-up area, responsible architect and land owner) and 
the geographic location of the permitted structure (cadastral zone and lot number) 
(Gebara et al., 2016).  
The data was instrumental in the site-selection of this study as it allowed the 
identification of areas which have experienced different rates of construction. Figures 
Figure A2 and Figure A3 present k-densities of constructions according to the number 
or total surface of new constructions, allowing me to identify patterns in changes of 
urban form according to area Figures Figure A2 and Figure A3 illustrate how Mar Mikhael 
has less concentration of new constructions both in terms of number and area built. 
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Figure A2 K-densities of constructions according to number of new constructions 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration of Neighbourhood Initiative data (Gebara et al., 2016). 
 
Figure A3 K-densities of constructions according to area of new constructions 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration of Neighbourhood Initiative data (Gebara et al., 2016). 
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Figure A4 Number of new constructions by year brackets 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration of Neighbourhood Initiative data (Gebara et al., 2016). 
 
5.11 Survey Data Collection 
5.11.1 Neighbourhood Definitions 
There is considerable debate about what size constitutes a neighbourhood and, indeed, 
how this varies for different research questions and affects the results of analyses (see, 
for example, Galster, 2001). Consequently, we hereby present geographical definitions 
of both Ras Beirut and Mar Mikhael to better understand how and to what extent each 
constitutes a ‘neighbourhood’, despite their different sizes. 
Ras Beirut is one of Beirut’s ‘neighbourhoods,’ but it is also one of 12 administrative 
districts in Municipal Beirut (the others being Achrafieh, Ain Mreisseh, Bachoura, 
Marfa’, Mazraa, Medawar, Minet el Hosn, Moussaitbeh, Remeil, Saifi, and Zoukak al 
Blat). The municipal district of Ras Beirut is further divided into eight sectors: Jounblat, 
Hamra, Snoubra, Qoreitem, Ain el-Tineh, Raouche, Manara and, confusingly, Ras Beirut. 
The sector of Ras Beirut fronts the sea from the Military Beach to the borders of AUB. 
For the purposes of this paper, I define Ras Beirut through seven sectors of Ras Beirut, 
all except Jamia, which delimits the American University of Beirut and therefore has few 
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on campus residents as illustrated in Figure A5. These sub-neighbourhood areas were 
confirmed by recent qualitative research (Kaddour et al., 2014). 
Mar Mikhael is also a Beiruti neighbourhood, but it is not one of the city’s 12 
administrative districts. The administrative districts of Medawar and Marfaa, however 
are overlapped by a sector which is confusingly called Mar Mikhael. For the purpose of 
this paper, the Neighbourhood of Mar Mikhael is defined by qualitative finds of what 
Beirut residents as Mar Mikhael and includes parts of sectors: Jisr, Khodr, Qobayat, 
Jeitaoui, Mustafa el Roum, Hikmeh and Mar Mikhael as illustrated in Figure A6.   
Figure A5 Defining Ras Beirut 
 
 
Figure A6 Defining Mar Mikhael 
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5.11.2 Building Change and Sampling 
In order to identify whether and how changing urban form affects the value residents 
attach to urban amenities, areas that had undergone different rates of construction 
were identified. The selection process was carried out as follows. The city of Beirut was 
divided in a fishnet grid of 200 metre by 200 metre square cells, as illustrated in Figure 
1. The cells were then limited to the squares overlapping the areas of Ras Beirut and Mar 
Mikhael.  
The building permit data was used to construct a simple index of building change 𝐵𝐶𝑐 
as follows: 
𝐵𝐶𝑐 =
∑ 𝐵𝑈𝑃𝑐𝑏𝑛𝑏=1
𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐
 
where 𝐵𝑈𝑃𝑏 is the sum of the super built-up areas58 b of all new developments within 
each square c and 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐 is simply the area of each square c, in this case 0.04 square 
kilometres. The building change index was calculated for the retained squares covering 
the two neighbourhoods of interest. Twenty-seven squares were then randomly 
selected over the two neighbourhoods, weighted by the number of observations 
available in the previous surveys. Squares with a low number of observations were 
therefore much less likely to be selected, which is why there is continuous selection of 
squares in the central part of Ras Beirut. This selection was made because of budgetary 
constraints which allowed for the collection of a maximum 1350 observations. The 
selection thus allowed for the collection of 50 observations per square which would 
later allow for the creation of an average per square.  
Once the building change ratio had been calculated, the squares were divided into 
quartiles, from areas of high BC to areas of low BC, as distinct treatment and control 
areas would have been contextually inappropriate. Quartile classification slightly varies 
according to whether it is calculated over the whole sampling area or only considering 
sampled squares. This paper uses the classification as calculated over the whole 
sampling area; however, the analysis was also run with the alternative and results did 
not significantly differ. Areas display high rates of BC (more than 13% of the area of a 
given square), yellow areas display medium rates of BC (7-13%), light green areas display 
low rates (5-7%) while dark green areas display almost no change to the urban fabric 
(<5%). Figure 1 in the main paper presents the sampling and data collection strategy. 
                                                             
58 In urban planning, ‘super built-up area’ refers to the carpet area + wall area + common area. 
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Figures Figure A7Figure A8 show the sampling more precisely for Ras Beirut and Mar 
Mikhael respectively. 
Figure A7 Sampling Ras Beirut 
 
Note: Squares 27 and 9 can have different quartile classifications. 
 
Figure A8 Sampling Mar Mikhael 
 
 
Note: Square 50 and 18 can have different quartile classifications 
 
5.11.3 Survey design and final sample 
Primary data collection was the only possible means of obtaining quantitative data on 
values residents attach to their urban environments at a detailed level. A household 
survey was first designed and then drafted, undergoing a long revision process. It was 
first drafted in English, subsequently translated in Lebanese Arabic and revised by 5 
different native Lebanese speakers in order to ensure correct comprehension of words 
and use of dialect. A pilot survey was first then administered in March 2018. Once the 
process was tested and reviewed, eight research assistants (RAs) and I collected over 
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1080 geo-localized observation which were then mapped on GIS. The RAs received both 
survey methodology and interview training including ethical guidance. I supervised 
them throughout the process and attended approximately 10% of all interviews I did not 
carry out myself. It must be noted that the data collection, especially in Ras Beirut, was 
a very difficult process because residents are often wary of statistical studies as no 
census has been carried out in Lebanon since 1932. 
The geo-localized survey observations were then mapped through Geographical 
Information Systems (GIS), and matched to the new constructions data. The final 
sample covers 7.7% of the estimated population and 21.5% of total households in the 
randomly selected 27 squares. Surveys were conducted face-to-face and the sample was 
drawn so as to cover the principal nationalities resident in these neighbourhoods, with 
a 95% confidence level and 5% margin of error. The squares selected also ensured that 
the sample geographically overlapped by 70% with data previously collected in these 
neighbourhoods so as to be able to control for population change. Figures A9 and A10 
present the mapped data. 
Table A1 Final Sample 
Final Sample Total pop.a  Total HHb  
1,055 13,700 4,900 
 
7.69% 21.53% 
Note: a The Total estimated number of residents in the 27 squares under consideration was 13,700. B The 
total estimated number of households in the 27 squares under consideration was 4,900. The targets 
originally stipulated were to survey 27.5% households and 10% of the population. 
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Figure A9 Buildings Surveyed Ra Beirut 2009 & 2019 
 
 
Figure A10 Buildings Surveyed Mar Mikhael 2013-2013 
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5.11.4 Survey Elements 
Table A2 present the opening statement of the survey. 
Table A2 Statement  
Preamble/scenario description 
Hello, How are you today? 
The American University of Beirut and the London School of Economics are conducting 
a research on how people feel (how people value their) about their neighbourhood in 
two areas of Beirut. We would like to ask you your kind cooperation in answering a 
few questions, and to express your opinions about your neighbourhood. This will help 
us gather information about what people value in their urban environments. 
First we/I are/am going to ask you a few general questions about your neighbourhood, 
then we are going to show you pictures for you to express your opinion on. 
Afterwards, we will ask you to fill in a questionnaire. We would like to assure you that 
the whole process is fully anonymous. 
Are you willing to participate? 
We thank you so much for your valuable collaboration. 
Let’s get started. 
 
؟مويلا كفيك ،ابحرم 
و توريب يف ةيكيرملأا ةعماجلا  يلكةيداصتقلاا مولعلل ندنل ة   فيك( هاجت ملاعلا روعش نع ثحب اولمعي مع
 )اوم يقب ملاعلا ضعب ىلع ةباجلإاب كنواعت ديرتب اذإ كنم بلطن اندب .توريبب نيتقطنمب نوتراح/نو يح
 اور دقيب ملاعلا وش تامولعم عمجن اندعاسي حر يشلاه .كتراح /ك يح صوصخب كيأر نع ر بعتو ،ةلئسلأا
.ة يرضحلا نوتائيبب   
 حر نيدعب ،كتراح/ك يح نع ةماعلا ةلئسلأا ضعب كلأسن/كلاسإ حر لولأاب روص كيجرفن/كيجرف
 ةيلمعلا لك ونإ كلدكأن  بحنم .ةرامتسا /نايبتسا ي بعت كنم بلطن/بلطا حر ،ادعب نم .كيأر نع نويفر بعتل
.ءامسأ لاب / ةلوهجم نوكت حر 
؟كراشت  دعتسم 
.م يقلا كنواعت ىلع ريتك كركشتنم نحن 
.شلبن انيلخ 
 
Questions in the survey covered topics ranging from perceptions and satisfaction with 
local neighbourhoods, through satisfaction with building conditions and open spaces, 
perceptions of neighbourhood belonging, experiences with power to influence 
neighbourhood change, to confidence in local government. Table A3 itemises all 
principle questions related to this paper.  
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Table A3 Survey questions 
Willingness to Pay  
Imagine you could decide whether an old building will be demolished, and a new tall building 
constructed next to your house.  Options: $0 a month for a year, $1-4 a month for a year, $5-10 a month for a year, $11-20 a month 
for a year, $21-50 a month for a year, If, $51 or more, how much? 
Building Change 
WTP – Would you be willing to pay the developer in order for a tall building not to be built next 
to your house and/or blocking your view from your house? If yes, how much (every month for 
a year)? If not, why? 
WTP – (with picture) – What would you be willing to pay in order for the change from picture 
A to picture B not to happen? (every month for a year) 
WTA – How much would a developer need to pay you for you to accept the change from 
picture A to picture B? (every month for a year) 
Sidewalks  
WTP – How much cost via local tax would you be willing to pay for the realization of the change 
from picture A to picture B? (every month for a year) 
Neighbourhood Belonging 
Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither, Agree, Strongly Agree 
I feel like I belong to this neighbourhood  
The friendships and associations I have with other people in my neighbourhood mean a lot to 
me  If I needed advice about something I could go to someone in my neighbourhood  
I borrow things and exchange favours with my neighbours  
I plan to remain a resident of this neighbourhood for a number of years  
I regularly stop and talk with people in my neighbourhood  
People around here are willing to help their neighbours  
People in this neighbourhood can be trusted  
How many of your neighbours do you know by name ? 
Architectural Amenities 
Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither, Agree, Strongly Agree 
It is important to protect urban heritage areas  
It is important to protect areas with well-designed modern buildings 
Legislation/policy is the best mechanism with which to protect the integrity the urban 
environment Philanthropic urban interventions are the best mechanism with which to protect the integrity 
the urban environment At your current residence, have you ever signed a petition objecting a major change in your 
neighbourhood (e.g. Destruction of a building, construction of high-rise building)? Open Space - sidewalks
Very dissatisfied, dissatisfied, Neither, Satisfied, Very Satisfied 
With the public open space in your local neighbourhood? 
With preserved small green space in your local neighbourhood? 
With large undeveloped land in your local neighbourhood? 
Yes, No 
Does your child/do your children have an outdoor space or facilities where they can play safely?  
Do you sit on your local sidewalk for leisure (read a book, smoke argyle etc.)? How often? 
 
Two main sets of CV questions were also presented to respondents throughout the 
survey. Early in the survey, respondents were asked: ‘Would you be willing to pay the 
developer in order for a tall building not to be built next to your house and/or blocking 
your view from your house?’ If a respondent answered ‘Yes’, she would then be 
presented with a payment card with five different offers on the basis of the pre-test. If 
a respondent answered ‘No’, she would be asked to explain why. Later in the survey, 
the respondent would be asked a very similar question but this time with an image 
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(Figure A11): ‘Would you be willing to pay in order for the change from picture A to 
picture B not to happen?’ If the respondent answered ‘Yes’, the same payment cards 
would be presented, and the respondent asked to choose the maximum amount that 
her household would like to pay. A very similar approach was taken for the sidewalk-
open space questions (Figure A12).  
Figure A11 Images building change 
Before                           After
 
Note: This change took place in 2014. 
 
Figure A12 Images Sidewalk change 
            Before               After 
 
Note: This change took place in 2017 
 
The willingness to pay section in the survey was introduced with a hypothetical 
scenario. Respondents were asked to imagine they could decide whether a building 
would be demolished and a new tall building constructed to replace it, next to their 
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building. They were then asked if they would be willing to pay the developer to prevent 
this change and how much they would be willing to pay every month for a year. The 
specific time frame and monthly instalment scenario were chosen to simplify the 
conception of the payment method and to give assurance that this payment would not 
be indefinite. This is an extremely common scenario in the Beiruti context, 24% of 
respondents commenting that this had happened to them at some point in their life. A 
very similar approach was taken for the sidewalk-open space questions. 
We focus on these two simple attributes for the WTP question – new buildings and 
sidewalks – as the urban reality of Beirut with its multi-faceted changes makes it difficult 
to present more complex situations. The scenarios initially combined a set of choices as 
well as a range in prices (choice experiments) (Strazzera et al. 2012), but the exercise 
was simplified after the pilot survey because of the difficulties experienced in obtaining 
reliable responses. Although contingent valuation and choice experiments have gained 
increasing acceptance in academic and policy-making circles (Carson et al. 2001), WTP 
has been shown to be particularly low in less-developed countries both in absolute 
terms and as a percentage of income (Whittington 2010; Alam 2005). In the case of 
Beirut, given the very low trust in institutions or third-party non-sectarian ties (Bou Akar 
2018), the concept of willingness to pay in a hypothetical scenario was understood with 
difficulty, and the final version of the survey therefore opted for the simplest scenario.  
For this study, I am not overly concerned with hypothetical bias – when people’s stated 
WTP exceeds their true WTP – as the lowering effect of mistrust in governance on WTP 
outweighs potential effect of hypothetical bias (Murphy et al. 2005). However, there 
may be bias, given the questions refer to public goods. This study attempted to 
minimize the problem of hypothetical bias in a number of ways. A small script was added 
to the valuation scenario, drawing respondents’ attention to the problem of mis-stating 
true values as a result of the hypothetical setting, asking them instead to focus on their 
responses as if they were in a real-life setting. The WTP format used also presented 
some very small monetary options to begin with – $1-4 a month for a year or $5-10 a 
month for a year – to encourage realistic responses. Piloting indicated that respondents 
found this simple formatting of the questions easiest to judge, and therefore the best 
observational gap between the ideal measurement and the response obtained (Groves 
2009, p.52). Piloting also suggested that respondents responded more accurately when 
presented with pictures. 
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5.12 Results 
5.12.1 Summary Statistics 
Table A4 presents some supplementary summary statistics. 
Table A4 Other Summary Statistics 
 mean sd min max 
Neighbourhood Perception / Building Condition 
Overall perception of N* 3.507978 .4920122 1 5 
Not at all changed, Not Changed, Neither, Changed Very Changed 
Perception of change 2.859733 1.414342 1 5 
Satisfied Physical Transformation of N* 2.776333 1.116594 1 5 
Very Poor, Below Average, Average, Above Average, Excellent 
Overall Building condition 3.121183 .8750002 1 5 
Old Building condition  2.405561 1.050294 1 5 
Not at all attractive, Not attractive, Neither, Attractive, Very Attractive 
Attractiveness of Local N* 3.755725 1.09939 1 5 
Attractiveness of New Constructions 3.446785 1.189552 1 5 
Willingness to Pay 
Bothered by Tall Building 8.380362 2.647056 1 10 
Stressed by Tall Building 7.908571 2.95231 1 10 
Sample Size N = 1055     
Note: * N for Neighbourhood  
 
5.12.2 Descriptive Analysis 
Figure A13 presents some complementary descriptive statistics, which illustrate how 
residents rated how safe, stressed, happy and satisfied they felt with their 
neighbourhoods to evaluate residents’ overall neighbourhood perception. The average 
of these four variables, by BC rate, results in the lower-right panel of Figure 2 in the main 
paper. 
Figure A13 Safety, Stress, Happy, Satisfied 
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Note: MM – Mar Mikhael; RB – Ras Beirut 
 
Figure A14 replicates Figure 3 in the main paper but plots the relationship by 
neighbourhood instead of by BC rate. 
Figure A14 Building Condition 
 
Note: MM – Mar Mikhael; RB – Ras Beirut 
 
Figure A15 presents the relationships between each Neighbourhood Belonging variable 
and the two case-study neighbourhoods. The average of all these variables is presented 
in the left panel of Figure 5 in the main paper. 
Figure A1. Neighbourhood Belonging 
 
Note: MM – Mar Mikhael; RB – Ras Beirut 
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Table A5 Value of Architectural Amenities and Socio-political activism 
 
 Value of urban heritage and well-designed buildings, OR Signing petition to avoid major change, OR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Building Change a 1.183** 1.210** 1.212** 1.216** 1.180* 0.670*** 0.698*** 0.661*** 0.667*** 0.662*** 
 (0.0966) (0.0995) (0.0998) (0.101) (0.101) (0.0673) (0.0714) (0.0694) (0.0705) (0.0703) 
Age   1.098 1.100 1.108 1.103  1.313*** 1.320*** 1.328*** 1.335*** 
  (0.0847) (0.0851) (0.0858) (0.0859)  (0.123) (0.127) (0.129) (0.130) 
Nationality    0.850 0.846 0.855 0.753*  0.496** 0.506** 0.518** 0.506** 
  (0.126) (0.125) (0.127) (0.115)  (0.141) (0.142) (0.145) (0.143) 
Sex  1.081 1.077 1.066 1.122  1.031 1.079 1.071 1.071 
  (0.195) (0.194) (0.193) (0.207)  (0.220) (0.232) (0.231) (0.231) 
Education  1.355*** 1.396*** 1.389*** 1.387***  1.221 1.024 1.012 1.012 
  (0.137) (0.152) (0.153) (0.154)  (0.167) (0.149) (0.148) (0.148) 
Income   0.963 0.965 0.954   1.222*** 1.222*** 1.223*** 
   (0.0485) (0.0488) (0.0491)   (0.0663) (0.0664) (0.0667) 
Building Condition    0.908 0.819*    0.895 0.879 
    (0.0952) (0.0908)    (0.113) (0.112) 
Legislation      1.304***     1.032 
     (0.0863)     (0.0830) 
Philanthropy     1.159**     1.048 
     (0.0775)     (0.0835) 
Observations 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,048 1,048 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,048 1,048 
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5.12.3 Results WTP 
Prior to being asked the WTP questions, respondents were first asked how much this 
scenario would bother or stress them. A new skyscraper being built bothered and 
stressed residents considerably less in areas with high BC rates, as illustrated in Figure 
A16. The relationship between stress or bother of a new construction in the vicinity of 
resident living place and rate of BC remains negative and significant 
Figure A15 Stress and Bother 
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